What is a child?

Ethics

Volumn 109, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 715-738

  Schapiro, Tamar ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033160143     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233943     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. The theory as a whole is presented in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Rawls explains nonideal theory in particular in secs. 11, 39, 51-59, and 82 of A Theory of Justice, as well as in his unpublished 1995 Princeton lectures on the law of peoples. An earlier version of the law of peoples material was published as "The Law of Peoples," in On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
2. The theory as a whole is presented in John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). Rawls explains nonideal theory in particular in secs. 11, 39, 51-59, and 82 of A Theory of Justice, as well as in his unpublished 1995 Princeton lectures on the law of peoples. An earlier version of the law of peoples material was published as "The Law of Peoples," in On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1993, ed. Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
3. Here I have in mind Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," in Free Will, ed. Gary Watson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 59-80.
4. See Christine Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 335-62, esp. 340-42. My argument in this article is informed by Korsgaard's conclusions in that article. These are: (1) that on a Kantian view, moral concepts function in the same way that concepts of legal status do, and (2) that this means moral concepts admit of "pragmatic" rather than "metaphysically precise" application to the world. A concept admits of metaphysically precise application if its application to a given object is determined wholly by the features of that object. Application of status concepts, by contrast, involves some degree of arbitrary "line drawing." Status concepts impose an "artificial" structure on the world, a structure which does not simply track the world's empirical contours.
5. For further discussion of the two approaches, see Christine Korsgaard, "Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and Responsibility in Personal Relations," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 197-200.
6. It is true that we sometimes excuse children's wrongful conduct simply because of their relative ignorance and incapacity. Children are newcomers to our world, people who have yet to learn the rules of our culture. In this respect their status is like that of foreigners or recent immigrants, young or old. We tend to excuse recent immigrants for social transgressions which we take to be the result of (nonnegligent) ignorance or lack of skill. Similarly, we often do not hold children responsible for wrongdoing simply because they cannot be expected to know the cultural rules, given their lack of experience in our world. But on the view I will be proposing, what it is to be a child is not fully explained by this analogy. Notice, for example, that we think it appropriate to instruct adult immigrants who say or do the wrong thing, but not to discipline them. And while adult immigrants may lack the information necessary to make good choices, we do not doubt that such choices are theirs to make. That said, it is no doubt the case that much of the time we do treat young people like adults who simply lack relevant knowledge or skill, and this may be entirely appropriate. My question is about what makes it appropriate to treat a young person like a child.
7. While I am fairly confident that Kant tended to have men in mind as exemplars of moral agency, I use feminine pronouns to suggest that his theory has the potential to extend beyond his particular applications of it. Ur like some feminist theorists, I do not believe Kant's moral theory is fundamentally shaped by illicit gender-based assumptions.
8. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
9. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
10. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
11. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
12. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
13. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
14. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
15. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
16. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
17. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
18. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
19. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
20. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
21. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
22. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
23. This comes out most clearly in the formula of humanity, which states: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (G 4: 429). The "humanity" we are always to treat as an end is "the capacity to set oneself an end" (DV 6: 392). Unless otherwise indicated, Kant citations refer to The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Page references are given by the volume and page numbers of the standard edition of Kant's works, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, ed. The Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences (Berlin: Georg Reimer, later Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-). Abbreviations are as follows: G, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785); CPrR, Critique of Practical Reason (1788); RWR, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793); TP, On the Common Saying: That May Be Correct in Theory, but It Is of No Use in Practice (1793); PP, Toward Perpetual Peace (1795); DR, The Doctrine of Right, first division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797); DV, The Doctrine of Virtue, second division of The Metaphysics of Morals (1797). All are to be found in the Cambridge volume entitled Practical Philosophy, trans. Mary J. Gregor, with the exception of RWR, which appears in the volume entitled Religion and Rational Theology, trans. Allen W. Wood and George Di Giovanni. For commentary on the antipaternalism of the formula of humanity, see Onora O'Neill, "Between Consenting Adults," in her Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 105-25; Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Humanity as an End in Itself," in his Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 38-57; and Korsgaard, "Two Arguments against Lying."
24. DV 6: 388.
25. DR 6: 314.
26. See TP, where Kant writes: "The quality requisite to [voting status], apart from the natural one (of not being a child or a woman), is only that of being one's own master (sui iuris), hence having some property (and any art, craft, fine art, or science can be counted as property) that supports him" (8: 295). I thank Stephen Darwall for drawing my attention to this passage.
