Understanding the 'conservative' view on abortion

Bioethics

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 32-56

  Wendler, Dave ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABORTION; CONCEPTION; FETUS DEVELOPMENT; HUMAN; MEDICAL ETHICS; MORALITY; PERSONALITY; REVIEW;

EID: 0032789297     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8519.00130     Document Type: Review

References (37)

1. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
2. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
3. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
4. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
5. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
6. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
7. For instance, Thomson claims that: 'Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception', Judith Jarvis Thomson, 'A Defense of Abortion', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 47. Similarly, Tooley argues that the 'extreme conservative' position on abortion (abortion is justified only to save the life of the mother) is based on the claim that the human fetus is a person, Michael Tooley, 'Abortion and Infanticide', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2, 1 (1972), pp. 38-39. Adopting the same view, Warren assumes that the abortion debate can be resolved by showing that 'on the basis of intuitions which we may expect even the opponents of abortion to share, a fetus is not a person', Mary Anne Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion', Monist 57, 1 (1973), p. 43. The list of writers who endorse the personhood reading also includes Roger Wertheimer, 'Understanding the Abortion Debate', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1, 1 (1971), p. 69, Baruch Brody, 'Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life', American Philosophical Quarterly, 10, 2 (1973), p. 140, L.W. Sumner, 'Toward a Credible View of Abortion', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 4, 1 (1974), p. 167 and R. M. Hare, 'Abortion and the Golden Rule', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 3 (1975), p. 204.
8. Don Marquis, 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4 (1989), 183-202. A number of articles have been published which criticize Marquis on other grounds. These include Ann E. Cudd, 'Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 262-264; Alastair Norcross, 'Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 268-277; Peter K. McInerney, 'Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 264-268.
9. Don Marquis, 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4 (1989), 183-202. A number of articles have been published which criticize Marquis on other grounds. These include Ann E. Cudd, 'Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 262-264; Alastair Norcross, 'Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 268-277; Peter K. McInerney, 'Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 264-268.
10. Don Marquis, 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4 (1989), 183-202. A number of articles have been published which criticize Marquis on other grounds. These include Ann E. Cudd, 'Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 262-264; Alastair Norcross, 'Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 268-277; Peter K. McInerney, 'Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 264-268.
11. Don Marquis, 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 86, 4 (1989), 183-202. A number of articles have been published which criticize Marquis on other grounds. These include Ann E. Cudd, 'Sensationalized Philosophy: A Reply to Marquis's 'Why Abortion is Immoral', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 262-264; Alastair Norcross, 'Killing, Abortion, and Contraception: A Reply to Marquis', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 268-277; Peter K. McInerney, 'Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours?', Journal of Philosophy, 87, 5 (1990), pp. 264-268.
12. Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion (New York: Alfred Knopf 1993) .
13. Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion'. Toolev makes a similar argument: Tooley, 'In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide'.
14. Warren, 'On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion'. Toolev makes a similar argument: Tooley, 'In Defense of Abortion and Infanticide'.
15. John T. Noonan, 'An Almost Absolute Value in History', in The Morality of Abortion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 57. Similar arguments can be found in Abortion and Catholicism, eds. Jong and Shannon, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988), p. 45; C. Everett Koop, 'A Physician Looks at Abortion', in Thou Shall Not Kill, ed. Richard L. Ganz (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1988), p. 9; and Hans Lotstra, Abortion: The Catholic Debate in America (New York: Irvington, 1985), pp. 50-53.
