The economics of an audit firm: The benefits of partnership governance

British Accounting Review

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 225-254

  Van Lent, LAURENCE ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033145981     PISSN: 08908389     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/bare.1998.0087     Document Type: Article

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