Beyond regional analysis: Manufacturing zones, urban employment and spatial inequality in China

China Quarterly

Volumn , Issue 157, 1999, Pages 1-21

  Johnston, M Francis ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPLOYMENT; INCOME DISTRIBUTION; INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT; REGIONAL PATTERN; SPATIAL ANALYSIS;

CHINA;

EID: 0032984779     PISSN: 00094439     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. I use the term "spatial inequality" to refer to the degree to which social resources are spatially distributed in an unequal way. Social resources is meant to include income, wealth and access to public services (e.g. health, education). There is a solid conceptual overview of the use and measurement of social resources in the China literature in Tsui Kai-yuen, "The measurement of China's regional inequalities: some issues and problems," in Roger C. K. Chan, Tien-tung Hsueh and Chiu-ming Luk (eds.), China's Regional Economic Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1996). There is also a good discussion of the concept in the introductory paragraphs (and first five footnotes) of Deborah S. Davis, "Inequality and stratification in the nineties," in Lo Chi Kin, Suzanne Pepper and Tsui Kai Yuen (eds.), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995). For a comprehensive overview of the different ways that social resources are stratified in China, see World Bank, China 2020: Disparities in China: Sharing Rising Incomes (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997).
2. I use the term "spatial inequality" to refer to the degree to which social resources are spatially distributed in an unequal way. Social resources is meant to include income, wealth and access to public services (e.g. health, education). There is a solid conceptual overview of the use and measurement of social resources in the China literature in Tsui Kai-yuen, "The measurement of China's regional inequalities: some issues and problems," in Roger C. K. Chan, Tien-tung Hsueh and Chiu-ming Luk (eds.), China's Regional Economic Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1996). There is also a good discussion of the concept in the introductory paragraphs (and first five footnotes) of Deborah S. Davis, "Inequality and stratification in the nineties," in Lo Chi Kin, Suzanne Pepper and Tsui Kai Yuen (eds.), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995). For a comprehensive overview of the different ways that social resources are stratified in China, see World Bank, China 2020: Disparities in China: Sharing Rising Incomes (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997).
3. I use the term "spatial inequality" to refer to the degree to which social resources are spatially distributed in an unequal way. Social resources is meant to include income, wealth and access to public services (e.g. health, education). There is a solid conceptual overview of the use and measurement of social resources in the China literature in Tsui Kai-yuen, "The measurement of China's regional inequalities: some issues and problems," in Roger C. K. Chan, Tien-tung Hsueh and Chiu-ming Luk (eds.), China's Regional Economic Development (Hong Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 1996). There is also a good discussion of the concept in the introductory paragraphs (and first five footnotes) of Deborah S. Davis, "Inequality and stratification in the nineties," in Lo Chi Kin, Suzanne Pepper and Tsui Kai Yuen (eds.), China Review 1995 (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1995). For a comprehensive overview of the different ways that social resources are stratified in China, see World Bank, China 2020: Disparities in China: Sharing Rising Incomes (Washington DC: World Bank, 1997).
4. Of all of the works I have read in this literature, Yang Dali makes the best case for using the RAF in "Patterns of China's regional development strategy," The China Quarterly, No. 122 (1990), pp. 230-257. Yang himself has already incorporated some of the issues I advocate in his new book: Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997), see especially pp. 7-9.
5. Of all of the works I have read in this literature, Yang Dali makes the best case for using the RAF in "Patterns of China's regional development strategy," The China Quarterly, No. 122 (1990), pp. 230-257. Yang himself has already incorporated some of the issues I advocate in his new book: Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the Regions in China (London: Routledge, 1997), see especially pp. 7-9.
6. The coastal provinces are Liaoning, Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan and Guangxi.
7. The central provinces are Jilin, Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Henan, Hubei, Anhui, Hunan and Jiangxi.
