Policy and performance under democratic coalitions: India's United Front government and economic reforms, 1996-98

Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

Volumn 37, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 22-56

  Nayar, Baldev Raj ^a  

^a MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; ECONOMIC REFORM; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

ASIA;

EID: 0032697544     PISSN: 03063631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14662049908447788     Document Type: Article

References (56)

1. On the two opposed positions, see Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 459, and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 'The State in the Initiation and Consolidation of Market-Oriented Reform', in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 221-40.
2. On the two opposed positions, see Robert H. Bates and Anne O. Krueger, Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform: Evidence from Eight Countries (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 459, and Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 'The State in the Initiation and Consolidation of Market-Oriented Reform', in Louis Putterman and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (eds.), State and Market in Development: Synergy or Rivalry? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 221-40.
3. A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol.1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1886), 73-4, cited in Lawrence C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 6-7.
4. A. Lawrence Lowell, Governments and Parties in Continental Europe, Vol.1 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1886), 73-4, cited in Lawrence C. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 6-7.
5. The myth of short-lived coalition governments has come under attack in the face of some evidence - not of overwhelming statistical power - of coalition stability in some countries. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, 208-9. The formation of stable coalitions in Dodd's analysis is dependent on restrictive requirements - such as stable, depolarised, and only moderately but not excessively fractionalised party systems - that are likely to be rarely met, especially in the developing world. 'Coalition government' is not a homogeneous concept, however. Dodd distinguishes between (1) minimum winning cabinets, (2) oversized or greater-than-minimum winning cabinets, and (3) undersized or less-than-minimum winning cabinets (i.e., minority governments); he holds the first type to be quite durable and the other two to be more transient. Other key elements entering into the prospects of stability of coalition governments pertain to attributes of the party system: cleavage conflict or polarisation; fractionalisation (the number and relative strength of parties within parliament); and party system stability (the continuity over time in the identity and relative strength of parties). See Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, 17-18, 54-70.
6. The myth of short-lived coalition governments has come under attack in the face of some evidence - not of overwhelming statistical power - of coalition stability in some countries. Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, 208-9. The formation of stable coalitions in Dodd's analysis is dependent on restrictive requirements - such as stable, depolarised, and only moderately but not excessively fractionalised party systems - that are likely to be rarely met, especially in the developing world. 'Coalition government' is not a homogeneous concept, however. Dodd distinguishes between (1) minimum winning cabinets, (2) oversized or greater-than-minimum winning cabinets, and (3) undersized or less-than-minimum winning cabinets (i.e., minority governments); he holds the first type to be quite durable and the other two to be more transient. Other key elements entering into the prospects of stability of coalition governments pertain to attributes of the party system: cleavage conflict or polarisation; fractionalisation (the number and relative strength of parties within parliament); and party system stability (the continuity over time in the identity and relative strength of parties). See Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, 17-18, 54-70.
7. Alberto Alesina and Guido Tabellini, 'A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt', Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), 403-14.
8. Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey D. Sachs, 'Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies', European Economic Review, 33 (1989), 903-38.
9. On the positions of Lowell, Lord Bryce, Harold Laski and Maurice Duverger on the issue, see Dodd, Coalitions in Parliamentary Government, 7-8.
10. Roubini and Sachs, 'Political and Economic Determinants', 926.
11. One commentator on the left asserted: 'The deeply retrogressive nature and aims of the economic reform programme, drawn up for India by the IMF/World Bank combine, already stands exposed among the people and they voted against it firmly and unambiguously.' BM, 'Uneasy True Among Conflicting Interests', Economic and Political Weekly, 15 June 1996, 1434-35. Note, however, the results of a systematic study based on rigorous polling of voters under the auspices of the Indian Council of Social Science Research and the Centre for the Studying of Developing Societies: 'Coming more specifically to the recent shifts in economic policy, only a fifth [of the sample] had heard about them. And of these, over half approved of the changes. One can thus legitimately doubt the assertion that the electoral debacle of the Congress party can be traced to the new economic policy'. V.B. Singh and Yogendra Yadav, 'The Maturing of a Democracy', India Today, 31 Aug. 1996, 28-43.
