Indigenous policy in Brazil: The development of Decree 1775 and the proposed Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve, Roraima, Brazil

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 21, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 444-463

  Moore, Sara Gavney ^a   Lemos, Maria Carmen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN RIGHTS; INDIGENOUS POPULATION; SOCIAL POLICY;

BRAZIL;

EID: 0032802949     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1999.0026     Document Type: Article

References (156)

1. DECREE No. 1775,8 Jan. 1996, available in [hereinafter DECREE No. 1775].
2. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, Legal Framework of the Demarcation Process of Indigenous Lands in Brazil, available in (last modified 23 June 1998) (summary of the original in Portuguese: Ministry of Justice of Brazil, O Procedimento de Demarcação de Terras Indigenas no Brasil (27 Feb. 1996)); see also Molly O'Meara, Brazil's "Genocide Decree," WORLD WATCH, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 8, 9.
3. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, Legal Framework of the Demarcation Process of Indigenous Lands in Brazil, available in (last modified 23 June 1998) (summary of the original in Portuguese: Ministry of Justice of Brazil, O Procedimento de Demarcação de Terras Indigenas no Brasil (27 Feb. 1996)); see also Molly O'Meara, Brazil's "Genocide Decree," WORLD WATCH, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 8, 9.
4. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, Legal Framework of the Demarcation Process of Indigenous Lands in Brazil, available in (last modified 23 June 1998) (summary of the original in Portuguese: Ministry of Justice of Brazil, O Procedimento de Demarcação de Terras Indigenas no Brasil (27 Feb. 1996)); see also Molly O'Meara, Brazil's "Genocide Decree," WORLD WATCH, Sept./Oct. 1996, at 8, 9.
5. See Sheryl Barbic, Brazil's "Genocide Decree,"MULTINAT'L MONITOR, March 1996, at 6; see also Terence Turner, Brazil: Indigenous Rights vs. Neoliberalism, DISSENT, Summer 1996, at 67, 67.
6. Examples of such legislation include Article 231 of the 1988 Federal Constitution, NOVA CONSTITUICAO BRASILEIRA art. 231, and DECREE 22 of 4 Feb. 1991, cited in Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 2 [hereinafter DECREE 22].
7. See Turner, supra note 3, at 67. Commenting on the history of indigenous policy in Brazil, Turner states: "From colonial times down to the late 1980s, Brazilian policy toward indigenous peoples was frankly assimilationist, based on the twin assumptions that absorption into the Brazilian nation represented evolutionary progress and that social and cultural homogenization was central to the building of a strong Brazilian state." Id. Further commenting on the former assimilationist policies of the Brazilian state toward indigenous peoples, Maybury-Lewis notes that the National Indian Foundation (FUNAI), a federal agency developed in 1967 to protect the country's indigenous populations, was "urged to 'civilize' the Indians as quickly as possible." David Maybury-Lewis, Brazil's Significant Minority, WILSON Q., Summer 1990, at 39, 39. Similarly, Turner quotes a general who headed FUNAI during the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1986, who stated that indigenous cultures were "ethnic cysts to be excised from the body politic." Turner, supra note 3, at 67.
8. See Ana Valéria Nascimento Araújo Leitao, Indigenous Peoples in Brazil, CULTURAL SURVIVAL Q., Spring 1994, at 48, 50. Ana Araújo, a lawyer working on indigenous issues in Sao Paulo Brazil, was guardedly optimistic about the future of Brazil's indigenous peoples in this 1994 article on indigenous policy in Brazil. In the conclusion of the article, Araújo states that "[h]opefully the Indian Chapter of the Constitution [referring to Article 231 of the 1988 Constitution] will rest untouched and the law of Brazil will uphold Indian rights.... Through strong legal control, it should be possible to guarantee the survival of Indian peoples in the country." Id.
9. See DECREE No. 1775, supra note 1.
10. President Cardoso was viewed for more than thirty years as one of the most well-respected leftist scholars in Latin America. He was a political exile during the Brazilian military dictatorship between 1964 and 1986 and was one of the most important figures in Brazil's political opposition in the 1980s. Regarding indigenous policy, President Cardoso appointed Marco Santilli, viewed as a progressive supporter of indigenous rights, as the head of FUNAI in 1995. The appointment of Santilli was "hailed as a positive move by Indians and their supporters" for the future of indigenous rights in Brazil. Bill Weinberg, Demarcation of Indigenous Land Threatened by New Decree in Brazil, available in (last modified Mar. 1996).
