Public and private

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 292-313

  Steinberger, Peter J ^a  

^a REED COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033147866     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00201     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
2. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
3. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
4. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
5. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
6. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
7. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
8. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
9. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
10. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
11. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
12. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
13. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
14. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' (J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
15. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
16. A standard formulation of this view was provided by S. Warren and L. Brartdeis, 'The right to privacy', Harvard Law Review, 4 (1890), 193-220, for whom privacy is largely a matter of being left alone. For later versions, see M. Weinstein, 'The Uses of Privacy in the Good Life', in J. R. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds), Nomos XIII: Privacy (New York, Atherton, 1971), p. 88 and R. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 272. The recent philosophical literature focuses largely on just what it means to be left alone. For some, privacy is essentially a matter of restricted access to information about a particular person. The standard work here is A. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1967); but see also E. Beardsley, 'Privacy: Autonomy and Self-disclosure', in Nomos XIII: Privacy; R. Wasserstrom, 'Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions', in R. Bronaugh (ed.), Philosophical Law (Westport CT, Greenwood, 1978); and W. Parent 'Recent work on the concept of privacy', American Philosophical Quarterly, 20 (1983), 341-54. Others agree in emphasizing restricted access, but conceive it to include more than information. See J. Rachels, 'Why is privacy important?', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975); J. Kupier, 'Privacy, autonomy and self-concept', American Philosophical Quarterly, 24 (1987), 81-8; and A. Allen, Uneasy Access: Privacy for Women in a Free Society (Totowa, NJ, Rowtnan and Littlefield, 1988). For still others, restricted access of whatever kind is itself less important than the actual control that a person has over certain kinds of decisions especially intimate ones. See J. Reiman, 'Privacy, intimacy, and personhood', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1976), 26-44; T. Gerety, 'Redefining privacy', Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Review, 12 (1977), 233-96; and J. DeCew, 'The scope of privacy in law and ethics', Law and Philosophy, 5 (1986), 145-73. Virtually all of this literature takes the boundary theory for granted; it asks only about the nature of the private realm, rather than whether or not privacy is best conceptualized in that way. Emblematic here is Inness's claim that 'privacy is the state of possessing control over a realm of intimate decisions' J. Inness, Priracy, Intimacy, and Isolation (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 140). Those philosophers who have recently questioned the idea of a private realm have questioned the idea of privacy altogether: for example, J. Thomson, 'The right to privacy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4 (1975), 295-314; and H. J. McCloskey, 'Privacy and the right to privacy', Philosophy, 55 (1980), 37. More generally, the analytic literature tends to treat the question of the private realm without looking systematically at its presumed counterpart, the public realm. For explicit comparisons along these lines, one must look to a rather different kind of writing, exemplified by the work of Hannah Arendt and discussed below in some detail.
17. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, pp. 21-63; Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, pp. 3-19.
18. Westin, Privacy and Freedom, pp. 21-63; Inness, Privacy, Intimacy, and Isolation, pp. 3-19.
19. Consider, in this respect, the tangled history of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For example, see Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in California v. Acevedo (500 US 565 [1991]), which provides a lengthy and detailed analysis of case law pertaining to the relative privacy of personal luggage, on the one hand, and the trunk of an automobile, on the other.
20. Of course, politicians often make a show of warmth. But kissing a baby for the benefit of the camera is hardly the same as kissing one's child out of genuine affection, any more than an actor pretending to love Juliet actually does.
21. H. Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago, University of Chicago Press), p. 39.
22. Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 29.
23. Arendt, The Human Condition, p. 40.
24. Arendt's celebration of politics and the public realm has led some commentators to suggest that she had 'contempt' for the private realm, that she regarded the quest for privacy as an illicit retreat from the world, a source of 'privation' (S. Dossa, The Public Realm and the Piblic Self: the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt, (Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1989), pp. 59-65). This is, I think, an impossible reading. Arendt certainly had grave concerns about the modern idea of intimacy, understood as a desperate and fugitive attempt to escape the insidious intrusions of society. But she dwelt, as well, on 'the danger to human existence from the elimination of the private realm'. She observed that 'a life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth . . .' The Human Condition, pp. 69-73). She thus clearly understood that human flourishing absolutely requires substantial opportunities for genuine intimacy, that a full life requires love as well as glory, friendship as well as citizenship, respite from the public gaze as well as the courage to welcome it.