12. One commentator on the left asserted: 'The deeply retrogressive nature and aims of the economic reform programme, drawn up for India by the IMF/World Bank combine, already stands exposed among the people and they voted against it firmly and unambiguously.' BM, 'Uneasy True Among Conflicting Interests', Economic and Political Weekly, 15 June 1996, 1434-35. Note, however, the results of a systematic study based on rigorous polling of voters under the auspices of the Indian Council of Social Science Research and the Centre for the Studying of Developing Societies: 'Coming more specifically to the recent shifts in economic policy, only a fifth [of the sample] had heard about them. And of these, over half approved of the changes. One can thus legitimately doubt the assertion that the electoral debacle of the Congress party can be traced to the new economic policy'. V.B. Singh and Yogendra Yadav, 'The Maturing of a Democracy', India Today, 31 Aug. 1996, 28-43.
13. Economic Times (Mumbai), 19 April 1996.
14. Economic Times (Mumbai), 12 May 1996.
15. Citations from the CMP hereafter are from The United Front, 'A Common Approach to Major Policy Matters and a Minimum Programme' (New Delhi: CII, 1996).
16. Economic Times (Mumbai), 20 July 1996.
17. Swaminathan S. Anklesaria Aiyar, 'Chidambaram = Manmohan +- 2 per cent', Economic Times (Mumbai), 23 July 1996.
18. Editorial, Economic Times (Mumbai), 23 July 1996.
19. Economic Times (Mumbai), 19 June 1996, and Frontline, 12 July 1996, 7.
20. Economic Times (Mumbai), 19 June 1996, and Frontline, 12 July 1996, 7.
21. Economic Times (Mumbai), 19 to 23 June 1996.
22. India Today, 31 July 1996, 62.
23. India Today, 31 July 1996, 62, and Economic Times (Mumbai), 7 July 1996.
24. India Today, 31 July 1996, 62, and Economic Times (Mumbai), 7 July 1996.
25. Economic Times (Mumbai), 23 Oct. and 18 Nov. 1996; Business India, 8-21 Sept. 1997, 9.
26. Economic Times (Mumbai), 23 Oct. and 18 Nov. 1996; Business India, 8-21 Sept. 1997, 9.
27. India Today, 15 Sept. 1997, 54; Business India; 8-21 Sept. 1997, 9-10; and India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997-98 (New Delhi: 1998), 106.
28. India Today, 15 Sept. 1997, 54; Business India; 8-21 Sept. 1997, 9-10; and India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997-98 (New Delhi: 1998), 106.
29. India Today, 15 Sept. 1997, 54; Business India; 8-21 Sept. 1997, 9-10; and India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1997-98 (New Delhi: 1998), 106.
30. India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey 1996-97 (New Delhi, 1997), 30.
31. Economic Times (Mumbai), 1 March 1996, and N.S. Jagannathan, Business Standard (New Delhi), 8 March 1997.
32. Economic Times (Mumbai), 1 March 1996, and N.S. Jagannathan, Business Standard (New Delhi), 8 March 1997.
33. Business India, 22 Sept.-5 Oct. 1997, 47-8.
34. 'It's Fiscal Suicide', Business India, 22 Sept.-5 Oct. 1997, 224.
35. Hindu (Chennai), 4 Nov. 1997.
36. Economic Survey 1997-98, 21-4.
37. India Today, 28 Feb. 1997, 56.
38. Economic Survey 1997-98, 8, 17.
39. Economic Survey 1997-98, 19.
40. World Bank, India: Five Years of Stabilization and Reform and the Challenges Ahead (Washington, DC, 1997), 24-25.
41. Economic Times (Mumbai), 1 March 1997.
42. World Bank, India: 1998 Macro Economic Update (Washington, DC, 1998), Annex Table 10.
43. Ibid.
44. Business World, 16-28 Feb. 1997, 27.
45. Economic Survey 1997-98, 109-13.
46. It may be objected that the comparison is unfair since, failing to take the particular stage of the electoral cycle into account, it compares the second half of the five-year term of the Congress Party in office - when the government had to keep the impending elections in view - with the 18 months or so of the UF government right after the elections. However, it is important to note that the UF government from the very beginning lived under the constant threat of being overthrown. For a discussion of the reforms under the Congress Party, see my 'Political Structure and India's Economic Reforms of the 1990s', Pacific Affairs, 71, 3 (Fall 1998), 337-60.
47. D.R. Pendse, 'Economic Reforms', Times of India (New Delhi), 4 June 1996.
48. Wockhardt chairman Habil F. Khorakiwala and Larson & Toubro managing director S.D. Kulkarni, in Business World, 22 Dec. 1997, 21.
49. However, the public may still consider a stable majority government a desirable end in itself. Besides, it may find the political instability under coalition governments intolerable for other undesirable consequences it may generate, such as political uncertainty and deterioration in law and order. The function of government is to govern, and instability may prevent it from doing that.
50. Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Economic Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1977).
51. Economic policy is often influenced by dominant ideas of the particular time - such as Keynesianism, development economics, or the new economic orthodoxy - though no doubt filtered through concrete interests.
52. These business associations differ in their degree of commitment to reform, but they remain the chief arenas of business-government interaction where reform is debated. Their demand for a 'level playing field' in relation to foreign business is not necessarily inconsistent with liberalisation; in any case, business all over the world seeks some protection against what it regards as unfair foreign competition. See my 'Business and India's Economic Policy Reforms', Economic and Political Weekly, 32, 38 (19-25 Sept. 1998), 2453-68.
53. Ruchir Sharma, 'Supply-Side Economies', Economic Times (New Delhi), 2 March 1997.
54. Business World, 1-15 Feb. 1997, 32.
55. T.T. Ram Mohan, 'Steady As She Goes', Economic Times (Mumbai), 3 Sept. 1998.
56. Industry Minister Murasoli Maran, Business World, 16-28 Feb. 1997, 26.