11. See, e.g., Barbic, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that, after the enactment of Decree 1775, the Organization of American States and the Amazon Coalition expressed concern over the state of human rights in Brazil and urged President Cardoso to revoke the decree).
12. See id.
13. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 9.
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Barbic, supra note 3, at 6 (noting that the Coordination of Indigenous Organizations of the Brazilian Amazon stated that Decree 1775 was not just a "set back," but a "death sentence for many indigenous groups").
16. See CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionário), Government Tries to Deny Negotiation over Raposa/Serra do Sol Area, NATIVE-L NEWSL., No. 261, 15 May 1997, available in (last modified 1998).
17. See, e.g., Turner, supra note 3, at 68 (stating that "[t]he signing of Decree 1775 . . . marked a drastic reversal of policy toward the protection of the human rights of indigenous peoples. . . .").
18. See id.
19. See SUSANNA HECHT & ALEXANDER COCKBURN, THE FATE OF THE FOREST (1989).
20. See Julio Feferman & Beto Borges, Brazil's Indians on Alert as Government Hears Final Land Rights Appeals, 13 WORLD RAINFOREST REP., Summer/Fall 1996, available in ; see also O'Meara, supra note 2.
21. See Diana Schemo, Brazil Indefinitely Postpones Ruling on Indian Land Claims, N.Y. TIMES, 11 Oct. 1996, at A5. The proposed Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve encompasses approximately 1,600,000 hectares in northeast Roraima along Brazil's borders with Venezuela and Guyana. The area is claimed by an estimated 12,000 indigenous peoples. The majority of the inhabitants are Macuxi, the largest indigenous nation in Roraima. In addition to the indigenous nations, the proposed reserve is occupied by nonindigenous settlers and gold miners, numerous gold and diamond mines, and approximately 150 cattle ranches. Under Decree 1775, the Macuxi's rights to this area was challenged by nonindigenous settlers, who claim that they have legal rights to 99 percent of the proposed indigenous reserve. See James Brooke, Amazon Indians' Battle for Land Grows Violent, N.Y. TIMES, 11 June 1995, at 3.
22. See Diana Schemo, Brazil Indefinitely Postpones Ruling on Indian Land Claims, N.Y. TIMES, 11 Oct. 1996, at A5. The proposed Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve encompasses approximately 1,600,000 hectares in northeast Roraima along Brazil's borders with Venezuela and Guyana. The area is claimed by an estimated 12,000 indigenous peoples. The majority of the inhabitants are Macuxi, the largest indigenous nation in Roraima. In addition to the indigenous nations, the proposed reserve is occupied by nonindigenous settlers and gold miners, numerous gold and diamond mines, and approximately 150 cattle ranches. Under Decree 1775, the Macuxi's rights to this area was challenged by nonindigenous settlers, who claim that they have legal rights to 99 percent of the proposed indigenous reserve. See James Brooke, Amazon Indians' Battle for Land Grows Violent, N.Y. TIMES, 11 June 1995, at 3.
23. Turner, supra note 3, at 67.
24. See, e.g., Maybury-Lewis, supra note 5, at 33; STEPHEN G. BAINES, "É A FUNAI QUE SABÉ: A FRENTE DE ATRAÇÀO WAIMIRI-ATROARI (1991); Elizabeth Allen, Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amazõnia, DEV. & CHANCE, Jan. 1992, at 71.
25. See, e.g., Maybury-Lewis, supra note 5, at 33; STEPHEN G. BAINES, "É A FUNAI QUE SABÉ: A FRENTE DE ATRAÇÀO WAIMIRI-ATROARI (1991); Elizabeth Allen, Calha Norte: Military Development in Brazilian Amazõnia, DEV. & CHANCE, Jan. 1992, at 71.
26. See Allen, supra note 21; Stephen Schwartzman et al., The Legal Battle over Indigenous Land Rights, NACLA (NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA) REP. ON AM. Mar./Apr. 1996, at 36, 38-39. The project, implemented by the Brazilian Army in 1987, sought to accomplish this task by: (a) reducing large indigenous areas, which were considered possible security threats; (b) restricting the demarcation of indigenous lands within sixty-two miles of international borders; (c) surrounding indigenous lands with national forests, where both logging and mining would be allowed; and (d) classifying indigenous peoples as either "forest dwellers" or "acculturated Indians" with different rights to land applying to the two categories. Id.