25. Arendt's celebration of politics and the public realm has led some commentators to suggest that she had 'contempt' for the private realm, that she regarded the quest for privacy as an illicit retreat from the world, a source of 'privation' (S. Dossa, The Public Realm and the Piblic Self: the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt, (Waterloo, Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier University, 1989), pp. 59-65). This is, I think, an impossible reading. Arendt certainly had grave concerns about the modern idea of intimacy, understood as a desperate and fugitive attempt to escape the insidious intrusions of society. But she dwelt, as well, on 'the danger to human existence from the elimination of the private realm'. She observed that 'a life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses the quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth . . .' (The Human Condition, pp. 69-73). She thus clearly understood that human flourishing absolutely requires substantial opportunities for genuine intimacy, that a full life requires love as well as glory, friendship as well as citizenship, respite from the public gaze as well as the courage to welcome it.
26. Indeed, this has created something of a crisis among students of her work. Numerous sympathetic commentators have sought to show that her theory of public and private, erroneous though it may be, does not seriously compromise her political thought in general. The results of these efforts have not been entirely successful. Arendt's teachings on 'diversity, solidarity . . . and the political equality (not the sameness) of women as citizens' (M. Dietz, 'Hannah Arendt and Feminist Polities', in M. Shanley and C. Pateman (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory (University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 245-50); on the sociology of modern mass society (C. Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin, and the Liberal-Democratic Conception of the Political', in Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 107-8); on political power as 'energy, capacity, and effectiveness' (N. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power (Boston, Northeastern University Press), p. 176, 225, 254) - all are widely admired by authors who do not always acknowledge the degree to which such notions, at least as Arendt understood them, absolutely require a politics that is importantly free from the vicissitudes of private life, that operates in terms of ideals independent of and even unrelated to the demands of family and workplace. Ultimately, the view that public and private are so ineluctably and inextricably intertwined as to be indistinguishable must, I think, lead to the conclusion that Arendt's 'theoretical formulation of action has rendered action impossible. She takes the Greek repudiation of the body and material life so far that despite her idolatry of political action, she eliminates the very possibility of it' W. Brown, Manhood and Politics: a Feminist Reading in Political Theory, (Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), p. 49).
27. Indeed, this has created something of a crisis among students of her work. Numerous sympathetic commentators have sought to show that her theory of public and private, erroneous though it may be, does not seriously compromise her political thought in general. The results of these efforts have not been entirely successful. Arendt's teachings on 'diversity, solidarity . . . and the political equality (not the sameness) of women as citizens' (M. Dietz, 'Hannah Arendt and Feminist Polities', in M. Shanley and C. Pateman (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory (University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 245-50); on the sociology of modern mass society (C. Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin, and the Liberal-Democratic Conception of the Political', in Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 107-8); on political power as 'energy, capacity, and effectiveness' (N. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power (Boston, Northeastern University Press), p. 176, 225, 254) - all are widely admired by authors who do not always acknowledge the degree to which such notions, at least as Arendt understood them, absolutely require a politics that is importantly free from the vicissitudes of private life, that operates in terms of ideals independent of and even unrelated to the demands of family and workplace. Ultimately, the view that public and private are so ineluctably and inextricably intertwined as to be indistinguishable must, I think, lead to the conclusion that Arendt's 'theoretical formulation of action has rendered action impossible. She takes the Greek repudiation of the body and material life so far that despite her idolatry of political action, she eliminates the very possibility of it' W. Brown, Manhood and Politics: a Feminist Reading in Political Theory, (Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), p. 49).
