U.S. dual-use exports to China, Chinese behavior, and the Israel factor effective controls?

Asian Survey

Volumn 39, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 193-213

  Clarke, Duncan L ^a   Johnston, Robert J ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EXPORT; GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; TRADE POLICY;

CHINA; ISRAEL; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032884144     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2645452     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Export Control, December 1997 (typescript).
2. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Export Controls: Issues Related to the Export of Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD-98-211, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1998, pp. 5-7; John Mintz, "How Hughes Got What It Wanted on China," Washington Post, June 25, 1998, p. A1, and "NSC Papers Trace Concerns on Export Waivers for China," ibid., June 11, 1998, p. A10.
3. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Export Controls: Issues Related to the Export of Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD-98-211, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1998, pp. 5-7; John Mintz, "How Hughes Got What It Wanted on China," Washington Post, June 25, 1998, p. A1, and "NSC Papers Trace Concerns on Export Waivers for China," ibid., June 11, 1998, p. A10.
4. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), Export Controls: Issues Related to the Export of Communications Satellites, T-NSIAD-98-211, Washington, D.C., June 17, 1998, pp. 5-7; John Mintz, "How Hughes Got What It Wanted on China," Washington Post, June 25, 1998, p. A1, and "NSC Papers Trace Concerns on Export Waivers for China," ibid., June 11, 1998, p. A10.
5. Interviews with four U.S. government officials, Washington, D.C., May-June 1998; GAO, Export Controls: Issues Related, p. 7. See also GAO, Export Controls: Some Controls over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China Are Weak, NSIAD-95-82, April 17, 1995.
6. Interviews with four U.S. government officials, Washington, D.C., May-June 1998; GAO, Export Controls: Issues Related, p. 7. See also GAO, Export Controls: Some Controls over Missile-Related Technology Exports to China Are Weak, NSIAD-95-82, April 17, 1995.
7. GAO, Export Controls: Issues Related, pp. 7-10; Mintz, "How Hughes Got What It Wanted," p. A1, and "Supporters Say High-Tech Export Control Watchdog Has Been Neutered," Washington Post, June 26, 1998, p. A9.
8. GAO, Export Controls: Issues Related, pp. 7-10; Mintz, "How Hughes Got What It Wanted," p. A1, and "Supporters Say High-Tech Export Control Watchdog Has Been Neutered," Washington Post, June 26, 1998, p. A9.
9. GAO, Export Controls: Issues Related, pp. 7-10; Mintz, "How Hughes Got What It Wanted," p. A1, and "Supporters Say High-Tech Export Control Watchdog Has Been Neutered," Washington Post, June 26, 1998, p. A9.
10. Roberto Suro and John Harris, "Clinton Rejected China Worries," Washington Post, May 23, 1998, p. A1; and Roberto Suro and John Mintz, "Bungled Report, Bureaucracy Collide in China Waiver," ibid., May 31, 1998, p. A16. Loral's chairman, Bernard Schwartz, contributed over $1 million to the Democratic Party between 1995 and 1997.
11. Roberto Suro and John Harris, "Clinton Rejected China Worries," Washington Post, May 23, 1998, p. A1; and Roberto Suro and John Mintz, "Bungled Report, Bureaucracy Collide in China Waiver," ibid., May 31, 1998, p. A16. Loral's chairman, Bernard Schwartz, contributed over $1 million to the Democratic Party between 1995 and 1997.
12. For clashing perspectives, see statement of Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) and testimony of Joan Johnson-Freese and Shirley A. Kan, U.S. House, Committees on International Relations and National Security, Joint Hearing, U.S. Policy Regarding Satellite Exports to China, 105th Cong., 2d sess., June 17-18, 1998 (typescript); testimony of Gary Milhollin, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, 105th Cong., 2d sess., July 9, 1998; Barbara Opall-Rome, "Dual-Hatted Role Presents Holum with Contradictions," Defense News, June 29-July 5, 1998, p. 32; and Michael Hirsh, "The Great Technology Giveaway?" Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998), pp. 2-9.