27. DR 6: 314.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. See n. 1 above. Rawls divides nonideal theory into two parts: partial compliance theory, which deals with problems arising from the existence of prior injustice, and a second part which deals with problems arising from "natural limitations." As an example of this latter sort of problem he specifically cites the condition of children, in virtue of which their liberty must be restricted (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 244). But Rawls does not go on to discuss the justification for this in any detail.
31. Immanuel Kant, Education, trans. Annette Churton (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), p. 2.
32. RWR 6: 26.
33. Immanuel Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," trans. Emil Fackenheim, in Immanuel Kant, On History, ed. Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1963), pp. 55-56. Kant describes this moment of awakening in decidedly existentialist terms: "He discovered in himself a power of choosing for himself a way of life, of not being bound without alternative to a single way, like the animals. Perhaps the discovery of this advantage created a moment of delight. But of necessity, anxiety and alarm as to how he was to deal with this newly discovered power quickly followed. . . . He stood, as it were, at the brink of an abyss" (p. 56).
34. I am indebted here and elsewhere to Christine Korsgaard's essays on Kant's moral philosophy, many of which are included in her collection Creating the Kingdom of Ends. On this point, see esp. "Morality as Freedom," pp. 159-87 in that volume.
35. DV 6: 392-93.
36. Kant's argument here is not exactly that attempting to perfect others is paternalistic, but that it is, strictly speaking, impossible. He writes, "So too, it is a contradiction for me to make another's perfection my end and consider myself under obligation to promote this. For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do" (DV 6: 386). Kant's point may simply be that the best we can do is to help others to cultivate themselves, but then the question is whether we are subject to an obligation to do that. Kant suggests some such obligation when he counts under the duty of beneficence a duty to promote the moral welfare of others, which he claims counts as part of their happiness regardless of their particular ends. But he states explicitly that this duty is merely negative: "To see to it that another does not deservedly suffer [the pangs of conscience] is not my duty but his affair; but it is my duty to refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human being, could tempt him to do something for which his conscience could afterwards pain him, to refrain from what is called giving scandal" (DV 6: 394). The point for my purposes is that this duty is rather different in content from what we normally think of as our obligation to see to it that children are raised well.
37. Kant's argument here is not exactly that attempting to perfect others is paternalistic, but that it is, strictly speaking, impossible. He writes, "So too, it is a contradiction for me to make another's perfection my end and consider myself under obligation to promote this. For the perfection of another human being, as a person, consists just in this: that he himself is able to set his end in accordance with his own concepts of duty; and it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do" (DV 6: 386). Kant's point may simply be that the best we can do is to help others to cultivate themselves, but then the question is whether we are subject to an obligation to do that. Kant suggests some such obligation when he counts under the duty of beneficence a duty to promote the moral welfare of others, which he claims counts as part of their happiness regardless of their particular ends. But he states explicitly that this duty is merely negative: "To see to it that another does not deservedly suffer [the pangs of conscience] is not my duty but his affair; but it is my duty to refrain from doing anything that, considering the nature of a human being, could tempt him to do something for which his conscience could afterwards pain him, to refrain from what is called giving scandal" (DV 6: 394). The point for my purposes is that this duty is rather different in content from what we normally think of as our obligation to see to it that children are raised well.
38. I think Onora O'Neill tacitly attributes to Kant something like this gradualist picture in her article "Children's Rights and Children's Lives," in her Constructions of Reason, pp. 187-205. But there she does not address the question of how the duty of self-cultivation is supposed to be extended to others in the case of children. Indeed she tends to gloss over the self-other distinction in referring to the duties of beneficence and self-cultivation. See, e.g., p. 199 where she writes, "The construction of imperfect obligations commits rational and needy beings only to avoiding principled refusal to help and principled neglect to develop human capabilities." This makes it look as though the Kantian duty of self-cultivation is a special case of a more general duty to develop human capabilities as such, or to see to it that they get developed. But Kant does not formulate the duty in this way.
39. For an excellent account of Kant's social contract theory, see Jeffrie Murphy, Kant: The Philosophy of Right (London: Macmillan, 1970; reprint, Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1994), pp. 91-127.
40. John Locke, "An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government," II.ii.8-11, in Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 272-73.
