The rape of Dinah: Human rights, civil war in liberia, and evil triumphant

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 265-307

  Cain, Kenneth L ^a,b,c  

^a International Human Rights Law Group   (Cambodia)

^b HARVARD LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

^c Women and US Foreign Policy Program   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN RIGHTS; MORTALITY; UNITED NATIONS; WAR;

LIBERIA;

EID: 0032803043     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1999.0022     Document Type: Article

References (155)

1. Genesis 34:1-31 (excerpted).
2. Jeffrey Goldberg, Without Purpose in a Country Without Identity, N.Y. TIMES, 22 Jan. 1995, § 6, at 37.
3. Charles Taylor, Address at Monrovia, Liberia (5 Nov. 1995) (transcript on file with author).
4. Howard W. French, Ledger for Liberia's War: Profit(eering) and Loss, N.Y. TIMES, 30 Apr. 1996, at A8.
5. The author was introduced to this quotation posted on the office wall of Liberia's leading Human Rights advocate, Samuel Koffi Woods of the Justice and Peace Commission, October 1995.
6. PRIMO LEVI, IF THIS IS A MAN: REMEMBERING AUSCHWITZ 65 (1986).
7. Estimation of casualties is an enormously unscientific enterprise. The US Department of State estimates 200,000 casualties for Liberia, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, at 181 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT ON LIBERIA], and as many as 263,000 in the former Yugoslavia, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 791 (1996). Most American media sources use an estimate of 200,000 casualties for the former Yugoslavia, but the International Committee for the Red Cross, among others, has challenged this figure and estimates a much lower casualty figure. See Peter Cary, Bosnia by the Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 10 Apr. 1995, at 53. Nevertheless, the analysis here takes as its point of departure the international response to the two analogous wars, and thus, analogous casualty estimates, regardless of the scientific accuracy, are comparable as to the impact the estimates have or have not had on the international community.
8. Estimation of casualties is an enormously unscientific enterprise. The US Department of State estimates 200,000 casualties for Liberia, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, at 181 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT ON LIBERIA], and as many as 263,000 in the former Yugoslavia, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 791 (1996). Most American media sources use an estimate of 200,000 casualties for the former Yugoslavia, but the International Committee for the Red Cross, among others, has challenged this figure and estimates a much lower casualty figure. See Peter Cary, Bosnia by the Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 10 Apr. 1995, at 53. Nevertheless, the analysis here takes as its point of departure the international response to the two analogous wars, and thus, analogous casualty estimates, regardless of the scientific accuracy, are comparable as to the impact the estimates have or have not had on the international community.
9. Estimation of casualties is an enormously unscientific enterprise. The US Department of State estimates 200,000 casualties for Liberia, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1997, at 181 (1998) [hereinafter 1997 REPORT ON LIBERIA], and as many as 263,000 in the former Yugoslavia, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 791 (1996). Most American media sources use an estimate of 200,000 casualties for the former Yugoslavia, but the International Committee for the Red Cross, among others, has challenged this figure and estimates a much lower casualty figure. See Peter Cary, Bosnia by the Numbers, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 10 Apr. 1995, at 53. Nevertheless, the analysis here takes as its point of departure the international response to the two analogous wars, and thus, analogous casualty estimates, regardless of the scientific accuracy, are comparable as to the impact the estimates have or have not had on the international community.
10. Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia.
11. Armed Forces of Liberia.
12. Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group.
13. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1996, at 147, 149 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 REPORT ON LIBERIA].
14. Liberia Peace Council.
15. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-Kromah.
16. United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia-Johnson.
17. 1996 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 11, at 149.
18. The one exception to this lack of analysis is the courageous work of Samuel Koffi Woods and the Justice and Peace Commission, which has published a long and substantial series of human rights analyses. Unfortunately, however, it is difficult for most scholars to access this body of work outside of Liberia.
19. See THE JUSTICE AND PEACE COMMISSION OF THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC SECRETARIAT OF LIBERIA, THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 14 (1994) [hereinafter THE LIBERIAN CRISIS].