16. John T. Noonan, 'An Almost Absolute Value in History', in The Morality of Abortion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 57. Similar arguments can be found in Abortion and Catholicism, eds. Jong and Shannon, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988), p. 45; C. Everett Koop, 'A Physician Looks at Abortion', in Thou Shall Not Kill, ed. Richard L. Ganz (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1988), p. 9; and Hans Lotstra, Abortion: The Catholic Debate in America (New York: Irvington, 1985), pp. 50-53.
17. John T. Noonan, 'An Almost Absolute Value in History', in The Morality of Abortion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 57. Similar arguments can be found in Abortion and Catholicism, eds. Jong and Shannon, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988), p. 45; C. Everett Koop, 'A Physician Looks at Abortion', in Thou Shall Not Kill, ed. Richard L. Ganz (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1988), p. 9; and Hans Lotstra, Abortion: The Catholic Debate in America (New York: Irvington, 1985), pp. 50-53.
18. John T. Noonan, 'An Almost Absolute Value in History', in The Morality of Abortion, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 57. Similar arguments can be found in Abortion and Catholicism, eds. Jong and Shannon, (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1988), p. 45; C. Everett Koop, 'A Physician Looks at Abortion', in Thou Shall Not Kill, ed. Richard L. Ganz (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1988), p. 9; and Hans Lotstra, Abortion: The Catholic Debate in America (New York: Irvington, 1985), pp. 50-53.
19. Numerous introductions to the principles of genetics exist, including: David Suzuki, An Introduction to Genetic Analysis (San Francisco: Freeman and Company, 1989, 4th edition), Daniel Hartl and Andrew Clark, Principles of Population Genetics (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates, 1989, 2nd edition) and Peter Russell, Genetics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990, 2nd edition).
20. Numerous introductions to the principles of genetics exist, including: David Suzuki, An Introduction to Genetic Analysis (San Francisco: Freeman and Company, 1989, 4th edition), Daniel Hartl and Andrew Clark, Principles of Population Genetics (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates, 1989, 2nd edition) and Peter Russell, Genetics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990, 2nd edition).
21. Numerous introductions to the principles of genetics exist, including: David Suzuki, An Introduction to Genetic Analysis (San Francisco: Freeman and Company, 1989, 4th edition), Daniel Hartl and Andrew Clark, Principles of Population Genetics (Sunderland: Sinauer Associates, 1989, 2nd edition) and Peter Russell, Genetics (Glenview: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1990, 2nd edition).
22. For some of the issues involved here see Robert M. Veatch, 'Definitions of Life and Death: Should there be Consistency?', in Defining Human Life: Medical, Legal, and Ethical Implications, eds. Margery W. Shaw and Edward A. Doudera (Ann Arbor: AUPHA Press, 1983), pp. 104-113.
23. Daniel Callahan, Abortion: Law, Choice, and Morality (New York: MacMillan, 1970), p. 389.
24. For more on this problem see S.I. Benn, 'Abortion, Infanticide, and Respect for Persons', and Joel Feinberg, 'Potentiality, Development, and Rights', in The Problem of Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg, (Belmont: Wadsworth Press, 1984, 2nd edition).
25. For more on this problem see S.I. Benn, 'Abortion, Infanticide, and Respect for Persons', and Joel Feinberg, 'Potentiality, Development, and Rights', in The Problem of Abortion, ed. Joel Feinberg, (Belmont: Wadsworth Press, 1984, 2nd edition).
26. Also see Eric Kraemer, 'Abortion and Cloning', Southern Journal of Philosophy. 21 (1983), p. 539. For a limited defense of the potential argument see David B. Annis, 'Abortion and Potentiality', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), and Michael J. Wreen, 'The Power of Potentiality', Theoria, 52, 1-2 (1986) pp 16-40. For background on the relevant metaphysical issues see Edward Covey, 'Physical Possibility and Potentiality in Ethics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1991), pp. 237-244, and Nicholas Rescher, A Theory of Possibility (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).
27. Also see Eric Kraemer, 'Abortion and Cloning', Southern Journal of Philosophy. 21 (1983), p. 539. For a limited defense of the potential argument see David B. Annis, 'Abortion and Potentiality', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), and Michael J. Wreen, 'The Power of Potentiality', Theoria, 52, 1-2 (1986) pp 16-40. For background on the relevant metaphysical issues see Edward Covey, 'Physical Possibility and Potentiality in Ethics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1991), pp. 237-244, and Nicholas Rescher, A Theory of Possibility (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).
