Response to “Advance Directives and Voluntary Slavery” by Christopher Tollefsen (CQ Vol 7, No 4) : Slavery, Commitment, and Choice: Do Advance Directives Reflect Autonomy?

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics

Volumn 8, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 358-363

  May, Thomas ^a,b  

^a MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER   (United States)

^b SOUTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FREEDOM; HUMAN; LEGAL APPROACH; LIVING WILL; MEDICAL ETHICS; NOTE; PERSONAL AUTONOMY; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PROFESSIONAL PATIENT RELATIONSHIP;

LEGAL APPROACH; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PROFESSIONAL PATIENT RELATIONSHIP;

ADVANCE DIRECTIVES; ETHICS, MEDICAL; FREEDOM; HUMANS; PERSONAL AUTONOMY;

EID: 0033141328     PISSN: 09631801     EISSN: 14692147     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0963180199003126     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Tollefsen C. Advance directives and voluntary slavery. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 1998;7(4):405–413.
2. May T. Reassessing the reliability of advance directives. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 1997;6(3):325–337.
3. May T. On Raz and the obligation to obey the law. Law and Philosophy 1997;16(1):19–36.
4. see also May T. Autonomy, Authority and Moral Responsibility. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, chh. 5,6,7.
5. See note 1, Tollefsen 1998:410.
6. May T. The concept of autonomy. American Philosophical Quarterly 1994;31(2)
7. See note 1, Tollefsen 1998:411.
8. See note 1, Tollefsen 1998:409.
9. See note 1, Tollefsen 1998.