27. NOVA CONSTITUICAO BRASILEIRA, art. 231. For more information on indigenous policy during the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1986, see Turner, supra note 3, at 67-68. Turner states that "the government adopted what amounted to a policy of 'benign neglect' toward indigenous groups." Id. at 67. During this period, the recognition and protection of indigenous peoples' rights was perceived as an impediment to the modernization and development policies of the Brazilian state. The modernization of the state in the midtwentieth century was in part based upon the settlement and development of Brazil's western regions, which were claimed by the country's indigenous peoples. The development of the West was ignited in the 1930s, when President Getulio Vargas urged Brazilians to "March to the West" to settle and exploit the rich resources of the Amazon region. These development policies were continued by the military dictatorship, which encouraged the development of the Amazon to protect the nation's political security. Turner further notes that "as military rulers pushed the development of the Amazon, Indian communities that found themselves in the way were roughly shouldered aside by government-supported settlers and developers...." Id. See also HECHT & COCKBURN, supra note 17; Maybury-Lewis, supra note 5, at 38.
28. See Turner, supra note 3, at 67-68.
29. See Eduardo Viola, A Multidimensionalidade da Globalização, as Novas Forças Sociais Transnacionais e seu Impacto na Politica Ambiental no Brasil, 1989-1995 (The Multidimensionality of Globalization, the New Transnational Social Forces, and Their Impact of Environmental Policy in Brazil, 1989-1995), in INCERTEZAS DE SUSTENTABILIDADE NA GLOBALIZACAO (UNCERTAINTIES OF SUSTAINABILITY IN GLOBALIZATION) 15 (Leila Costa Ferreira & Eduardo Viola eds., 1996).
30. See Schwartzman et al., supra note 22; Turner, supra note 3.
31. Ministry of Justice of Brazil, Indian Lands (last modified 1997), available at .
32. See Maybury-Lewis, supra note 5; Turner, supra note 3.
33. See NOVA CONSTITUICAO BRASILEIRA art. 231, ¶ 1.
34. Id. ¶ 6.
35. UNI is the first national indigenous organization established in Brazil that is directed solely by indigenous peoples.
36. See Araújo, supra note 6; Schwartzman et al., supra note 22.
37. See, e.g., Araújo, supra note 6; Maybury-Lewis, supra note 5. Commenting on the status of indigenous rights in Brazil after the inclusion of Article 231 in the 1988 Federal Constitution, Maybury-Lewis states that "the partial constitutional victories for the Indian cause have done little to mitigate the violence that continues to be done to them." Id. at 41.
38. See DECREE 22, supra note 4.
39. Barbic, supra note 3, at 6.
40. Id.
41. Decree 608, cited in Ministry of Justice of Brazil, Procedures for Demarcation of Indigenous Lands in Brazil, available in (last modified 4 Feb. 1999).
42. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, Procedures for Demarcation of Indigenous Lands in Brazil, available in (last modified 4 Feb. 1999).
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. The Official Journal of the Union.
46. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 38.
47. See id.
48. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 2; Schwartzman et al., supra note 22.
49. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 8.
50. See Schwartzman et al., supra note 22, at 39.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 40.
53. See Turner, supra note 3, at 68.
54. See id.
55. Id.
56. Schwartzman et al., supra note 22, at 40.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 40-41. Commenting on the position of Brazil's federal courts regarding indigenous cases, Schwartzman et al. note a dramatic change between the late 1980s and early 1990s. They note: After 1988, the federal courts, particularly in Brasilia [the federal capital], garnered a reputation for impartiality ... The judicial winds began to shift, however, in lawsuits involving land in the south and northeast, brought by landholders who in some cases could show regular land titles dating back to the beginning of the century. Id. at 40. As an example of this shift, Schwartzman et al. cite a 1993 case involving the Potiguara in the Paraiba state of northeast Brazil. The demarcation of the Jacare de Sao Domingos area, a region claimed by the Potiguara, was annulled by the Superior Federal Appeals Court on grounds that "the demarcation of the area was illegal, since it violated the rights of the holders of registered land titles." Id. at 41.