41. DR 6: 312.
42. Ibid.
43. In Kant's political essays, he routinely characterizes the state of war which exists between nations as a perversion of the juridical condition. See esp. "Toward Perpetual Peace," where Kant describes war as "only the regrettable expedient for asserting one's right by force in a state of nature (where there is no court that could judge with rightful force); in it neither of the two parties can be declared an unjust enemy (since that already presupposes a judicial decision), but instead the outcome of the war (as in a so-called judgment of God) decides on whose side the right is" (PP 8: 346-47). A few pages later Kant writes, "The way in which states pursue their right can never be legal proceedings before an external court but can only be war; but right cannot be decided by war and its favorable outcome, victory" (PP 8: 355).
44. In Kant's political essays, he routinely characterizes the state of war which exists between nations as a perversion of the juridical condition. See esp. "Toward Perpetual Peace," where Kant describes war as "only the regrettable expedient for asserting one's right by force in a state of nature (where there is no court that could judge with rightful force); in it neither of the two parties can be declared an unjust enemy (since that already presupposes a judicial decision), but instead the outcome of the war (as in a so-called judgment of God) decides on whose side the right is" (PP 8: 346-47). A few pages later Kant writes, "The way in which states pursue their right can never be legal proceedings before an external court but can only be war; but right cannot be decided by war and its favorable outcome, victory" (PP 8: 355).
45. DR 6: 312-13.
46. Ibid., 6: 312.
47. This idea is deeply embedded in Kant's theory, and it informs his distinctive claim that actions are to be evaluated as embodiments of maxims.
48. Kant states in "Conjectural Beginning" that once man "discovered in himself a power of choosing for himself a way of life . . . it was impossible for him to return to the state of servitude (i.e., subjection to instinct) from the state of freedom" (p. 56).
49. In "Toward Perpetual Peace," Kant notes the tenacity with which human beings hold onto juridical concepts even as they make a mockery of them. He writes, "In view of the malevolence of human nature, which can be seen unconcealed in the free relations of nations (whereas in a condition under civil laws it is greatly veiled by the government's constraint), it is surprising that the word right could still not be altogether banished as pedantic from the politics of war and that no state has yet been bold enough to declare itself publicly in favor of this view. . . . This homage that every state pays the concept of right (at least verbally) nevertheless proves that there is to be found in the human being a still greater, though at present dormant, moral predisposition to eventually become master of the evil principle within him (which he cannot deny) and also to hope for this from others; for otherwise the word right would never be spoken by states wanting to attack one another, unless merely to make fun of it, as a certain Gallic prince defined right: 'It is the prerogative nature has given the stronger over the weaker, that the latter should obey him'" (PP 8: 355). See also PP 8: 375-76.
50. In "Toward Perpetual Peace," Kant notes the tenacity with which human beings hold onto juridical concepts even as they make a mockery of them. He writes, "In view of the malevolence of human nature, which can be seen unconcealed in the free relations of nations (whereas in a condition under civil laws it is greatly veiled by the government's constraint), it is surprising that the word right could still not be altogether banished as pedantic from the politics of war and that no state has yet been bold enough to declare itself publicly in favor of this view. . . . This homage that every state pays the concept of right (at least verbally) nevertheless proves that there is to be found in the human being a still greater, though at present dormant, moral predisposition to eventually become master of the evil principle within him (which he cannot deny) and also to hope for this from others; for otherwise the word right would never be spoken by states wanting to attack one another, unless merely to make fun of it, as a certain Gallic prince defined right: 'It is the prerogative nature has given the stronger over the weaker, that the latter should obey him'" (PP 8: 355). See also PP 8: 375-76.
51. For another use of a "constitutionalist" conception of the person in moral theory, see Stephen Darwall, "Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution," in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: Univer" sity of California Press, 1988), pp. 407-30, as well as Darwall's discussion of Joseph Butler in his The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 244-83. Darwall rightly identifies the constitutional conception of the person as an important point of convergence between Butler and Kant. My own use of the term is informed by Christine Korsgaard's paper, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," forthcoming in the Journal of Ethics.
52. For another use of a "constitutionalist" conception of the person in moral theory, see Stephen Darwall, "Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution," in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: Univer" sity of California Press, 1988), pp. 407-30, as well as Darwall's discussion of Joseph Butler in his The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 244-83. Darwall rightly identifies the constitutional conception of the person as an important point of convergence between Butler and Kant. My own use of the term is informed by Christine Korsgaard's paper, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," forthcoming in the Journal of Ethics.