20. See Herbert Howe, Lessons of Liberia, ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping, 21 INT'L SECURITY, Winter 1996-97, at 145, 148.
21. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 192, 196 (1991) [hereinafter 1990 REFORT ON LIBERIA].
22. 1990 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 19, at 196.
23. Confidential witness statement presented to the author, April 1996, Monrovia, Liberia (document on file with author).
24. Liberia: The Cycle of Abuse: Human Rights Violations Since the November Cease-Fire, HUM. RTS. WATCH/AFR., October 1991, at 6 [hereinafter The Cycle of Abuse].
25. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1992, at 135, 142 (1993) [hereinafter 1992 REPORT ON LIBERIA].
26. William O'Neill, Liberia: An Avoidable Tragedy, 92 CURRENT HIST. 213, 215 (1993).
27. See id. at 215-16.
28. THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 17-18.
29. Throble K. Suah, Dokie's Whereabouts Still Unknown, INQUIRER (Monrovia), 3 Dec. 1997, at 1.
30. See Cold Bloody Murder, NAT'L CHRON. (Monrovia), 6 Dec. 1997, at 1.
31. Howard W. French, Liberia Waits: Which Charles Taylor Won?, N.Y. TIMES, 17 Jan. 1998, at A3.
32. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, LIBERIA: A NEW PEACE AGREEMENT - AN OPTORTUNITY TO INTRODUCE HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION 17 (1995) (A.I. Index AFR 34/01/95).
33. See 1996 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 11, at 149.
34. 1992 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 23, at 136.
35. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1994, at 132, 134 (1995) [hereinafter 1994 REPORT ON LIBERIA].
36. See 1990 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 19, at 196. An "ECOMOG national" is a national of a country that contributed troops to ECOMOG.
37. See The Cycle of Abuse, supra note 22, at 13.
38. Economic Community of West African States, ECOMOG's diplomatic sponsor and parent organization.
39. It is interesting to note that one year hence, on the other side of the continent, Mohamed Farah Aideed of Somalia became the subject of an approximation of an international arrest warrant, as mandated by the UN Security Council, and a concerted US-led manhunt on the basis of similar conduct - ambushing and killing twenty-four Pakistani Peacekeepers: prosecutorial discretion. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Somalia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993, at 258, 259 (1994).
40. See THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 47.
41. See Rape - A Silent Scourge of the Liberian Conflict, WORLD HEALTH ORG. NEWSL. (WHO Office, Monrovia, Liberia), Apr.-June 1995, at 1, 4 (on file with author) [hereinafter WHO NEWSL.].
42. Liberian rapists did not distinguish between women and girls.
43. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 30, at 8-9.
44. Estimates of the number of fighters have fluctuated wildly depending on the interests of the putative analyst. For example, when the United Nations was attempting to raise money, fighter estimates were high, as many as 53,537, see UNOMIL Demobilization Unit, Liberia Disarmament/Demobilization Plan (Dec. 1995) (restricted circulation document on file with author) [hereinafter UNOMIL Demobilization Plan], but then celebrated as a success was the 1996 demobilization of approximately 21,000 fighters. See 1997 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 7, at 182. No one assumes that all of the fighters were demobilized in 1996, and throughout the war a realistic figure seemed to be 40,000. The author uses the figure 35,000 as a conservative, compromise estimate.
45. United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia.
46. See UNOMIL Demobilization Plan, supra note 42, at 48, 52. The authors of the relevant section on rape noted that "[t]he analysis provided here is based on information attained from combatants during the general demobilization of 1994." Id.
47. Confidential witness statement provided to the author, Monrovia, Liberia, Nov. 1995 (on file with author).
48. Confidential witness statement provided to the author, Monrovia, Liberia, Nov. 1995 (on file with author).
49. Confidential witness statement provided to the author, Monrovia, Liberia, Nov. 1995 (on file with author).
50. WHO NEWSL., supra note 39, at 1.
51. Author's Memorandum to Ambassador Anthony Nykayi, UNOMIL Special Representative to the Secretary General, Mission Report: Bo, Tienni, Sinje and Dia 3 (1 Mar. 1996) (on file with author).
52. One newspaper account of the torture and execution of opposition politician Samuel Dokie, see supra Part III, included the following account of the treatment of Dokie's wife and niece by their executioners before they died: "Mr. And Mrs. Dokie were reportedly taken to Kokoya road where Mrs. Dokie was violently raped by four men before her womb came out and [was] killed in the fore view of her husband. Dokie was later beheaded and body burnt while his car was set ablaze. Serena Dokie and Emmanuel Voker were according to reports taken to Geneive Town where Serena was also reported raped before flogging them to death." Cold Bloody Murder, NAT'L CHRON. (Monrovia), 6 Dec. 1997, at 1.
