Poisons in the fields: The United Farm Workers, pesticides, and environmental politics

Pacific Historical Review

Volumn 68, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 51-77

  Gordon, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL WORKER; ENVIRONMENTALISM; PESTICIDE; SOCIAL MOVEMENT;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032956815     PISSN: 00308684     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3641869     Document Type: Article

References (150)

1. Ronald B. Taylor, Chavez and the Farm Workers (Boston, 1975), 242.
2. Linda C. Majka and Theo J. Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State (Philadelphia, 1982), 201-203.
3. The terms of the arrangement between growers and the International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) are spelled out in "Chavez Against the Wall," The New Republic, 171 (Dec. 7, 1974), 13-16; folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11 [accession date, July 18, 1978], Works Department, United Farm Workers Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit; hereafter referred to as UFW Collection. Parts of the UFW collection were unprocessed at the time this research was conducted; consequently, boxes that were unprocessed are identified by their accession date.
4. Between 1967 and 1970 this "external, progressive base of support" included important elements within the organized labor movement, numerous progressive religious organizations, leading civil rights organizations, and leading luminaries in the Democratic Party. For an excellent and more detailed discussion of the UFW's progressive alliance and the 1967-1970 table grape boycott, see Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the. 1960s (New York, 1985); Taylor, Chavez and the Farm Workers; Jerald Berry Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 1965-1970: An Evaluation of the Culture of Poverty Theory (New York, 1972).
5. Between 1967 and 1970 this "external, progressive base of support" included important elements within the organized labor movement, numerous progressive religious organizations, leading civil rights organizations, and leading luminaries in the Democratic Party. For an excellent and more detailed discussion of the UFW's progressive alliance and the 1967-1970 table grape boycott, see Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the. 1960s (New York, 1985); Taylor, Chavez and the Farm Workers; Jerald Berry Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 1965-1970: An Evaluation of the Culture of Poverty Theory (New York, 1972).
6. Between 1967 and 1970 this "external, progressive base of support" included important elements within the organized labor movement, numerous progressive religious organizations, leading civil rights organizations, and leading luminaries in the Democratic Party. For an excellent and more detailed discussion of the UFW's progressive alliance and the 1967-1970 table grape boycott, see Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the. 1960s (New York, 1985); Taylor, Chavez and the Farm Workers; Jerald Berry Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 1965-1970: An Evaluation of the Culture of Poverty Theory (New York, 1972).
7. Between 1967 and 1970 this "external, progressive base of support" included important elements within the organized labor movement, numerous progressive religious organizations, leading civil rights organizations, and leading luminaries in the Democratic Party. For an excellent and more detailed discussion of the UFW's progressive alliance and the 1967-1970 table grape boycott, see Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; J. Craig Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency: The Farm Worker Movement in the. 1960s (New York, 1985); Taylor, Chavez and the Farm Workers; Jerald Berry Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 1965-1970: An Evaluation of the Culture of Poverty Theory (New York, 1972).
8. Folder 15, box 178, Sierra Club Records, vol. 1, Sierra Club Collection, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.
9. The use of the term "mainstream environmental organizations" refers to large, national environmental organizations, whose membership tended to be predominantly white and economically middle or upper class, and whose primary orientation relied heavily on a conservationist approach toward the environment. Eventually known as the "Group of Ten," the environmental mainstream included, but was not limited to, the following: the Audubon Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Environmental Policy Institute, Izaak Walton League, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), National Parks Association, Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society. John Bellamy Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class: Lessons From the Ancient Forest Struggles of the Pacific Northwest," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 4 (1993), 11-41; Jim Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green: The Rise of Blue-Collar and Minority Environmentalism in America (San Francisco, 1994), xvii-xxii; Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington, D.C., 1993). For an example of the environmental mainstream's reluctance to become involved in the UFW's boycott, see folder "Environmental Action," box 2 [accession date, July 10, 1975], UFW Collection.
10. The use of the term "mainstream environmental organizations" refers to large, national environmental organizations, whose membership tended to be predominantly white and economically middle or upper class, and whose primary orientation relied heavily on a conservationist approach toward the environment. Eventually known as the "Group of Ten," the environmental mainstream included, but was not limited to, the following: the Audubon Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Environmental Policy Institute, Izaak Walton League, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), National Parks Association, Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society. John Bellamy Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class: Lessons From the Ancient Forest Struggles of the Pacific Northwest," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 4 (1993), 11-41; Jim Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green: The Rise of Blue-Collar and Minority Environmentalism in America (San Francisco, 1994), xvii-xxii; Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington, D.C., 1993). For an example of the environmental mainstream's reluctance to become involved in the UFW's boycott, see folder "Environmental Action," box 2 [accession date, July 10, 1975], UFW Collection.
11. The use of the term "mainstream environmental organizations" refers to large, national environmental organizations, whose membership tended to be predominantly white and economically middle or upper class, and whose primary orientation relied heavily on a conservationist approach toward the environment. Eventually known as the "Group of Ten," the environmental mainstream included, but was not limited to, the following: the Audubon Society, Defenders of Wildlife, Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), Environmental Policy Institute, Izaak Walton League, National Wildlife Federation, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), National Parks Association, Sierra Club, and the Wilderness Society. John Bellamy Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class: Lessons From the Ancient Forest Struggles of the Pacific Northwest," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 4 (1993), 11-41; Jim Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green: The Rise of Blue-Collar and Minority Environmentalism in America (San Francisco, 1994), xvii-xxii; Robert Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington, D.C., 1993). For an example of the environmental mainstream's reluctance to become involved in the UFW's boycott, see folder "Environmental Action," box 2 [accession date, July 10, 1975], UFW Collection.
12. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
13. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
14. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
15. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
16. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
17. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
18. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
19. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
20. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
21. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
22. Robert Gordon, "Shell No!: OCAW and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1984," Environmental History, 3 (1998), 459-486; Schwab, Deeper Shades of Green; Richard Kazis and Richard Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (New York, 1982); Robert Gottlieb, "A Question of Class: The Workplace Experience," Socialist Review, 22 (1992), 131-163; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, Richard White, "'Are You an Environmentalist or Do You Work for a Living?': Work and Nature," in William Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature (New York, 1995); Foster, "The Limits of Environmentalism Without Class"; Roger Keil, "The Green Work Alliance," Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 6 (1995), 63-76; John Bellamy Foster, The Vulnerable Planet: A Short Economic History of the Environment (New York, 1994), 137-138. For those who portray the relationship between workers and environmentalists as typically confrontational, see Mark Dowie, Losing Ground: American Environmentalism at the Close of the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1995), 158-159. Overlooking the long history of cooperation between unions and mainstream environmental organizations, Dowie states, "If there is ever a rapprochement between labor and environmentalists it is unlikely to be between unions and the mainstream environmental movement." See also Charles Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (Philadelphia, 1986), 142-144. In an otherwise excellent history of OSHA, Noble argues that organized labor was and continues to be primarily responsible for the failure of OSHA and strained relations with the environmental mainstream.
23. The power of California's agribusiness industry is demonstrated in Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; Patrick H. Mooney and Theo J. Majka, Farmers' and Farmworkers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture (New York, 1995); Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal (Berkeley, 1994).
24. The power of California's agribusiness industry is demonstrated in Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; Patrick H. Mooney and Theo J. Majka, Farmers' and Farmworkers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture (New York, 1995); Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal (Berkeley, 1994).
25. The power of California's agribusiness industry is demonstrated in Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State; Patrick H. Mooney and Theo J. Majka, Farmers' and Farmworkers' Movements: Social Protest in American Agriculture (New York, 1995); Devra Weber, Dark Sweat, White Gold: California Farm Workers, Cotton, and the New Deal (Berkeley, 1994).
26. Folder 7, box 18, Office of the President, UFW Collection; folder 15, box 35, ibid.
27. For examples of reports on the health impact of exposure to pesticides, see J. R. Dille and P. W. Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," Aerospace Medicine, 35 (1964), 475-478; T. Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides: Acute and Chronic Manifestations," American Journal of Medicine, 50 (1971), 475-492; Occupational Disease in California Related to Pesticides and other Agricultural Chemicals, 1967 (Sacramento, 1968).
28. For examples of reports on the health impact of exposure to pesticides, see J. R. Dille and P. W. Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," Aerospace Medicine, 35 (1964), 475-478; T. Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides: Acute and Chronic Manifestations," American Journal of Medicine, 50 (1971), 475-492; Occupational Disease in California Related to Pesticides and other Agricultural Chemicals, 1967 (Sacramento, 1968).
29. For examples of reports on the health impact of exposure to pesticides, see J. R. Dille and P. W. Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," Aerospace Medicine, 35 (1964), 475-478; T. Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides: Acute and Chronic Manifestations," American Journal of Medicine, 50 (1971), 475-492; Occupational Disease in California Related to Pesticides and other Agricultural Chemicals, 1967 (Sacramento, 1968).
30. Folder 7, box 18, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
31. Folder 4, box 7, ibid.; El Malcriado, Jan. 15, 1969, p. 3; Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 164.
32. Folder 4, box 7, ibid.; El Malcriado, Jan. 15, 1969, p. 3; Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 164.
33. Folder 4, box 7, ibid.; El Malcriado, Jan. 15, 1969, p. 3; Brown, The United Farm Workers Grape Strike and Boycott, 164.
34. Jack Flimmer, ed., Pesticide Chemistry in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C., 1977), 98-99; F. L. McEwen and G. R. Stephenson, The Use and Significance of Pesticides in the Environment (New York, 1979), 166.
35. Jack Flimmer, ed., Pesticide Chemistry in the 20th Century (Washington, D.C., 1977), 98-99; F. L. McEwen and G. R. Stephenson, The Use and Significance of Pesticides in the Environment (New York, 1979), 166.
36. Marion Moses, "Farm Workers and Pesticides," in Robert Bullard, ed., Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (Boston, 1993), 161-178; Robert F. Wasserstrom and Richard Wiles, Field Duty: U.S. Farmworkers and Pesticide Safety (New York, 1985), 1.
37. Marion Moses, "Farm Workers and Pesticides," in Robert Bullard, ed., Confronting Environmental Racism: Voices from the Grassroots (Boston, 1993), 161-178; Robert F. Wasserstrom and Richard Wiles, Field Duty: U.S. Farmworkers and Pesticide Safety (New York, 1985), 1.
38. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; Ronald B. Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," The Nation, 210 (June 22, 1970), 751-753; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Joel Schwartz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," Environment, 17 (June 1975), 26-33; Wasserstrom and Wiles, Field Duty, 3; Ruth Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," The Nation, 209 (Aug. 25, 1969), 134. Wasserstrom and Wiles argue that federal and California regulation of pesticides has remained ineffective and that by 1985 the number of farm workers nationwide who suffered from pesticide poisoning each year exceeded 300,000.
39. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; Ronald B. Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," The Nation, 210 (June 22, 1970), 751-753; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Joel Schwartz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," Environment, 17 (June 1975), 26-33; Wasserstrom and Wiles, Field Duty, 3; Ruth Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," The Nation, 209 (Aug. 25, 1969), 134. Wasserstrom and Wiles argue that federal and California regulation of pesticides has remained ineffective and that by 1985 the number of farm workers nationwide who suffered from pesticide poisoning each year exceeded 300,000.
40. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; Ronald B. Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," The Nation, 210 (June 22, 1970), 751-753; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Joel Schwartz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," Environment, 17 (June 1975), 26-33; Wasserstrom and Wiles, Field Duty, 3; Ruth Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," The Nation, 209 (Aug. 25, 1969), 134. Wasserstrom and Wiles argue that federal and California regulation of pesticides has remained ineffective and that by 1985 the number of farm workers nationwide who suffered from pesticide poisoning each year exceeded 300,000.
41. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; Ronald B. Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," The Nation, 210 (June 22, 1970), 751-753; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Joel Schwartz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," Environment, 17 (June 1975), 26-33; Wasserstrom and Wiles, Field Duty, 3; Ruth Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," The Nation, 209 (Aug. 25, 1969), 134. Wasserstrom and Wiles argue that federal and California regulation of pesticides has remained ineffective and that by 1985 the number of farm workers nationwide who suffered from pesticide poisoning each year exceeded 300,000.
42. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; Ronald B. Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," The Nation, 210 (June 22, 1970), 751-753; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Joel Schwartz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," Environment, 17 (June 1975), 26-33; Wasserstrom and Wiles, Field Duty, 3; Ruth Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," The Nation, 209 (Aug. 25, 1969), 134. Wasserstrom and Wiles argue that federal and California regulation of pesticides has remained ineffective and that by 1985 the number of farm workers nationwide who suffered from pesticide poisoning each year exceeded 300,000.
43. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; Ronald B. Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," The Nation, 210 (June 22, 1970), 751-753; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Joel Schwartz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," Environment, 17 (June 1975), 26-33; Wasserstrom and Wiles, Field Duty, 3; Ruth Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," The Nation, 209 (Aug. 25, 1969), 134. Wasserstrom and Wiles argue that federal and California regulation of pesticides has remained ineffective and that by 1985 the number of farm workers nationwide who suffered from pesticide poisoning each year exceeded 300,000.
44. Moses, "Farm Workers and Pesticides," 14; U.S. Congressional Record, Aug. 1, 1969, p. 21892.
45. Moses, "Farm Workers and Pesticides," 14; U.S. Congressional Record, Aug. 1, 1969, p. 21892.
46. Lester R. Brown, ed., The State of the World (New York, 1988), 21. The Environmental Protection Agency estimated that by 1987 the United States used 1 billion pounds of pesticides annually. See "Pesticide Industry Sales and Usage, 1987 Market Estimates" (Washington, D.C., 1988).
47. Lester R. Brown, ed., The State of the World (New York, 1988), 21. The Environmental Protection Agency estimated that by 1987 the United States used 1 billion pounds of pesticides annually. See "Pesticide Industry Sales and Usage, 1987 Market Estimates" (Washington, D.C., 1988).
48. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33.
49. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33.
50. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33.
51. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collecuon; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33; Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," 751-753.
52. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collecuon; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33; Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," 751-753.
53. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collecuon; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33; Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," 751-753.
54. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collecuon; El Malcriado, Sept. 15, 1969, p. 7; Schwanz, "Poisoning Farm Workers," 26-33; Taylor, "Nerve Gas in the Orchards," 751-753.
55. An estimated 80 to 90 percent of the California agricultural workforce is Latino; P. Martin et al., "A Profile of California Farmworkers," California Agriculture (1985), 16-18.
56. Folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
57. Ibid.
58. The EDF's "legalistic approach" relied primarily on soliciting donations from middle-class individuals concerned about the environment and then using those resources either to enact tougher statutory regulations, to pressure regulatory agencies voluntarily to recommend more effective safeguards, or to win legal suits requiring tougher standards. This legalistic approach typified many mainstream environmental organizations but was most heavily used by the EDF and the NRDC, which was initially staffed almost exclusively by Harvard-educated lawyers and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. See Dowie, Losing Ground, 1-8; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 117-161.
59. The EDF's "legalistic approach" relied primarily on soliciting donations from middle-class individuals concerned about the environment and then using those resources either to enact tougher statutory regulations, to pressure regulatory agencies voluntarily to recommend more effective safeguards, or to win legal suits requiring tougher standards. This legalistic approach typified many mainstream environmental organizations but was most heavily used by the EDF and the NRDC, which was initially staffed almost exclusively by Harvard-educated lawyers and funded by the Rockefeller Foundation. See Dowie, Losing Ground, 1-8; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 117-161.
60. Folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Colin Norman, "Regulating Pesticides: The Delaney Paradox," Science, 236 (1987), 1054; George Hoberg, Pluralism by Design: Environmental Policy and the American Regulatory State (New York, 1992), 120-121. The three states that officially banned DDT before the permanent EPA ban was announced were Michigan (1969), Texas (1969), and Wisconsin (1970). For more on the attempts to pressure the federal Departments of Agriculture and of Health, Education, and Welfare, see Michael D. Green, "The Politics of Pesticides," The Nation, 209 (Nov. 24, 1969), 569-571.
61. Folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Colin Norman, "Regulating Pesticides: The Delaney Paradox," Science, 236 (1987), 1054; George Hoberg, Pluralism by Design: Environmental Policy and the American Regulatory State (New York, 1992), 120-121. The three states that officially banned DDT before the permanent EPA ban was announced were Michigan (1969), Texas (1969), and Wisconsin (1970). For more on the attempts to pressure the federal Departments of Agriculture and of Health, Education, and Welfare, see Michael D. Green, "The Politics of Pesticides," The Nation, 209 (Nov. 24, 1969), 569-571.
62. Folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Colin Norman, "Regulating Pesticides: The Delaney Paradox," Science, 236 (1987), 1054; George Hoberg, Pluralism by Design: Environmental Policy and the American Regulatory State (New York, 1992), 120-121. The three states that officially banned DDT before the permanent EPA ban was announced were Michigan (1969), Texas (1969), and Wisconsin (1970). For more on the attempts to pressure the federal Departments of Agriculture and of Health, Education, and Welfare, see Michael D. Green, "The Politics of Pesticides," The Nation, 209 (Nov. 24, 1969), 569-571.
63. The quote on the need to work cooperatively with the UFW is taken from Garrett De Bell, The Environmental Handbook (New York, 1970), 88.
64. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
65. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
66. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
67. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
68. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
69. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
70. For an example of studies documenting the potential health hazard of organophosphates, see Green, "Politics of Pesticides," 569-571; Harmer, "Poisons, Profits, and Politics," 43; Dille and Smith, "Central Nervous System Effects of Chronic Exposure to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-478; and Namba, et al., "Poisoning Due to Organophosphate Insecticides," 475-492. For cooperation between the EDF and the UFW, see folder 7, box 61, Office of the President, UFW Collection; Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 119-120; Marion Moses, "Pesticide-Related Health Problems and Farmworkers," AAOHN [American Association of Occupational Health Nurses] Journal, March 1989, p. 1 ; and J. M. Last and R. B. Wallace, eds., Public Health and Preventive Medicine (New York, 1992), 488.
71. For evidence of the mainstream's opposition to the use of pesticides, see Kirkpatrick Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental Movement, 1962-1992 (New York, 1993), 21-27; Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement (New York, 1993), 111-120; Joseph A. Page and Mary-Win O'Brien, Bitter Wages: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Disease and Injury on the Job (New York, 1973), 41-44. For evidence of UFW disappointment, see folder 15, box 26, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
72. For evidence of the mainstream's opposition to the use of pesticides, see Kirkpatrick Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental Movement, 1962-1992 (New York, 1993), 21-27; Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement (New York, 1993), 111-120; Joseph A. Page and Mary-Win O'Brien, Bitter Wages: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Disease and Injury on the Job (New York, 1973), 41-44. For evidence of UFW disappointment, see folder 15, box 26, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
73. For evidence of the mainstream's opposition to the use of pesticides, see Kirkpatrick Sale, The Green Revolution: The American Environmental Movement, 1962-1992 (New York, 1993), 21-27; Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental Movement (New York, 1993), 111-120; Joseph A. Page and Mary-Win O'Brien, Bitter Wages: Ralph Nader's Study Group Report on Disease and Injury on the Job (New York, 1973), 41-44. For evidence of UFW disappointment, see folder 15, box 26, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
74. Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 244.
75. Folder 15, box 26, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
76. By the summer of 1969, the boycott had become extremely effective. The union had made the decision to continue targeting the largest grape-consuming markets, such as New York, Boston, Detroit, and Chicago, and by June the boycott had, to varying degrees, become effective in the forty-one largest North American markets. Shipments to these markets were down by 22 percent from 1966. The small independent vineyards in the Coachella Valley felt the impact of the boycott most heavily because New York was their most important market outside of California. Grower Lionel Steinberg estimated that the boycott cost the Coachella growers $3 million during 1969 alone. Folder 7, box 18, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
77. Folder 9, box 19, ibid.; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 142.
78. Folder 9, box 19, ibid.; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 142.
79. Folder 15, box 26, Office of the President, UFW Collection.
80. Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 176.
81. Ronald B. Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," The Nation, 216 (March 19, 1973), 366-370; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 201.
82. Ronald B. Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," The Nation, 216 (March 19, 1973), 366-370; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 201.
83. Ibid.
84. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; " Chavez Against the Wall," 13-16; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 178; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 202; "Cesar Chavez's Decisive Battle," Business Week, Aug. 4, 1973, p. 81.
85. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; " Chavez Against the Wall," 13-16; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 178; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 202; "Cesar Chavez's Decisive Battle," Business Week, Aug. 4, 1973, p. 81.
86. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; " Chavez Against the Wall," 13-16; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 178; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 202; "Cesar Chavez's Decisive Battle," Business Week, Aug. 4, 1973, p. 81.
87. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; " Chavez Against the Wall," 13-16; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 178; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 202; "Cesar Chavez's Decisive Battle," Business Week, Aug. 4, 1973, p. 81.
88. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection; " Chavez Against the Wall," 13-16; Jenkins, Politics of Insurgency, 178; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 202; "Cesar Chavez's Decisive Battle," Business Week, Aug. 4, 1973, p. 81.
