Constructions of cultural identity: Multiculturalism and exclusion

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 17-31

  Tempelman, Sasja ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032623305     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00185     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. 1 I thank Mark Bovens, Herman van Gunsteren, Hans Oversloot, Pieter Pekelharing, John Rex, and Robert-Jan van der Veen for their comments on earlier versions of this article.
2. 2 S. N. Eisenstadt and B. Giesen, 'The construction of collective identity', Archives of European Sociology, XXXVI (1995), 72-192.
3. 3 Eisenstadt and Giesen, 'The construction of collective identity', p. 78.
4. 4 I realize that the connotations used by Eisenstadt and Giesen may lead to confusion. The common notions of the 'civic' and 'cultural' nation, for instance, mean something completely different than in this typology. However, changing the connotations, e.g. into primordial, traditional and universal, only raises different problems. I have therefore decided to stick to Eisenstadt and Giesen's concepts, hoping that the reader will bear with me. I have only redefined the 'cultural' mode as the 'universal' mode, to avoid the cumbersome phrase 'the cultural mode of constructing cultural identity'.
5. 5 See in particular C. Tatlor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in C. Taylor, Multiculturalism and The Politics of Recognition (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 1994).
6. 6 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 27.
7. 7 Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 58.
8. 8 Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 61-73.
9. 9 Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', pp. 59-62.
10. 10 See for instance Taylor, Sources of the Self.
11. 11 I thank Melissa Williams for making this point, and Bert van den Brink for helping me to see it more clearly.
12. 12 Taylor argues that the survival of French culture in Canada requires that the province of Quebec be allowed to conduct a politics of the common good actively aimed at preserving this culture, in particular the language. French culture requires protection because it is threatened by the dominance of English, because many Canadians identify with it, and because its moral and social frameworks are crucial for their making sense of their lives. (C. Taylor, 'Shared and Divergent Values', in C. Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes. Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press), 1992).
13. 13 Bert van den Brink has noted that there is a tension here between Taylor's allegiance to the ideal of authenticity understood as the ideal of finding 'my own original way of being' and his remark that identity is primarily a question of 'where we are coming from' (Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics and Recognition', pp. 32-3).
14. The first idea points towards the way in which people should shape their individual lives, while Taylor tends to let the latter slip into the idea that our individual identities are the expressions of particular cultures or communities (B. van den Brink, The Tragedy of Liberalism (unpublished thesis, Utrecht, The Netherlands) 1997, p. 205).
15. 14 Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 58.
16. 15 Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 63.
17. 16 For instance, many Muslims disassociated themselves from the fatwah against Salman Rushdie, which Taylor cites as an example of an intolerable cultural expression. In his account, those internal critics can only belong to the 'we' (as if they were 'westernized' Muslims). However, one can be a good Muslim (belong to 'they') and still contest the fatwah against Rushdie, or rather, the fatwah is the site of conflicts about what it means to be a good Muslim (Taylor, Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 62).
18. 17 B. Parekh, 'Discourses on national identity', Political Studies, 42, 3 (1994), 492-504; 'Cultural pluralism and the limits of diverstiy', Alternatives 20, 43 (1995), 431-57; 'Minority practices and principles of toleration', International Migration Review, 20, 1 (1996), 251-84.
19. 17 B. Parekh, 'Discourses on national identity', Political Studies, 42, 3 (1994), 492-504; 'Cultural pluralism and the limits of diverstiy', Alternatives 20, 43 (1995), 431-57; 'Minority practices and principles of toleration', International Migration Review, 20, 1 (1996), 251-84.
20. 17 B. Parekh, 'Discourses on national identity', Political Studies, 42, 3 (1994), 492-504; 'Cultural pluralism and the limits of diverstiy', Alternatives 20, 43 (1995), 431-57; 'Minority practices and principles of toleration', International Migration Review, 20, 1 (1996), 251-84.
21. 18 Parekh, 'Discourses on national identity', p. 504.
22. 19 Parekh, 'Cultural pluralism and the limits of diversity', p. 439.
23. 20 Parekh, 'Cultural pluralism and the limits of diverstiy', pp. 436-7.
