Peace-building in the periphery: Lessons from Central America

Third World Quarterly

Volumn 20, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 51-68

  Pearce, Jenny ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRADFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; PEACE PROCESS; STATE ROLE;

CENTRAL AMERICA;

EID: 0032938687     PISSN: 01436597     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01436599913910     Document Type: Article

References (52)

1. The UN coined the term CPE to describe the major crises which have proliferated since 1989 which are multi-causal and require a multi-mandated international response: a combination of military intervention, peace-keeping efforts, relief programmes, high-level diplomacy, etc. D Eade, 'Preface', in D Eade (ed), Development in States of War, Oxford: Oxfam, 1996, p. 5.
2. Complex Political Emergencies: From Relief Work to Sustainable Development? Briefing Paper, November 1997, p 4.
3. Rwanda had a GNP per capita of US$180 in 1995; 45.7% of its population were living on less than $1 a day; Nicaragua had a per capita income of $380, and 43.8% of its population were living on less than $1 a day; Guatemala has a per capita income of $1340 but 53.3% of its population live on less than $1 a day. World Bank, The State in a Changing World, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
4. The Guatemalan conflict is generally dated from 1960 when the guerrilla movements were first formed; in Nicaragua the war dates from the formation of the US-funded counterrevolutionary army, the Contra, in 1982. The Salvadorean war broke out with the guerrilla offensive of 1981.
5. A useful overview of the Central American wars and their aftermath is Carlos M Vilas, Between Earthquakes and Volcanoes, Market, Slate, and The Revolutions in Central America, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1995.
6. C Boone, 'States and ruling classes in Africa, in J S Migdal, A Kohli & V Shue (eds), State Power and Social Forces, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p 142.
7. M Bratton, 'Peasant-state relations in post-colonial Africa: patterns of engagement and disengagement', in J S Migdal el al, State Power and Social forces, p 231.
8. William Reno, 'Wars, markets and the reconfiguration of West Africa's weak states, Comparative Politics, 29(4), 1997.
9. M. Duffield, Evaluating Conflict Resolution - Context, Models and Methodology, Discussion Paper prepared for the Michelson Institute, Bergen, Norway, May 1997, pp 79-12.
10. The World Bank's commitment to private sector development the them to explore the obstacles facing this in El Salvador through An enterprise survey. It found that instability of prices and government remained the dominant concern, with problems of security, particularly 'common delinquency ranking fifth, equal with policy and exchange rate uncertainty. World Bunk, Meeting the Challenge of Globalization, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996.
11. In Afghanistan, for example, it is UNDP which is the most articulate promoter of a state-building project.
12. For a more detailed analysis of the macro-level policy environment in postwar El Salvador and Nicaragua, sec J Pearce, 'From civil war to "civil society": has the end of the Cold War brought peace, to Central America, International Affairs, June 1998.
13. Peace was agreed in Nicaragua with the Contras initially under the Sandinista government but not formally ratified until 1990 after the Sandinistas had lost the election. The Salvadorean peace accords were signed in January 1992.
14. This is the title of the World Bank Country Study of El Salvador published in Washington, 1996.
15. James K Boyce, 'Introduction', in Boyce (ed), Economic Policy for Building Peace: The Lessons of El Salvador, Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner, 1996, p 3.
16. Ibid., p 4.
17. A Segovia, 'Domestic resource mobilization', in Boyce, Economic Policy for Building Peace, p 123.
18. The share of income accruing to the wealthiest 10% of Salvadorean households rose from 31% to over 38% between 1977 and 1990-91. Manual Pastor & Michael E Contra, 'Distributional implication', in Boyce, Economic Policy for Building Peace, p 157.
19. A Segovia, 'Macroeconomic performance and policies since 1989', in Boyce, Economic Policy for Building Peace, p 57.
20. World Bank, Meeting the Challenge of Globalisation op. cit.
21. USAID calculated in 1993 that remittances increased the income of poor urban and rural families by one-third. Segovia, 'Macroeconomic performance and policies since 1989', in Boyce, Economic Policy for Building Peace, p. 56.
22. Quoted in J Spence et al, Chapultepec: Five Years Later, Cambridge, MA: Hemisphere Initiatives, January 1997.
23. This process is detailed in William Leogrande, 'Making the economy scream: US economic sanctions against Sandinista Nicaragua', Third World Quarterly, 17(2), pp 329-348.
24. 'USAID'S strategy in Nicaragua', Envio, May 1993, pp 23-25.
25. David Dye et al., Contesting Everything, Winning Nothing: The Search for Consensus in Nicaragua, 1990-95, Cambridge, MA: Hemisphere Initiatives, November 1995.
26. Banco Mundial, Nicaragua, Estudio de la Pobreza, Resumen Ejecutivo, mimeo, Managua, 1995.
27. Dye et al, Contesting Everything, Winning Nothing, p 10.
28. Ibid.
29. Center for International Policy, Central America Update, 29 November-5 December 1997.
30. J Spence et al, Chapultepec, p 9.
31. P J Williams & Knut Walter, Militarization and Demilitarization in El Salvador's Transition to Democracy, Pittsburgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997, p 169.
32. Ibid., p 174.
33. Latin American Monitor, Central America. April 1997.
34. J Spence, Democracy Weakened? A Report on the October 20 1996 Nicaraguan Elections, Washington, DC: Hemisphere Initiatives and Washington Office on Latin America, 22 November 1997.
35. Jose Miguel Cruz & Luis Armando González, 'Magnitude de la violencia en El Salvador', Estudios Centroamericanos, 588, 1997.