89. Folder "Info/Research-Pesticides 1974," box 11, UFW Collection.
90. Hoberg, Pluralism by Design, 124.
91. Ibid., 124-127; "The Dilemma of Pesticides," U.S. News and World Report, 79 (Nov. 3, 1975), 74.
92. Ibid., 124-127; "The Dilemma of Pesticides," U.S. News and World Report, 79 (Nov. 3, 1975), 74.
93. Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 213.
94. Folder "Conditions/Pesticides," box 2 [accession date, June 1, 1978], Administration Files, UFW Collection.
95. Ibid.; El Malcriado, March 9, 1973, pp. 8-9.
96. Ibid.; El Malcriado, March 9, 1973, pp. 8-9.
97. New York Times, March 26, 1972; Time, 104 (Sept. 18, 1974), 13-16; Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," 366-370; Ronald B. Taylor, "Something in the Wind," The Nation, 220 (Feb. 22, 1975), 206-209; "IBT's Grim Warning," Business Week, May 4, 1974, p. 102.
98. New York Times, March 26, 1972; Time, 104 (Sept. 18, 1974), 13-16; Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," 366-370; Ronald B. Taylor, "Something in the Wind," The Nation, 220 (Feb. 22, 1975), 206-209; "IBT's Grim Warning," Business Week, May 4, 1974, p. 102.
99. New York Times, March 26, 1972; Time, 104 (Sept. 18, 1974), 13-16; Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," 366-370; Ronald B. Taylor, "Something in the Wind," The Nation, 220 (Feb. 22, 1975), 206-209; "IBT's Grim Warning," Business Week, May 4, 1974, p. 102.
100. New York Times, March 26, 1972; Time, 104 (Sept. 18, 1974), 13-16; Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," 366-370; Ronald B. Taylor, "Something in the Wind," The Nation, 220 (Feb. 22, 1975), 206-209; "IBT's Grim Warning," Business Week, May 4, 1974, p. 102.
101. New York Times, March 26, 1972; Time, 104 (Sept. 18, 1974), 13-16; Taylor, "A Romance Rekindled," 366-370; Ronald B. Taylor, "Something in the Wind," The Nation, 220 (Feb. 22, 1975), 206-209; "IBT's Grim Warning," Business Week, May 4, 1974, p. 102.
102. Folder "Environmental Action," box 2 [accession date, July 10, 1975], Works Department, UFW Collection.
103. "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, March 1973, p. 18; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 289; Kazis and Grossman, Fear at Work, 247.
104. "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, March 1973, p. 18; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 289; Kazis and Grossman, Fear at Work, 247.
105. "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, March 1973, p. 18; Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 289; Kazis and Grossman, Fear at Work, 247.
106. See, for example, testimony by UAW President Leonard Woodcock in June 1971 before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. Woodcock explicitly rejected employers' efforts to "enlist workers, their unions and the communities in campaigns or resistance to enforcement of those [environmental] standards through overt or implied threats that such enforcement would result in the loss of jobs and income through shutdowns and layoffs." Woodcock went on to say that the cost of environmental pollution was being shouldered primarily by rank-and-file workers and that the time had come to halt the century-long assault on workers and the environment. Folder 3, box 9, Urban Environment Conference Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit; hereafter referred to as the UEC Collection. See also Frank Wallick, "Labor: Paying a Price," Equilibrium, July 1974, pp. 22-25. The labor-environmental coalition operated most effectively between 1976 and the early 1980s. Environmental support was crucial to the passage of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act in 1978 and in the fight to pass the Labor Law Reform Act between 1977 and 1978. Likewise, labor support was important to the passage of the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976 and the Superfund Act in 1980. See, for example, correspondence between the Environmentalists for Full Employment and the AFL-CIO; folder 127, box 434, Environmentalists for Full Employment Collection, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh; hereafter referred to as EFFE Collection; folder 115, box 434, ibid. For a review of environmental legislation enacted during the 1970s, see Sale, The Green Revolution, introduction.
107. See, for example, testimony by UAW President Leonard Woodcock in June 1971 before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. Woodcock explicitly rejected employers' efforts to "enlist workers, their unions and the communities in campaigns or resistance to enforcement of those [environmental] standards through overt or implied threats that such enforcement would result in the loss of jobs and income through shutdowns and layoffs." Woodcock went on to say that the cost of environmental pollution was being shouldered primarily by rank-and-file workers and that the time had come to halt the century-long assault on workers and the environment. Folder 3, box 9, Urban Environment Conference Collection, Walter P. Reuther Library of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit; hereafter referred to as the UEC Collection. See also Frank Wallick, "Labor: Paying a Price," Equilibrium, July 1974, pp. 22-25. The labor-environmental coalition operated most effectively between 1976 and the early 1980s. Environmental support was crucial to the passage of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act in 1978 and in the fight to pass the Labor Law Reform Act between 1977 and 1978. Likewise, labor support was important to the passage of the Toxic Substance Control Act of 1976 and the Superfund Act in 1980. See, for example, correspondence between the Environmentalists for Full Employment and the AFL-CIO; folder 127, box 434, Environmentalists for Full Employment Collection, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh; hereafter referred to as EFFE Collection; folder 115, box 434, ibid. For a review of environmental legislation enacted during the 1970s, see Sale, The Green Revolution, introduction.
108. See, for example, testimony by UAW President Leonard Woodcock in June 1971 before the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. Woodcock explicitly rejected employers' efforts to "enlist workers, their unions and the communities in campaigns or resistance to enforcement of those [environmental] standards through overt or implied threats that such enforcement would result in the loss of jobs and income through shutdowns and layoffs."
