Political community, liberal-nationalism, and the ethics of assimilation

Ethics

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 261-286

  Mason, Andrew ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032648208     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233896     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. I shall treat this, stipulatively, as the defining thesis of liberal-nationalism. Those who are ordinarily regarded as liberal-nationalists advance it, but also defend a broader set of theses. See esp. Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
2. I shall treat this, stipulatively, as the defining thesis of liberal-nationalism. Those who are ordinarily regarded as liberal-nationalists advance it, but also defend a broader set of theses. See esp. Y. Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); D. Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
3. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 307, and "Coleridge," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 134-36. Although Mill defines nationality in terms of the possession of common sympathies, he thinks that in practice these sympathies are created by various factors such as shared history and language. See also Y. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in National Rights, International Obligations, ed. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (Oxford: Westview, 1996), but cf. Tamir's Liberal Nationalism, p. 66; B. Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 136. The fellow feeling and common sympathies or sentiments which both Mill and Barry regard as essential to a shared national identity could in principle fall short of a sense of belonging together in my sense, for that requires believing there to be some special reason for associating together. But to the extent that, say, fellow feeling does fall short of a sense of belonging together, it would be a mistake to regard it as sufficient for shared nationality. E.g., concern for others simply because they happen to be members of the same state, even if that is humanly intelligible, does not on its own make for a shared national identity, even on subjectivist accounts. So I shall assume in what follows that both Mill and Barry believe that a shared national identity is constituted by a sense of belonging together in my sense.
4. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 307, and "Coleridge," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 134-36. Although Mill defines nationality in terms of the possession of common sympathies, he thinks that in practice these sympathies are created by various factors such as shared history and language. See also Y. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in National Rights, International Obligations, ed. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (Oxford: Westview, 1996), but cf. Tamir's Liberal Nationalism, p. 66; B. Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 136. The fellow feeling and common sympathies or sentiments which both Mill and Barry regard as essential to a shared national identity could in principle fall short of a sense of belonging together in my sense, for that requires believing there to be some special reason for associating together. But to the extent that, say, fellow feeling does fall short of a sense of belonging together, it would be a mistake to regard it as sufficient for shared nationality. E.g., concern for others simply because they happen to be members of the same state, even if that is humanly intelligible, does not on its own make for a shared national identity, even on subjectivist accounts. So I shall assume in what follows that both Mill and Barry believe that a shared national identity is constituted by a sense of belonging together in my sense.
5. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 307, and "Coleridge," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 134-36. Although Mill defines nationality in terms of the possession of common sympathies, he thinks that in practice these sympathies are created by various factors such as shared history and language. See also Y. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in National Rights, International Obligations, ed. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (Oxford: Westview, 1996), but cf. Tamir's Liberal Nationalism, p. 66; B. Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 136. The fellow feeling and common sympathies or sentiments which both Mill and Barry regard as essential to a shared national identity could in principle fall short of a sense of belonging together in my sense, for that requires believing there to be some special reason for associating together. But to the extent that, say, fellow feeling does fall short of a sense of belonging together, it would be a mistake to regard it as sufficient for shared nationality. E.g., concern for others simply because they happen to be members of the same state, even if that is humanly intelligible, does not on its own make for a shared national identity, even on subjectivist accounts. So I shall assume in what follows that both Mill and Barry believe that a shared national identity is constituted by a sense of belonging together in my sense.
6. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 307, and "Coleridge," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 134-36. Although Mill defines nationality in terms of the possession of common sympathies, he thinks that in practice these sympathies are created by various factors such as shared history and language. See also Y. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in National Rights, International Obligations, ed. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (Oxford: Westview, 1996), but cf. Tamir's Liberal Nationalism, p. 66; B. Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 136. The fellow feeling and common sympathies or sentiments which both Mill and Barry regard as essential to a shared national identity could in principle fall short of a sense of belonging together in my sense, for that requires believing there to be some special reason for associating together. But to the extent that, say, fellow feeling does fall short of a sense of belonging together, it would be a mistake to regard it as sufficient for shared nationality. E.g., concern for others simply because they happen to be members of the same state, even if that is humanly intelligible, does not on its own make for a shared national identity, even on subjectivist accounts. So I shall assume in what follows that both Mill and Barry believe that a shared national identity is constituted by a sense of belonging together in my sense.
7. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 307, and "Coleridge," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 134-36. Although Mill defines nationality in terms of the possession of common sympathies, he thinks that in practice these sympathies are created by various factors such as shared history and language. See also Y. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in National Rights, International Obligations, ed. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (Oxford: Westview, 1996), but cf. Tamir's Liberal Nationalism, p. 66; B. Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 136. The fellow feeling and common sympathies or sentiments which both Mill and Barry regard as essential to a shared national identity could in principle fall short of a sense of belonging together in my sense, for that requires believing there to be some special reason for associating together. But to the extent that, say, fellow feeling does fall short of a sense of belonging together, it would be a mistake to regard it as sufficient for shared nationality. E.g., concern for others simply because they happen to be members of the same state, even if that is humanly intelligible, does not on its own make for a shared national identity, even on subjectivist accounts. So I shall assume in what follows that both Mill and Barry believe that a shared national identity is constituted by a sense of belonging together in my sense.
8. See E. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 9; J. S. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962), p. 307, and "Coleridge," in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, vol. 10, Essays on Ethics, Religion and Society, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969), pp. 134-36. Although Mill defines nationality in terms of the possession of common sympathies, he thinks that in practice these sympathies are created by various factors such as shared history and language. See also Y. Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," in National Rights, International Obligations, ed. S. Caney, D. George, and P. Jones (Oxford: Westview, 1996), but cf. Tamir's Liberal Nationalism, p. 66; B. Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," in The Nature of Political Theory, ed. D. Miller and L. Siedentop (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 136. The fellow feeling and common sympathies or sentiments which both Mill and Barry regard as essential to a shared national identity could in principle fall short of a sense of belonging together in my sense, for that requires believing there to be some special reason for associating together. But to the extent that, say, fellow feeling does fall short of a sense of belonging together, it would be a mistake to regard it as sufficient for shared nationality. E.g., concern for others simply because they happen to be members of the same state, even if that is humanly intelligible, does not on its own make for a shared national identity, even on subjectivist accounts. So I shall assume in what follows that both Mill and Barry believe that a shared national identity is constituted by a sense of belonging together in my sense.
9. See, e.g., J. Haldane, "Identity, Community and the Limits of Multiculture," Public Affairs Quarterly, 7 (1993): 199-214, p. 210; Miller, On Nationality, pp. 21-27.
10. See, e.g., J. Haldane, "Identity, Community and the Limits of Multiculture," Public Affairs Quarterly, 7 (1993): 199-214, p. 210; Miller, On Nationality, pp. 21-27.
11. See Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," p. 88; Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," pp. 136-37.
12. See Tamir, "Reconstructing the Landscape of Imagination," p. 88; Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," pp. 136-37.
13. D. Miller, Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 244-45, and "Reflections on British National Identity," New Community 21 (1995): 153-66, p. 153. Miller is an objectivist in my sense, although in his sense he is not since he holds that sharing a national identity depends upon people's belief that they do, and an objectivist in his sense must deny that this is so.
14. D. Miller, Market, State, and Community: Theoretical Foundations of Market Socialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 244-45, and "Reflections on British National Identity," New Community 21 (1995): 153-66, p. 153. Miller is an objectivist in my sense, although in his sense he is not since he holds that sharing a national identity depends upon people's belief that they do, and an objectivist in his sense must deny that this is so.
15. The idea that nations are imagined communities is Benedict Anderson's. See his Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), esp. pp. 5-7.
16. D. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. S. Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 241-42, and Market, State, and Community, pp. 234-36; cf. R. Scruton, "In Defence of the Nation," in his The Philosopher on Dover Beach (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990), p. 308.
17. D. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. S. Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 241-42, and Market, State, and Community, pp. 234-36; cf. R. Scruton, "In Defence of the Nation," in his The Philosopher on Dover Beach (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990), p. 308.