36. This has been amply documented. Since the USA backed the coup which overthrew the reforming president Jacobo Arbenz in 1954 in Guatemala, it systematically blocked the reforming as well as revolutionary movement for change in the region. See J Pearce, Under the Eagle: US Intervention in Central America and the Caribbean, London: Latin America Bureau, 1982.
37. An estimated $280 million in non-reimbursable funds were mobilised for projects in the seven countries affected by war (Belize, Mexico, Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala. Nicaragua and El Salvador), and a further $158 million within the framework of PRODERE, mostly from the Italian government. PRODEREconcentrated on six countries (not Mexico) at first, and since 1993 on six former conflict zones of El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua and six former refugee reception areas in Belize, Honduras and Costa Rica. United Nations, Third International Meeting of the CIREFCA Follow-Up Committee, 28 and 29 Jane, mimeo, Mexico, 1994.
38. An example of the pluralistic, integrated and participatory approaches promoted through PRODERE are the Local Development Committees and Local Development Agencies, known as ADELS, which were intended to involve all local actors (private sector, beneficiary organisations, NGOS) in the rebuilding of the local economy. Fourteen of these were functioning by the time the PRODERER programme finished officially in 1995 (interview with Jairo Morales of UNOPS, 13 July 1997) with some delay between the relaunching of a new Programme of Sustainable Human Development at the Local Level in Central America (PROGRESS) in 1997. It is difficult TO assess the success of this strategy given the lack of external evaluation. Evidence suggests it worked best in areas, such as Chalatenango in El Salvador, where a local and popularly rooted NGO was active.
39. This is systematically explored in G Perez de Castillo & M Fahlen, CIREFCA An Opportunity and Challenge for Inter-agency Cooperation, Joint UNDP/UNHCR Review, mimeo, May 1995. Another study points to the different conceptions on how to link relief with development. UNHCR favoured a two-step approach where development followed on from an initial, relief operation, while UNDP supported a continuum approach from initial emergency aid through to development assistance. In practice UNHCR moved to accepting the UNDP approach, but did not participate in the overall plannnig of the emergency intervention which encompassed the eight countries involved in CIREFCA. Mary Ann Larkin, Review of the CIREFCA Process, UNHCR, EVAL/CIREF, 14, mimeo, May 1994.
40. This is systematically explored in G Perez de Castillo & M Fahlen, CIREFCA An Opportunity and Challenge for Inter-agency Cooperation, Joint UNDP/UNHCR Review, mimeo, May 1995. Another study points to the different conceptions on how to link relief with development. UNHCR favoured a two-step approach where development followed on from an initial, relief operation, while UNDP supported a continuum approach from initial emergency aid through to development assistance. In practice UNHCR moved to accepting the UNDP approach, but did not participate in the overall plannnig of the emergency intervention which encompassed the eight countries involved in CIREFCA. Mary Ann Larkin, Review of the CIREFCA Process, UNHCR, EVAL/CIREF, 14, mimeo, May 1994.
41. An interesting case study of these problems is Chris van der Borgh, 'Decision-making and participation in poverty alleviation programmers in post-war Chalatenango, El Salvador', European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies, 63, 1997, pp 49-66. The author identifies the many difficulties experienced by donors trying to reach the grassroots and how they often end up delivering projects to communities out failing to help the communities analyse their problems and prioritise the projects most needed by them. The agenda of outside intermediaries rapidly becomes the driving force behind the intervention.
42. Refugee Policy Group, RPG Contribution to the Assessment of PRODERE, Washington, DC, 22 December 1994.
43. Peter Sollis, 'Partners in development? The state, non-governmental organisations and the UN in Central America', Third World Quarterly, 16(3), pp 525-542.
44. The Swedish government for instance, channelled 80% of its financial commitment to CIREFCA through NGOS. UNCR/UNDP, Review of the CIREFCA Process.
45. Larkin, Review of the CIREFCA Process, p 53. For a critical examination of this dynamic in El Salvador; see M Foley, 'Laying the groundwork: the struggle for civil society in El Salvador, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38(1), pp 67-104.
46. Larkin, Review of the CIREFCA Process, p 53. For a critical examination of this dynamic in El Salvador; see M Foley, 'Laying the groundwork: the struggle for civil society in El Salvador, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 38(1), pp 67-104.
47. R Cordero, "Evaluation of the reintegration process of the CIREFCA population in the Central and Northern regions of Nicaragua', mimeo, Managua, May 1996.
48. World Development Report 1997, op cit.
49. Mark Duffield, 'Normalising, the crisis - from complex emergencies to social reconstruction', in Jenny Edkins (ed), The Politics of Emergence, mimeo, Department of Government, University of Manchester, Manchester Papers in Politics, February 1997.
50. In Guatemala, the ruling PAN party represents the more technocratic and modernising forces in the country and has embraced a strategy of modernisation. However, it is also closely tied to the wealthy classes and lacks a social and political base outside the urban areas, a factor prejudicing its long-term survival as a party of government.
51. World Development Report, 1997, op cit., p 18.
52. The idea of 'civility' and a moral order arising out of the interaction of individuals in the market place, freed from the constraints of kinship but also in need of new ethical bonds to replace those previously provided by family and kin, is at the heart of the first formulations of the concept of 'civil society' by European Enlightenment philosophers such as Ferguson and Hegel.