59. See id.
60. See DECREE 1775, supra note 1.
61. Id. art. 11. Interestingly, before becoming Brazil's Minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim worked as a lawyer for the state of Para against indigenous reserve demarcation. Jobim prepared a brief for the governor of Para against Decree 22 that "argued that the Indian reserves demarcated in the state were unconstitutional, because they had failed to take account of objections from non-Indians whose 'interests' were affected." The Supreme Court of Brazil denied Jobim's case but, as Minister of Justice, Jobim reintroduced his argument against indigenous lands in Para as the basis of Decree 1775. See Turner, supra note 3, at 68.
62. See DECREE 1775, supra note 1. As an example of the changes, the technical report, which formerly was published in the Diário Oficial and presented to the Minister of Justice for review, was now required to be made publicly available in the municipality where the proposed area was located. See id. art. 2, ¶ 7.
63. Id. art. 2, ¶ 8.
64. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 2.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Schwartzman et al., supra note 22, at 42.
68. See id. This is the case for half of the indigenous lands in Brazil that have not completed the demarcation process and are thus subject to legal appeal under Decree 1775.
69. See CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionário), Brazil: Contestation Affects over 35 percent of Demarcated Indigenous Areas, NATIVE-L NEWSL., No. 205, 15 Apr. 1996, available in (visited 25 Feb. 1999).
70. See id.
71. See Feferman & Borges, supra note 18.
72. See id.
73. See Id.
74. See id.
75. See Schemo, supra note 19, at AS.
76. See id.
77. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 9.
78. Schwartzman et al., supra note 22, at 41. The Sete Cerros legal case involves the Guaraní nation in Mato Grosso, Brazil and the Sattin S/A Agropecuária e Imóveis, a company involved in agriculture and cattle ranching as well as real estate. In 1992, Sattin initiated a legal case to halt the physical demarcation of the Guaraní indigenous reserve. Two years later, the Supreme Court of Brazil ruled in favor of the Guarani, but the decision was only "procedural" and both sides filed lawsuits appealing the decision. To fight the demarcation, Sattin's lawyer argued that the process was unconstitutional because it denied the ranchers the right to contest government action, which is guaranteed by the Brazilian Constitution. See id.
79. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 2; Turner, supra note 3, at 69.
80. Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 2.
81. See Schwartzman et al., supra note 22; Turner, supra note 3.
82. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 9; Turner, supra note 3.
83. See CIMI, supra note 14.
84. See Turner, supra note 3, at 68.
85. See CIMJ, supra note 14.
86. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 8.
87. See Feferman & Borges, supra note 18.
88. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 9.
89. Indianist Missionary Council.
90. See, e.g., CIMI, supra note 65.
91. See Peter Furley & Luc Mougeot, Perspectives, in THE FOREST FRONTIER: SETTLEMENT AND CHANGE IN BRAZILIAN RORAIMA 1 (Peter A. Furley ed., 1994) [hereinafter THE FOREST FRONTIER].
92. See id. at 3.
93. See GORDON MACMILLAN, AT THE END OF THE RAINBOW?: GOLD, LAND, AND PEOPLE IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON 9 (1995); Rainforest Action Network, Brazil Justice Minister Delays Macuxi Demarcation, available in (last modified Sept. 1996).
94. See GORDON MACMILLAN, AT THE END OF THE RAINBOW?: GOLD, LAND, AND PEOPLE IN THE BRAZILIAN AMAZON 9 (1995); Rainforest Action Network, Brazil Justice Minister Delays Macuxi Demarcation, available in (last modified Sept. 1996).
95. See Rainforest Action Network, supra note 89.
96. See id.
97. See MACMILLAN, supra note 89, at 9.
98. John Hemming, Indians, Cattle and Settlers: The Growth of Roraima, in THE FOREST FRONTIER, supra note 87, at 39, 45.
99. See id. at 46; MACMILLAN, supra note 89.
100. See MACMILIAN, supra note 89, at 9.
101. See id.
102. See Hemming, supra note 93, at 42; MACMILLAN, supra note 89.
103. See Instituto Socioambiental, Informações do Instituto Socioambiental, available in (last modified 7 Mar. 1997).
104. See Hemming, supra note 93, at 40.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 54.
107. See Brooke, supra note 19, at 3.
108. See MACMILLAN, supra note 89, at 1.
109. See id. at 24.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 24-26.
112. See id. at 26.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 30-31.
115. See DAVID CLEARY, ANATOMY OF THE AMAZON GOLD RUSH (1990); MICHAEL GOULDING ET AL., FLOODS OF FORTUNE: ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY ALONG THE AMAZON (1996).