18. D. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," in Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives, ed. S. Mendus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 241-42, and Market, State, and Community, pp. 234-36; cf. R. Scruton, "In Defence of the Nation," in his The Philosopher on Dover Beach (Manchester: Carcanet, 1990), p. 308.
19. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 309. See also E. Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 16-17; T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941 ), secs. 122-23; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), chap. 3. Lord Acton rejects Mill's thesis, arguing that liberty and stability are better preserved by the existence of more than one nation in a state. When different nations exist under the same sovereignty, there is a need to balance interests and restrain policy, and this guards against corruption and absolutism. See Lord Acton, "Nationalism," in The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1922), esp. p. 289. As Barker points out, however, Acton's claims are not borne out by history.
20. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 309. See also E. Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 16-17; T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941 ), secs. 122-23; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), chap. 3. Lord Acton rejects Mill's thesis, arguing that liberty and stability are better preserved by the existence of more than one nation in a state. When different nations exist under the same sovereignty, there is a need to balance interests and restrain policy, and this guards against corruption and absolutism. See Lord Acton, "Nationalism," in The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1922), esp. p. 289. As Barker points out, however, Acton's claims are not borne out by history.
21. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 309. See also E. Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 16-17; T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941 ), secs. 122-23; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), chap. 3. Lord Acton rejects Mill's thesis, arguing that liberty and stability are better preserved by the existence of more than one nation in a state. When different nations exist under the same sovereignty, there is a need to balance interests and restrain policy, and this guards against corruption and absolutism. See Lord Acton, "Nationalism," in The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1922), esp. p. 289. As Barker points out, however, Acton's claims are not borne out by history.
22. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 309. See also E. Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 16-17; T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941 ), secs. 122-23; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), chap. 3. Lord Acton rejects Mill's thesis, arguing that liberty and stability are better preserved by the existence of more than one nation in a state. When different nations exist under the same sovereignty, there is a need to balance interests and restrain policy, and this guards against corruption and absolutism. See Lord Acton, "Nationalism," in The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1922), esp. p. 289. As Barker points out, however, Acton's claims are not borne out by history.
23. Mill, Considerations on Representative Government, p. 309. See also E. Barker, National Character and the Factors in Its Formation (London: Methuen, 1927), pp. 16-17; T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941 ), secs. 122-23; M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), chap. 3. Lord Acton rejects Mill's thesis, arguing that liberty and stability are better preserved by the existence of more than one nation in a state. When different nations exist under the same sovereignty, there is a need to balance interests and restrain policy, and this guards against corruption and absolutism. See Lord Acton, "Nationalism," in The History of Freedom and Other Essays, ed. J. Figgis and R. Laurence (London: Macmillan, 1922), esp. p. 289. As Barker points out, however, Acton's claims are not borne out by history.
24. Roger Scruton has recently arrived at the same conclusion as Mill, that the stability of liberal institutions must rest upon the existence of a shared national identity, via a somewhat different route. See Scruton. See also J. Gray, Enlightenment's Wake: Politics and Culture at the Close of the Modern Age (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 22-23.
25. See Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," pp. 141-42. See also my comment on Barry in n. 2 above.
26. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 247, and On Nationality, pp. 93-94. See also Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 117-20. Barry also endorses the idea: see Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," p. 141.
27. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 247, and On Nationality, pp. 93-94. See also Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 117-20. Barry also endorses the idea: see Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," p. 141.
28. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 247, and On Nationality, pp. 93-94. See also Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 117-20. Barry also endorses the idea: see Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," p. 141.
29. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 247, and On Nationality, pp. 93-94. See also Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, pp. 117-20. Barry also endorses the idea: see Barry, "Self-Government Revisited," p. 141.
30. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 247.
31. Ibid., p. 243; Miller, Market, State, and Community, p. 237. See also Canovan, chap. 4; D. Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 137-38; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 121. Buchanan addresses a related thesis. See A. Buchanan, Secession: The Legitimacy of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), p. 51.
32. Ibid., p. 243; Miller, Market, State, and Community, p. 237. See also Canovan, chap. 4; D. Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 137-38; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 121. Buchanan addresses a related thesis. See A. Buchanan, Secession: The Legitimacy of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), p. 51.
