China's agricultural land

China Quarterly

Volumn , Issue 158, 1999, Pages 414-429

  Smil, Vaclav ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL LAND; LAND MARKET; LAND USE;

CHINA;

EID: 0032853435     PISSN: 00094439     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. The two annual Chinese sources are Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe), and Zhongguo nongye nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe). Official Chinese data are regularly reprinted in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, annually), and in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, biennially).
2. The two annual Chinese sources are Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe), and Zhongguo nongye nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe). Official Chinese data are regularly reprinted in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, annually), and in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, biennially).
3. The two annual Chinese sources are Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe), and Zhongguo nongye nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe). Official Chinese data are regularly reprinted in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, annually), and in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, biennially).
4. The two annual Chinese sources are Zhongguo tongji nianjian (China Statistical Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe), and Zhongguo nongye nianjian (China Agricultural Yearbook) (Beijing: Nongye chubanshe). Official Chinese data are regularly reprinted in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, annually), and in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1996-97 (New York: Oxford University Press, biennially).
5. As all of these figures come from official national statistics collated by the FAO there is no doubt that real values for many poor populous countries may be appreciably different.
6. For more on China's nutritional transition see: Barry M. Popkin et al., "The nutrition transition in China: a cross-sectional analysis," European Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Vol. 47 (1993), pp. 333-346; Vaclav Smil, "Feeding China," Current History, Vol. 94, No. 593 (1995), pp. 280-84.
7. For more on China's nutritional transition see: Barry M. Popkin et al., "The nutrition transition in China: a cross-sectional analysis," European Journal of Clinical Nutrition, Vol. 47 (1993), pp. 333-346; Vaclav Smil, "Feeding China," Current History, Vol. 94, No. 593 (1995), pp. 280-84.
8. Lester Brown, Who Will Feed China? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). For critiques of Brown's arguments see, among others: Vaclav Smil, "Who will feed China?" The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp. 801 -813; Jiang Wandi, "China poses no threat to future global food supplies," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (30 January-5 February 1995), pp. 14-16; Scott Rozelle et al., "Why China will not starve the world," Choices, No. 1 (1996), pp. 18-25; Nikos Alexandratos, "China's projected cereals deficits in a world context," Agricultural Economics, Vol. 15 (1996), pp. 1-16.
9. Lester Brown, Who Will Feed China? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). For critiques of Brown's arguments see, among others: Vaclav Smil, "Who will feed China?" The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp. 801 -813; Jiang Wandi, "China poses no threat to future global food supplies," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (30 January-5 February 1995), pp. 14-16; Scott Rozelle et al., "Why China will not starve the world," Choices, No. 1 (1996), pp. 18-25; Nikos Alexandratos, "China's projected cereals deficits in a world context," Agricultural Economics, Vol. 15 (1996), pp. 1-16.
10. Lester Brown, Who Will Feed China? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). For critiques of Brown's arguments see, among others: Vaclav Smil, "Who will feed China?" The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp. 801 -813; Jiang Wandi, "China poses no threat to future global food supplies," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (30 January-5 February 1995), pp. 14-16; Scott Rozelle et al., "Why China will not starve the world," Choices, No. 1 (1996), pp. 18-25; Nikos Alexandratos, "China's projected cereals deficits in a world context," Agricultural Economics, Vol. 15 (1996), pp. 1-16.
11. Lester Brown, Who Will Feed China? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). For critiques of Brown's arguments see, among others: Vaclav Smil, "Who will feed China?" The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp. 801 -813; Jiang Wandi, "China poses no threat to future global food supplies," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (30 January-5 February 1995), pp. 14-16; Scott Rozelle et al., "Why China will not starve the world," Choices, No. 1 (1996), pp. 18-25; Nikos Alexandratos, "China's projected cereals deficits in a world context," Agricultural Economics, Vol. 15 (1996), pp. 1-16.
