Dilemmas of “Thought Work” in Fin-de-Siècle China

China Quarterly

Volumn 157, Issue , 1999, Pages 173-201

  Lynch, Daniel C ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; INFORMATION MANAGEMENT; STATE ROLE;

CHINA;

EID: 0033047047     PISSN: 03057410     EISSN: 14682648     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0305741000040248     Document Type: Article

References (84)

1. The term “thought work” originally denoted the exertion of influence in small study groups, but is now used in China to refer to propaganda and persuasion in general. See Martin King Whyte, Small Groups and Political Rituals in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974)
2. Quan Zhongguo xuanchuan sixiang gongzuo huiyi wenjian huibian (Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference) (Beijing: Xuexi chubanshe, 1994; for internal circulation only).
3. Liu Renwei, “On colonial culture,” Qiushi (Seeking Truth), 1 March 1996, pp. 26–33; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 4 September 1996. This is, of course, the essence of “peaceful evolution.”
4. On the distinction between legal property rights and economic property rights, see Yoram Barzel, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
5. Interviews 111 and 138. For a detailed discussion, see Daniel C. Lynch, After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and “Thought Work” in Reformed China (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999).
6. “Internet becomes part of daily life,” Xinhua, 27 June 1996; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), I July 1996.
7. “Li Ruihuan tongzhi zai quanguo zhengdun qingli shu-bao-kan he yinxiang shichang dianhua huiyi shang dc jianghua” (“Comrade Li Ruihuan's speech at the all-China teleconference on the rectification of book, periodical, audio and video markets”), Zhongguo gaige quanshu, 1978–1991 (China Reforms, 1978–1991), Vol. 3 (Dalian: Dalian chubanshe, 1992), p. 219.
8. Cited in Zhao Lanying, “In the midst of improvement and rectification, Shanghai news publishing enterprises focus on development,” Liaowang (Outlook), Vol. 10 (5 March 1990), pp. 25–26; translated in JPRS China Report, 19 June 1990, pp. 82–84.
9. “Regulations penalizing pornography announced,” Xinhua, 16 July 1990; translated in JPRS China Report, 27 July 1990, pp. 91–92
10. Lo Dic, “Sentencing guidelines established for pornography,” Hongkong Standard, 9 August 1990, p. 10; reprinted in JPRS China Report, 14 August 1990, p. 87
11. Anti-pornography tsar Liu Zhongde boasts of these “remarkable successes” in “Propaganda official on antipornography efforts,” Xinhua, 18 December 1991; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 26 December 1991, pp. 23–27.
12. Liu Zhongde, “Several theoretical and practical questions concerning cultural work under the new conditions,” Qiushi, No. 15(August 1993), pp. 19–25; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 22 September 1993, pp. 34–40.
13. Ai Zhisheng, “Jianchi liangshou zhua, liangshou dou yao ying de fangzhen” (“Staunchly uphold the policy of seizing with both hands and holding tight”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, p. 125.
14. “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on certain important questions on strengthening the building of a socialist spiritual civilization,” Xinhua, 13 October 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 17 October 1997.
15. The term xitong - literally, “system”- refers to a cluster of bureaucracies responsible for implementing (and, to a degree, formulating) policy over a set of interrelated issue-areas. There are four or five main xitong, including foreign affairs, finance and economics, and -most important for this study - education and propaganda. Xitong are organized into loose, interpenetrating hierarchies, so that within any single organization there can be representatives from more than one xitong. But most organizations are primarily identified with one xitong. For an authoritative explanation, see Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform (New York and London: Norton, 1995).
16. See Liu Zhongde, “Jiaqiang xuexi, shenhua gaige, guanhao shichang fanrong wenyi” (“Strengthen study, deepen reform, and effectively manage the flourishing arts market”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, pp. 111–120.
17. Wang Feng, “Zai quanguo guangbo yingshi xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de fayan” (“Remarks at the all-China radio, film and television work conference”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, p. 336.
