Labor and the challenge of economic restructuring in Iran

Middle East Report

Volumn 29, Issue 210, 1999, Pages 34-37

  Salehi Isfahani, Djavad ^a  

^a VIRGINIA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; ISLAMISM; LABOR MARKET;

IRAN;

EID: 0032790372     PISSN: 08992851     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3012501     Document Type: Article

References (21)

1. The most popular and anti-establishment Teheran newspapers, Hamshahri and Salam (as well as Jameeh and Tous, before they were closed down), appear to favor pro-market reforms. During the early years of the revolution, anti-imperialism and anti-dictatorship implied anti-market and anti-capitalist sentiments, but this is no longer true.
2. Tabibian, an architect of the reforms, rejects the charge leveled by reform critics that they were inspired by the IMF and the World Bank. See Mohammad Tabiban, On the First and Second Development Plans (Teheran: Institute for Research in Planning and Development, 1996). (In Persian.)
3. This article was serialized in the Teheran daily, Hamshahri, in 1996.
4. Khatami's political dilemma is reflected in his choice of cabinet posts for economic affairs: The Plan and Budget Organization is under the control of the pro-market reformists, while the Ministry of Economic Affairs is controlled by his "leftist" associates.
5. A high official of the Plan and Budget Organization has called the Labor Law "the largest obstacle to creating employment," Iran Times, November 6, 1998.
6. Iran Times, October 16, 1998, p. 4.
7. Hassan Khoshpour, "An analysis of the performance of public firms and privatization policies," in M. Nili, ed., The Iranian Economy (Teheran: Institute for Research in Planning and Development, 1997, in Persian).
8. A high official of the Plan and Budget Organization, quoted in Iran Times, October 30, 1998.
9. See Bonyad's web page.
10. In 1993 the manager of a luxury hotel owned by the Bonyad, complained of overstaffing but could not lay off any workers for fear of the Labor Law. In one instance, he had agreed to pay a disgruntled employee his salary on the condition that he would only show up to collect it once a month!
11. Hamshahri, November 30, 1998.
12. Since the revolution infant mortality has decreased from 122 per thousand in 1976 to 36 in 1996, and consumption of bread and rice per head are up by 50 percent and 95 percent, respectively.
13. Masoud Nili, "An analysis of the performance of the structural adjustment policies" in Nili, Hamshahri, op. cit., pp. 361-444.
14. M. H. Pesaran, "Economic Trends and Macroeconomic Policies in post-Revolutionary Iran," in P. Alizadeh, ed., State and Development: The Case of Post-Revolutionary Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, forthcoming).
15. Seyyed Ahmad Reza Jalali-Naini, "A Look at Inflation and Monetary, Foreign Exchange, and Credit Policies" in Nili, State and Development: The Case of Post-Revolutionary Iran, op. cit.
16. See Assef Bayat's "Workers' Control after the Revolution" MERIP Reports 13/3 (1983),
17. and Workers and Revolution in Iran (London: Zed Books, 1987).
18. The conservative Council of Guardians opposed this controversial ruling after parliament had approved it; the law was eventually passed in the adjudicating Expediency Council.
19. To close this loophole, the Labor Law requires employers "to write their service contracts in such a way as to commit the contractors to treating its workers according to the Law" (Article 13).
20. Buyers were willing to pay only the book value of a company because, anticipating its continued lack of profitability, they would not lose if they declared bankruptcy and sold off its assets.
21. Each unit must decide on one of these two options (not both), or simply elect a representative then register its choice with the local labor office.