53. See Stephen Ellis, Liberia 1989-1994: A Study of Ethnic and Spiritual Violence, 94 AFR. AFF. 165 (1995).
54. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, EASY PREY: CHILD SOLDIERS IN LIBERIA 32 (1994) [hereinafter EASY PREY].
55. See THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 69.
56. Howard W. French, When the Gun Play Kills the Kids' Play, N.Y. TIMES, 12 May 1996, §4, at 3.
57. See EASY PREY, supra note 52, at 24.
58. See id. at 2-3.
59. Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted 8 June 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, art. 4, ¶ 3(c), 1125 U.N.T.S. 513 (entered into force 7 Dec. 1978), reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977).
60. The NPFL's abuses were uniquely egregious, however, in inaugurating the use of small children upon commencement of hostilities, in institutionalizing their use within the Small Boys Units, and in the national scope of NPFL operations throughout the war.
61. EASY PREY, supra note 52, at 21-22.
62. Confidential Report of the UNOMIL Chief of Security to UNOMIL Headquarters, Monrovia, Liberia 12 (24 May 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter UNOMIL Confidential Report]; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 30, at 11.
63. UNOMIL Confidential Report, supra note 60, at 11.
64. Peter Da Costa, Counselling Victims of the Civil War, AFR. REP. NEWSMAGAZINE, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 30, 31.
65. The Cycle of Abuse, supra note 22, at 5.
66. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1995, at 140, 144 (1996) [hereinafter 1995 REPORT ON LIBERIA].
67. THE JUSTICE AND PEACE COMMISSION OF THE NATIONAL CATHOLIC SECRETARIAT OF LIBERIA, REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSION TO GBARNGA 3 (14-17 July 1994) [hereinafter GBARNGA REPORT].
68. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
69. Id. at 890.
70. GBARNGA REPORT, supra note 65, at 4 (emphasis added).
71. See supra Part IV.
72. UNOMIL Demobilization Plan, supra note 42, at 52.
73. See 1994 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 33, at 137.
74. Confidential witness statement provided to the author, Monrovia, Liberia, Nov. 1995 (on file with author).
75. UNOMIL Confidential Report, supra note 60, at 11.
76. 1995 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 64, at 144.
77. See Ellis, supra note 51, at 190.
78. Id. at 192 (footnote omitted).
79. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 30, at 14.
80. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Robinson, Address to the House Committee for African Affairs (19 November 1992), in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 170, 172 (hereinafter Robinson Address).
81. This is a recurring Taylor motif: to orchestrate chaos then to present himself as the only leader capable of imposing order.
82. Jonathan C. Randal, Militia Chiefs in Liberia Assail Looting; Aid Donors Demand End to Lawlessness, WASH. POST, 16 Apr. 1996, at A10.
83. Indeed, Liberians consistently referred to incidents of forced labor, particularly in relation to palm oil production, performed by civilians under threat of violence from rebel fighters. The State Department specifically cited NPFL leadership with responsibility for operating involuntary labor camps in Grand Gedeh County. 1992 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 23, at 139. One victim submitted the following testimonial statement: "The NPFL commanded me to provide them with palm oil and meat for eating. Due to my failure to provide these, I was badly beaten and wounded. We have always been forced to wash the NPFL clothes, clean their yards, and carried loads on our heads at six or seven hours distance walk." Confidential witness statement provided to the author, Monrovia, Liberia, Nov. 1995 (on file with author).
84. See Testimony by William H. Twaddell, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs: Hearing on Liberia Before the House International Relations Committee, 26 June 1996, available in Charles W. Corey, US Faces Dilemma in Liberia, USIA File ID 96062702.AAF, 27 June 1996, [hereinafter Twaddell Testimony].
85. Id.
86. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WAR 204 (1991).
87. William Reno, The Business of War in Liberia, in CURRENT HIST. 211 (1996).
88. Thomas L. Friedman, Heart of Darkness, N.Y. TIMES, 21 Jan. 1996, § 4, at 15.
89. 1994 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 33, at 133-34.
90. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Liberia, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1993, at 148, 152 (1994) [hereinafter 1993 REPORT ON LIBERIA].
91. See THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 72.
92. Confidential witness statement provided to the author, Monrovia, Liberia, Apr. 1996 (on file with author).
93. See Robinson Address, supra note 78, at 172. According to Amnesty International, "thousands" were killed by the shelling. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 30, at 16.
94. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 30, at 17.
95. See id.