53. For another use of a "constitutionalist" conception of the person in moral theory, see Stephen Darwall, "Self-Deception, Autonomy, and Moral Constitution," in Perspectives on Self-Deception, ed. Brian P. McLaughlin and Amélie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: Univer" sity of California Press, 1988), pp. 407-30, as well as Darwall's discussion of Joseph Butler in his The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought': 1640-1740 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 244-83. Darwall rightly identifies the constitutional conception of the person as an important point of convergence between Butler and Kant. My own use of the term is informed by Christine Korsgaard's paper, "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant," forthcoming in the Journal of Ethics.
54. See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, sec. 2.
55. Thus I find support for this extension of Rawls's idea of the basic structure in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. There he states that a person's character is determined by the way he organizes his incentives, the fundamental alternatives being the incentive of self-love and that of respect for the moral law. See RWR 6: 36. There is more to be said, however, about Kant's notion of an evil character, for in the Anthropology he denies that an evil character is a character in the strict sense. Kant writes, "for evil is really without character (since it involves conflict with itself and does not permit any permanent principle within itself)" (Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1797], trans. Mary Gregor [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], p. 189). For a discussion of this complication, see Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant."
56. Thus I find support for this extension of Rawls's idea of the basic structure in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. There he states that a person's character is determined by the way he organizes his incentives, the fundamental alternatives being the incentive of self-love and that of respect for the moral law. See RWR 6: 36. There is more to be said, however, about Kant's notion of an evil character, for in the Anthropology he denies that an evil character is a character in the strict sense. Kant writes, "for evil is really without character (since it involves conflict with itself and does not permit any permanent principle within itself)" (Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1797], trans. Mary Gregor [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], p. 189). For a discussion of this complication, see Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant."
57. Thus I find support for this extension of Rawls's idea of the basic structure in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. There he states that a person's character is determined by the way he organizes his incentives, the fundamental alternatives being the incentive of self-love and that of respect for the moral law. See RWR 6: 36. There is more to be said, however, about Kant's notion of an evil character, for in the Anthropology he denies that an evil character is a character in the strict sense. Kant writes, "for evil is really without character (since it involves conflict with itself and does not permit any permanent principle within itself)" (Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1797], trans. Mary Gregor [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], p. 189). For a discussion of this complication, see Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant."
58. Thus I find support for this extension of Rawls's idea of the basic structure in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. There he states that a person's character is determined by the way he organizes his incentives, the fundamental alternatives being the incentive of self-love and that of respect for the moral law. See RWR 6: 36. There is more to be said, however, about Kant's notion of an evil character, for in the Anthropology he denies that an evil character is a character in the strict sense. Kant writes, "for evil is really without character (since it involves conflict with itself and does not permit any permanent principle within itself)" (Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1797], trans. Mary Gregor [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], p. 189). For a discussion of this complication, see Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant."
59. Thus I find support for this extension of Rawls's idea of the basic structure in Kant's Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. There he states that a person's character is determined by the way he organizes his incentives, the fundamental alternatives being the incentive of self-love and that of respect for the moral law. See RWR 6: 36. There is more to be said, however, about Kant's notion of an evil character, for in the Anthropology he denies that an evil character is a character in the strict sense. Kant writes, "for evil is really without character (since it involves conflict with itself and does not permit any permanent principle within itself)" (Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View [1797], trans. Mary Gregor [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974], p. 189). For a discussion of this complication, see Korsgaard's "Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant."
60. In Aristotelian terms this is a problem about substantial generation, the type of change which brings a new entity into existence. Substantial generation is puzzling - and was puzzling to Aristotle - because it seems to depend on the possibility of something coming from nothing.
61. For the purposes of attributing full moral status to a state or a person, Kant believes it is necessary to conceive of the unifying transition as an original act outside of time. He writes, "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state" (DR 6: 315). Similarly Kant holds that our attributions of responsibility to individuals seem to presuppose that individuals freely adopt their characters in an act of original choice: "To look for the temporal origin of free actions as free (as though they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which (just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the representations of reason alone" (RWR 6: 39-40; see also CPrR 5: 99-100, where Kant discusses "born villains"). And yet when Kant tries to describe the transition prospectively and without regard to our practices of attributing responsibility, he suggests that the social contract is an agreement which individuals can be forced to enter. For he asserts that in the state of nature, every subject must "be permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's to enter along with him into a civil constitution" (DR 6: 256). And in the political writings, Kant speaks of nature or providence as an invisible force which "guarantees" the establishment of the civil condition by compelling us to enter into it, "whether we will it or not" (PP 8: 365). See also Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," pp. 66-67.