13. For clashing perspectives, see statement of Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) and testimony of Joan Johnson-Freese and Shirley A. Kan, U.S. House, Committees on International Relations and National Security, Joint Hearing, U.S. Policy Regarding Satellite Exports to China, 105th Cong., 2d sess., June 17-18, 1998 (typescript); testimony of Gary Milhollin, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, 105th Cong., 2d sess., July 9, 1998; Barbara Opall-Rome, "Dual-Hatted Role Presents Holum with Contradictions," Defense News, June 29-July 5, 1998, p. 32; and Michael Hirsh, "The Great Technology Giveaway?" Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998), pp. 2-9.
14. For clashing perspectives, see statement of Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) and testimony of Joan Johnson-Freese and Shirley A. Kan, U.S. House, Committees on International Relations and National Security, Joint Hearing, U.S. Policy Regarding Satellite Exports to China, 105th Cong., 2d sess., June 17-18, 1998 (typescript); testimony of Gary Milhollin, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, 105th Cong., 2d sess., July 9, 1998; Barbara Opall-Rome, "Dual-Hatted Role Presents Holum with Contradictions," Defense News, June 29-July 5, 1998, p. 32; and Michael Hirsh, "The Great Technology Giveaway?" Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998), pp. 2-9.
15. For clashing perspectives, see statement of Congressman Floyd Spence (R-South Carolina) and testimony of Joan Johnson-Freese and Shirley A. Kan, U.S. House, Committees on International Relations and National Security, Joint Hearing, U.S. Policy Regarding Satellite Exports to China, 105th Cong., 2d sess., June 17-18, 1998 (typescript); testimony of Gary Milhollin, U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Hearing, 105th Cong., 2d sess., July 9, 1998; Barbara Opall-Rome, "Dual-Hatted Role Presents Holum with Contradictions," Defense News, June 29-July 5, 1998, p. 32; and Michael Hirsh, "The Great Technology Giveaway?" Foreign Affairs 77 (September/October 1998), pp. 2-9.
16. John Mintz, "Panel Says Firms Gave China Aid on Missiles," Washington Post, December 31, 1998, p. A1.
17. Ibid.
18. Interviews, U.S. government officials, Washington, D.C., May-July 1998. Michael Swaine of the Rand Corporation and others agree. See "Classified Report at Heart of Accusation of Technology Loss to China," Washington Post, May 31, 1998, p. A16.
19. Barrie McKenna, "AECL Expects U.S. Rivals in China," Globe and Mail, October 15, 1997, p. B6; P. Felgengauer, "An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales," in Russia in the World Arms Trade, eds. Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 94; and Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Reactor Firms Maneuvering to Tap China's Vast Market," Washington Post, October 21, 1997, p. A1.
20. Barrie McKenna, "AECL Expects U.S. Rivals in China," Globe and Mail, October 15, 1997, p. B6; P. Felgengauer, "An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales," in Russia in the World Arms Trade, eds. Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 94; and Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Reactor Firms Maneuvering to Tap China's Vast Market," Washington Post, October 21, 1997, p. A1.
21. Barrie McKenna, "AECL Expects U.S. Rivals in China," Globe and Mail, October 15, 1997, p. B6; P. Felgengauer, "An Uneasy Partnership: Sino-Russian Defense Cooperation and Arms Sales," in Russia in the World Arms Trade, eds. Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitri V. Trenin (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), p. 94; and Dan Morgan and David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Reactor Firms Maneuvering to Tap China's Vast Market," Washington Post, October 21, 1997, p. A1.
22. Bill Gertz, "Nuclear Sales to China Too Chancy, Foes Insist," Washington Times, October 28, 1997, p. A1.
23. Richard T. Cupitt, "One Country, Three Systems: Nonproliferation Export Controls and the Role of China in the International System" (paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Minneapolis, March 17-21, 1998); and "China: PRC Regulations on Nuclear Exports," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/China (DR/C), September 13, 1997.
24. Richard T. Cupitt, "One Country, Three Systems: Nonproliferation Export Controls and the Role of China in the International System" (paper presented at the International Studies Association Conference, Minneapolis, March 17-21, 1998); and "China: PRC Regulations on Nuclear Exports," in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/China (DR/C), September 13, 1997.