33. Ibid., p. 243; Miller, Market, State, and Community, p. 237. See also Canovan, chap. 4; D. Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 137-38; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 121. Buchanan addresses a related thesis. See A. Buchanan, Secession: The Legitimacy of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), p. 51.
34. Ibid., p. 243; Miller, Market, State, and Community, p. 237. See also Canovan, chap. 4; D. Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 137-38; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 121. Buchanan addresses a related thesis. See A. Buchanan, Secession: The Legitimacy of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), p. 51.
35. Ibid., p. 243; Miller, Market, State, and Community, p. 237. See also Canovan, chap. 4; D. Bell, Communitarianism and Its Critics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 137-38; Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, p. 121. Buchanan addresses a related thesis. See A. Buchanan, Secession: The Legitimacy of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), p. 51.
36. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 243, and Market, State, and Community, p. 237. There does seem to be a non sequitur here: from the fact that people give more weight to need than, say, merit when they see themselves as bound together to the beneficiaries, it does not follow that they will only give significant weight to need under these circumstances. But it might nevertheless be thought that Miller's thesis here has independent plausibility.
37. Miller, "Socialism and Toleration," p. 243, and Market, State, and Community, p. 237. There does seem to be a non sequitur here: from the fact that people give more weight to need than, say, merit when they see themselves as bound together to the beneficiaries, it does not follow that they will only give significant weight to need under these circumstances. But it might nevertheless be thought that Miller's thesis here has independent plausibility.
38. Miller, On Nationality, p. 94 . There is a danger of partly trivializing the claim here (as Miller is aware, see p. 96, n. 23) by defining a solidaristic national identity as one which involves a commitment to redistribution. What is it for a national identity to be solidaristic other than for compatriots to be mutually concerned, part of which would include a willingness to support redistribution? For further discussion of Miller's claims, see my "The State, National Identity, and Distributive Justice," New Community 21 (1995): 241-54.
39. Miller, On Nationality, p. 94 . There is a danger of partly trivializing the claim here (as Miller is aware, see p. 96, n. 23) by defining a solidaristic national identity as one which involves a commitment to redistribution. What is it for a national identity to be solidaristic other than for compatriots to be mutually concerned, part of which would include a willingness to support redistribution? For further discussion of Miller's claims, see my "The State, National Identity, and Distributive Justice," New Community 21 (1995): 241-54.
40. The arguments do not, however, point unequivocally in the direction of a policy of assimilation. When the source of cultural diversity is the coexistence of a number of different nations within the same state, it might be thought that the arguments give reason for allowing them political independence of some kind. In many cases, however, granting national minorities political independence is unlikely to solve the problem given the intermingling of peoples and, indeed, may cause more harm than good. Even those theorists who are most sympathetic to national self-determination acknowledge that serious constraints need to be placed on the circumstances under which it is justified. See Miller, On Nationality, chap. 4; A. Margalit and J. Raz, "National Self-Determination," Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990): 439-61.
41. The arguments do not, however, point unequivocally in the direction of a policy of assimilation. When the source of cultural diversity is the coexistence of a number of different nations within the same state, it might be thought that the arguments give reason for allowing them political independence of some kind. In many cases, however, granting national minorities political independence is unlikely to solve the problem given the intermingling of peoples and, indeed, may cause more harm than good. Even those theorists who are most sympathetic to national self-determination acknowledge that serious constraints need to be placed on the circumstances under which it is justified. See Miller, On Nationality, chap. 4; A. Margalit and J. Raz, "National Self-Determination," Journal of Philosophy, 87 (1990): 439-61.
42. This definition does not respect a distinction that some have drawn between integration and assimilation. Roy Jenkins, e.g., implicitly drew such a distinction in a speech in 1966 when he was British home secretary: "Integration is perhaps a rather loose word. I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a melting pot, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishmen. . . . I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (R. Jenkins, Essays and Speeches [London: Collins, 1967], p. 267, quoted in Sebastian Poulter, "Cultural Pluralism and Its Limits," in Britain: A Plural Society, ed. B. Parekh [London: CRE, 1990], p. 5).