28. Also see Eric Kraemer, 'Abortion and Cloning', Southern Journal of Philosophy. 21 (1983), p. 539. For a limited defense of the potential argument see David B. Annis, 'Abortion and Potentiality', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), and Michael J. Wreen, 'The Power of Potentiality', Theoria, 52, 1-2 (1986) pp 16-40. For background on the relevant metaphysical issues see Edward Covey, 'Physical Possibility and Potentiality in Ethics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1991), pp. 237-244, and Nicholas Rescher, A Theory of Possibility (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).
29. Also see Eric Kraemer, 'Abortion and Cloning', Southern Journal of Philosophy. 21 (1983), p. 539. For a limited defense of the potential argument see David B. Annis, 'Abortion and Potentiality', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), and Michael J. Wreen, 'The Power of Potentiality', Theoria, 52, 1-2 (1986) pp 16-40. For background on the relevant metaphysical issues see Edward Covey, 'Physical Possibility and Potentiality in Ethics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1991), pp. 237-244, and Nicholas Rescher, A Theory of Possibility (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).
30. Also see Eric Kraemer, 'Abortion and Cloning', Southern Journal of Philosophy. 21 (1983), p. 539. For a limited defense of the potential argument see David B. Annis, 'Abortion and Potentiality', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1984), and Michael J. Wreen, 'The Power of Potentiality', Theoria, 52, 1-2 (1986) pp 16-40. For background on the relevant metaphysical issues see Edward Covey, 'Physical Possibility and Potentiality in Ethics', American Philosophical Quarterly, 28 (1991), pp. 237-244, and Nicholas Rescher, A Theory of Possibility (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975).
31. Jim Stone 'Why Potentiality Matters', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17 (1987) pp 815-829. More recently, see Jim Stone, 'Why Potentiality Still Matters', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24, 2 (1994), pp. 281-293.
32. Jim Stone 'Why Potentiality Matters', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 17 (1987) pp 815-829. More recently, see Jim Stone, 'Why Potentiality Still Matters', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 24, 2 (1994), pp. 281-293.
33. Richard Lewontin, 'Biological Determinism as a Social Weapon', in Biology as a Social Weapon (Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Collective, 1977), p. 10.
34. See, for instance, James Leslie Carry, Human Sexuality (New York: Van Nostrand, 1973, 2nd edition) pp. 230-231. Some claim that the figure is much higher. For instance, Roberts and Lowe estimate that it might be as high as 78%, Roberts and Lowe, 'Where Have all the Conceptions Gone?', The Lancet 1, (1975), pp. 498-499.
35. See, for instance, James Leslie Carry, Human Sexuality (New York: Van Nostrand, 1973, 2nd edition) pp. 230-231. Some claim that the figure is much higher. For instance, Roberts and Lowe estimate that it might be as high as 78%, Roberts and Lowe, 'Where Have all the Conceptions Gone?', The Lancet 1, (1975), pp. 498-499.
36. Supporters of CV have written very little on this question - on the personhood reading, a surprising fact in itself. As a result, one must glean their views from the reactions to the treatment of stored embryos. In response to the destruction of 3,000 embryos in London, the Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano, argued that British law was mandating a 'prenatal massacre' (British law limits the storage of unclaimed in-vitro fertilized eggs to 5 years; Fred Barbash, The Washington Post, August 1, 1996, p. A1). Despite such statements, one rarely hears of supporters of CV taking the steps to oppose the destruction of embryos outside the womb that they take to oppose the destruction of embryos inside the womb. This relative silence suggests an ambivalence even on the part of those who adopt the apparently strong view. And, in the same case, other pro-life Catholics argued that the embryos should be allowed to perish 'naturally'. Again, not the sort of view that supporters of CV tend to endorse with respect to fetuses in the womb (Youseff M. Ibrahim, The New York Times, August 1, 1996, P. A4).
37. Supporters of CV have written very little on this question - on the personhood reading, a surprising fact in itself. As a result, one must glean their views from the reactions to the treatment of stored embryos. In response to the destruction of 3,000 embryos in London, the Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romano, argued that British law was mandating a 'prenatal massacre' (British law limits the storage of unclaimed in-vitro fertilized eggs to 5 years; Fred Barbash, The Washington Post, August 1, 1996, p. A1). Despite such statements, one rarely hears of supporters of CV taking the steps to oppose the destruction of embryos outside the womb that they take to oppose the destruction of embryos inside the womb. This relative silence suggests an ambivalence even on the part of those who adopt the apparently strong view. And, in the same case, other pro-life Catholics argued that the embryos should be allowed to perish 'naturally'. Again, not the sort of view that supporters of CV tend to endorse with respect to fetuses in the womb (Youseff M. Ibrahim, The New York Times, August 1, 1996, P. A4).