Intergenerational justice and climate change

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 53-66

  Page, Edward ^a  

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EID: 0032623273     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00187     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. 1 For a game theoretical account of climate change politics, see Hugh Ward, 'Game theory and the politics of global warming: the state of play and beyond', Political Studies, 44, 5 (1996). 850-71; for the international relations perspective on climate change issues see M. Peterson, Global Warming and Global Politics (London, Routledge, 1996).
2. 1 For a game theoretical account of climate change politics, see Hugh Ward, 'Game theory and the politics of global warming: the state of play and beyond', Political Studies, 44, 5 (1996). 850-71; for the international relations perspective on climate change issues see M. Peterson, Global Warming and Global Politics (London, Routledge, 1996).
3. 2 See M. Grubb, 'Seeking fair weather: ethics and the international debate on climate change', International Affairs, 71, 3 (1995), 463-96; H. Shue, 'Avoidable Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and Alternative Energy', in I. Shapiro and J.W. DeCew (eds), NOMOS XXXVII: Theory and Practice (New York, New York University Press, 1995), pp. 239-64; and H. Shue, 'The Unavoidably of Justice', in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds). The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 373-97.
4. 2 See M. Grubb, 'Seeking fair weather: ethics and the international debate on climate change', International Affairs, 71, 3 (1995), 463-96; H. Shue, 'Avoidable Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and Alternative Energy', in I. Shapiro and J.W. DeCew (eds), NOMOS XXXVII: Theory and Practice (New York, New York University Press, 1995), pp. 239-64; and H. Shue, 'The Unavoidably of Justice', in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds). The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 373-97.
5. 2 See M. Grubb, 'Seeking fair weather: ethics and the international debate on climate change', International Affairs, 71, 3 (1995), 463-96; H. Shue, 'Avoidable Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and Alternative Energy', in I. Shapiro and J.W. DeCew (eds), NOMOS XXXVII: Theory and Practice (New York, New York University Press, 1995), pp. 239-64; and H. Shue, 'The Unavoidably of Justice', in A. Hurrell and B. Kingsbury (eds). The International Politics of the Environment (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), 373-97.
6. 3 J.T. Houghton, M.C. Zinyowera and R.H. Moss (eds), Climate Change 1995: the Science of Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 5.
7. 4 See A.J. McMichael et al., 'Human Population Health', in R.T. Watson (ed), Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 564ff. It is worth noting that at least some of the IPCC's research findings are controversial. However, even those who are sceptical of the relevance of the IPPC's findings for questions of social justice, such as Wilfrid Beckerman, do not dispute the fact that climate change will impact upon the distribution of resources across generations to some extent. See W. Beckerman, Small is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens (London, Duckworth, 1995), pp. 90ff.
8. 4 See A.J. McMichael et al., 'Human Population Health', in R.T. Watson (ed), Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 564ff. It is worth noting that at least some of the IPCC's research findings are controversial. However, even those who are sceptical of the relevance of the IPPC's findings for questions of social justice, such as Wilfrid Beckerman, do not dispute the fact that climate change will impact upon the distribution of resources across generations to some extent. See W. Beckerman, Small is Stupid: Blowing the Whistle on the Greens (London, Duckworth, 1995), pp. 90ff.
9. 5 K.J. Arrow et al., 'International Equity, Discounting and Economic Efficiency', in J.P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. Haites (eds), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 130. This conclusion is consistent with the text of the earlier United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, according to which those nations party to it 'should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (London, HMSO, 1993), p. 5.
10. 5 K.J. Arrow et al., 'International Equity, Discounting and Economic Efficiency', in J.P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. Haites (eds), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 130. This conclusion is consistent with the text of the earlier United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, according to which those nations party to it 'should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities'. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (London, HMSO, 1993), p. 5.
11. 6 Onora O'Neill, for example, writes that 'by burning fossil fuel prodigally we accelerate the green-house effect and may dramatically harm successors, who can do nothing to us'. See O'Neill. Towards Justice and Virtue (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 115.
12. 7 B. Barry, 'The Ethics of Resource Depletion', in Democracy, power and Justice, (Oxford, Claderon, 1989), p. 519 - emphasis added.
13. 8 Barry, 'The Ethics of Resource Depletion', pp. 515ff.
14. 9 Various versions of this argument have been put forward, but by far the most influential is Parfit's, See D. Parfit, reasons and Persons (Oxford, Claredon, 1984), pp. 351ff.
15. 10 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, p. 359.
16. 11 T.M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 116.
17. 12 T.M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110. Barry endorses the contractualist view in both Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp. 284ff; and Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 67-72. It is worth noting that Barry does not address the difficulties which the non-identity problem pose for his view in any of his published work on intergenerational and environmental justice, although in a recent article he does observe that contractual thinking cannot readily explain our duties to future persons or the non-human world. Thus he remarks that although 'the interests of people in the future should have no less weight than those of people in the present', it does not appear that 'the contractual apparatus is useful in this context; it throws up more problems than it solves'. See 'Contractual justice: a modest defence', Utilitas, 8 (1996), p. 365. Barry does not go on to state how he thinks we might reconcile contractualism with stringent duties of intergenerational justice, though it appears to be his desire to do so in future volumes of his Treatise on Social Justice.