28. Indeed, this has created something of a crisis among students of her work. Numerous sympathetic commentators have sought to show that her theory of public and private, erroneous though it may be, does not seriously compromise her political thought in general. The results of these efforts have not been entirely successful. Arendt's teachings on 'diversity, solidarity . . . and the political equality (not the sameness) of women as citizens' (M. Dietz, 'Hannah Arendt and Feminist Polities', in M. Shanley and C. Pateman (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory (University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 245-50); on the sociology of modern mass society (C. Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin, and the Liberal-Democratic Conception of the Political', in Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 107-8); on political power as 'energy, capacity, and effectiveness' (N. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power (Boston, Northeastern University Press), p. 176, 225, 254) - all are widely admired by authors who do not always acknowledge the degree to which such notions, at least as Arendt understood them, absolutely require a politics that is importantly free from the vicissitudes of private life, that operates in terms of ideals independent of and even unrelated to the demands of family and workplace. Ultimately, the view that public and private are so ineluctably and inextricably intertwined as to be indistinguishable must, I think, lead to the conclusion that Arendt's 'theoretical formulation of action has rendered action impossible. She takes the Greek repudiation of the body and material life so far that despite her idolatry of political action, she eliminates the very possibility of it' W. Brown, Manhood and Politics: a Feminist Reading in Political Theory, (Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), p. 49).
29. Indeed, this has created something of a crisis among students of her work. Numerous sympathetic commentators have sought to show that her theory of public and private, erroneous though it may be, does not seriously compromise her political thought in general. The results of these efforts have not been entirely successful. Arendt's teachings on 'diversity, solidarity . . . and the political equality (not the sameness) of women as citizens' (M. Dietz, 'Hannah Arendt and Feminist Polities', in M. Shanley and C. Pateman (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory (University Park, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), pp. 245-50); on the sociology of modern mass society (C. Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification: Locke, Wolin, and the Liberal-Democratic Conception of the Political', in Pateman, The Disorder of Women: Democracy, Feminism, and Political Theory (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1989), pp. 107-8); on political power as 'energy, capacity, and effectiveness' (N. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power (Boston, Northeastern University Press), p. 176, 225, 254) - all are widely admired by authors who do not always acknowledge the degree to which such notions, at least as Arendt understood them, absolutely require a politics that is importantly free from the vicissitudes of private life, that operates in terms of ideals independent of and even unrelated to the demands of family and workplace. Ultimately, the view that public and private are so ineluctably and inextricably intertwined as to be indistinguishable must, I think, lead to the conclusion that Arendt's 'theoretical formulation of action has rendered action impossible. She takes the Greek repudiation of the body and material life so far that despite her idolatry of political action, she eliminates the very possibility of it' (W. Brown, Manhood and Politics: a Feminist Reading in Political Theory, (Totowa, NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), p. 49).
30. S. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York, Basic, 1989), p. 111.
31. N. Hartsock, Money, Sex, and Power, p, 176.
32. D. Dinnerstem, The Mermaid ami the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York, Harper, 1977), pp. 161, 176-7. See also, N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley, University of California Press 1978); and J. Mitchell, Women: the Longest Revolution (New York, Pantheon, 1984), pp. 221-313.
33. D. Dinnerstem, The Mermaid ami the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York, Harper, 1977), pp. 161, 176-7. See also, N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley, University of California Press 1978); and J. Mitchell, Women: the Longest Revolution (New York, Pantheon, 1984), pp. 221-313.
34. D. Dinnerstem, The Mermaid ami the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and Human Malaise (New York, Harper, 1977), pp. 161, 176-7. See also, N. Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley, University of California Press 1978); and J. Mitchell, Women: the Longest Revolution (New York, Pantheon, 1984), pp. 221-313.
35. S. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: the Case for Feminist Revolution (New York, William Morrow, 1970), pp. 205-42.
36. S. Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (Baltimore, Penguin, 1974), pp. 51-66. See also, J. Mitchell, Woman's Estate (New York, Pantheon, 1971), pp. 152-9; and L. Nicholson. Gender and History: the Limits of Social
37. S. Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (Baltimore, Penguin, 1974), pp. 51-66. See also, J. Mitchell, Woman's Estate (New York, Pantheon, 1971), pp. 152-9; and L. Nicholson. Gender and History: the Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 167-200.