96. The Harbel Massacre also spurred a formal UN investigation. UNITED NATIONS PANEL OF INQUIRY, REPORT: THE CARTER CAMP MASSACRE, RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MASSACRE NEAR HARBEL, LIBERIA ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 5/6, 1993 (1993) (restricted circulation document on file with author) [hereinafter HARBEL REPORT]. An Executive Summary of this report is available in REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 382 (Marc Weller ed., 1994).
97. The Harbel Massacre also spurred a formal UN investigation. UNITED NATIONS PANEL OF INQUIRY, REPORT: THE CARTER CAMP MASSACRE, RESULTS OF AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MASSACRE NEAR HARBEL, LIBERIA ON THE NIGHT OF JUNE 5/6, 1993 (1993) (restricted circulation document on file with author) [hereinafter HARBEL REPORT]. An Executive Summary of this report is available in REGIONAL PEACE-KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS 382 (Marc Weller ed., 1994).
98. See 1990 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 19, at 192; HARBEL REPORT, supra note 94, ¶¶ 71-72.
99. See 1990 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 19, at 192; HARBEL REPORT, supra note 94, ¶¶ 71-72.
100. The AFL did not recruit child soldiers.
101. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163, 1192 (1993).
102. See generally Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501 (1996).
103. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), supra note 97, at art. 2.
104. Id. art. 3.
105. Id. art. 5.
106. Id. art. 4.
107. Id. art. 7.
108. The Final Communique of the First Session of the Economic Community of West African States Standing Mediation Committee (7 August 1990), in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 83, 84.
109. Communique on ECOWAS Summit in Abuja, Nigeria (7 November 1992), in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 17, at 151, 154.
110. Letter Dated 21 August 1996 from the Charge d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, Annex, at 5, U.N. Doc. S/1996/679 (1996). No action was ever taken on this threat.
111. HARBEL REPORT, supra note 94, at 3, ¶ 9.
112. Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
113. Id.
114. Liberia: Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights, HUMAN RTS. WATCH/AFR., June 1993, at 12 (emphasis added) [hereinafter Waging War to Keep the Peace].
115. 1996 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 11, at 149.
116. S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 3281st mtg., ¶ 3(f), U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (1993) [hereinafter Res. 866].
117. This is with the one exception of the Harbel massacre investigation and report. However, no follow-up action was taken based on the Harbel Report, and none of its recommendations for a robust investigative mechanism was implemented.
118. Tenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, U.N. SCOR, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/1995/279 (1995).
119. From the author's notes taken at the Special Representative of the Secretary General to UNOMIL's staff briefings, 1996, Monrovia.
120. From internal policy discussions with senior UNOMIL staff upon the arrival of the author in Monrovia for duties in UNOMIL, Sept. 1995, Monrovia, Liberia.
121. Mussa was otherwise known as the "Butcher of Buchanan" because of the brutality of his actions as an NPFL commander in operations in and around Buchanan.
122. Kenneth Cain, UNOMIL and Human Rights Overview, code cable to UN Headquarters New York, 20 Jan. 1996, Monrovia, Liberia (on file with author).
123. Outgoing code cable from UN Headquarters New York to Ambassador A. Nyakyi, SRSG of UNOMIL, 13 Feb. 1996, (on file with author) (emphasis added).
124. See 1996 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 11, at 154. The State Department's report for 1996 reads: "Although [UNOMIL] has responsibility for monitoring human rights, for most of the year no one carried out this function. No UNOMIL reports on human rights were made public. The trained human rights observer assigned to UNOMIL in October 1995 resigned in November 1995 [sic], claiming lack of support for his work by the [SRSG]." Id. The author's resignation actually took place in April 1996, not November 1995.
125. Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, U.N. SCOR, ¶¶ 25-30, U.N. Doc. S/1997/90 (1997), cited in Liberia Emerging from the Destruction: Human Rights Challenges Facing the New Liberian Government, 9 HUM. RTS. WATCH/AFR., Nov. 1997, at 31 [hereinafter Emerging from the Destruction].
126. Twenty-First Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia, U.N. SCOR, ¶¶ 25-30, U.N. Doc. S/1997/90 (1997), cited in Liberia Emerging from the Destruction: Human Rights Challenges Facing the New Liberian Government, 9 HUM. RTS. WATCH/AFR., Nov. 1997, at 31 [hereinafter Emerging from the Destruction].
127. See id.
128. Statement of Madeleine Albright, US Ambassador to the United Nations, before the Security Council, 25 Jan. 1996, available in [hereinafter Albright Statement].
129. Liberia: Human Rights Abuses by the Liberian Peace Council and the Need for International Oversight, HUM. RTS. WATCH/AFR., 17 May 1994, at 8.
130. Albright Statement, supra note 123.
131. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976).
132. Emerging from the Destruction, supra note 122, at 27.
133. Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra note 110, at 32 (emphasis added).
134. See, e.g., Liberia: News from Liberia: Nine Years of Doe's Rule, AFR. WATCH, Oct. 1989, at 2-3, 5.
135. See 1993 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 88, at 152; see also Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra note 110, at 15-19.
136. See 1993 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 88, at 152; see also Waging War to Keep the Peace, supra note 110, at 15-19.
137. 1997 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 7, at 184-85.
138. See 1994 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 33, at 138.
139. Res. 866, supra note 112.
140. Further Report of the Secretary-General on Liberia, U.N. SCOR, ¶ 17, U.N. Doc. S/26200(1993).
141. This material was reported to the author in an interview on 15 Dec. 1997 in New York by a former UNOMIL human rights officer who participated in the investigation and read General Malu's letter to the SRSG. While serving as a UNOMIL human rights official in Liberia, the author participated in similar failed attempts to investigate ECOMOG malfeasance. These attempts were generally aborted at the authorization level by senior UN staff in Monrovia, and when they did succeed in reaching ECOMOG, were disposed of with alacrity by senior ECOMOG commanders, in the absence of support for the investigation from UN headquarters, Monrovia.
142. See, e.g., Letter Dated 14 October 1994 from the Permanent Representative of Ghana to the United Nations, Addressed to the President of the Security Council (transmitting the text of the Akosombo agreement), U.N. SCOR, Annex, Part I, sec. C, art. 4, Count 6, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1174 (1994) (stating that "the Liberian National Transitional Government shall enter into a status-of-forces agreement with ECOWAS within 30 days from signing this Agreement").
143. See 1994 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 33, at 135.
144. Bai M. Gbalal, Status of Forces Agreement: What and Why Is It? NEW DEMOCRAT NEWSWKLY. (Monrovia), 28 Sept.-3 Oct. 1995, at 6-7.
145. Demonstrating the complexities of the loss of sovereign authority, several Liberian civic organizations actually opposed ECOMOG entry into a status of forces agreement because they believed any diminution of authority as to ECOMOG, however illegitimate that authority might have been, would accrue to the leadership of the warring factions - among whom Charles Taylor in particular maintained a venomous hatred for "Monrovia-based politicians," his potential competitors for power, and consistently threatened to "deal with" them. From the perspective of the Monrovia-based civil society, it is better that ECOMOG's authority not be defined and, thereby, not be limited, thus enabling ECOMOG to provide protection and cover against the unrestrained and abusive tendencies of the warring factions. See DISARMAMENT WATCH (Center for Democratic Empowerment), 22 Feb. 1996. The irony of civilian politicians relying on the ill-defined authority of a military intervention force sent by neighboring dictatorial military regimes to protect their right of expression and association as politicians was lost on no one.
146. Emerging from the Destruction, supra note 122, at 32.
147. Report on Technical Mission to Liberia, UN restricted circulation internal memorandum, 20 Aug. 1993 (on file with author) (emphasis added).
148. See 1996 REPORT ON LIBERIA, supra note 11, at 147.
149. From the author's notes taken at the Special Representative of the Secretary General to UNOMIL's morning senior staff briefing, 21 Feb. 1996, Monrovia.
150. Id.
151. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. GAOR, World Conf. on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess., 22d plen. mtg., part I, ¶ 1, U.M. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1664 (1993).
152. For a discussion of Asian values and human rights,· see generally Jonathan Wright, 'Asian Values' Dead, Amnesty International Says, SEATTLE TIMES, at Nation & World, 17 June 1998, available in (visited 22 Feb. 1999); WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); Lee Chang-sup, Indonesian Turmoil Symbolizes Fallacy of 'Asian Values': President Kim, KOREA TIMES, 23 May 1998.
153. For a discussion of Asian values and human rights,· see generally Jonathan Wright, 'Asian Values' Dead, Amnesty International Says, SEATTLE TIMES, at Nation & World, 17 June 1998, available in (visited 22 Feb. 1999); WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); Lee Chang-sup, Indonesian Turmoil Symbolizes Fallacy of 'Asian Values': President Kim, KOREA TIMES, 23 May 1998.
154. For a discussion of Asian values and human rights,· see generally Jonathan Wright, 'Asian Values' Dead, Amnesty International Says, SEATTLE TIMES, at Nation & World, 17 June 1998, available in (visited 22 Feb. 1999); WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998); Lee Chang-sup, Indonesian Turmoil Symbolizes Fallacy of 'Asian Values': President Kim, KOREA TIMES, 23 May 1998.
155. See supra note 7 on casualty figures.