Prices, incentives and choice of management form

Regional Science and Urban Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 173-195

  Sirmans, G Stacy ^a   Sirmans, C F ^b   Turnbull, Geoffrey K ^c  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^c LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Principal agent relationship; Third party management

Indexed keywords

PROPERTY MARKET;

EID: 0032817961     PISSN: 01660462     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0166-0462(98)00025-8     Document Type: Article

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