109. OCAW President Al Grospiron quoted in the union's newspaper, Union News, 27 (June 1971), 2.
110. Environmental organizations supporting the OCAW strike and boycott included the Friends of the Earth, Izaak Walton League, National Parks and Conservation Association, Environmental Policy Center, Public Interest Economics Center, Environmental Defense Council, Environmental Action, Ecology Center Communications Council, Center for Science in the Public Interest, and the Natural Resources Defense Fund and had a combined membership of nearly a million people. "Shell Oil & Shell Chemical Strike, 1973," 3, folder 3, box 45, OCAW-Local 1-128, Series V, Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers Collection, University of Colorado, Boulder; hereafter referred to as the OCAW Collection.
111. The Sierra Club's decision to endorse the 1973 OCAW strike against Shell Oil came only after months of deliberation and pressure from other environmental groups to get involved. The club's decision was also motivated by the increasingly prevalent perception in the California media that the organization was antilabor. Sierra Club Executive Director Mike McCloskey, the club's Washington D.C., representative David Browder, and others felt that the club had to take a more progressive stand toward labor. These efforts, however, encountered serious resistance among the organization's members. See "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972; Eliot Porter, Jr., The Sierra Club-'Ecclesiastical Self-Confidence,'" The Sierra Club's Loma Prietan, March 1973, p. 5; "Labor Chief Henning Scores Environmentalists," Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1972; Alan Cline, "Labor, Ecology Headed for Showdown," San Francisco Chronicle March 3 1972; John Peterson, "Union Chiefs, Ecologists Clash Over Job Losses," National Observer, 12 (Dec. 9, 1972). For clippings on the role of the Sierra Club see folder 19 "Environmental Organizations and Labor Movements Clippings, 1971-1973," box 174, Sierra Club Members Papers, Ray Sherwin Collection, Sierra Club Collection. For a sample of the negative reaction to the decision to support the OCAW strike, see folder 17, box 177, ibid.
112. The Sierra Club's decision to endorse the 1973 OCAW strike against Shell Oil came only after months of deliberation and pressure from other environmental groups to get involved. The club's decision was also motivated by the increasingly prevalent perception in the California media that the organization was antilabor. Sierra Club Executive Director Mike McCloskey, the club's Washington D.C., representative David Browder, and others felt that the club had to take a more progressive stand toward labor. These efforts, however, encountered serious resistance among the organization's members. See "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972; Eliot Porter, Jr., The Sierra Club-'Ecclesiastical Self-Confidence,'" The Sierra Club's Loma Prietan, March 1973, p. 5; "Labor Chief Henning Scores Environmentalists," Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1972; Alan Cline, "Labor, Ecology Headed for Showdown," San Francisco Chronicle March 3 1972; John Peterson, "Union Chiefs, Ecologists Clash Over Job Losses," National Observer, 12 (Dec. 9, 1972). For clippings on the role of the Sierra Club see folder 19 "Environmental Organizations and Labor Movements Clippings, 1971-1973," box 174, Sierra Club Members Papers, Ray Sherwin Collection, Sierra Club Collection. For a sample of the negative reaction to the decision to support the OCAW strike, see folder 17, box 177, ibid.
113. The Sierra Club's decision to endorse the 1973 OCAW strike against Shell Oil came only after months of deliberation and pressure from other environmental groups to get involved. The club's decision was also motivated by the increasingly prevalent perception in the California media that the organization was antilabor. Sierra Club Executive Director Mike McCloskey, the club's Washington D.C., representative David Browder, and others felt that the club had to take a more progressive stand toward labor. These efforts, however, encountered serious resistance among the organization's members. See "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972; Eliot Porter, Jr., The Sierra Club-'Ecclesiastical Self-Confidence,'" The Sierra Club's Loma Prietan, March 1973, p. 5; "Labor Chief Henning Scores Environmentalists," Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1972; Alan Cline, "Labor, Ecology Headed for Showdown," San Francisco Chronicle March 3 1972; John Peterson, "Union Chiefs, Ecologists Clash Over Job Losses," National Observer, 12 (Dec. 9, 1972). For clippings on the role of the Sierra Club see folder 19 "Environmental Organizations and Labor Movements Clippings, 1971-1973," box 174, Sierra Club Members Papers, Ray Sherwin Collection, Sierra Club Collection. For a sample of the negative reaction to the decision to support the OCAW strike, see folder 17, box 177, ibid.
114. The Sierra Club's decision to endorse the 1973 OCAW strike against Shell Oil came only after months of deliberation and pressure from other environmental groups to get involved. The club's decision was also motivated by the increasingly prevalent perception in the California media that the organization was antilabor. Sierra Club Executive Director Mike McCloskey, the club's Washington D.C., representative David Browder, and others felt that the club had to take a more progressive stand toward labor. These efforts, however, encountered serious resistance among the organization's members. See "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972; Eliot Porter, Jr., The Sierra Club-'Ecclesiastical Self-Confidence,'" The Sierra Club's Loma Prietan, March 1973, p. 5; "Labor Chief Henning Scores Environmentalists," Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1972; Alan Cline, "Labor, Ecology Headed for Showdown," San Francisco Chronicle March 3 1972; John Peterson, "Union Chiefs, Ecologists Clash Over Job Losses," National Observer, 12 (Dec. 9, 1972). For clippings on the role of the Sierra Club see folder 19 "Environmental Organizations and Labor Movements Clippings, 1971-1973," box 174, Sierra Club Members Papers, Ray Sherwin Collection, Sierra Club Collection. For a sample of the negative reaction to the decision to support the OCAW strike, see folder 17, box 177, ibid.