24. 21 Indeed, nationalist conflicts have become more acute while cultural differences have diminished. As Bauböck elegantly puts it: 'We might say that with regard to cultural practices, habits, aspirations and values there are increasing similarities between national minorities and majorities which they do not want to share as communalities' (R. Bauböck, 'Group Rights for Cultural Minorities: Justifications and Constraints', paper presented to the conference 'Multiculturalism, Minorities and Citizenship', Florence (1996), p. 13). This paradoxical double dynamic in which the emphasis on diversity coincides with actual homogenization is apparent in all kinds of cultural conflicts. For instance, women are demanding recognition at a point in history when their lives have never been so similar to men's. Phillips argues that the current attention to difference 'cannot be understood just in terms of an absolute or growing difference. More precisely it reflects a shift in political culture and claims, where people who may be significantly less different than at some point in the past come to assert a stronger sense of themselves and their identities' (A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 12).
25. 21 Indeed, nationalist conflicts have become more acute while cultural differences have diminished. As Bauböck elegantly puts it: 'We might say that with regard to cultural practices, habits, aspirations and values there are increasing similarities between national minorities and majorities which they do not want to share as communalities' (R. Bauböck, 'Group Rights for Cultural Minorities: Justifications and Constraints', paper presented to the conference 'Multiculturalism, Minorities and Citizenship', Florence (1996), p. 13). This paradoxical double dynamic in which the emphasis on diversity coincides with actual homogenization is apparent in all kinds of cultural conflicts. For instance, women are demanding recognition at a point in history when their lives have never been so similar to men's. Phillips argues that the current attention to difference 'cannot be understood just in terms of an absolute or growing difference. More precisely it reflects a shift in political culture and claims, where people who may be significantly less different than at some point in the past come to assert a stronger sense of themselves and their identities' (A. Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) p. 12).
26. 22 Bauböck, 'Group Rights for Cultural Minorities', p. 14.
27. 23 N. Glazer, 'Is assimilation dead?'. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 530 (1993), 122-36.
28. 24 This strategy is employed by separatist movements as well as by social groups such as immigrant groups, African-Americans or the gay movement. All these groups have an interest in stressing external boundaries and internal unity to achieve recognition. An important difference is, as Melissa Williams has pointed out to me, that the former aim at exclusion from a political community, while the latter stress differences and internal unity to effect their full inclusion into society.
29. 25 It is thus logically possible for civic multiculturalists to defend the concept of an identifiable group with a strong claim to recognition, even if the claim about internal diversity is accurate. I thank Melissa Williams for pointing this out to me.
30. 26 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989): Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995); States, Nations and Cultures (Amsterdam, Van Gorcum, 1997).
31. 26 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989): Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995); States, Nations and Cultures (Amsterdam, Van Gorcum, 1997).
32. 26 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989): Multicultural Citizenship: a Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995); States, Nations and Cultures (Amsterdam, Van Gorcum, 1997).
33. 27 Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture, p. 165.
34. 28 At the basis of the recognition of cultural communities lies a universalist conception of a moral person: an individual whose freedom is made possible by an upbringing in a rich and stable cultural community. This is the one thing all people, whatever their ethnic, culture or racial background, must require equally. It is this assumption of the person that is the basic source for justifying substantive minority rights and privileges, and for working out their limitations (compare A. Favell, 'Applied Political Philosophy at the Rubicon. A Discussion of Will Kymlicka's "Multicultural Citizenship"', paper to the conference on 'Multiculturalism, Minorities and Citizenship', Florence, 1996).
35. 28 At the basis of the recognition of cultural communities lies a universalist conception of a moral person: an individual whose freedom is made possible by an upbringing in a rich and stable cultural community. This is the one thing all people, whatever their ethnic, culture or racial background, must require equally. It is this assumption of the person that is the basic source for justifying substantive minority rights and privileges, and for working out their limitations (compare A. Favell, 'Applied Political Philosophy at the Rubicon. A Discussion of Will Kymlicka's "Multicultural Citizenship"', paper to the conference on 'Multiculturalism, Minorities and Citizenship', Florence, 1996).
36. 29 A societal culture is 'a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language. I have called these 'societal cultures' to emphasize that they involve not just shared memories or values, but also common institutions and practices' (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 76).
37. 30 Kymlicka believes that members of societal cultures can share a common identity based on a shared language and history, and still disagree fundamentally about the ultimate ends of life. Indeed, it is precisely because societal cultures do not rest on shared values (nations lie 'outside the normative sphere') that they provide a secure foundation for individual autonomy: they do not impose morality but provide a stable context in which conceptions of the good may be questioned (Kymlicka, States, Nations and Cultures, p. 43).
38. 31 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 152.