8. The western provinces are Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunan, Tibet, Qinghai and Xinjiang.
9. Paul Krugman, Geography and Trade (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993).
10. Due to the lack of 1995 population data, I use the 1990 population census to compute the number of people living in different parts of urban China. The definition of urban used in the 1990 census is explained by Kam Wing Chan, "Urbanization and rural-urban migration in China since 1982," Modern China, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1994), pp. 243-281. Across different data sources, "urban" may be defined in slightly different ways. It is conceivable that the definition of urban used by the department of the State Statistical Bureau responsible for the Population Census differs slightly from that used by the department of the State Statistical Bureau responsible for helping compile the Labour Statistical Yearbook or the part of the government which compiled the Industrial Census. The source of the discrepancy would be small towns. To check for a possible bias, I computed the statistics of this paper twice in an earlier draft - once including township enterprises and once excluding them. Results differed slightly for Yunnan and Liaoning. I have not included township and village enterprises in the calculations for this paper. When they are included, the evidence supports my argument in a stronger way.
11. While this empirical focus does not capture all of the dimensions of social resources, the spatial distribution of urban industrial job opportunities is perhaps the single most important dimension of spatial inequality and certainly correlates with other dimensions of spatial inequality.
12. By "state-owned," I am referring solely to those enterprises which are explicitly classified as state-owned (guoyou qiye). When I refer to non-state enterprises, I am referring to all others, including the large collective enterprises. It is true that some of the large and medium-sized collectively-owned enterprises are better treated as state-owned than non-state. But it is also the case that many collectively-owned enterprises are in fact private, registered as collective for tax purposes. There is no easy way to solve this problem with the aggregate data. However, there should not be a large impact upon the empirical analysis in this paper. When the empirical ambiguity possible impacts on my analysis (especially for Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang), I note this in the text.
13. See for example Simon Xiaobin Zhao, "Spatial disparities and economic development in China, 1953-92: a comparative study," Development and Change, Vol. 27 (1996), pp. 131-163.
14. After reviewing the Chinese literature, one author points out that there is little discussion of the role of non-governmental actors. See C. Cindy Fan, "Uneven development and beyond: regional development theory in post-Mao China," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 21, No. 4 (1997), pp. 620-639, especially p. 632.
15. See Simon Xiaobin Zhao, "Spatial disparities and economic development in China, 1953-92."
16. Ibid. For documentation of the important role Shanghai played in developing the RAF, see J. Bruce Jacobs and Lijian Hong, "Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley," in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 241.
17. Ibid. For documentation of the important role Shanghai played in developing the RAF, see J. Bruce Jacobs and Lijian Hong, "Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley," in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 241.
18. Simon Xiaobin Zhao, "Spatial disparities and economic development in China, 1953-92."
19. Yang Dali, "Patterns of China's regional development strategy."
20. Under Premier Li Peng, government officials in the State Planning Commission developed several other frameworks, of which the most recent one is called the "omnidirectional opening" policy. See Ick Soo Kim, "Regional disparities, localism and China's search for a new regional development strategy in the 1990s," in Denis F. Simon and Hong Pyo Lee (eds.), Globalization and Regionalization of China's Economy: Implications for the Pacific Rim and Korea (Seoul: Sejong Institute, 1995), p. 251.
21. Sec for instance Yang Dali, "Patterns of China's regional development strategy."
22. See for example Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. Chinese Economic Reform: 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). This was first brought to my attention during a series of lectures on the Chinese economy given by Songlin Li at the Hopkins-Nanjing Centre of Nanjing University in the autumn of 1996.
23. Krugman, Geography and Trade.
24. Also, one of the reviewers called my attention to excellent work of a somewhat similar nature by C. Cindy Fan in the China area. In one article, Fan applies some of the growth pole theories to the Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces. See C. Cindy Fan, "Developments from above, below and outside: spatial impacts of China's economic reforms in Jiangsu and Guangdong provinces," Chinese Environment and Development, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2 (1995), pp. 85-116. In another article, Fan meticulously examines data at the county, province and regional level to understand spatial restructuring. See C. Cindy Fan, "Of belts and ladders: state policy and uneven regional development in post-Mao China," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 421-449.
