Alternate futures after the South Asian nuclear tests: Pokhran as prologue

Asian Survey

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 504-523

  Huntley, Wade L ^a  

^a Nautilus Institute   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING; REGIONAL SECURITY; SECURITY THREAT;

ASIA;

EID: 0032700163     PISSN: 00044687     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/as.1999.39.3.01p0009n     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. India currently avows "minimum deterrence" to be the use policy of its nuclear forces, although debate continues as to the precise meaning of this position.
2. The very guarded U.S. public view of the extent of weaponization by India and Pakistan can be seen in the transcript of Defense Department Spokesman Kenneth Bacon's Regular Briefing for May 29, 1998 (available as "Defense Department Press Briefing, May 29, 1998 [Excerpts]" on the Internet at . Regarding Agni capabilities, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 19, 1998; and Andrew Koch and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Subcontinental Missiles," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54:4 (July-August 1998), pp. 48-49. Pakistan's Ghauri missile was developed from North Korean Nodong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 even though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own military. See Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 15, 1998; see also Rahul Bedi and Duncan Lennox, "Pakistan Reveals Test Firing of New Ballistic Missile," ibid., April 16, 1998. Some reports suggest both India and Pakistan already possess missile-deliverable nuclear warheads. See Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort."
3. The very guarded U.S. public view of the extent of weaponization by India and Pakistan can be seen in the transcript of Defense Department Spokesman Kenneth Bacon's Regular Briefing for May 29, 1998 (available as "Defense Department Press Briefing, May 29, 1998 [Excerpts]" on the Internet at . Regarding Agni capabilities, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 19, 1998; and Andrew Koch and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Subcontinental Missiles," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54:4 (July-August 1998), pp. 48-49. Pakistan's Ghauri missile was developed from North Korean Nodong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 even though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own military. See Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 15, 1998; see also Rahul Bedi and Duncan Lennox, "Pakistan Reveals Test Firing of New Ballistic Missile," ibid., April 16, 1998. Some reports suggest both India and Pakistan already possess missile-deliverable nuclear warheads. See Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort."
4. The very guarded U.S. public view of the extent of weaponization by India and Pakistan can be seen in the transcript of Defense Department Spokesman Kenneth Bacon's Regular Briefing for May 29, 1998 (available as "Defense Department Press Briefing, May 29, 1998 [Excerpts]" on the Internet at . Regarding Agni capabilities, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 19, 1998; and Andrew Koch and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Subcontinental Missiles," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54:4 (July-August 1998), pp. 48-49. Pakistan's Ghauri missile was developed from North Korean Nodong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 even though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own military. See Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 15, 1998; see also Rahul Bedi and Duncan Lennox, "Pakistan Reveals Test Firing of New Ballistic Missile," ibid., April 16, 1998. Some reports suggest both India and Pakistan already possess missile-deliverable nuclear warheads. See Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort."
5. The very guarded U.S. public view of the extent of weaponization by India and Pakistan can be seen in the transcript of Defense Department Spokesman Kenneth Bacon's Regular Briefing for May 29, 1998 (available as "Defense Department Press Briefing, May 29, 1998 [Excerpts]" on the Internet at . Regarding Agni capabilities, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 19, 1998; and Andrew Koch and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Subcontinental Missiles," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54:4 (July-August 1998), pp. 48-49. Pakistan's Ghauri missile was developed from North Korean Nodong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 even though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own military. See Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 15, 1998; see also Rahul Bedi and Duncan Lennox, "Pakistan Reveals Test Firing of New Ballistic Missile," ibid., April 16, 1998. Some reports suggest both India and Pakistan already possess missile-deliverable nuclear warheads. See Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort."