25. Cupitt, "One Country, Three Systems," pp. 7, 15-19. See also Zachary S. Davis, "Theory and Practice of China's Export Controls," in U.S. and Japanese Nonproliferation Export Controls, eds. Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt, and Takehiko Yamamoto (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 221-42.
26. Cupitt, "One Country, Three Systems," pp. 7, 15-19. See also Zachary S. Davis, "Theory and Practice of China's Export Controls," in U.S. and Japanese Nonproliferation Export Controls, eds. Gary K. Bertsch, Richard T. Cupitt, and Takehiko Yamamoto (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1996), pp. 221-42.
27. Ambassador Pasi Patokallio, speech, "The Future of Nuclear Export Controls," NSG Transparency Seminar, Vienna, Austria, October 8, 1997 (typescript).
28. See Shirley A. Kan, China's Compliance with International Arms Control Commitments, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1998. Some Chinese have told Americans that, concerning nuclear proliferation, "Pakistan is China's Israel." See Douglas Paal, "China and East Asian Security Environment," in Living with China, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 113.
29. See Shirley A. Kan, China's Compliance with International Arms Control Commitments, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1998. Some Chinese have told Americans that, concerning nuclear proliferation, "Pakistan is China's Israel." See Douglas Paal, "China and East Asian Security Environment," in Living with China, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 113.
30. See Shirley A. Kan, China's Compliance with International Arms Control Commitments, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., 1998. Some Chinese have told Americans that, concerning nuclear proliferation, "Pakistan is China's Israel." See Douglas Paal, "China and East Asian Security Environment," in Living with China, ed. Ezra F. Vogel (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), p. 113.
31. Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, June 1997), p. 5. A leaked CIA report in 1997 warned that Russian enrichment technology exported to China could be sent to an unsafeguarded facility in Pakistan through the use of "false end-user certificates" and "subterfuge" approved by senior Chinese government officials. Gertz, "Nuclear Sales," p. A1.
32. Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, June 1997), p. 5. A leaked CIA report in 1997 warned that Russian enrichment technology exported to China could be sent to an unsafeguarded facility in Pakistan through the use of "false end-user certificates" and "subterfuge" approved by senior Chinese government officials. Gertz, "Nuclear Sales," p. A1.
33. Barton Gellman and Joan Pomfret, "U.S. Action Stymied China Sale to Iran," Washington Post, March 13, 1998, p. A-1.
34. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Office of International Security Affairs, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: November 1998), pp. 49-50. See also Michael Laris, "U.S. Team in China Said to Raise Issue of Missile Trading," Washington Post, November 13, 1998, p. A36.
35. U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Office of International Security Affairs, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: November 1998), pp. 49-50. See also Michael Laris, "U.S. Team in China Said to Raise Issue of Missile Trading," Washington Post, November 13, 1998, p. A36.
36. U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs, Hearing: Proliferation Threats of the 1990s, 103rd Cong., 1st sess., 1993, p. 135.
37. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Threat Control Through Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1997), pp. 51, 72, 75.
38. Michael Moodie, "The Challenge of Technology Diffusion," Washington Quarterly 18 (Spring 1995), pp. 183-202.
39. U.S. ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1996 (Washington, D.C.: ACDA, 1997), p. 1.
40. See Geoffrey Kemp, "Military Technology and Conflict," in Managing Global Chaos, ed. Chester Crocker (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 134-35.
41. Suzanne Wood, Martin F. Wiskoff, and Callie J. Chandler, Illegal Technology Transfer: Patterns of U.S. Export Control Violations 1981-93 (Monterey, Calif.: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 1994), pp. vi-vii.
42. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Control (BXA), "New York Company Fined for Illegal Exports to China" (press release), October 16, 1997, on the Internet at 〈http://www.bxa.doc.gov/lansing2.htm〉.
43. Wood, Wiskoff, and Chandler, Illegal Technology Transfer, p. viii. The study found (p. 37) that 80% of the fines were less than $20,000.
44. U.S. Department of Commerce, BXA, "Sigma Chemical Penalized $480,000 for Biotoxin Exports" (press release), July 8, 1996, on the Internet at 〈http://www.bxz.gov/sigma.htm〉.
45. Red flag indicators include such things as customers with little or no business background, product capabilities that do not fit the buyer's line of business, and so forth. Red flag guidelines are available from the Department of Commerce on the Internet at 〈http\\www. bxa.doc\redflags.htm〉.