25. Also, one of the reviewers called my attention to excellent work of a somewhat similar nature by C. Cindy Fan in the China area. In one article, Fan applies some of the growth pole theories to the Guangdong and Jiangsu provinces. See C. Cindy Fan, "Developments from above, below and outside: spatial impacts of China's economic reforms in Jiangsu and Guangdong provinces," Chinese Environment and Development, Vol. 6, Nos. 1 and 2 (1995), pp. 85-116. In another article, Fan meticulously examines data at the county, province and regional level to understand spatial restructuring. See C. Cindy Fan, "Of belts and ladders: state policy and uneven regional development in post-Mao China," Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 85, No. 3 (1995), pp. 421-449.
26. This is composed of the Ruhr, Northern France and Belgium. See Krugman, Geography and Trade, p. 11.
27. This belt is an approximate parallelogram from Green Bay to St. Louis to Baltimore to Portland. See ibid.
28. For a longer explanation of this theory, see ibid. pp. 36-54. See also Yang Dali, Beyond Beijing, pp. 7-13. Note that this theory is very similar to the Worlds Systems Theory which posits that there are core, semi-periphery and peripheral areas of economic production. See Alvin So and Stephen Chiu, East Asia and the World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), for discussion of industrialization and regional differentiation in China. One way to read this article, then, is as an update of the micro details of their Worlds Systems analysis of China.
29. For a longer explanation of this theory, see ibid. pp. 36-54. See also Yang Dali, Beyond Beijing, pp. 7-13. Note that this theory is very similar to the Worlds Systems Theory which posits that there are core, semi-periphery and peripheral areas of economic production. See Alvin So and Stephen Chiu, East Asia and the World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), for discussion of industrialization and regional differentiation in China. One way to read this article, then, is as an update of the micro details of their Worlds Systems analysis of China.
30. For a longer explanation of this theory, see ibid. pp. 36-54. See also Yang Dali, Beyond Beijing, pp. 7-13. Note that this theory is very similar to the Worlds Systems Theory which posits that there are core, semi-periphery and peripheral areas of economic production. See Alvin So and Stephen Chiu, East Asia and the World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995), for discussion of industrialization and regional differentiation in China. One way to read this article, then, is as an update of the micro details of their Worlds Systems analysis of China.
31. Locationally-bound enterprises are those which produce in a particular location because the production materials are located there and transporting them to another place for production would substantively increase production costs.
32. Guangzhou Panyu, Shcnzhcn, Zhuhai, Huizhou, Dongguan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen, Foshan, Nanhai, and Shunde. This list is adopted from Roger C. K. Chan, "The Pearl River Delta region," in J. Cheng and S. MacPherson (eds.), Development in Southern China: A Report on The Pearl River Della Region, Including the Special Economic Zones (NewYork: Routledge 1996) pp 1-3. Note that other people define this zone in a slightly different way. For example, there is a "small delta" comprised of four cities and 12 counties, originally designated by the central government in 1985. In December 1987, Guangdong, with the permission of the State Council, enlarged the area, adding three more cities and eight more counties. I have not included the municipalities of Xiaoqing or Qingyuan, which are administratively part of the greater Zhu River Delta, because they are economically lagging.
33. See also Peter Tsan-yin Cheung, "Pearl River Delta development," in Joseph Cheng Yu-shek and Maurice Brosseau (eds.), China Review 1993 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1993), ch. 18, pp. 2-3.
34. Suzhou, Wuxi and Changzhou. See Guanbao Shen, "Rural enterprises and urbanization: the Sunan region," in R. Yin-Wang Kwok, William Parish, Anthony Gar-on Yeh, with Xu Xue Qiang (eds.), Chinese Urban Reform: What Model Now? (London: M. E. Sharpe 1990) See p. 171 for a discussion of which areas constitute the southern region of Jiangsu. The authors include Zhejiang in their list. I do not include Zhejiang, following the lead of Jacobs and Lijian Hong, "Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley, p. 241.
35. Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, Shaoxing, Ningbo and Zhoushan. See Keith Forster, "Zhejiang: paradoxes of restoration, reinvigoration and renewal," in David S. G. Goodman (ed.), China's Provinces in Reform: Class, Community and Political Culture (London: Routledge, 1997), especially p. 254.
36. The northern part of Zhejiang province contains about 51% of the population, but contributed 77% of the provincial Gross Value Industrial Output in 1984. See Forster, "Zhejiang: paradoxes of restoration, reinvigoration and renewal," especially p. 254. The author notes that this decreased slightly by 1993, without specifying the details.
37. Development of this manufacturing zone in pre-1949 China has been extensively analysed by, for instance, G. William Skinner, "Regional urbanization in nineteenth-century China," in G. William Skinner (ed.), The City in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977).
38. For details of this political process, see Jacobs and Lijian Hong, "Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley." See also Tian Gang "China's post-1979 uneven regional policy: Shanghai and Guangdong," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (1997), pp. 61-78.
39. For details of this political process, see Jacobs and Lijian Hong, "Shanghai and the Lower Yangzi Valley." See also Tian Gang "China's post-1979 uneven regional policy: Shanghai and Guangdong," Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 6, No. 14 (1997), pp. 61-78.
40. I have drawn on East Asia Analytical Unit, "China's regions - disparities and prospects," in China Embraces the Market: Achievements, Constraints, and Opportunities (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1997), ch. 8, p. 283. Note that I have expanded their original list to include the cities of Beijing, Tanggu, Jinan and Zibo.
41. Dalian, Dandong and Yingkou. For an in-depth discussion of Liaoning province, see Margot Schueller, "Liaoning: struggling with the burdens of the past," in Goodman (ed.), China's Provinces in Reform, pp. 93-121.
42. Panshan, Jingxi, Tangshan, Qinghuangdao, Cangzhou and Tanggu.
43. Qingdao, Yantai, Weifang, Dongying, Weihai, Jinan and Zibo.
44. Again, for the purpose of this paper I set aside the details of manufacturing zones. Marxists could contribute to this effort by spelling out the ways in which productive activities integrate enterprises in these manufacturing zones. Neo-classical economists, on the other hand, could elaborate how exchange relations integrate enterprises within these manufacturing zones.
45. This theme is found in Susan L. Shirk, "The politics of industrial reform," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Christine P. Wong (eds.), The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 195-221.
46. This is not surprising since Shenzhen did not have state-owned enterprises in the beginning of the reform period.
47. This is noted by Yingyi Qian and Joseph Stiglitz, "Institutional innovations and the role of local government in transition economies: the case of Guangdong province of China," in John McMillan and Barry Naughton (eds.), Reforming Asian Socialism: The Growth of Market Institutions (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), pp. 175-193.
48. This is noted in "Who's the Boss?" Far Eastern Economic Review, 5 March 1998, along with other reforms instituted by Zhu Rongji when he was leading Shanghai.
49. This was pointed out to me by Ralph Thorpe, currently engaged on doctoral research about land use in Beijing.
50. For a solid explanation of the "price scissors," see Calla Wiemer, "Price reform and structural change: distributional impediments to allocative gains," Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1992), pp. 171-196.
51. This theme is touched upon by Shirk, "The politics of industrial reform."
52. This tax is 7% of the combined value of the product tax, the VAT and the business tax. See Kim Wang Chan, "Urbanization and urban infrastructure services in the PRC," in Christine P. Wong (ed.), Financing Local Government in the People's Republic of China (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 83-125.
