Designing auction institutions for exchange

IIE Transactions (Institute of Industrial Engineers)

Volumn 31, Issue 9, 1999, Pages 803-811

  McCabe, Kevin ^a   Rassenti, Stephen ^a   Smith, Vernon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

AUCTION INSTITUTIONS;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 0033185435     PISSN: 0740817X     EISSN: 15458830     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07408179908969882     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Vickrcy, W., (1976) Auctions, markets, and optimal allocations, in Bidding and Auctioning for Procurement and Allocation, Arnihud, Y. (ed), New York University Press, New York.
2. McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1990) Auction institutional design theory and behavior of multiple unit generalizations of Dutch and English auctions. American Economic Review, December.
3. Cramton, P., (1997) The FCC spectrum auctions an early assessment. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 6.
4. Bronfman, C., McCabe, K., Porter, D., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1996) An experimental examination of the Walrasian tatonne-ment mechanism. Rand Journal, 27, 681–699.
5. McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1992) Designing call auction institutions is double Dutch the best? The Economic Journal, 102, 9–23.
6. Brown, D., (1991) Human Universal, McGraw-Hill, New York.
7. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., and Smith, V., (1998) Behavioral foundations of reciprocity experimental economics and evolutionary psychology. Economic Inquiry, 36, 335–352.
8. Isaac, M., and Walker, J., (1998) Group size effects in VCM provision the voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 179–199.
9. Ameden, H., Gunnthorsdottir, A., Houser, D., and McCabe, IC., (1999) A minimal property right system for the sustainable provision of public goods. Working Paper, Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721.
10. Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., and McCabe, K., (1995) Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142.
11. McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1990) Auction design for composite goods the natural gas industry. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, September, 127–149.
12. McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1989) Designing 'smart' computer assisted markets in an experimental auction for gas networks. European Journal of Political Economy, 5, 259–283.
13. Rassenti, S., Smith, V., and Bulfin, R., (1982) A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, Fall.
14. Porter, D., and Wessen, R., (1998) A market-based approach for manifesting shuttle secondary payloads. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets, November
15. Isikida, T., Ledyard, J., Olson, M., and Porter, D., (1999) A two-sided packaging mechanism for allocating pollution emission credits results from Southern California's RECLAIM market.Working Paper, Economic Science Laboratory, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 857210.
16. McCabe, K., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1991) Testing Vickrey's and other simultaneous multiple unit versions of the English auction. Research in Experimental Economics, 4.
17. Backerman, S., Rassenti, S., and Smith, V., (1997) Efficiency and income shares in high demand energy network who receives the congestion rents when a line is constrained? Pacific Economic Review, April.