46. Interview, U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., May 1998; and Barbara Opall-Rome, "Chinese Skirt U.S. Sanctions on Parts," Defense News, April 20-26, 1998, p. 1.
47. See Solomon M. Karmel, "The Chinese Military's Hunt for Profits," Foreign Policy 107 (Summer 1997), pp. 102-13.
48. GAO, Export Controls: Sale of Telecommunications Equipment to China, NSIAD-97-5, Washington, D.C., 1996.
49. John Pomfret, "Jiang Tells Army to End Trade Role," Washington Post, July 23, 1998, p. A1.
50. GAO, Export Controls: Sensitive Machine Tool Exports to China, NSIAD-97-4, Washington, D.C., 1996, pp. 4, 8.
51. Ibid., pp. 22-23.
52. GAO, Export Controls: Some Controls, p. 3.
53. See Code of Federal Regulations, Ch. VII(C), 736.2, 738.4.
54. Interviews, U.S. government officials, Washington, D.C., January and June 1998.
55. Special Interagency Review, Offices of Inspector General, U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, Energy, and State, The Federal Government's Export Licensing Processes for Munitions and Dual-Use Commodities, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 3, A10.
56. Ibid., pp. A14-A15. Similar problems were found on the munitions control side with State's Blue Lantern program.
57. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Inspector General, "Export Application Screening Process Could Benefit from Further Changes," Rpt. No. IPE-9524, Washington, D.C., September 1997.
58. Interviews, U.S. government officials, January and June 1998; and David Ruppe, "China Challenging U.S. Export-Control Capability," New Technology Week, January 12, 1998, p. 2.
59. See Karl W. Eikenberry, Explaining and Influencing Chinese Arms Transfers, McNair Paper 36 (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1995).
60. John Lancaster, "U.S. Role as Arms Merchant to Kuwait Faces Challenge by China," Washington Post, July 15, 1997, p. A14.
61. Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, October 30, 1997, p. A1; and Kan, China's Compliance , p. 11 .
62. Bill Gertz, "China Aided Iran Chemical Arms," Washington Times, October 30, 1997, p. A1; and Kan, China's Compliance , p. 11 .
63. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearing: Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997; Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute, 1994); and Carla Anne Robbins, "China Got Secret Data on U.S. Warhead," Wall Street Journal (WSJ), January 7, 1999, p. A3.
64. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearing: Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997; Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute, 1994); and Carla Anne Robbins, "China Got Secret Data on U.S. Warhead," Wall Street Journal (WSJ), January 7, 1999, p. A3.
65. U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Hearing: Economic Espionage, Technology Transfers and National Security, 105th Cong., 1st sess., 1997; Nicholas Eftimiades, Chinese Intelligence Operations (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute, 1994); and Carla Anne Robbins, "China Got Secret Data on U.S. Warhead," Wall Street Journal (WSJ), January 7, 1999, p. A3.
66. Paul Blustein, "China Plays Rough: 'Invest and Transfer Technology, or No Market Access'," Washington Post, October 25, 1997, p. C1. A top U.S. government official expected this to occur with U.S. nuclear technology transfers to China. Interview, Washington, D.C., January 1998.
67. See Richard Fisher, How America's Friends Are Building China's Military Power, Heritage Backgrounder, no. 1146 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, November 5, 1997); and Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisition from Abroad, SIPRI Res. Rpt. No. 11 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
68. See Richard Fisher, How America's Friends Are Building China's Military Power, Heritage Backgrounder, no. 1146 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, November 5, 1997); and Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, China's Arms Acquisition from Abroad, SIPRI Res. Rpt. No. 11 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
69. GAO, China: Military Imports from the United States and the European Union Since the 1989 Embargoes, NSIAD-98-176. Washington, D.C., June 1998, pp. 2-4.
70. GAO, China: Military Imports, p. 10.
71. Ibid., p. 10; John Pomfret, "China, Russia Forging Partnership," Washington Post, November, 1998, p. A13; and interviews and briefings, officials of government on Taiwan, Taipei, August 1998. See also DOD, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 1998, on the Internet at 〈http://www.defensenews.comm〉.