62. For the purposes of attributing full moral status to a state or a person, Kant believes it is necessary to conceive of the unifying transition as an original act outside of time. He writes, "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state" (DR 6: 315). Similarly Kant holds that our attributions of responsibility to individuals seem to presuppose that individuals freely adopt their characters in an act of original choice: "To look for the temporal origin of free actions as free (as though they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which (just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the representations of reason alone" (RWR 6: 39-40; see also CPrR 5: 99-100, where Kant discusses "born villains"). And yet when Kant tries to describe the transition prospectively and without regard to our practices of attributing responsibility, he suggests that the social contract is an agreement which individuals can be forced to enter. For he asserts that in the state of nature, every subject must "be permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's to enter along with him into a civil constitution" (DR 6: 256). And in the political writings, Kant speaks of nature or providence as an invisible force which "guarantees" the establishment of the civil condition by compelling us to enter into it, "whether we will it or not" (PP 8: 365). See also Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," pp. 66-67.
63. For the purposes of attributing full moral status to a state or a person, Kant believes it is necessary to conceive of the unifying transition as an original act outside of time. He writes, "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state" (DR 6: 315). Similarly Kant holds that our attributions of responsibility to individuals seem to presuppose that individuals freely adopt their characters in an act of original choice: "To look for the temporal origin of free actions as free (as though they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which (just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the representations of reason alone" (RWR 6: 39-40; see also CPrR 5: 99-100, where Kant discusses "born villains"). And yet when Kant tries to describe the transition prospectively and without regard to our practices of attributing responsibility, he suggests that the social contract is an agreement which individuals can be forced to enter. For he asserts that in the state of nature, every subject must "be permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's to enter along with him into a civil constitution" (DR 6: 256). And in the political writings, Kant speaks of nature or providence as an invisible force which "guarantees" the establishment of the civil condition by compelling us to enter into it, "whether we will it or not" (PP 8: 365). See also Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," pp. 66-67.
64. For the purposes of attributing full moral status to a state or a person, Kant believes it is necessary to conceive of the unifying transition as an original act outside of time. He writes, "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state" (DR 6: 315). Similarly Kant holds that our attributions of responsibility to individuals seem to presuppose that individuals freely adopt their characters in an act of original choice: "To look for the temporal origin of free actions as free (as though they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which (just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the representations of reason alone" (RWR 6: 39-40; see also CPrR 5: 99-100, where Kant discusses "born villains"). And yet when Kant tries to
65. For the purposes of attributing full moral status to a state or a person, Kant believes it is necessary to conceive of the unifying transition as an original act outside of time. He writes, "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state" (DR 6: 315). Similarly Kant holds that our attributions of responsibility to individuals seem to presuppose that individuals freely adopt their characters in an act of original choice: "To look for the temporal origin of free actions as free (as though they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which (just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the representations of reason alone" (RWR 6: 39-40; see also CPrR 5: 99-100, where Kant discusses "born villains"). And yet when Kant tries to describe the transition prospectively and without regard to our practices of attributing responsibility, he suggests that the social contract is an agreement which individuals can be forced to enter. For he asserts that in the state of nature, every subject must "be permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's to enter along with him into a civil constitution" (DR 6: 256). And in the political writings, Kant speaks of nature or providence as an invisible force which "guarantees" the establishment of the civil condition by compelling us to enter into it, "whether we will it or not" (PP 8: 365). See also Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," pp. 66-67.