53. Note that a few provinces do not conform to the MZF predictions on one or two of the indicators. For instance, in the case of Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan and Sichuan, there are more non-state enterprises than expected. This is probably due to a high number of collective enterprises from the Maoist period. In the case of Heilongjiang and Jilin, there are more labourers than expected. Again, this is probably due to the Maoist legacy. In the Maoist period, several large collectives were established in these two provinces. Henan and Yunnan illustrate the importance of locationally-bound enterprises in providing industrial job opportunities. In these two provinces, there is greater profit than expected in the non-state sector. Yunnan is the centre of tobacco production for China: Yunnan nianjian (Yunnan Yearbook) (Yunnan: Yunnan nianjian bianjibu, 1996). The major industries performing well in Henan are coal extraction and oil extraction: Henan jingji tongji nianjian (Henan Economic Statistical Yearbook) (Henan: Henan tongji chubanshe, 1996).
54. Simon Long, "Regionalism in Fujian," in David S. G. Goodman and Gerald Segal, China Deconstructs: Politics, Trade and Regionalism (New York: Routledge, 1994), pp. 203-208.
55. Long, "Regionalism in Fujian."
56. An interview with a government official from Fuzhou revealed that the non-state sector in Fuzhou, Fujian, is also relatively vibrant. There are plans for linking Fuzhou, Fujian, and Wenzhou, Zhejiang, but these have not yet materialized.
57. For an overview of the role of state-owned enterprises in China during the Maoist period, see Yang Dali, "Patterns of China's regional development strategy." For a comprehensive overview of the changes to state-owned enterprises during the reform period, see Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. For a review of changes to state-owned enterprises during the early parts of the reform, see Lin, "Open-ended economic reform in China."
58. For an overview of the role of state-owned enterprises in China during the Maoist period, see Yang Dali, "Patterns of China's regional development strategy." For a comprehensive overview of the changes to state-owned enterprises during the reform period, see Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. For a review of changes to state-owned enterprises during the early parts of the reform, see Lin, "Open-ended economic reform in China."
59. For an overview of the role of state-owned enterprises in China during the Maoist period, see Yang Dali, "Patterns of China's regional development strategy." For a comprehensive overview of the changes to state-owned enterprises during the reform period, see Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan. For a review of changes to state-owned enterprises during the early parts of the reform, see Lin, "Open-ended economic reform in China."
60. Heath B. Chamberlain, "Party management relations in Chinese industries: some political dimensions of economic reforms," The China Quarterly, No. 112 (1987), pp. 631-661.
61. In particular, township and village enterprises emerged in force and ate away at the monopoly profits of state-owned enterprise. See Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan, p. 237.
62. For example, the central government ordered all enterprises to begin using the same accounting system beginning on 1 July 1993, and on 1 January 1994, the central government instituted a new tax system in which enterprises were treated equally. See ibid.
63. Sec Michel Bonnin, "Perspectives on social stability after the 15th Party Congress," paper presented at the international conference, The PRC After the 15th Party Congress: Reassessing the Post-Deng Political and Economic Prospects (19-20 February 1998).
64. As noted above, the jobs in Tianjin and Liaoning do not appear sustainable in these data for special reasons. For Liaoning, only a very small part of the province is in a manufacturing zone. For Tianjin, there is competition with Beijing.
65. This is according to the staff calculations of the World Bank, which has a large project examining the economic restructuring in the Heilongjiang province.
66. Shaun Breslin, "Shanxi: China's powerhouse," in David S. G. Goodman, China's Regional Development (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 135-152.
67. Henan jingji tongji nianjian (Henan Economic Statistical Yearbook) (Henan: Henan tongji chubanshe, 1996).
68. Jeffrey D. Sachs and Wing Thye Woo, "Experiences in the transition to a market economy," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 271-76, especially p. 272.
69. Implicit in this debate is the definition of an acceptable criteria for what constitutes "adequate" performance. The interested reader is encouraged to consult the literature cited in the following footnotes.