39. 32 Thus, the state may support education in a minority language if it helps people to master the national language and culture more quickly or it may allow women to wear the veil if this increases their possibilities to participate in the public realm.
40. 33 This distinction between national and other cultural groups is a principled one; it points toward a fundamental difference in moral status which follows directly from Kymlicka's conception of the moral person as an individual who can only develop his or her autonomy in a secure cultural context.
41. 34 Kymlicka counters this issue by arguing that immigrants, in contrast to national minorities or indigenous people, have voluntarily left their countries and therefore have waived the right to live within their societal culture (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 95-8). Besides the fact that we should seriously question the extent to which the decision to emigrate is voluntary, this distinction has no bearing on Kymlicka's fundamental reason for protecting cultures, i.e., that these provide the basis for individual autonomy. According to this reasoning, if immigrants' cultural communities are essential to their freedom of choice and self-respect then they deserve protection, regardless of the historical circumstances of their (or, rather, their forefathers') settlement.
42. 35 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 153.
43. 36 See for instance C. Kukathas, 'Are there any cultural rights?', Political Theory 20, 1 (1992), 105-39; B. Parekh, 'Dilemmas of a multicultural theory of citizenship', Constellations, 4, 1 (1997), 54-62; I. Young, 'A multicultural continuum: a critique of Will Kymlicka's ethnic-nation dichotomy', Constellations, 4, 1 (1997), 48-53.
44. 36 See for instance C. Kukathas, 'Are there any cultural rights?', Political Theory 20, 1 (1992), 105-39; B. Parekh, 'Dilemmas of a multicultural theory of citizenship', Constellations, 4, 1 (1997), 54-62; I. Young, 'A multicultural continuum: a critique of Will Kymlicka's ethnic-nation dichotomy', Constellations, 4, 1 (1997), 48-53.
45. 36 See for instance C. Kukathas, 'Are there any cultural rights?', Political Theory 20, 1 (1992), 105-39; B. Parekh, 'Dilemmas of a multicultural theory of citizenship', Constellations, 4, 1 (1997), 54-62; I. Young, 'A multicultural continuum: a critique of Will Kymlicka's ethnic-nation dichotomy', Constellations, 4, 1 (1997), 48-53.
46. 37 By integrating citizens into a common language through standardized education and by promoting their participation in a common public culture, processes of nation-building increase people's opportunities. They give them equal access to the modern economy, as well as generate the sense of common membership and solidarity that is essential to social equality and political cohesion in the modern welfare-state (Kymlicka, States, Nations and Cultures, p. 30).
47. 38 'Liberalism is committed to (perhaps even defined by) the view that individuals should have the freedom and capacity to question and possibly revise the traditional practices of their community should they come to see them as no longer worthy of their allegiance . . . Hence, a liberal conception of minority rights will condemn certain traditional practices of minority cultures just as it has historically condemned the traditional practices of majority cultures and will support their reform' (W. Kymlicka, 'Rights of Minority Cultures. A Reply to Kukathas', Political Theory, 20, 1 (1992), pp. 140-6, p. 142).
48. 39 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 163-70. This suggests that any culture can be liberalized without violating its integrity. Everyone can become a liberal: 'To assume that any culture is inherently illiberal, and incapable of reform, is ethnocentric and ahistorical'. Indeed, he adds, it is quite misleading to talk of 'liberal' and 'illiberal' societies. Rather, liberality is a matter of degree, while 'the task of liberal reform remains incomplete in every society' (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 94). Here we see the universalist notions of the openness of the community and of the hierarchical approach to its transcendental core which is never completely attained.
49. 39 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 163-70. This suggests that any culture can be liberalized without violating its integrity. Everyone can become a liberal: 'To assume that any culture is inherently illiberal, and incapable of reform, is ethnocentric and ahistorical'. Indeed, he adds, it is quite misleading to talk of 'liberal' and 'illiberal' societies. Rather, liberality is a matter of degree, while 'the task of liberal reform remains incomplete in every society' (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 94). Here we see the universalist notions of the openness of the community and of the hierarchical approach to its transcendental core which is never completely attained.
50. 40 Kymlicka argues for the exact opposite: the liberal state is more justified in imposing its principles on non-liberal ethnic minorities than on national minorities or on other states (Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, p. 170). It seems to me, however, that it is precisely members of the first group, because they are and desire to remain equal citizens, who should have the right to contest the dominant (liberal) principles of the political community and to preserve their own way of life, as long as they do not impose it upon others.
51. 41 Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 164-72.