66. For the purposes of attributing full moral status to a state or a person, Kant believes it is necessary to conceive of the unifying transition as an original act outside of time. He writes, "The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state" (DR 6: 315). Similarly Kant holds that our attributions of responsibility to individuals seem to presuppose that individuals freely adopt their characters in an act of original choice: "To look for the temporal origin of free actions as free (as though they were natural effects) is therefore a contradiction; and hence also a contradiction to look for the temporal origin of the moral constitution of the human being, so far as this constitution is considered as contingent, for constitution here means the ground of the exercise of freedom which (just like the determining ground of the free power of choice in general) must be sought in the representations of reason alone" (RWR 6: 39-40; see also CPrR 5: 99-100, where Kant discusses "born villains"). And yet when Kant tries to describe the transition prospectively and without regard to our practices of attributing responsibility, he suggests that the social contract is an agreement which individuals can be forced to enter. For he asserts that in the state of nature, every subject must "be permitted to constrain everyone else with whom he comes into conflict about whether an external object is his or another's to enter along with him into a civil constitution" (DR 6: 256). And in the political writings, Kant speaks of nature or providence as an invisible force which "guarantees" the establishment of the civil condition by compelling us to enter into it, "whether we will it or not" (PP 8: 365). See also Kant, "Conjectural Beginning of Human History," pp. 66-67.
67. I do not intend the notion of "play" to eliminate the paradox; when forced to come up with a clear conception of what "play" involves, we have to think of it either as an activity which the player undertakes deliberately or as a spontaneous process occurring without her active participation. In his On the Aesthetic Education of Man (Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, ed. Elizabeth Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967]), Friedrich Schiller also uses the concept of "play" as a bridge between the notions of activity and passivity, but my use of "play" is not intended to be an extension of his. Moreover I am agnostic on the question whether my use of "play" here connects with Kant's use of this notion in his writings on aesthetics.
68. For adults, play is re-creation. I am suggesting that for children it is creation. Some readers have suggested to me that the characterization of play as children's form of work seems to miss the carefree spontaneity of childhood. And it is true that the Kantian view is decidedly unromantic. But this view may also explain at least part of the attraction of the romantic conception of childhood. That conception may express a nostalgia for the condition children must leave behind, i.e., the condition of animality. The idea of being governed purely by instinct seems to promise a kind of peace and contentment, at least if we imagine ourselves as having very rudimentary cognitive capacities.
69. Kant's remarks about play in the Education may appear to be in conflict with what I say here. He writes, "It is very bad for a child to look upon everything as play. He must, it is true, have his time for recreation, but he must also have his time for work" (p. 70), Here Kant is invoking our commonsense distinction between "work" and "play," where "play" refers to any pleasant activity undertaken simply for fun, in contrast to "work," which is not pleasant, but which is undertaken for the sake of some further end. Given this common-sense definition of the terms, it is of course true that children must both work and play. It should be clear, however, that the notion of play I am using here is not essentially connected with the idea of pleasure.
70. PP 8: 356.
71. There might be special questions here about the status of newborns and infants generally. My account of undeveloped agency presupposes a capacity to take up the practical point of view in a minimal way. The agent, I said, must be capable of being addressed by her motivational impulses. Developmental psychology would of course be relevant to deciding when to regard children as having this capacity. And it is a further question how we ought to treat human beings who have not yet developed this capacity. In short, there may turn out to be important distinctions in status even within the category of undeveloped agents. These distinctions might roughly correspond to our distinctions between infants and children and between children and mentally retarded adults.
72. Kant writes, "One of the greatest problems of education is how to unite submission to the necessary restraint with the child's capability of exercising freewill - for restraint is necessary. How am I to develop the sense of freedom in spite of restraint? I am to accustom my pupil to endure a restraint of his freedom, and at the same time I am to guide him to use his freedom aright." In order to do so, Kant claims, we must take into account how our acts of restrain are to be perceived by the child. In particular, he states, "we must prove to [the child] that restraint is only laid upon him that he may learn in time to use his liberty aright, and that his mind is being cultivated so that one day he may be free; that is, independent of the help of others" (Education, pp. 27-28). Here Kant touches on what I take to be a general point about action under nonideal conditions - because such action involves a moral risk, because it threatens to transgress the very ideal it purports to uphold, we must strive to make it as articulate as possible.
73. This does not amount to the same thing as wishing dependence away, acting as if it does not exist. Some readers have worried that the view I am putting forth implies that we ought to force children to take on adult responsibilities as early as possible, to "throw them in the deep end," as it were. But when a child (or any person, for that matter) is forced to perform tasks which are overly demanding given her abilities, this tends merely to reinforce her sense of her own dependence and powerlessness. Children should be given tasks which are challenging yet tractable, tasks which allow them to feel pleasure in their own achievement of mastery.
74. These examples reflect Rawls's bipartite division of nonideal theory, as mentioned in n. 12 above. On the issue of coping with evil, see Korsgaard, "The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil," in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends, pp. 133-58.