43. This definition does not respect a distinction that some have drawn between integration and assimilation. Roy Jenkins, e.g., implicitly drew such a distinction in a speech in 1966 when he was British home secretary: "Integration is perhaps a rather loose word. I do not regard it as meaning the loss, by immigrants, of their own national characteristics and culture. I do not think that we need in this country a melting pot, which will turn everybody out in a common mould, as one of a series of carbon copies of someone's misplaced vision of the stereotyped Englishmen. . . . I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" (R. Jenkins, Essays and Speeches [London: Collins, 1967], p. 267, quoted in Sebastian Poulter, "Cultural Pluralism and Its Limits," in Britain: A Plural Society, ed. B. Parekh [London: CRE, 1990], p. 5).
44. Here we need to distinguish between arranged marriages and forced marriages. There is no general reason for thinking that the former are unjust or involve a violation of individual rights.
45. Liberals have sometimes objected that polygamy, when it takes its standard form of polygyny, is unjust because it discriminates against women (see J. S. Mill, "On Liberty," in Utilitarianism, ed. M. Warnock [Glasgow: Fontana, 1962], p. 224). But we can imagine forms of polygamy that did not discriminate in this way.
46. See R. Dworkin, "Liberalism," in his A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Not all those who think that the basic structure of society should be neutral between different conceptions of the good suppose that all of the state's policies should be neutral in this way. See B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 143-44.
47. See R. Dworkin, "Liberalism," in his A Matter of Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). Not all those who think that the basic structure of society should be neutral between different conceptions of the good suppose that all of the state's policies should be neutral in this way. See B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 143-44.
48. See I. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), esp. pp. 164-65. Young's initial characterization of assimilation is somewhat different from mine. She calls it "the transcendence of group difference" (p. 157), but her discussion makes clear that she would also regard what I am calling moderate assimilation policies as oppressive even when they are noncoercive.
49. Young also claims that a policy of assimilation is likely to be ineffective or counterproductive. Although the kind of noncoercive policies I have described are unlikely to be effective in assimilating members of minority cultures in a short space of time, they may well be effective over a generation or two, and need not always provoke significant opposition. What kind of opposition they are likely to face will largely depend upon past history. If the group concerned has been unjustly treated in the past, a policy of assimilation may provide a focus for their grievances. And assimilation is more likely to face resistance from indigenous groups who believe that they have some right of self-determination than from an immigrant group which makes no such claims (It may also be affected by external factors, e.g., groups may regard assimilation as a betrayal of their relatives in the country from which they have emigrated and who have remained true to their traditional practices.)
50. See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. chaps. 8-9, and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. chaps. 5-6.
51. See W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), esp. chaps. 8-9, and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. chaps. 5-6.
52. See Young, p. 165.
53. C. L. Ten emphasizes the first of these objections and the value of cultural diversity. See C. L. Ten, "Multiculturalism and the Value of Diversity," in Multicultural Citizens: The Philosophy and Politics of Identity, ed. C. Kukathas (St. Leonards: Centre for Independent Studies, 1993), pp. 9-10, 12-16.
54. C. Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," in his Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism, ed. G. Laforest (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. 183.
55. Something of this kind may have happened in the twentieth century in Belgium when many Dutch speakers began to feel alienated from its main institutions (see below).
56. W. Kymlicka, "Social Unity in a Libera State," Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996): 105-36, p. 131.
57. M. Walzer, "What Does It Mean to Be an 'American'?" Social Research 57 (1990): 591-614, p. 602.
58. See, e.g., Miller, On Nationality, pp. 20, 72, n. 24, 94, 113.
59. Ibid., p. 25.
60. Ibid., p. 26.
61. These claims are controversial. For a different view, see Walzer, pp. 606-14; P. Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," in The Harvard Encyclopaedia of American Ethnic Groups, ed. S. Thernstrom (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 55-57. But I am inclined to think that the idea that there is a shared American national identity has been advanced so confidently because an adequate distinction has not been drawn between what I am calling a sense of belonging together and a sense of belonging to a polity.