116. See DAVID CLEARY, ANATOMY OF THE AMAZON GOLD RUSH (1990); MICHAEL GOULDING ET AL., FLOODS OF FORTUNE: ECOLOGY AND ECONOMY ALONG THE AMAZON (1996).
117. See MACMILLAN, supra note 89, at 48-49.
118. See Instituto Socioambiental, supra note 98, at 1.
119. See Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol: Nearing Demarcation, available in (last modified 10 Aug. 1998); see also Rainforest Action Network, supra note 88.
120. See Brooke, supra note 19, at 3.
121. See Instituto Socioambiental, supra note 98.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See Rainforest Action Network, supra note 89.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. See Brooke, supra note 19, at 3; CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionário), Jobim Visits Raposa/Serra do Sol Area: Indians Conclude Self-Demarcation, NATIVE-L NEVSL., No. 231, 14 Oct. 1996, available in (visited 25 Feb. 1999).
130. See id.
131. See Amanaka'a Amazon Network, Indigenous Rights Threatened: Decree 1775, available in (last modified May 1996).
132. See id.
133. See Schemo, supra note 19.
134. See id.
135. See CIMI, supra note 123.
136. See id.
137. See Amanaka'a Amazon Network, Urgent Actions: Macuxi Land Rights, available in (last modified 23 Dec. 1996).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id.; Rainforest Action Network, supra note 89; The Coalition for Amazonian Peoples and Their Environment, available in (last modified 30 Nov. 1998).
142. See Amanaka'a Amazon Network, supra note 131.
143. See O'Meara, supra note 2, at 9.
144. See Ministry of Justice of Brazil, supra note 2.
145. See Amanaka'a Amazon Network, supra note 125; Schemo, supra note 19.
146. See Amanaka'a Amazon Network, supra note 131.
147. See Furley & Mougeot, supra note 87, at 27; Gordon MacMillan & Peter Furley, LandUse Pressures and Resource Exploitation in the 1990s, in THE FOREST FRONTIER, supra note 87, at 185.
148. See Instituto Socioambiental, supra note 98.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See CIMI (Conselho Indigenista Missionário), CIR Denounces the Consequences of Decision on the Raposa/Serra do Sol Area, NATIVE-L NEWSL., No. 251, available in (last modified 3 Mar. 1997).
152. See Amanaka'a Amazon Network, supra note 131.
153. See id.
154. On 11 December 1998, Minister of Justice Renam Calheiros signed Decree 820, which recognizes the Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve as a territory traditionally occupied by the Macuxi, Wapixana, Ingarico, and Taurepang. In reaction to Decree 820, nonindigenous settlers in the area have organized demonstrations against the demarcation of the reserve. Federal and state representatives have also met with Justice Minister Calheiros and requested that the demarcation of the reserves be stopped. A January 1999 update by the Instituto Socioambiental of Brazil notes that the mayor of Boa Vista, Roraima is encouraging the use of violence against indigenous communities. The update further warns that, currently, "there is a very strong anti-indigenous feeling in Roraima." Instituto Socioambiental, Indigenous Council of Roraima Seeks Support to Maintain Demarcation of the Raposa-Serra do Sol Territory, available in . Since 1996, little has been done formally to contest the former Minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim's, decision to reduce the area of the indigenous reserve. However, in July 1998, the new president of FUNAI, Sullivan Silvestre, submitted a request to Justice Minister Calheiros to "reconsider" Jobim's ruling of December 1996. Silvestre's justification for the revision, according to an August 1998 update by the Instituto Socioambiental of Brazil, was based on the reduction of mining activity and nonindigenous settlers in the proposed reserve area since the 1996 ruling. The signing of Decree 820 has created renewed optimism for the future demarcation of the proposed indigenous area. However, the final two steps of the demarcation process - the physical demarcation of the area by FUNAI and its registration in the county real estate registry and the Federal Property Department-must still be completed to finish the demarcation of the reserve. In addition, the continuing opposition to the demarcation of the reserve highlights the precarious balance that exemplifies indigenous rights in Brazil-which are dependent upon often shifting political opposition and support. See id.; Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol: Nearing Demarcation, available in (last modified 6 Aug. 1998); Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol back on Justice Minister's Docket, available in (last modified 1 Sept. 1998).