6. The very guarded U.S. public view of the extent of weaponization by India and Pakistan can be seen in the transcript of Defense Department Spokesman Kenneth Bacon's Regular Briefing for May 29, 1998 (available as "Defense Department Press Briefing, May 29, 1998 [Excerpts]" on the Internet at . Regarding Agni capabilities, see Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 19, 1998; and Andrew Koch and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, "Subcontinental Missiles," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 54:4 (July-August 1998), pp. 48-49. Pakistan's Ghauri missile was developed from North Korean Nodong missiles, sold in complete form to Pakistan in 1997 even though they have yet to be provided to North Korea's own military. See Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner," Jane's Defence Weekly 29, May 15, 1998; see also Rahul Bedi and Duncan Lennox, "Pakistan Reveals Test Firing of New Ballistic Missile," ibid., April 16, 1998. Some reports suggest both India and Pakistan already possess missile-deliverable nuclear warheads. See Ben Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort."
7. See ibid. For a pre-test account of the unpreparedness of India's nuclear infrastructure, see Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Weapons: In the Shadow of Fear," India Today (Delhi), July 21, 1997, pp. 62-65. Some reports suggest India has delayed implementation of a nuclear command and control structure, either due to internal strategic indecision or as a bargaining tactic in discussions with the United States; see Pamela Constable, "India Plays Nuclear Waiting Game," Washington Post, September 14, 1998, p. A15.
8. See ibid. For a pre-test account of the unpreparedness of India's nuclear infrastructure, see Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Weapons: In the Shadow of Fear," India Today (Delhi), July 21, 1997, pp. 62-65. Some reports suggest India has delayed implementation of a nuclear command and control structure, either due to internal strategic indecision or as a bargaining tactic in discussions with the United States; see Pamela Constable, "India Plays Nuclear Waiting Game," Washington Post, September 14, 1998, p. A15.
9. See ibid. For a pre-test account of the unpreparedness of India's nuclear infrastructure, see Manoj Joshi, "Nuclear Weapons: In the Shadow of Fear," India Today (Delhi), July 21, 1997, pp. 62-65. Some reports suggest India has delayed implementation of a nuclear command and control structure, either due to internal strategic indecision or as a bargaining tactic in discussions with the United States; see Pamela Constable, "India Plays Nuclear Waiting Game," Washington Post, September 14, 1998, p. A15.
10. See S. Rashid Naim, "Asia's Day After: Nuclear War between India and Pakistan?" in The Security of South Asia: American and Asian Perspectives, ed. Stephen P. Cohen (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp. 260-69. Insofar as prevailing winds tend to travel easterly, this concern is much higher for India and tends to neutralize the relevance for this issue of India's larger land area.
11. George Perkovich, "Think Again: Nonproliferation," Foreign Policy, no. 112 (Fall 1998). For a strong argument against the dominant importance of domestic politics in Indian decision making on nuclear weapons, see Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 148-77, esp. pp. 173-74.
12. George Perkovich, "Think Again: Nonproliferation," Foreign Policy, no. 112 (Fall 1998). For a strong argument against the dominant importance of domestic politics in Indian decision making on nuclear weapons, see Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran II: The Prospects and Sources of New Delhi's Nuclear Weapons Program," International Security 23:4 (Spring 1999), pp. 148-77, esp. pp. 173-74.
13. Stephen P. Cohen, "India's Strategic Misstep," New York Times, June 3, 1998.
14. For a detailed argument that China historically has been relatively unwilling to provide concrete support and assistance to Pakistan and other of India's neighbors, see Leo E. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship in the Subcontinent," in Shalendra D. Sharma, ed., The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, Research Papers and Policy Studies Series, 2000). China reportedly has provided Pakistan with assistance in its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development and also reportedly facilitated North Korean missile technology transfers to Pakistan. See Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort"; Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner." On China's denial to Pakistan, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella," New York Times, May 21, 1998.
15. For a detailed argument that China historically has been relatively unwilling to provide concrete support and assistance to Pakistan and other of India's neighbors, see Leo E. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship in the Subcontinent," in Shalendra D. Sharma, ed., The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, Research Papers and Policy Studies Series, 2000). China reportedly has provided Pakistan with assistance in its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development and also reportedly facilitated North Korean missile technology transfers to Pakistan. See Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort"; Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner." On China's denial to Pakistan, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella," New York Times, May 21, 1998.