72. Ibid., p. 10; John Pomfret, "China, Russia Forging Partnership," Washington Post, November, 1998, p. A13; and interviews and briefings, officials of government on Taiwan, Taipei, August 1998. See also DOD, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 1998, on the Internet at 〈http://www.defensenews.comm〉.
73. Ibid., p. 10; John Pomfret, "China, Russia Forging Partnership," Washington Post, November, 1998, p. A13; and interviews and briefings, officials of government on Taiwan, Taipei, August 1998. See also DOD, Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China, Washington, D.C., 1998, on the Internet at 〈http://www.defensenews.comm〉.
74. Steve Rodan, "IAI, Russian Industries Seek to Wed Tech, Old Platforms," Defense News, February 16-22, 1998, p. 22; and Richard Fisher, Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, June 1998). Over U.S. objections, Israel is also moving to sell the Phalcon to India. Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns over Transfers to India," Defense News, November 2-8, 1998, p. 3.
75. Steve Rodan, "IAI, Russian Industries Seek to Wed Tech, Old Platforms," Defense News, February 16-22, 1998, p. 22; and Richard Fisher, Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, June 1998). Over U.S. objections, Israel is also moving to sell the Phalcon to India. Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns over Transfers to India," Defense News, November 2-8, 1998, p. 3.
76. Steve Rodan, "IAI, Russian Industries Seek to Wed Tech, Old Platforms," Defense News, February 16-22, 1998, p. 22; and Richard Fisher, Foreign Arms Acquisition and PLA Modernization (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, June 1998). Over U.S. objections, Israel is also moving to sell the Phalcon to India. Barbara Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns over Transfers to India," Defense News, November 2-8, 1998, p. 3.
77. For background, see Duncan L. Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Retransfers," Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 89-109. Cf., Yitzhak Shichor, "Israel's Military Transfers to China and Taiwan," Survival 40 (Spring 1998), pp. 68-91.
78. For background, see Duncan L. Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Retransfers," Foreign Policy 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 89-109. Cf., Yitzhak Shichor, "Israel's Military Transfers to China and Taiwan," Survival 40 (Spring 1998), pp. 68-91.
79. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Inspector General, Report of Audit: Department of State Defense Trade Controls, Washington, D.C., March 1992, pp. 17, 25, 40;
80. and Edward T. Pound, "U.S. Sees New Signs Israel Resells Its Arms to China, South Africa," WSJ, March 13, 1992, p. A1.
81. U.S. Senate, Hearing: Proliferation Threats, p. 158.
82. For the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reports, see ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 28, and Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 14, 16. For the commission reports, see Enduring Partnership: Report of the Commission on U.S.-Israel Relations (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), pp. 30-31; and Building for Security & Peace in the Middle East: Report of the Presidential Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), p. 59. The State Department official's comment came in an interview, Washington, D.C., June 1998.
83. For the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reports, see ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 28, and Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 14, 16. For the commission reports, see Enduring Partnership: Report of the Commission on U.S.-Israel Relations (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), pp. 30-31; and Building for Security & Peace in the Middle East: Report of the Presidential Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), p. 59. The State Department official's comment came in an interview, Washington, D.C., June 1998.
84. For the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reports, see ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 28, and Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 14, 16. For the commission reports, see Enduring Partnership: Report of the Commission on U.S.-Israel Relations (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), pp. 30-31; and Building for Security & Peace in the Middle East: Report of the Presidential Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), p. 59. The State Department official's comment came in an interview, Washington, D.C., June 1998.
85. For the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) reports, see ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1996, p. 28, and Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare, Washington, D.C., 1997, pp. 14, 16. For the commission reports, see Enduring Partnership: Report of the Commission on U.S.-Israel Relations (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1993), pp. 30-31; and Building for Security & Peace in the Middle East: Report of the Presidential Study Group (Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), p. 59. The State Department official's comment came in an interview, Washington, D.C., June 1998.