70. To understand this position, see, for example, Wing Thye Woo, "The art of reforming centrally planned economics: comparing China, Poland, and Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 276-308; Wing Thye Woo, "How successful has Chinese enterprise reform been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 410-437; Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges, in Wing Thye Woo, Stephen Parker and Jeffrey D. Sachs (eds.), Economics in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Wing Thye Woo, "Improving the performance of enterprises in transition countries," in Wing Thye Woo, Parker and Sachs (eds.), Economies in Transition.
71. To understand this position, see, for example, Wing Thye Woo, "The art of reforming centrally planned economics: comparing China, Poland, and Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 276-308; Wing Thye Woo, "How successful has Chinese enterprise reform been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 410-437; Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges, in Wing Thye Woo, Stephen Parker and Jeffrey D. Sachs (eds.), Economics in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Wing Thye Woo, "Improving the performance of enterprises in transition countries," in Wing Thye Woo, Parker and Sachs (eds.), Economies in Transition.
72. To understand this position, see, for example, Wing Thye Woo, "The art of reforming centrally planned economics: comparing China, Poland, and Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 276-308; Wing Thye Woo, "How successful has Chinese enterprise reform been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 410-437; Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges, in Wing Thye Woo, Stephen Parker and Jeffrey D. Sachs (eds.), Economics in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Wing Thye Woo, "Improving the performance of enterprises in transition countries," in Wing Thye Woo, Parker and Sachs (eds.), Economies in Transition.
73. To understand this position, see, for example, Wing Thye Woo, "The art of reforming centrally planned economics: comparing China, Poland, and Russia," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 276-308; Wing Thye Woo, "How successful has Chinese enterprise reform been? Pitfalls in opposite biases and focus," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 410-437; Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges, in Wing Thye Woo, Stephen Parker and Jeffrey D. Sachs (eds.), Economics in Transition: Comparing Asia and Eastern Europe (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1997); Wing Thye Woo, "Improving the performance of enterprises in transition countries," in Wing Thye Woo, Parker and Sachs (eds.), Economies in Transition.
74. By technical efficiency, Woo is referring to increases in capital and labour productivity - what he terms Total Factor Productivity (TFP).
75. There is an interesting exchange between several economists over the computational details of growth calculations. On the one hand, a set of authors argues that during the 1980s state-owned enterprises had a productivity growth of 2.4% in comparison to 4.6% productivity growth of collective-owned enterprises. See Gary H. Jefferson, Thomas G. Rawski and Yuxin Zheng, "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1992), pp. 239-266. Another set of economists argue that this finding is biased. In fact, state-owned enterprises had a negative growth of 1% during the 1980s. See Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges." Afterwards, there was an exchange printed in a journal solely on this point of measuring total factor productivity See Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski and Yunxin Zheng, "Comment on the efficiency and macroeconomic consequences of Chinese enterprise reform by Woo Fan, Hai and Jin," China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 235-241; Wing Thye Woo, Gang Fan, Wen Hai and Yibiao Jin, "Reply to comment by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 243-48.
76. There is an interesting exchange between several economists over the computational details of growth calculations. On the one hand, a set of authors argues that during the 1980s state-owned enterprises had a productivity growth of 2.4% in comparison to 4.6% productivity growth of collective-owned enterprises. See Gary H. Jefferson, Thomas G. Rawski and Yuxin Zheng, "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1992), pp. 239-266. Another set of economists argue that this finding is biased. In fact, state-owned enterprises had a negative growth of 1% during the 1980s. See Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges." Afterwards, there was an exchange printed in a journal solely on this point of measuring total factor productivity See Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski and Yunxin Zheng, "Comment on the efficiency and macroeconomic consequences of Chinese enterprise reform by Woo Fan, Hai and Jin," China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 235-241; Wing Thye Woo, Gang Fan Wen Hai and Yibiao Jin, "Reply to comment by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 243-48.