16. For a detailed argument that China historically has been relatively unwilling to provide concrete support and assistance to Pakistan and other of India's neighbors, see Leo E. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship in the Subcontinent," in Shalendra D. Sharma, ed., The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, Research Papers and Policy Studies Series, 2000). China reportedly has provided Pakistan with assistance in its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development and also reportedly facilitated North Korean missile technology transfers to Pakistan. See Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort"; Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner." On China's denial to Pakistan, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella," New York Times, May 21, 1998.
17. For a detailed argument that China historically has been relatively unwilling to provide concrete support and assistance to Pakistan and other of India's neighbors, see Leo E. Rose, "India and China: Forging a New Relationship in the Subcontinent," in Shalendra D. Sharma, ed., The Asia-Pacific in the New Millennium: Geopolitics, Security, and Foreign Policy (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, Research Papers and Policy Studies Series, 2000). China reportedly has provided Pakistan with assistance in its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development and also reportedly facilitated North Korean missile technology transfers to Pakistan. See Sheppard, "Too Close for Comfort"; Joseph Bermudez, "A Silent Partner." On China's denial to Pakistan, see Elisabeth Rosenthal, "China Seems to Deny Pakistan a Nuclear Umbrella," New York Times, May 21, 1998.
18. On India's Sagarika program, see Koch and Sidhu, "Subcontinental Missiles," p. 49;
19. and Steven Lee Myers, "Russia Is Helping India Extend Range of Missile, U.S. Aids Say," New York Times, April 27, 1998. The Sagarika missile is said to have a range of over 300 kilometers. There are also reports that India is pursuing plans to utilize Russian assistance to build a nuclear-powered submarine capable of carrying nuclear missiles to distant targets ("India to Build Nuclear Sub by 2004 with Russian Help," Associated Press, June 26, 1998). Most observers consider the near-term prospects for India to acquire such capability quite remote.
20. North Korea-Pakistan cooperation in development of the Ghauri missile is believed to have directly benefitted North Korea's own cash-strapped missile programs, in part from data provided in the April 6 test firing of the Ghauri, which flew further than any previously tested North Korean missile. See David Wright, "Analysis: DPRK Missile Test," NAPSNet Daily Report, September 1, 1998, on the Internet at .
21. Wade Huntley and Tim Savage, "Agreed Framework at the Crossroads," Sekai Journal (in Japanese) and Nautilus Policy Forum Online #99-05 on the Internet at , March 11, 1999.
22. See infra, Taewoo Kim, "South Korea's Missile Dilemmas," Asian Survey 39:3 (May-June 1999).
23. Sumit Ganguly, "India's Pathway to Pokhran." The breakdown and failure of the second Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2000 Review Conference, held April 27 to May 8, 1998, was in good measure due to the widespread perception that the United States and Russia in particular were attempting to roll back the renewed commitments to disarmament included in the decisions underlying the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT. See Rebecca Johnson, Reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Problems and Processes, Acronym Institute Report #12 (September 1998), pp. 9-10.
24. See John Isaacs, "Senate: Test Ban Prospects Shaken," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 54:4 (July-August 1998), p. 40; and Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, "From Russia, a Muted Reaction," ibid., p. 42.
25. See John Isaacs, "Senate: Test Ban Prospects Shaken," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 54:4 (July-August 1998), p. 40; and Igor Khripunov and Anupam Srivastava, "From Russia, a Muted Reaction," ibid., p. 42.
26. Charles Krauthammer, "Defenseless America," Washington Post, May 22, 1998.
27. Benjamin Kang Lim, "China Fears Nuclear Proliferation," Reuters, May 29, 1998.
28. K. K. Yatyal, "Vajpayee, Sharif Sign Lahore Declaration," Hindu, February 22, 1999; Jonathan Karp, "India, Pakistan Summit Offers Reason for Hope in South Asia," Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1999.
29. K. K. Yatyal, "Vajpayee, Sharif Sign Lahore Declaration," Hindu, February 22, 1999; Jonathan Karp, "India, Pakistan Summit Offers Reason for Hope in South Asia," Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1999.