155. On 11 December 1998, Minister of Justice Renam Calheiros signed Decree 820, which recognizes the Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve as a territory traditionally occupied by the Macuxi, Wapixana, Ingarico, and Taurepang. In reaction to Decree 820, nonindigenous settlers in the area have organized demonstrations against the demarcation of the reserve. Federal and state representatives have also met with Justice Minister Calheiros and requested that the demarcation of the reserves be stopped. A January 1999 update by the Instituto Socioambiental of Brazil notes that the mayor of Boa Vista, Roraima is encouraging the use of violence against indigenous communities. The update further warns that, currently, "there is a very strong anti-indigenous feeling in Roraima." Instituto Socioambiental, Indigenous Council of Roraima Seeks Support to Maintain Demarcation of the Raposa-Serra do Sol Territory, available in . Since 1996, little has been done formally to contest the former Minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim's, decision to reduce the area of the indigenous reserve. However, in July 1998, the new president of FUNAI, Sullivan Silvestre, submitted a request to Justice Minister Calheiros to "reconsider" Jobim's ruling of December 1996. Silvestre's justification for the revision, according to an August 1998 update by the Instituto Socioambiental of Brazil, was based on the reduction of mining activity and nonindigenous settlers in the proposed reserve area since the 1996 ruling. The signing of Decree 820 has created renewed optimism for the future demarcation of the proposed indigenous area. However, the final two steps of the demarcation process - the physical demarcation of the area by FUNAI and its registration in the county real estate registry and the Federal Property Department-must still be completed to finish the demarcation of the reserve. In addition, the continuing opposition to the demarcation of the reserve highlights the precarious balance that exemplifies indigenous rights in Brazil-which are dependent upon often shifting political opposition and support. See id.; Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol: Nearing Demarcation, available in (last modified 6 Aug. 1998); Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol back on Justice Minister's Docket, available in (last modified 1 Sept. 1998).
156. On 11 December 1998, Minister of Justice Renam Calheiros signed Decree 820, which recognizes the Raposa/Serra do Sol Reserve as a territory traditionally occupied by the Macuxi, Wapixana, Ingarico, and Taurepang. In reaction to Decree 820, nonindigenous settlers in the area have organized demonstrations against the demarcation of the reserve. Federal and state representatives have also met with Justice Minister Calheiros and requested that the demarcation of the reserves be stopped. A January 1999 update by the Instituto Socioambiental of Brazil notes that the mayor of Boa Vista, Roraima is encouraging the use of violence against indigenous communities. The update further warns that, currently, "there is a very strong anti-indigenous feeling in Roraima." Instituto Socioambiental, Indigenous Council of Roraima Seeks Support to Maintain Demarcation of the Raposa-Serra do Sol Territory, available in . Since 1996, little has been done formally to contest the former Minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim's, decision to reduce the area of the indigenous reserve. However, in July 1998, the new president of FUNAI, Sullivan Silvestre, submitted a request to Justice Minister Calheiros to "reconsider" Jobim's ruling of December 1996. Silvestre's justification for the revision, according to an August 1998 update by the Instituto Socioambiental of Brazil, was based on the reduction of mining activity and nonindigenous settlers in the proposed reserve area since the 1996 ruling. The signing of Decree 820 has created renewed optimism for the future demarcation of the proposed indigenous area. However, the final two steps of the demarcation process - the physical demarcation of the area by FUNAI and its registration in the county real estate registry and the Federal Property Department-must still be completed to finish the demarcation of the reserve. In addition, the continuing opposition to the demarcation of the reserve highlights the precarious balance that exemplifies indigenous rights in Brazil-which are dependent upon often shifting political opposition and support. See id.; Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol: Nearing Demarcation, available in (last modified 6 Aug. 1998); Instituto Socioambiental, Raposa-Serra do Sol back on Justice Minister's Docket, available in (last modified 1 Sept. 1998).