12. Lester Brown, Who Will Feed China? (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). For critiques of Brown's arguments see, among others: Vaclav Smil, "Who will feed China?" The China Quarterly, No. 143 (1995), pp. 801 -813; Jiang Wandi, "China poses no threat to future global food supplies," Beijing Review, Vol. 38, No. 5 (30 January-5 February 1995), pp. 14-16; Scott Rozelle et al., "Why China will not starve the world," Choices, No. 1 (1996), pp. 18-25; Nikos Alexandratos, "China's projected cereals deficits in a world context," Agricultural Economics, Vol. 15 (1996), pp. 1-16.
13. The latest long-term population projections are available in United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 1996 Revision (New York: United Nations, 1998).
14. This reconstruction is based on the data in: "China's population, land, grain," Zhongguo renkou bao (China Population Newspaper), 31 March 1989, p. 1.
15. All available figures are compiled in Frederick W. Crook, Agricultural Statics of the Peoples Republic of China, 1949-86 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1988).
16. For details on recent official totals of arable land and on reported loss and reclamation rates see Robert F. Ash and Richard L. Edmonds, "China's land resources, environment and agricultural production," The China Quarterly, No. 156 (December 1998), pp. 836-879.
17. Frederick W. Crook, "Underreporting of China's cultivated land area: implications for world's agricultural trade," in China Situation and Outlook Series (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1993), pp. 33-39.
18. 2: Xinhua, 28 December 1987, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/W807 A/1.
19. Of course, China is far from unique in this regard: under-reporting of farmland has been widespread in most agrarian societies. The greatest disparity I have come across resulted from an ongoing cadastral survey of Nepali hills: it revealed that the cultivated area of the region is almost four times as large as shown by the official decennial National Agricultural Census figures, with subregional multiples ranging from more than two to more than eight: Gerard J. Gill, O.K., The Data's Lousy, But Its All We've Got (Being a Critique of Conventional Methods) (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 1993).
20. Kenneth R. Walker, "Trends in crop production, 1978-86," The China Quarterly, No. 116 (1988), p. 593.
21. Wu Chuanchun, "Land utilization," in Qu Geping and Woyen Lee (eds.), Managing the Environment in China (Dublin: Tycooly International, 1984), p. 68.
22. This task is particularly challenging in areas where ponds and small lakes, clogged with water weeds and supporting a rich growth of reeds, are mixed with paddy fields and groves of bamboo, mulberries or fruit trees.
23. Quoted in Renmin ribao (People's Daily), 31 July 1989, p. 2.
24. Gerhard K. Heilig, "Anthropogenic factors in land-use change in China," Population and Development Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1997), p. 142.
25. These are strictly quantitative comparisons lacking any adjustment for considerable difference in typical soil quality.
26. For origins and activities of MEDEA programmes see Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Scientists in black," Scientific American, Vol. 278, No. 2 (1998), pp. 48-55.
27. MEDEA, China Agriculture, Cultivated Land Area, Grain Projections, and Implications (Washington, D.C.: MEDEA, 1997).
28. Yield of 10 t/ha is far from the top performance in China's intensive aquaculture; rice harvests of 6 t/ha are now fairly typical in major rice-growing provinces.
29. I have assumed fruit yield of no more than 10 t/ha, less than half of the average yield in the U.S. citrus groves.
30. For rice I have assumed an average milling rate of 70%, 15 MJ/kg of edible energy and 7.5% of protein; for carp I have assumed 15% food waste, 4.8 MJ/kg and 18% of protein.
31. China is now the world's largest producer of fresh-water fish and crustaceans. For details on output and species composition see FAO Fisheries Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 1996 (Rome: FAO, 1997).
32. Farmland statistics for these three countries are among the most reliable in Asia, with errors unlikely to surpass 5%.
33. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhongfa No. 4, translated in Issues & Studies, Vol. 15 (1979), pp. 105-106.
34. Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Zhongfa No. 4, translated in Issues & Studies, Vol. 15 (1979), pp. 105-106.
35. Cao Zhaoqin and Wang Hangzeng, "China's arable land declines by 9 million mu in 1986," Renmin ribao, 18 May 1987, p. 1.
36. Yang Bangjie, "China makes public the plan for using farmland for non-agricultural construction," Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 30 June 1987, p. 4.
37. All figures in this table are from the State Land Administration Bureau, Zhongguo tudi nianjian (China's Land Yearbook) (Beijing: Zhongguo tudi chubanshe, 1997).