38. S. Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World (Baltimore, Penguin, 1974), pp. 51-66. See also, J. Mitchell, Woman's Estate (New York, Pantheon, 1971), pp. 152-9; and L. Nicholson. Gender and History: the Limits of Social Theory in the Age of the Family (New York, Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 167-200.
39. L. Irigaray, Sexes and Genealogies (New York, Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 133.
40. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
41. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
42. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
43. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
44. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
45. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
46. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
47. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
48. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
49. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
50. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
51. Eisenstein's view is representative: 'The state is said to be public (by definition) and therefore divorced from the private realm, which is the area of women's lives. The state can appear, through its own ideology, to be unrelated to the family as the private sphere, when in actuality this sphere is both defined and regulated in relation to the state realm' (Z. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1993), p. 26). See also, Brown, Manhood and Politics, chs 2-8; J. Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), chs 1-4; J. Elshtain, 'Aristotle, the Public-Private Split, and the Case of the Suffragists', in Elshtain, The Family in Political Thought (Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), pp. 51-65; M. Gatens, '"The Oppressed State of My Sex": Wollstonecraft on Reason, Feeling and Quality', in Shanley and Pateraan (eds), Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory, pp. 112-28; S. Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979), pp.47-8, 90-1, 109-15, 226-30); Nicholson, Gender and History, ch. 5; C. Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985), pp. 156-8; C. Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1988), ch. 4; Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 118-40; J. Ring, Modern Political Theory and Contemporary Feminism: a Dialectical Analysis, (Albany, State University of New York Press, 1991), chs 5-6; and B. Thiele, 'Vanishing Acts in Social and Political Thought: Trick of the Trade', in C. Pateman and E. Gross (eds), Feminist Challenges: Social and Political Theory (Boston, Northeastern University Press, 1987), pp. 30-43.
52. C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 188, 190. See also, A. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), pp. 254-5.
53. C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 188, 190. See also, A. Jaggar, Feminist Politics and Human Nature (Totowa NJ, Rowman and Littlefield, 1988), pp. 254-5.
54. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 191.
55. The distinction is at least implicit, I think, in some of what Elshtain says: Public Man, Private Woman, pp. 217-8, 241, 249, 269-71, 326-40.
56. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, p. 111.
57. S. Okin, 'Gender, the Public and the Private', in D. Held (ed.), Political Theory Today (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 76. See also, Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, pp. 127-8; and Nicholson, Gender and History, p. 19.
58. S. Okin, 'Gender, the Public and the Private', in D. Held (ed.), Political Theory Today (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 76. See also, Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, pp. 127-8; and Nicholson, Gender and History, p. 19.
59. S. Okin, 'Gender, the Public and the Private', in D. Held (ed.), Political Theory Today (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 76. See also, Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, pp. 127-8; and Nicholson, Gender and History, p. 19.
60. Pateman, 'Sublimation and Reification', pp. 112-3.
61. See also, Nicholson, Gender and History, p. 17.
62. P. Steinberger, Logic and Politics: Hegel's Philosophy of Right (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988), pp. 167-75.
63. References are to G. W. F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, [1821] 1970). 'A' refers to the 'Zusästze' or additions extracted by Gans from the lecture notes of Hotho and Griesheim and incorporated into the 1833 edition of the Philosophy of Right.
64. 'In short, its [the Corporation's] right is to come on the scene like a second family for its members' (§252).
65. References are to J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, [1690] 1988).
66. The point is reiterated in J. Locke. Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Oxford, Oxford University Press, [1693] 1989): parents are 'wisely ordain'd by nature to love their children . . . They love their little ones, and 'tis their duty . . .' (§34). This does create certain problems, since parents are apt to spoil their children (§§34-35; also Two Treatises: 67,17-21). But it is clear for Locke that the duly to love and the duty to educate go hand in hand and that, in his view, the state should play virtually no role in the education of children. For an excellent account along these line, see N. Tarcov, Locke's Education for Libety (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984), for example at p. 135.