18. Interviews 133 and 167. This tactic is used often particularly at the county level and below, where cultural market management offices are especially understaffed. See Liu Zhongde, “Zai quanguo wenhua ting, juzhang huiyi shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the all-China meeting of Cultural Bureau chiefs and department directors”), in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference, p. 260.
19. Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference
20. Quoted in Wang Li, “Audio, visual products management conference opens,” Xinhua, 15 May 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 15 May 1996.
21. Interview no. 169; “Mingling jinzhi maimai shuhao” (“The buying and selling of book numbers is forbidden”), Renmin ribao, 29 October 1993, p. 1
22. Xu Weicheng, “Zai fanrong chuban shiye, jinzhi ‘maimai shuhao,’ zuotanhui shang de jianghua” (“Speech at the conference on forbidding the buying and selling of book numbers in the flourishing publishing industry”), Guangming ribao (Enlightenment Daily), 29 October 1993, pp. 1–2
23. “Government clamps down on book registration numbers,” Zhongguo tongxun she (China News Agency), 13 June 1994; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 22 June 1994, p. 21.
24. FBIS Daily Report, and interview no. 142.
25. Interviews 109, 115 and 142; Guojia tongjiju (ed.), Zhongguo tongji nianjian 1997(China Statistical Yearbook 1997) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshc, 1997)
26. Qu Zhihong, “Upward trend maintained in press and publications business,” 22 January 1997; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 23 January 1997.
27. The reissued regulations were published by Xinhua on 29 January 1997 and translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 31 January 1997.
28. During the first two years of the crackdown, only one publishing house in all of China was punished for selling book numbers - the relatively obscure Xinjiang University Press. (Interview no. 169; see, also, Qu Zhihong, “Publishing house closed for rectification,” Xinhua, 20 October 1994; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 20 October 1994.)
29. A PRC journalism professor told the Hongkong Standard in May 1996 that the licences of more than 1,000 internally-circulating newspapers and magazines had been revoked between late 1994 and early 1996, but no official PRC media outlet has reported such a dramatic figure. (See Pamela Pun, “Publication crackdown designed to ‘purify media,’” Hongkong Standard, 9 May 1996, p. 6; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 May 1996.)
30. Following the Sixth Plenum, the stale did become more active: between October 1996 and May 1997, the SPPA ordered eight publishing houses to cease operations temporarily for publishing bad books and tapes and selling book numbers. However, all eight were relatively obscure (e.g. the Hainan Photographic and Art Publishing House), suggesting that the SPPA was targeting easy marks in an effort to demonstrate its support for the new emphasis on spiritual civilization. Moreover, the punished houses clearly represent the tip of the iceberg, suggesting a “kill the chicken to scare the monkey” strategy unlikely to be effective because the “monkeys” now face strong incentives to increase unit income. See “Anyone who violates publication laws and regulations must be prosecuted,” Renmin ribao, 28 April 1997, p. 1; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 29 April 1997
31. “Press authority punishes publishers for infractions,” Xinhua, 14 April 1997; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 19 May 1997.
32. Interview no. 142; see, also, “China's publication undertaking is nearly out of control because of serious political problems,” Mingbao, 26 August 1996, p. A6; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 29 August 1996.
33. SPPA Director Yu Youxian, citing the need to “check reckless and decentralized practices,” revealed in January 1997 that his office had refused to approve the establishment of a single new publishing house in 1996 - though he did not say how many new houses were in fact established. Li Xinyan and Yang Mingfang, “Press and publications work starts satisfactorily at beginning of ‘Ninth Five-Ycar Plan,’” Renmin ribao, 21 January 1997, p. 5; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 6 February 1997.
34. “System to improve quality of periodicals,” Renmin ribao, 13 April 1994, p. 3; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 6 May 1994, pp. 26–28.
