Crises and bail-outs of banks and countries: Linkages, analogies, and differences

World Economy

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 55-86

  De Bonis, Riccardo ^a   Giustiniani, Alessandro ^b   Gomel, Giorgio ^a  

^a BANK OF ITALY   (Italy)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BANKING; DEBT CRISIS; FINANCIAL CRISIS;

EID: 0032903161     PISSN: 03785920     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9701.00193     Document Type: Article

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