115. The Sierra Club's decision to endorse the 1973 OCAW strike against Shell Oil came only after months of deliberation and pressure from other environmental groups to get involved. The club's decision was also motivated by the increasingly prevalent perception in the California media that the organization was antilabor. Sierra Club Executive Director Mike McCloskey, the club's Washington D.C., representative David Browder, and others felt that the club had to take a more progressive stand toward labor. These efforts, however, encountered serious resistance among the organization's members. See "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972; Eliot Porter, Jr., The Sierra Club-'Ecclesiastical Self-Confidence,'" The Sierra Club's Loma Prietan, March 1973, p. 5; "Labor Chief Henning Scores Environmentalists," Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1972; Alan Cline, "Labor, Ecology Headed for Showdown," San Francisco Chronicle March 3 1972; John Peterson, "Union Chiefs, Ecologists Clash Over Job Losses," National Observer, 12 (Dec. 9, 1972). For clippings on the role of the Sierra Club see folder 19 "Environmental Organizations and Labor Movements Clippings, 1971-1973," box 174, Sierra Club Members Papers, Ray Sherwin Collection, Sierra Club Collection. For a sample of the negative reaction to the decision to support the OCAW strike, see folder 17, box 177, ibid.
116. The Sierra Club's decision to endorse the 1973 OCAW strike against Shell Oil came only after months of deliberation and pressure from other environmental groups to get involved. The club's decision was also motivated by the increasingly prevalent perception in the California media that the organization was antilabor. Sierra Club Executive Director Mike McCloskey, the club's Washington D.C., representative David Browder, and others felt that the club had to take a more progressive stand toward labor. These efforts, however, encountered serious resistance among the organization's members. See "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972; Eliot Porter, Jr., The Sierra Club-'Ecclesiastical Self-Confidence,'" The Sierra Club's Loma Prietan, March 1973, p. 5; "Labor Chief Henning Scores Environmentalists," Sacramento Bee, Feb. 2, 1972; Alan Cline, "Labor, Ecology Headed for Showdown," San Francisco Chronicle March 3 1972; John Peterson, "Union Chiefs, Ecologists Clash Over Job Losses," National Observer, 12 (Dec. 9, 1972). For clippings on the role of the Sierra Club see folder 19 "Environmental Organizations and Labor Movements Clippings, 1971-1973," box 174, Sierra Club Members Papers, Ray Sherwin Collection, Sierra Club Collection. For a sample of the negative reaction to the decision to support the OCAW strike, see folder 17, box 177, ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
120. "Shell Oil & Shell Chemical Strike, 1973"; Cathy Lerza, "Giving Shell Some Gas: Environmental Issues Reach the Bargaining Table," Environmental Action, March 3, 1973, pp. 3-6; "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, 58 (1973), 18; Deborah Shapley, "Shell Strike: Ecologists Refine Relations with Labor," Science, 180 (April 13, 1973), 166.
121. "Shell Oil & Shell Chemical Strike, 1973"; Cathy Lerza, "Giving Shell Some Gas: Environmental Issues Reach the Bargaining Table," Environmental Action, March 3, 1973, pp. 3-6; "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, 58 (1973), 18; Deborah Shapley, "Shell Strike: Ecologists Refine Relations with Labor," Science, 180 (April 13, 1973), 166.
122. "Shell Oil & Shell Chemical Strike, 1973"; Cathy Lerza, "Giving Shell Some Gas: Environmental Issues Reach the Bargaining Table," Environmental Action, March 3, 1973, pp. 3-6; "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, 58 (1973), 18; Deborah Shapley, "Shell Strike: Ecologists Refine Relations with Labor," Science, 180 (April 13, 1973), 166.
123. "Shell Oil & Shell Chemical Strike, 1973"; Cathy Lerza, "Giving Shell Some Gas: Environmental Issues Reach the Bargaining Table," Environmental Action, March 3, 1973, pp. 3-6; "A Broader Look at the Environment," Sierra Club Bulletin, 58 (1973), 18; Deborah Shapley, "Shell Strike: Ecologists Refine Relations with Labor," Science, 180 (April 13, 1973), 166.
124. For the UFW's limited role in the labor-environmental alliance, see Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 290-292.
125. Folder 15, box 178, Sierra Club Records, vol. 1, Sierra Club Collection.
126. Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, 194-195.
127. DeVall, "The Governing of a Voluntary Organization," 184-187.
128. Folder "Mitchell/Goldwin Study of Environmental Action Membership, 6/14/83," box 7, Environmental Action Collection, University of Pittsburgh.
129. Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, 194-195.
130. Folder 53 "Economy and Industrial Relations," box 101, Sierra Club Records, vol. 1, Sierra Club Collection.
131. Folder 15, box 178, ibid.
132. Folder 31 "Grapes-Table-Cold Storage-1969-1974," box 15, Information and Research Files, UFW Collection. The cold storage figures come from a report the UFW put together from numbers California growers supplied to the USDA. Cold storage holding on October 15, 1974 (7.1 million 23-pound lugs) were actually higher than on October 15, 1969 (5.1 million lugs) at the height of the 1967-1970 boycott.