86. Barbara Opall, "U.S. Eyes Looser Controls on Israel Tech Use," Defense News, November 30-December 6, 1992, p. 21.
87. Shichor, "Israel's Military Transfers to China," pp. 68, 86. He grants (p. 77) that the China-bound Phalcon system being built jointly by Israel and Russia "could be used against U.S. forces in East Asia," yet (p. 87) finds it "reasonable" for Israel to contribute to China's defense modernization. Shichor contends (pp. 85-87) that a U.S. China policy that is "obsessed with the so-called 'China threat'" has unfairly "singled out" Israel, and "may deliberately inflate Israel's military transfers to Beijing as an excuse to provide Taipei with advanced weapons." These latter contentions were forcefully denied by all of our U.S. government interviewees.
88. Barbara Opall, "Israel Denies Charges on Tech Sales to China," Defense News, July 21-27, 1997, p. 4.
89. Privately, some Israeli officials share these concerns. Doug Bloomfield, "Ties that Bind: Israel, China Cozy Up, but Will It Last?" Washington Jewish Week, November 11, 1997, p. 4.
90. Dov S. Zakheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside A U.S.-Israeli Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), pp. 158, 257; and Opall, "Israel Denies Charges," p. 4. Israel denies malfeasance, but acknowledges having sold China "some technology on aircraft." See "Israel Denies Report on Fighter Sales to China," Reuters, January 4, 1996.
91. Dov S. Zakheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside A U.S.-Israeli Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), pp. 158, 257; and Opall, "Israel Denies Charges," p. 4. Israel denies malfeasance, but acknowledges having sold China "some technology on aircraft." See "Israel Denies Report on Fighter Sales to China," Reuters, January 4, 1996.
92. Dov S. Zakheim, Flight of the Lavi: Inside A U.S.-Israeli Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1996), pp. 158, 257; and Opall, "Israel Denies Charges," p. 4. Israel denies malfeasance, but acknowledges having sold China "some technology on aircraft." See "Israel Denies Report on Fighter Sales to China," Reuters, January 4, 1996.
93. ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare (1997), p. 16. See also Nick Cook, "Lifting the Veil on China's Fighters," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 31, 1996, p. 54.
94. ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare (1997), p. 16. See also Nick Cook, "Lifting the Veil on China's Fighters," Jane's Defence Weekly, January 31, 1996, p. 54.
95. ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare (1997), p. 16; and GAO, China: Military Imports, p. 10.
96. ONI, Worldwide Challenges to Naval Strike Warfare (1997), p. 16; and GAO, China: Military Imports, p. 10.
97. Interviews, U.S. government officials, June 1994 and May-June 1998; Barbara Opall, "Congress to Press Israelis on Sales to China," Defense News, September 30-October 6, 1996, p. 3; and Fisher, Foreign Arms Acquisition, pp. 7-8.
98. Interviews, U.S. government officials, June 1994 and May-June 1998; Barbara Opall, "Congress to Press Israelis on Sales to China," Defense News, September 30-October 6, 1996, p. 3; and Fisher, Foreign Arms Acquisition, pp. 7-8.
99. See generally Fisher, Foreign Arms Acquisition, pp. 22-24 and appendix; and
100. P. R. Kumaraswamy, "Israel, China and the United States: The Patriot Controversy," Israel Affairs 3 (Winter 1996), p. 29.
101. Opall, "Congress to Press Israelis," p. 3; and Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Transfers," pp. 104-05.
102. Opall, "Congress to Press Israelis," p. 3; and Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Transfers," pp. 104-05.
103. Bill Gertz, "Israel Suspect in Data Transfer," Washington Times, January 27, 1999, p. A1.
104. "U.S. to Question Israel on China Tech Transfers," Defense News, December 8-14, 1997, p. 2; and Shawn L. Twing. "Mixed Signals in U.S.-Israel and U.S.-GCC Relationship," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 16 (January/February 1998), p. 25.
105. "U.S. to Question Israel on China Tech Transfers," Defense News, December 8-14, 1997, p. 2; and Shawn L. Twing. "Mixed Signals in U.S.-Israel and U.S.-GCC Relationship," Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 16 (January/February 1998), p. 25.
106. Over U.S. objections, Israeli officials state publicly that elements of Arrow may be sold to Turkey and India. Umit Enginsoy and Steve Rodan, "Turkey, Israel Spar over Agreement on New Missile System," Defense News, April 27-May 3, 1998, p. 10; and Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns," p. 3. See also Duncan L. Clarke, "The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel and Strategic Cooperation," Middle East Journal 48 (Summer 1994), pp. 483-85; and John Donnelly, "House Appropriators Begrudge Israeli Arrow Money," Defense Week, July 24, 1996, p. 9.
