Community rating and choice between traditional health insurance and managed care

Health Economics

Volumn 8, Issue 7, 1999, Pages 563-578

  Kifmann, Mathias ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF KONSTANZ   (Germany)

Author keywords

Community rating; Cream skimming; Health insurance; Managed care; Risk equalization schemes

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COMPETITION; COST; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HEALTH INSURANCE; MANAGED CARE; MODEL; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RISK;

CHOICE BEHAVIOR; ECONOMIC COMPETITION; EUROPE; FEES AND CHARGES; HEALTH SERVICES ACCESSIBILITY; HUMANS; INSURANCE SELECTION BIAS; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MANAGED CARE PROGRAMS; MODELS, ECONOMETRIC; RISK ADJUSTMENT;

EID: 0032710893     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199911)8:7<563::AID-HEC477>3.0.CO;2-A     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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14. T).
15. 2 makes managed care attractive for H-types and leads to negative profits due to an increase in expected costs.
16. H. If the inequality is not binding, then insurers make positive profits on managed care.
17. T.
18. H.
19. H.
20. H. The cost difference between H- and L-types is, therefore, higher in M than in T.