77. There is an interesting exchange between several economists over the computational details of growth calculations. On the one hand, a set of authors argues that during the 1980s state-owned enterprises had a productivity growth of 2.4% in comparison to 4.6% productivity growth of collective-owned enterprises. See Gary H. Jefferson, Thomas G. Rawski and Yuxin Zheng, "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1992), pp. 239-266. Another set of economists argue that this finding is biased. In fact, state-owned enterprises had a negative growth of 1% during the 1980s. See Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges." Afterwards, there was an exchange printed in a journal solely on this point of measuring total factor productivity See Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski and Yunxin Zheng, "Comment on the efficiency and macroeconomic consequences of Chinese enterprise reform by Woo Fan, Hai and Jin," China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 235-241; Wing Thye Woo, Gang Fan Wen Hai and Yibiao Jin, "Reply to comment by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 243-48.
78. There is an interesting exchange between several economists over the computational details of growth calculations. On the one hand, a set of authors argues that during the 1980s state-owned enterprises had a productivity growth of 2.4% in comparison to 4.6% productivity growth of collective-owned enterprises. See Gary H. Jefferson, Thomas G. Rawski and Yuxin Zheng, "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 40, No. 2 (1992), pp. 239-266. Another set of economists argue that this finding is biased. In fact, state-owned enterprises had a negative growth of 1% during the 1980s. See Yuan Zheng Cao, Gang Fan and Wing Thye Woo, "Chinese economic reforms: past successes and future challenges." Afterwards, there was an exchange printed in a journal solely on this point of measuring total factor productivity See Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski and Yunxin Zheng, "Comment on the efficiency and macroeconomic consequences of Chinese enterprise reform by Woo Fan, Hai and Jin," China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 235-241; Wing Thye Woo, Gang Fan Wen Hai and Yibiao Jin, "Reply to comment by Jefferson, Rawski and Zheng, China Economic Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1994), pp. 243-48.
79. See Wing Thye Woo, "The art of reforming centrally planned economies.
80. See for example, Barry Naughton, "What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise reform and overall system transformation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 470-490; Jefferson, Rawski and Yuxin Zheng "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry"; Kang Chen, Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, Hongchang Wang and Yuxin Zheng, "Productivity change in Chinese industry: 1953-1985," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 570-591; Barry Naughton, "Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation," Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1992), pp. 14-41.
81. See for example, Barry Naughton, "What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise reform and overall system transformation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 470-490; Jefferson, Rawski and Yuxin Zheng "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry"; Kang Chen, Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, Hongchang Wang and Yuxin Zheng, "Productivity change in Chinese industry: 1953-1985," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 570-591; Barry Naughton, "Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation," Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1992), pp. 14-41.
82. See for example, Barry Naughton, "What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise reform and overall system transformation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 470-490; Jefferson, Rawski and Yuxin Zheng "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry"; Kang Chen, Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, Hongchang Wang and Yuxin Zheng, "Productivity change in Chinese industry: 1953-1985," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 570-591; Barry Naughton, "Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation," Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1992), pp. 14-41.
83. See for example, Barry Naughton, "What is distinctive about China's economic transition? State enterprise reform and overall system transformation," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 18, No. 3 (1994), pp. 470-490; Jefferson, Rawski and Yuxin Zheng "Growth, efficiency and convergence in China's state and collective industry"; Kang Chen, Gary Jefferson, Thomas Rawski, Hongchang Wang and Yuxin Zheng, "Productivity change in Chinese industry: 1953-1985," Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988), pp. 570-591; Barry Naughton, "Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation," Modern China, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1992), pp. 14-41.
84. Naughton, "Implications of the state monopoly over industry and its relaxation."
85. David Slark, "Path dependence and privatization strategics in East Central Europe," East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 6, (1992), pp. 17-54.
86. Ivan Szelenyi, "Preface," in Ivan Szelenyi (ed.), Privations the Land: Rural Political Economy in Post-Communist Societies (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 12.