30. "Text: U.S., India Issue Joint Statement at Conclusion of Talks," United States Information Agency, February 1, 1999; and "U.S., Pakistan Joint Statement Following Talks, Feb. 2," ibid., February 2, 1999.
31. Celia W. Dugger, "U.S.-India Talks Gain and Could Lead to Easing of Sanctions," New York Times, February 2, 1999; and John Chalmers, "India, U.S. Shirk Nuclear Deal for Progressive Steps," Reuters, February 3, 1999; Jonathan Karp "India to Hold China Talks Despite Govt's Fall - Foreign Min." Dow Jones Newswires, April 19, 1999.
32. Celia W. Dugger, "U.S.-India Talks Gain and Could Lead to Easing of Sanctions," New York Times, February 2, 1999; and John Chalmers, "India, U.S. Shirk Nuclear Deal for Progressive Steps," Reuters, February 3, 1999; Jonathan Karp "India to Hold China Talks Despite Govt's Fall - Foreign Min." Dow Jones Newswires, April 19, 1999.
33. Celia W. Dugger, "U.S.-India Talks Gain and Could Lead to Easing of Sanctions," New York Times, February 2, 1999; and John Chalmers, "India, U.S. Shirk Nuclear Deal for Progressive Steps," Reuters, February 3, 1999; Jonathan Karp "India to Hold China Talks Despite Govt's Fall - Foreign Min." Dow Jones Newswires, April 19, 1999.
34. Neelesh Misra, "India Won't Give Up Nukes," Associated Press, January 28, 1999; James Morrison, "U.S. Irks India," Washington Times, January 12, 1999.
35. Neelesh Misra, "India Won't Give Up Nukes," Associated Press, January 28, 1999; James Morrison, "U.S. Irks India," Washington Times, January 12, 1999.
36. On Agni II capabilities, see "Fact Sheet: South Asian Missile Race,"Race," Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet, April 15, 1999, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On U.S. pressure, see "India Postpones Missile Tests," Associated Press, January 21, 1999; and "Pakistan Denies Having Nuclear Cooperation with China," ibid., April 9, 1999. On Agni capabilities, see Kathy Gannon, "Pakistan Tests Nuke-Capable Missile," ibid., April 14, 1999.
37. On Agni II capabilities, see "Fact Sheet: South Asian Missile Race,"Race," Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet, April 15, 1999, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On U.S. pressure, see "India Postpones Missile Tests," Associated Press, January 21, 1999; and "Pakistan Denies Having Nuclear Cooperation with China," ibid., April 9, 1999. On Agni capabilities, see Kathy Gannon, "Pakistan Tests Nuke-Capable Missile," ibid., April 14, 1999.
38. On Agni II capabilities, see "Fact Sheet: South Asian Missile Race,"Race," Non-Proliferation Fact Sheet, April 15, 1999, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. On U.S. pressure, see "India Postpones Missile Tests," Associated Press, January 21, 1999; and "Pakistan Denies Having Nuclear Cooperation with China," ibid., April 9, 1999. On Agni capabilities, see Kathy Gannon, "Pakistan Tests Nuke-Capable Missile," ibid., April 14, 1999.
39. Barry Bearak, "India Tests Missile Able to Hit Deep into Neighbor Lands," New York Times, April 12, 1999; Narayanan Madhavan, "Focus-India Shrugs Off Pakistan Missile Test," Reuters, April 14, 1999.
40. Barry Bearak, "India Tests Missile Able to Hit Deep into Neighbor Lands," New York Times, April 12, 1999; Narayanan Madhavan, "Focus-India Shrugs Off Pakistan Missile Test," Reuters, April 14, 1999.
41. William M. Arkin, "Misplaced Priorities," Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 54:4 (July-August 1998), p. 72.
42. The classic statement of this strategic effect of nuclear weapons is Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Among the more prominent proponents of this view among historians of the cold war is John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
43. The classic statement of this strategic effect of nuclear weapons is Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). Among the more prominent proponents of this view among historians of the cold war is John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).