Patterns of negotiation in a South Korean cultural context

Asian Survey

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 394-417

  Snyder, Scott ^a  

^a UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; CULTURAL INFLUENCE; NEGOTIATION PROCESS;

SOUTH KOREA;

EID: 0032750194     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3021205     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. For a summary critical review of the typology of literature on negotiation and culture, see Robert J. Janosik, "Rethinking the Culture-Negotiation Link," in Negotiation Theory and Practice, eds. J. William Breslin and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, Program on Negotiation, 1991).
2. I. William Zartman, "A Skeptics View," in Culture and Negotiation, eds. Guy Olivier Faure and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 17-18.
3. Ibid., p. 20.
4. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1991).
5. Raymond Cohen, "An Advocate's View," in Culture and Negotiation,p. 22.
6. Christopher Rob McCusker, "Individualism-Collectivism and Relationships in Distributive Negotiation: An Experimental Analysis" (Ph.D. diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994), pp. 34-35.
7. Although expressed in a different form and with less exhaustive analytical rigor, this question is complementary to the research problem Alistair lain Johnston poses in his book Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) in which he first determines whether there is a discernible Chinese "strategic culture" before drawing conclusions with regard to its content and how it affects China's approach to diplomacy and negotiations. See also Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through "Old Friends" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999).
8. Although expressed in a different form and with less exhaustive analytical rigor, this question is complementary to the research problem Alistair lain Johnston poses in his book Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995) in which he first determines whether there is a discernible Chinese "strategic culture" before drawing conclusions with regard to its content and how it affects China's approach to diplomacy and negotiations. See also Richard H. Solomon, Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests Through "Old Friends" (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999).
9. English-language case studies of bargaining behavior and conflict resolution are rare, but there are a few cases available for examination as part of anthropological and social scientific studies of other aspects of Korean politics and society.
10. Edward Wagner, Carter Eckert, Michael Robinson et al., A New History of Korea (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1990).
11. Min Gyung Sook, "The Negotiation Process for the United States Television Broadcasting Rights for the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games" (M.A. thesis, San Diego State University, 1986), pp. 90-91.
12. Ibid., pp. 80-99. SLOOC hoped to make up the shortfall in expected revenue in its negotiations with the European Broadcasting Union and Japan.
13. U.S. government trade officials, personal communications, Washington, D.C., 1998.
14. Nancy Abelmann, Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent: A South Korean Social Movement (Berkeley: University of California, 1996); and Nancy (Anne) Abelmann, "The Practice and Politics of History: A South Korean Tenant Farmers Movement" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1990).
15. Nancy Abelmann, Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent: A South Korean Social Movement (Berkeley: University of California, 1996); and Nancy (Anne) Abelmann, "The Practice and Politics of History: A South Korean Tenant Farmers Movement" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Berkeley, 1990).
16. The story of the Koch'ang Kims and their role in the Japanese colonial period is fully developed in Carter Eckert, Offspring of Empire: The Koch'ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1991).
17. Abelmann, Echoes of the Past, pp. 77-110.
18. "While the corporation espoused capitalist rationality and representative liberal democracy, the farmers appealed to an egalitarian and participatory arrangement. In accordance with two versions of modernity, two conflicting notions of settlement emerged through the course of the month: a contractual or price settlement versus a settlement of historical injustices." Ibid.,p. 111.
19. Ibid., pp. 54-55.
20. Ibid.,p. 122. During the first three negotiating sessions, all the farmers participated, but subsequently, only the members of the leadership committee were involved in the negotiation sessions.
21. Ibid, pp. 118, 126-27.
22. "One farmer's words straddled these sensibilities [between paternal responsibility and the landlord offices as 'enemy quarters']; he seemed to acquiesce to a continuous relationship with Samyang when he yelled spontaneously, 'We are the guests, and we won't go down [to the countryside] before this affair is settled'." Ibid,p. 123.
