Early starters versus late beginners

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 107, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 731-760

  Chiappori, Pierre André ^a   Salanié, Bernard ^a   Valentin, Julie ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LABOR MARKET; THEORETICAL STUDY; WAGE;

EID: 0032741463     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/250077     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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