38. For details on pre-1979 conversions of slopelands, grasslands and wetlands into fields see Vaclav Smil, The Bad Earth (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1984), pp. 15-68.
39. Reductions in soil erosion can be particularly impressive: annual topsoil losses from a sloping field planted with a row crop (most often corn) can be an order of magnitude higher than in an orchard with a grassy ground cover.
40. Six-fold expansion of domestic fruit supply during the past 20 years has been already noted. Chinese fruit exports (mainly oranges and apples) are now approaching 0.5 Mt a year, and are earning about US$200 million.
41. 2 have chronic erosion problems, with annual soil loss rates as high as 300 t/ha (or 2 cm/year): Tung-sheng Liu, Loess in China (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988).
42. 2 have chronic erosion problems, with annual soil loss rates as high as 300 t/ha (or 2 cm/year): Tung-sheng Liu, Loess in China (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1988).
43. G.W.J. Van Lynden and L.R. Oldeman, The Assessment of the Status of Human-induced Soil Degradation in South and Southeast Asia (Wageningen: ISRIC/UNEP/FAO, 1997).
44. Farmland loss in rapidly industrializing coastal provinces is almost invariably accompanied by severe water pollution whose effects further weaken the average productivity of cultivated land as do higher levels of air pollution (particularly ozone) and uncontrolled solid waste disposal.
45. During the mid-1990s animal foodstuffs supplied, on average, about 15% of China's food energy, almost 30% of all protein and about 60% of all lipids: FAO, Food Balance Sheets (Rome: FAO, 1996), p. 89.
46. In estimating total grain output the SSB statisticians rely on a common practice of sampling survey cuttings to calculate average yields - but then they inflate them by 20-30% in order to compensate for the under-reported land area: Frederick W. Crook and W. Hunter Colby, The Future of China's Grain Market (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1996).
47. China is the world's largest user of nitrogenous fertilizers but when this consumption is divided by at least 140 Mha of cultivated land the country's average annual applications prorate to about 40 kg N/ha, no more than the German or Japanese national mean However, typical European and Japanese nitrogen fertilizer use efficiences are at least 30% higher than the Chinese mean. For more on intensities of fertilizer use see FAO, Fertilizer Yearbook (Rome: FAO, 1997); for environmental consequences of these applications see Vaclav Smil, Cycles of Life (New York: Scientific American Library, 1997).
48. China is the world's largest user of nitrogenous fertilizers but when this consumption is divided by at least 140 Mha of cultivated land the country's average annual applications prorate to about 40 kg N/ha, no more than the German or Japanese national mean However, typical European and Japanese nitrogen fertilizer use efficiences are at least 30% higher than the Chinese mean. For more on intensities of fertilizer use see FAO, Fertilizer Yearbook (Rome: FAO, 1997); for environmental consequences of these applications see Vaclav Smil, Cycles of Life (New York: Scientific American Library, 1997).
49. For reports on recently approved rules aimed to limit the loss of farmland see "Nation tightens land-use approval," China News Digest, 20 January 1996 (http://www.cnd.org); "Government sets new rules to curb use of farmland," China News Digest, 18 May 1997.
50. For reports on recently approved rules aimed to limit the loss of farmland see "Nation tightens land-use approval," China News Digest, 20 January 1996 (http://www.cnd.org); "Government sets new rules to curb use of farmland," China News Digest, 18 May 1997.
51. Tim Hanstad and Li Ping, "Land reform in the People's Republic of China: auctioning rights to wasteland," International & Comparative Law Journal, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1997), pp. 545-580.
52. Scott Rozelle, Li Guo and Loren Brandt, Land Tenure, Property Rights, and Productivity in China's Agricultural Sector (Stanford, CA: Food Research Institute, Stanford University, 1996).
53. This is why the assumptions of a study conducted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences - which projects the share of land categorized in the first quality grade rising from 39.8% in 1990 to 50.7% by the year 2025 - may be too optimistic: CISNAR, The Land Resources Production and Population-supporting Capacity in China (Beijing: CAS, 1991).
54. Four of the six published projections of China's grain imports by the year 2010 forecast levels no higher than 18-33 Mt/year (compared to recent rates of 10-20 Mt/year); only Lester Brown and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund put the annual total above 100 Mt/year Weishuang Qu, "A comparison of seven China agriculture models," in: The Strategy and Action Project for Chinese and Global Food Security (Washington, D.C.: Millenmum Institute, 1997).