35. See also Li Zhurun and Ni Siyi, “Official: law, self-discipline to ‘eventually’ guide press,” Xinhua, 27 February 1994; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 1 March 1994, p. 24
36. Pamela Pun, “Tighter grip on propaganda system planned,” Hongkong Standard, 10 January 1995, p. 6; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 January 1995.
37. Interview No. 138; Guojia Tongjiju (ed.), China Statistical Yearbook 1997.
38. Cited in “Special dispatch: large-scale rectification of media,” in Mingbao, 5 April 1997, p. A8; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 14 April 1997.
39. Cited in Zhang Yizhang, “Central Party school takes over China market newspaper,” in Xingdao ribao, 7 June 1991, p.A7; translated in FBIS Daily Report(China), 10 June 1997.
40. FBIS Daily Report(China).
41. Thus, the Ministry of Culture also announced plans in January 1997 to “basically wipe out the country's influx of pornography and protect intellectual property rights by 2000.” (Cited in “Ministry to improve administration of cultural market,” Xinhua, 22 January 1997; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 24 January 1997.)
42. See, for example, Larry Martz, “Revolution by information,” Newsweek, 19 June 1989, pp. 28–29
43. “The information war,” Asiaweek, 23 June 1989, p. 30.
44. “Paging services prohibited from distributing news,” Zhongguo xinwen she, 7 April 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 12 April 1996.
45. Interviews 102, 103,114, and 122; see, also, “Circular concerning cracking down on unauthorized radio stations and punishing personnel involved,” Anhui ribao, 26 June 1995, p. 1; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 26 June 1995.
46. Cited in John Markoff, “AT&T may have edge in future on-line,” The New York Times, 21 August 1995, pp. C1 and C4.
47. In 1988, the Chinese Academy of Sciences' Institute of High Energy Physics became the first PRC unit to connect to the Internet, using a dedicated line to link up with the European Centre on Nuclear Research. Zuo Feng, “Chinese masses go on-line,” Window, 7 July 1995, p. 3; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 7 July 1995.
48. “Opening of public switching data network reported,” Xinhua, 31 August 1993; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 14 September 1993, p. 24
49. Gao Tao, “Information sector thrives,” China Daily (Science and Technology Supplement), 3 June 1994, p. 1
50. Cindy Zheng, “Opening the digital door; computer networking in China,” Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 236–242.
51. For a thorough discussion, see Lynch, After the Propaganda State.
52. “Computer network to connect universities,” Xinhua, 30 October 1994; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 30 October 1994
53. He Jun, “Computer network to link 1,000 universities,” China Daily, 1 December 1994, p. 3; reprinted in JPRS China Science and Technology Report, 13 February 1995, pp. 12–13.
54. Interview 122. See, also, Li Yan, “China to get Internet via SprintLink,” China Daily, 31 August 1994, p. 2; reprinted in JPRS China Science and Technology Report, 18 October 1994, pp. 26–27.
55. Actually the terms “Chinanet” and “Chinapac” arc not completely synonymous; Chinanet is being built on the back of the Chinapac system with expertise from the American computer firm AsianInfo. (See Michael Laris, “Power for the web,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 17 October 1996, pp. 45–46.) At the same time, numerous new Internet service providers have sprung up in several Chinese cities over the past three years, but all of them supply their services through the over-arching MPT network.
56. Zuo Feng, “Chinese masses go on-line,” and “Public security ministry circular on Internet use,” Zhongguo tongxun she (China News Agency), 29 February 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 7 March 1996. After the end of the promotional period, Internet access charges were 100 yuan (US$ 12) per month for six hours' use and 600 yuan per month for 40 hours.
57. Wang Jing, “Government to tighten Internet security control,” Xinhua, 30 December 1997; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 1 January 1998
58. “The Great Wall wired,” The Economist, Internet edition. No. 4981 (January 1998).
59. See Seth Faison, “Chinese cruise Internet, wary of watchdogs,” The New York Times, 5 February 1996, pp. A1 and A3. A foreign telecommunications businessman reported confidentially that he had heard that one impetus for this new set of regulations was Prime Minister Li Peng's personal irritation at e-mail debates among Chinese college students concerning the contemporary significance of the 9 December 1935 student movement. The debates took place in conjunction with the movement's 40th anniversary.
