Some remarks on Leland's model of insider trading

Economica

Volumn 66, Issue 263, 1999, Pages 359-374

  Repullo, Rafael ^a  

^a CEMFI   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC THEORY; INVESTMENT;

EID: 0032745324     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00175     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. AUSUBEL, L. M. (1990). Insider trading in a rational expectations economy. American Economic Review, 80, 1022-41.
2. BERNHARDT, D., HOLLIFIELD, B. and HUGHSON, E. (1995). Investment and insider trading. Review of Financial Studies, 8, 501-43.
3. BHATTACHARYA, S. and NICODANO, G. (1996). Insider trading, investment, and welfare: a perturbation analysis. Mimeo, London School of Economics.
4. DENNERT, J. (1989). Insider trading and the allocation of risks. LSE Financial Markets Group Discussion Paper no. 77, London School of Economics.
5. GROSSMAN, S. J. and STIGLITZ, J. E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient markets. American Economic Review, 70, 393-408.
6. KYLE, A. S. (1985). Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica, 53, 1315-35.
7. LELAND, H. E. (1992). Insider trading: should it be prohibited? Journal of Political Economy, 100, 859-87.