107. Over U.S. objections, Israeli officials state publicly that elements of Arrow may be sold to Turkey and India. Umit Enginsoy and Steve Rodan, "Turkey, Israel Spar over Agreement on New Missile System," Defense News, April 27-May 3, 1998, p. 10; and Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns," p. 3. See also Duncan L. Clarke, "The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel and Strategic Cooperation," Middle East Journal 48 (Summer 1994), pp. 483-85; and John Donnelly, "House Appropriators Begrudge Israeli Arrow Money," Defense Week, July 24, 1996, p. 9.
108. Over U.S. objections, Israeli officials state publicly that elements of Arrow may be sold to Turkey and India. Umit Enginsoy and Steve Rodan, "Turkey, Israel Spar over Agreement on New Missile System," Defense News, April 27-May 3, 1998, p. 10; and Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns," p. 3. See also Duncan L. Clarke, "The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel and Strategic Cooperation," Middle East Journal 48 (Summer 1994), pp. 483-85; and John Donnelly, "House Appropriators Begrudge Israeli Arrow Money," Defense Week, July 24, 1996, p. 9.
109. Over U.S. objections, Israeli officials state publicly that elements of Arrow may be sold to Turkey and India. Umit Enginsoy and Steve Rodan, "Turkey, Israel Spar over Agreement on New Missile System," Defense News, April 27-May 3, 1998, p. 10; and Opall-Rome, "Israel, U.S. Lock Horns," p. 3. See also Duncan L. Clarke, "The Arrow Missile: The United States, Israel and Strategic Cooperation," Middle East Journal 48 (Summer 1994), pp. 483-85; and John Donnelly, "House Appropriators Begrudge Israeli Arrow Money," Defense Week, July 24, 1996, p. 9.
110. See Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Retransfers," pp. 94-101.
111. Tony Capaccio, "U.S., Israel Using 'Low Key' Process to Air Arms Retransfer Concerns," Defense Week, October 10, 1995, p. 6.
112. Ibid., p. 6.
113. For instance, see David Makovsky, "U.S. Worried About Sale of Israeli Technology to China," Jerusalem Post, October 31, 1996; Opall, "Israel Denies Charges," p. 4; and "U.S. to Question Israel on China Tech Transfers," p. 2.
114. For instance, see David Makovsky, "U.S. Worried About Sale of Israeli Technology to China," Jerusalem Post, October 31, 1996; Opall, "Israel Denies Charges," p. 4; and "U.S. to Question Israel on China Tech Transfers," p. 2.
115. For instance, see David Makovsky, "U.S. Worried About Sale of Israeli Technology to China," Jerusalem Post, October 31, 1996; Opall, "Israel Denies Charges," p. 4; and "U.S. to Question Israel on China Tech Transfers," p. 2.
116. This is treated in Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Retransfers," pp. 101-02; and Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 175-78.
117. This is treated in Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Retransfers," pp. 101-02; and Duncan L. Clarke, Daniel B. O'Connor, and Jason D. Ellis, Send Guns and Money: Security Assistance and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), pp. 175-78.
118. Opall, "Congress to Press Israelis," p. 3.
119. Interview, U.S. government official, Washington, D.C., May 1998.
120. See generally Clarke, "Israel's Unauthorized Arms Retransfers," especially pp. 90-91, 95-102.
121. Quoted in Kenneth R. Timmerman, "Close-Out Sale at Commerce," American Spectator (August 1995), p. 40.
122. Uli Schmetzer, "What's Motorola Chip Doing in Land Mine?" Chicago Tribune, March 31, 1994.
123. See Robert Johnston, "U.S. Export Control Policy in High Performance Computer Sector," Nonproliferation Review 5 (Winter 1998), pp. 52-56.
124. Barbara Opall-Rome, "China Leads Supercomputer Charge," Defense News, January 25, 1999, p. 8.
125. GAO, China: Military Imports, pp. 11-12.
126. Interviews, U.S. government officials, Washington, D.C., May-July 1998.