62. These claims are controversial. For a different view, see Walzer, pp. 606-14; P. Gleason, "American Identity and Americanization," in The Harvard Encyclopaedia of American Ethnic Groups, ed. S. Thernstrom (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), esp. pp. 55-57. But I am inclined to think that the idea that there is a shared American national identity has been advanced so confidently because an adequate distinction has not been drawn between what I am calling a sense of belonging together and a sense of belonging to a polity.
63. Miller, On Nationality, pp. 94-95.
64. J. Steinberg, Why Switzerland? 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 249.
65. Ibid., p. 251.
66. Ibid.
67. J. Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federalism (London: Hurst & Co., 1996), p. 4.
68. See R. De Schryver, "The Belgian Revolution and the Emergence of Belgium's Biculturalism," and J. Stengers, "Belgian National Sentiments," both in Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society, ed. A. Lijphart (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1981).
69. See R. De Schryver, "The Belgian Revolution and the Emergence of Belgium's Biculturalism," and J. Stengers, "Belgian National Sentiments," both in Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics of a Culturally Divided Society, ed. A. Lijphart (Berkeley: University of California, Institute of International Studies, 1981).
70. Fitzmaurice, pp. 61, 267.
71. Miller, Market, State, and Community, p. 189.
72. M. Viroli, For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 14.
73. Ibid., p. 175.
74. C. Taylor, "Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in his Philosophical Arguments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 199.
75. Ibid., p. 196. Taylor seems to think that patriotic identification can have many different bases, however: elsewhere he seems to allow that valuing "deep diversity" could be a basis for patriotic identification. See Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," pp. 182-84.
76. Ibid., p. 196. Taylor seems to think that patriotic identification can have many different bases, however: elsewhere he seems to allow that valuing "deep diversity" could be a basis for patriotic identification. See Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," pp. 182-84.
77. It might seem that (2) and (3) can be readily distinguished because (2), unlike (3), is vulnerable to the objection that it has no explanation for why citizens identify with their major institutions rather than any other institutions which embody the same principles. But that is not obviously so. According to (2), identification is explained, in part, by the fact that citizens are subject to those institution.
78. See J. Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," in Theorizing Citizenship, ed. R. Beiner (Albany, N.Y.: SUNYPress, 1995), pp. 264, 278-79.
79. Here again there is a parallel with Taylor's idea that a liberal polity divided by history and culture might be held together by the acceptance of deep diversity. See Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," p. 183.
80. For example, Taylor argues that American parents have no legitimate objection to "the pious tone with which American history and its major figures are presented to the young" ("Cross-Purposes," p. 198). But what if that tone were founded upon historical illusions?
81. Kymlicka refers to this approach as "benign neglect." See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 3-4.
82. Compare A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 39-40.
83. See A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 81-83. This is one of the seven conditions which Lijphart mentions that are conducive to the success of consociational democracy.
84. Much the same point is made by Anne Phillips in her "Democracy and Difference: Some Problems for Feminist Theory," in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. W. Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 296-97, and at greater length in her The Politics of Presence.
85. Much the same point is made by Anne Phillips in her "Democracy and Difference: Some Problems for Feminist Theory," in The Rights of Minority Cultures, ed. W. Kymlicka (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), esp. pp. 296-97, and at greater length in her The Politics of Presence.
86. Phillips, The Politics of Presence, p. 53.
87. See Miller, On Nationality, p. 116.
88. Here I am perhaps in partial disagreement with Kymlicka who argues that granting self-government rights to national minorities is unlikely to serve an integrative function, except in the case of guaranteed representation at the intergovernmental or federal level. See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 182.
89. During the 1980s, the Union of Muslim Organizations of the United Kingdom and Ireland drew up proposals for a system of family law to be applicable to all British Muslims. See S. Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs (London: Butterworth, 1986), p. 58.
90. My examples are owed to Poulter, English Law and Ethnic Minority Customs.
91. Taylor's suggestion that past failures of recognition explain the desire for independence expressed by many Quebecois can appeal to both of the general factors I have mentioned. See Taylor, "Shared and Divergent Values," pp. 168-69.
92. Of course, we cannot always expect recognition and accommodation to quiet secessionist movements.
93. I extend these arguments in my Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press).