Justice and equal opportunities in health

Bioethics

Volumn 13, Issue 5, 1999, Pages 392-404

  Harris, John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HEALTH CARE DELIVERY; HEALTH CARE DISTRIBUTION; HEALTH CARE POLICY; HEALTH CARE QUALITY; HEALTH CARE SYSTEM; JUSTICE; QUALITY OF LIFE; REVIEW; WELLBEING;

EID: 0032827284     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8519.00167     Document Type: Review

References (25)

1. John Harris 'What Is the Good of Health Care?' Bioethics 10:4 1996 269-291. Justine Burley and Søren Holm have made helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The author thanks the European Commission (DG XII) for a project grant, which made this work possible.
2. Julian Savulescu, 'Consequentialism, Reasons, Value and Justice' Bioethics 12:3. 1998. 212-235.
3. See for example Amartya Sen, 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom', Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985. 187ff. See also G.A. Cohen 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', Ethics 99. 1989 pp. 906-909.
4. See for example Amartya Sen, 'Well-Being, Agency and Freedom', Journal of Philosophy 82, 1985. 187ff. See also G.A. Cohen 'On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice', Ethics 99. 1989 pp. 906-909.
5. Savulescu 1998 p. 235.
6. We'll ignore cases in which our survival is incompatible with that of someone we care deeply about.
7. With apologies to St. Augustine!
8. If desired.
9. This is an astonishing claim for someone sporting utilitarian credentials because any gain in utility is a gain in utility!
10. Ibid. p. 232.
11. If that chance is wanted or claimed.
12. Remember, although it may be hard to calculate, each claimant on health resources has, in fact, a different chance of benefit so any requirement to give all an equal chance cannot coherently refer to size of benefit or to the magnitude of the chance of obtaining that benefit unless equal just means 'proportional to size of benefit'.
13. Savulescu, like several of my other critics, seems unable to distinguish between situations where life is at stake and situations where a person will survive with better or worse quality of life. In the former case it is always rational to take a very small chance on life, in the latter it may be rational to discount the value of the various outcomes with the probability of achieving them.
14. See for example my 'More & Better Justice' in Sue Mendus and Martin Bell Eds. Philosophy And Medical Welfare, Cambridge, University Press, 1988. 75-97. 'QALYfying the value of life' in The Journal of Medical Ethics Vol.13 No 3. September 1987. p. 118. 'Could we hold people responsible for their own adverse health?' in The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 1 1996. 100-106. 'What the principal objective of the NHS should really be' in The British Medical Journal 314. 1st March 1997. And my The Value of Life Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985.
15. See for example my 'More & Better Justice' in Sue Mendus and Martin Bell Eds. Philosophy And Medical Welfare, Cambridge, University Press, 1988. 75-97. 'QALYfying the value of life' in The Journal of Medical Ethics Vol.13 No 3. September 1987. p. 118. 'Could we hold people responsible for their own adverse health?' in The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 1 1996. 100-106. 'What the principal objective of the NHS should really be' in The British Medical Journal 314. 1st March 1997. And my The Value of Life Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985.
16. See for example my 'More & Better Justice' in Sue Mendus and Martin Bell Eds. Philosophy And Medical Welfare, Cambridge, University Press, 1988. 75-97. 'QALYfying the value of life' in The Journal of Medical Ethics Vol.13 No 3. September 1987. p. 118. 'Could we hold people responsible for their own adverse health?' in The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 1 1996. 100-106. 'What the principal objective of the NHS should really be' in The British Medical Journal 314. 1st March 1997. And my The Value of Life Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985.
17. See for example my 'More & Better Justice' in Sue Mendus and Martin Bell Eds. Philosophy And Medical Welfare, Cambridge, University Press, 1988. 75-97. 'QALYfying the value of life' in The Journal of Medical Ethics Vol.13 No 3. September 1987. p. 118. 'Could we hold people responsible for their own adverse health?' in The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 1 1996. 100-106. 'What the principal objective of the NHS should really be' in The British Medical Journal 314. 1st March 1997. And my The Value of Life Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985.
18. See for example my 'More & Better Justice' in Sue Mendus and Martin Bell Eds. Philosophy And Medical Welfare, Cambridge, University Press, 1988. 75-97. 'QALYfying the value of life' in The Journal of Medical Ethics Vol.13 No 3. September 1987. p. 118. 'Could we hold people responsible for their own adverse health?' in The Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy Vol. 1 1996. 100-106. 'What the principal objective of the NHS should really be' in The British Medical Journal 314. 1st March 1997. And my The Value of Life Routledge & Kegan Paul 1985.
19. For that's what it amounts to.
20. Savulescu 1998, pp. 217-218.
21. Ibid. p. 219.
22. Ibid. p. 220.
23. Ibid. p. 221.
24. Ibid. p. 228.
25. Ibid. p. 230.