133. Ibid.
134. For more information on the negotiations between the UFW and the AFL-CIO, see folder 17 "AFL-CIO Negotiations, 1974," box 2, Marshall Ganz Files, UFW Collection; folder 7 "AFL-CIO, 1974," box 31, Administration Department Files, ibid.; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 226-233; Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, 192-194. Negotiations between the UFW and the AFL-CIO took place at a March 7, 1974, meeting in George Meany's Washington, D.C., office and suggest that Meany was under considerable political pressure to endorse the UFW boycott but also worried that the other unionized employees affected by the UFW's boycott would be outraged if the AFL-CIO endorsed the UFW without bringing the secondary boycotts to an end.
135. For more information on the negotiations between the UFW and the AFL-CIO, see folder 17 "AFL-CIO Negotiations, 1974," box 2, Marshall Ganz Files, UFW Collection; folder 7 "AFL-CIO, 1974," box 31, Administration Department Files, ibid.; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 226-233; Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, 192-194. Negotiations between the UFW and the AFL-CIO took place at a March 7, 1974, meeting in George Meany's Washington, D.C., office and suggest that Meany was under considerable political pressure to endorse the UFW boycott but also worried that the other unionized employees affected by the UFW's boycott would be outraged if the AFL-CIO endorsed the UFW without bringing the secondary boycotts to an end.
136. For more information on the negotiations between the UFW and the AFL-CIO, see folder 17 "AFL-CIO Negotiations, 1974," box 2, Marshall Ganz Files, UFW Collection; folder 7 "AFL-CIO, 1974," box 31, Administration Department Files, ibid.; Majka and Majka, Farm Workers, Agribusiness, and the State, 226-233; Jenkins, The Politics of Insurgency, 192-194. Negotiations between the UFW and the AFL-CIO took place at a March 7, 1974, meeting in George Meany's Washington, D.C., office and suggest that Meany was under considerable political pressure to endorse the UFW boycott but also worried that the other unionized employees affected by the UFW's boycott would be outraged if the AFL-CIO endorsed the UFW without bringing the secondary boycotts to an end.
137. Folder 17 "AFL-CIO Negotiations, 1974," box 2, Marshall Ganz Files, and folder 7 "AFL-CIO, 1974," box 31, Administration Department Files, UFW Collection.
138. Cesar Chavez, "Farm Workers at Risk," in Richard Hofrichter, ed., Toxic Struggles: The Theory and Practice of Environmental Justice (Philadelphia, 1993), 163-170.
139. Evan T. Barr, "Sour Grapes: Cesar Chavez 20 Years Later," The New Republic, 193 (Nov. 25, 1985), 20; Aaron Burnstein, "Chavez and the UFW," Business Week, Sept. 26, 1983, pp. 86-88; Mooney and Majka, Farmers and Farm Workers Movements, 191.
140. Evan T. Barr, "Sour Grapes: Cesar Chavez 20 Years Later," The New Republic, 193 (Nov. 25, 1985), 20; Aaron Burnstein, "Chavez and the UFW," Business Week, Sept. 26, 1983, pp. 86-88; Mooney and Majka, Farmers and Farm Workers Movements, 191.
141. Evan T. Barr, "Sour Grapes: Cesar Chavez 20 Years Later," The New Republic, 193 (Nov. 25, 1985), 20; Aaron Burnstein, "Chavez and the UFW," Business Week, Sept. 26, 1983, pp. 86-88; Mooney and Majka, Farmers and Farm Workers Movements, 191.
142. Sale, The Green Revolution, 23;
143. Susan Zakin, Coyotes and Town Dogs: EARTH FIRST! and the Environmental Movement (New York, 1993), 168. The Sierra Club's membership continued to increase in the 1970s and especially in the 1980s, partly, as with other environmental organizations, in a backlash against the anti-environmental policies of the Reagan administration.
144. Michael P. Cohen, The History of the Sierra Club, 1892-1970 (San Francisco, 1988), 395-434.
145. For more on the UFW's support of Proposition 128, see Chavez, "Farm Workers at Risk," 167-168.
146. For a more detailed discussion of the labor and environmental legislation enacted during the 1970s and the role the labor-environmental alliance played in its passage, see Robert Gordon, "Environmental Blues: Working-Class Environmentalism and the Labor-Environmental Alliance, 1968-1985" (Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State University, forthcoming).
147. Gottlieb, Forcing the Spring, 291.
148. In January 1972, for example, the California AFL-CIO News charged, "What should be a natural alliance between progressive forces is becoming instead a bitter struggle between unions and those who couldn't care less about unemployed workers." "Labor Attacks the 'Conservation Caper,'" San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 18, 1972.
149. Evans to McCloskey, Feb. 14, 1973, folder 27 "Shell Oil Company-OCAW Strike-1973," box 61, National Legislative Office Records, Sierra Club Collection. See also McCloskey to OCAW Environmental and Education Representative Richard Engler, Feb. 15, 1973, in which McCloskey stated that it was likely that the Sierra Club would provide striking workers with support; folder 53 "Economy and Industrial Relations," box 101, ibid.
150. Evans to McCloskey, Feb. 14, 1973, folder 27 "Shell Oil Company-OCAW Strike-1973," box 61, National Legislative Office Records, Sierra Club Collection. See also McCloskey to OCAW Environmental and Education Representative Richard Engler, Feb. 15, 1973, in which McCloskey stated that it was likely that the Sierra Club would provide striking workers with support; folder 53 "Economy and Industrial Relations," box 101, ibid.