Cooperative solutions for sustainable resource management

Environmental Management

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 167-175

  Lejano, Raul P ^a   Davos, Climis A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Common pool resources; Core; Equity; Game theory; Sustainability

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY; SUSTAINABLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

DECISION MAKING; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; GAME THEORY; OPTIMIZATION; PROBLEM SOLVING; PROJECT MANAGEMENT; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

ENVIRONMENTAL ENGINEERING;

LOCAL PARTICIPATION; METHODOLOGY; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT;

COOPERATION; DEVELOPMENT; ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT; GAME; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT; REVIEW;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0033181105     PISSN: 0364152X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s002679900224     Document Type: Review

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