A signalling theory of excessive technological adoption

Health Care Management Science

Volumn 2, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 117-123

  Barros, Pedro Pita ^a   Pinto, Carlos Gouveia ^b   Machado, Ana ^a  

^a NOVA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS   (Portugal)

^b UNIVERSITY OF LISBON   (Portugal)

Author keywords

Signalling; Technology adoption

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH PERSONNEL ATTITUDE; INVESTMENT; PERCEPTIVE DISCRIMINATION; PHYSICIAN; PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT; TECHNOLOGY;

ATTITUDE OF HEALTH PERSONNEL; BAYES THEOREM; DECISION MAKING; DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE; INVESTMENTS; PHYSICIANS; SIGNAL DETECTION (PSYCHOLOGY); TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER;

EID: 0033122863     PISSN: 13869620     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1019075425763     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. J. Baumgardner, The interaction between forms of insurance contract and types of technical change in medical care, RAND J. Economics 22(1) (1991) 36-53.
2. D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press, 1991)
3. J. Newhouse, Medical care costs: how much welfare loss?, J. Economic Perspectives 6(1) (1992) 3-21.
4. C.G. Pinto, Competition in the health care sector and welfare, Discussion Paper 1/95, Portuguese Association of Health Economics (1995).
5. B. Weisbrod, The health care quadrilemma: an essay on technological change, insurance, quality of care, and cost containment, J. Economic Literature 29(3) (1991) 523-552.