67. The point is reiterated in J. Locke. Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Oxford, Oxford University Press, [1693] 1989): parents are 'wisely ordain'd by nature to love their children . . . They love their little ones, and 'tis their duty . . .' (§34). This does create certain problems, since parents are apt to spoil their children (§§34-35; also Two Treatises: 67,17-21). But it is clear for Locke that the duly to love and the duty to educate go hand in hand and that, in his view, the state should play virtually no role in the education of children. For an excellent account along these line, see N. Tarcov, Locke's Education for Libety (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984), for example at p. 135.
68. The point is reiterated in J. Locke. Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Oxford, Oxford University Press, [1693] 1989): parents are 'wisely ordain'd by nature to love their children . . . They love their little ones, and 'tis their duty . . .' (§34). This does create certain problems, since parents are apt to spoil their children (§§34-35; also Two Treatises: 67,17-21). But it is clear for Locke that the duly to love and the duty to educate go hand in hand and that, in his view, the state should play virtually no role in the education of children. For an excellent account along these line, see N. Tarcov, Locke's Education for Libety (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1984), for example at p. 135.
69. I. Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Hamburg, Felix Meiner, [1790] 1968), 4.26.
70. This is not quite Kant's view. Writing primarily about aesthetic claims concerning beauty, Kant says that all such claims are a matter of 'subjective universality'. He insists that aesthetic judgments, unlike judgments of sense, always purport to be universal, i.e., their form is such that they are meant to hold true for everyone; however, they are also inevitably 'subjective', meaning that there is literally no argument or evidence to show that they are or might be true. With respect to aesthetic judgment, then, Kant is decidedly a non-cognitivist. The view of judgment presented here, on the other hand, follows P. Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 211-80), This view has been criticized by R. Beiner (Book Review, Political Theory, 22 (November 1994), 988-93). for being too intellectualistic. Beiner believes that judgment, properly understood, is fundamentally not a matter of argument at all, and that Steinberger's account, which emphasizes evidence and argumentation, is therefore mistaken.
71. This is not quite Kant's view. Writing primarily about aesthetic claims concerning beauty, Kant says that all such claims are a matter of 'subjective universality'. He insists that aesthetic judgments, unlike judgments of sense, always purport to be universal, i.e., their form is such that they are meant to hold true for everyone; however, they are also inevitably 'subjective', meaning that there is literally no argument or evidence to show that they are or might be true. With respect to aesthetic judgment, then, Kant is decidedly a non-cognitivist. The view of judgment presented here, on the other hand, follows P. Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 211-80), This view has been criticized by R. Beiner (Book Review, Political Theory, 22 (November 1994), 988-93). for being too intellectualistic. Beiner believes that judgment, properly understood, is fundamentally not a matter of argument at all, and that Steinberger's account, which emphasizes evidence and argumentation, is therefore mistaken.
72. Paraphrasing M. Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 47. On notion of concrete and abstract, see also J. Gray. 'Hegel's logic: the philosophy of the concrete', Virginia Quarterly Review, 47 (1971), 175-89.
73. Paraphrasing M. Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 47. On notion of concrete and abstract, see also J. Gray. 'Hegel's logic: the philosophy of the concrete', Virginia Quarterly Review, 47 (1971), 175-89.
74. Thus, for example, events surrounding the departure of Bob Packwood from the United States Senate suggest that the activity of keeping a diary can no longer be considered the kind of private activity that presumably it once was, a fact that all elected officials would be wise to recognize.
75. And so too for friendship. As indicated above, true acts of friendship require, indeed admit of, no justification. But as a practical matter, and for a variety of reasons, friends often feel the need to explain and account for their actions to one another; and this only shows that, in the real world, the sphere of friendship, like any other, is likely to be a complex and ever-shifting structure of public and private activity. To be sure, friendship is compromised when it begins to take on a public character, but everyday experience tells us that, at least up to a certain point, it need not be fatally so.