60. “Text of interim Internet management rules,” Xinhua, 4 February 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 10 February 1996.
61. Two months after the promulgation of these rules, the MPT took the additional step of formally forbidding paging services from providing customers with such value-added content as news and pornography. (Interview no. 102; see also Wang Yanrong, “Minister discusses telecommunications control,” Xinhua, 5 November 1993; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 16 November 1993, pp. 41–42
62. “Paging services prohibited from distributing news,” Zhongguo xinwen she, 7 April 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 12 April 1996.)
63. Public security ministry circular on Internet use.
64. “Ministry adopts Internet measures,” Zhongguo xinwen she, 22 May 1996; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 22 May 1996.
65. The State Council revised and formally promulgated restrictions on direct hook-ups to overseas networks a year later. (“Li Peng promulgates computer regulation,” Xinhua, 30 May 1997; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 2 June 1997.)
66. Vivien Wong, “Ideology chief visits Singapore for tips on Internet,” Hong Kong Standard, 13 July 1996, p. 6; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 19 July 1996.
67. See Steven Mufson, “Beijing tightens its control,” The Washington Post, 17 September 1996, p. A9
68. “Singapore bans sex, religion, and politics on the Internet,” The New York Times, 6 March 1996
69. Michael Vatikiotis, “Net police: ASEAN seeks to control cyberspace,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 28 March 1996, p. 22.
70. The regulations arc available in translation from the website of the United States Embassy in Beijing: http://www.redfish.com/USEmbassy-China/sandt/sandt.htm
71. See Erik Eckholm's discussion, “China cracks down on dissent in cyberspace,” The New York Times (on-line edition), 31 December 1997.
72. Interview no. 144. See also Peter H. Lewis, “The Internet's very nature defies censorship by government or individual,” The New York Times, 15 January 1996.
73. See John R. Mathiason and Charles C. Kuhlman, “International public regulation of the Internet,” paper delivered at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, March 1998, Minneapolis.
74. See Tunnel's inaugural declaration, available upon request at See also “Cyberspace magazine fights for freedom of expression,” South China Morning Post, 19 June 1997.
75. Ken Zita, Modernizing China's Telecommunications (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, and Hong Kong: Business International Corporation, 1987), p. 42.
76. Jiang's speech was widely reprinted in all the major media, including in Collected Documents from the All-China Thought Work and Propaganda Work Conference. The quote here is taken from “Jiang Zemin's speech delivered at the National Working Conference on Propaganda and Ideological Work on 24 January,” Xinhua, 6 March 1994; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 7 March 1994, pp. 29–36. (Emphasis added.)
77. “Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on certain important questions on strengthening the building of socialist spiritual civilization.” See also “Fan out from point to area, jointly build civilization,” Renmin ribao, 25 March 1997, p. 4; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 11 April 1997.
78. See Lloyd E. Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1974).
79. See “Wei Jianxing on promoting spiritual civilization in Beijing,” Xinhua, 30 January 1997; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 5 February 1997.
80. See Huang Chien's article, “Rigorous control of ideology reiterated,” Dangdai, No. 44 (15 November 1994), pp. 24–25; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 9 January 1995.
81. Willy Wo-lap Lam, “Team to draft ideological programme for next century,” South China Morning Post, 16 May 1996, p. 10; reprinted in FBIS Daily Report (China), 20 May 1996
82. Hua Hsia, “Theme of Sixth Plenary Session is fixed,” Xin bao, 19 June 1996, p. 10; translated in FBIS Daily Report (China), 20 June 1996.
83. See Matt Forney, “Patriot games,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 October 1996, pp. 22–28.
84. On the concept of the “selectorate,” see Susan L. Shirk, The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993).