23. The price of 1,881 won was "the price recommended by media institutions, virtuous citizens, and company officials," and thus was seen as an acceptable settlement in the broader context of Korean society, p. 129.
24. "Government Finalizes Revision of Labor Laws," Korea Times, December 4, 1996, p. 1, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/East Asia (DR/EAS) (96-234). All FBIS data cited here and below are accessible on the Internet at .
25. "Government Finalizes Revision of Labor Laws," Korea Times, December 4, 1996, p. 1, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/East Asia (DR/EAS) (96-234). All FBIS data cited here and below are accessible on the Internet at .
26. "NKP, Administration Discuss Passage of Labor Reform Bill," Yonhap News Service, December 8, 1996, in FBIS, DR/EAS (96-237); "Opposition Formally Objects to NKP Call for Special Session," ibid., December 23, 1996, in FBIS, DR/EAS (96-247); and "Ruling NKP Rail-roads Labor Controversial Bills at Assembly," ibid., December 26, 1996, in FBIS, DR/EAS (96-249).
27. See "Early Morning Ambush By NKP," Chosun ilbo, editorial, December 26, 1996, in FBIS, DR/EAS (96-250); "1.4 Million Workers Said on Strike; Compromise Unlikely," Korea Times, December 28, 1996,p. 1; and "KCTU 'Tentatively' Suspends Strike for New Year's Holidays," Yonhap News Service, December 30, 1996.
28. "NKP Said Seeking Dialogue with Opposition," Korea Times, January 5, 1997,p. 2, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-003).
29. "Solutions to the Current Crisis," Chosun ilbo, editorial, January 15, 1997, in FBIS, DR/ EAS (97-011).
30. "Assembly 'Compromise' on Labor Law Amendment Outlined," Korea Times, March 7, 1997, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-066); and "Paper Highlights Provisions of Revised Labor Law," Korea Times, March 10, 1997, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-069).
31. "Assembly 'Compromise' on Labor Law Amendment Outlined," Korea Times, March 7, 1997, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-066); and "Paper Highlights Provisions of Revised Labor Law," Korea Times, March 10, 1997, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-069).
32. "Experts Discuss ROK Economic Crisis," Wolgan Choson (Monthly Choson) (October 1997), pp. 196-219, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-287). Subsequent reporting on the sequence of events during this critical time period has focused on when President Kim Young Sam was made aware of the seriousness of the crisis. See John Burton and Gerard Baker, "The Country that Invested Its Way into Trouble," Financial Times (London), January 15, 1998,p. 6. Korean papers have also reported that National Security Planning Agency chief Kwon Young Hae warned President Kim in mid-October of the seriousness of the currency crisis but was told that it was a matter for discussion with economic officials. Finance Minister Kang Kyung Sik clearly did not admit the severity of the problem until early November.
33. "Experts Discuss ROK Economic Crisis," Wolgan Choson (Monthly Choson) (October 1997), pp. 196-219, in FBIS, DR/EAS (97-287). Subsequent reporting on the sequence of events during this critical time period has focused on when President Kim Young Sam was made aware of the seriousness of the crisis. See John Burton and Gerard Baker, "The Country that Invested Its Way into Trouble," Financial Times (London), January 15, 1998,p. 6. Korean papers have also reported that National Security Planning Agency chief Kwon Young Hae warned President Kim in mid-October of the seriousness of the currency crisis but was told that it was a matter for discussion with economic officials. Finance Minister Kang Kyung Sik clearly did not admit the severity of the problem until early November.
34. Kang Sok-chae, "Currency Crisis in Korea: Real or Imaginary? Foreigners Grow More Pessimistic, Despite Repeated Government Assurances," Korea Herald, November 8, 1998, on the Internet at .
35. Paul Blustein and Clay Chandler, "Behind the S. Korea Bailout: Speed, Stealth, Consensus," Washington Post, December 28, 1997,p. 1.
36. John Burton and Gerard Baker, "The Country."
37. Blustein and Chandler, "Behind the S. Korea Bailout, p. 1.
38. Richard Waters, "S. Korea and Banks Reach Deal of $24 bn of Debts," Financial Times, January 29, 1998,p. 1. The deal depends on whether banks not represented at the negotiations will also follow the terms negotiated in New York. The negotiating outcome was not binding on any single bank, which is free to pursue its own negotiations with South Korean counterparts.
39. This sort of tactic was also used by North Korea in negotiations just prior to the announcement of the Geneva Agreed Framework. The use of brinkmanship as a tactic to facilitate conclusion of negotiations by attempting to embarrass the counterpart into accepting compromise on the most difficult issues in a negotiation rather than risking the embarrassment and shame of perceived failure by walking out of a prematurely scheduled ceremonial announcements appears to be a tactic shared by both North and South Korea in international negotiating contexts.
40. As quoted in Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 149.
41. See Scott Snyder, Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1999).