18. 12 T.M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110. Barry endorses the contractualist view in both Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp. 284ff; and Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 67-72. It is worth noting that Barry does not address the difficulties which the non-identity problem pose for his view in any of his published work on intergenerational and environmental justice, although in a recent article he does observe that contractual thinking cannot readily explain our duties to future persons or the non-human world. Thus he remarks that although 'the interests of people in the future should have no less weight than those of people in the present', it does not appear that 'the contractual apparatus is useful in this context; it throws up more problems than it solves'. See 'Contractual justice: a modest defence', Utilitas, 8 (1996), p. 365. Barry does not go on to state how he thinks we might reconcile contractualism with stringent duties of intergenerational justice, though it appears to be his desire to do so in future volumes of his Treatise on Social Justice.
19. 12 T.M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110. Barry endorses the contractualist view in both Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp. 284ff; and Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 67-72. It is worth noting that Barry does not address the difficulties which the non-identity problem pose for his view in any of his published work on intergenerational and environmental justice, although in a recent article he does observe that contractual thinking cannot readily explain our duties to future persons or the non-human world. Thus he remarks that although 'the interests of people in the future should have no less weight than those of people in the present', it does not appear that 'the contractual apparatus is useful in this context; it throws up more problems than it solves'. See 'Contractual justice: a modest defence', Utilitas, 8 (1996), p. 365. Barry does not go on to state how he thinks we might reconcile contractualism with stringent duties of intergenerational justice, though it appears to be his desire to do so in future volumes of his Treatise on Social Justice.
20. 12 T.M. Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110. Barry endorses the contractualist view in both Theories of Justice (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989), pp. 284ff; and Justice as Impartiality (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 67-72. It is worth noting that Barry does not address the difficulties which the non-identity problem pose for his view in any of his published work on intergenerational and environmental justice, although in a recent article he does observe that contractual thinking cannot readily explain our duties to future persons or the non-human world. Thus he remarks that although 'the interests of people in the future should have no less weight than those of people in the present', it does not appear that 'the contractual apparatus is useful in this context; it throws up more problems than it solves'. See 'Contractual justice: a modest defence', Utilitas, 8 (1996), p. 365. Barry does not go on to state how he thinks we might reconcile contractualism with stringent duties of intergenerational justice, though it appears to be his desire to do so in future volumes of his Treatise on Social Justice.
21. 13 See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, who observes that on the Scanlonian view 'an act cannot be wrong unless it will affect someone in a way that cannot be justified - unless there will be some complainant whose complaint cannot be answered' (p. 523).
22. 14 The possibility that climate change policies could well have as damaging an effect on the well-| being of the present poor as they do beneficial effects for the well-being of future generations is raised by Beckerman and Malkin. The authors observe that 'Global warming is far more glamorous and telegenic, of course, than the need for better toilets and drains in the Third World. But if we truly care about the welfare of our fellow world citizens, it is these kinds of environmental issues upon which we must focus our attention'. See W. Beckerman and J. Malkin, 'How much does global warming matter?', The Public Interest, 114 (1994), 15-6.
23. 15 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London, Everyman, 1924), Book II, Ch. V, Sec. 27, p. 130. See also R. Elliot, 'Future generations, Locke's proviso and libertarian justice', Journal of Applied Philiosophy, 3 (1986), pp. 217ff.
24. 15 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (London, Everyman, 1924), Book II, Ch. V, Sec. 27, p. 130. See also R. Elliot, 'Future generations, Locke's proviso and libertarian justice', Journal of Applied Philiosophy, 3 (1986), pp. 217ff.
25. 16 I put aside the possibility of revising belief D in order to retain beliefs A, B and C - a move which seems at the very least inconsistent with the pre-eminent theories of personal identity. See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 351-5.
26. 17 Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of Persons (Berkeley, University of California Press), pp. 80ff.
27. 18 It is worth noting that the non-identity problem appears to call into question the idea of obligations to both future humans and non-humans. This is because the identity of particular non-human animals will be as contingent on events which pre-date their existence as their future human counterparts.
28. 19 See, for example, Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 20ff.
29. 20 R. Goodin, Green Political Theory (Cambridge, Polity, 1992), pp. 42-3. A similarly anthropocentric stance on the value of the natural environment is endorsed by the World Commission on Environment and Development's influential report Our Common Future (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987). In the foreword to this report, Gro Harlem Brundlandt argues that human well-being 'is the ultimate goal of all environment and development and development policies' (p. xiv).
30. 21 See R. and V. Routley, 'Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism', in Robert Elliot (ed.), Environmental Ethics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 104ff.
31. 22 Elliot, Environmental Ethics, p. 9.
32. 23 P. Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 55.
33. 24 See P. Taylor, Respect for Nature (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986); K. Goodpaster, 'On being morally considerable', Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1978), pp. 308ff.
34. 24 See P. Taylor, Respect for Nature (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1986); K. Goodpaster, 'On being morally considerable', Journal of Philosophy, 78 (1978), pp. 308ff.
35. 25 One problem which Parfit raises is that, in line with the duty to maximize social utility across generations, utilitarianism could require us to adopt environmental policies which lead to a huge number of people existing in the future who lead lives of poor overall quality instead of policies which lead to a much smaller number of people existing in the future who lead lives of a much higher quality. See Parfit, Reasons and Persons, pp. 381ff.
36. 26 For criticism of the ecocentric view, see A. Brennan, 'Ecological Theory and Value in Nature', in R. Elliot (ed.), Environmental Ethics, pp. 195ff.
37. 27 See Shue, 'Avoidable Necessity: Global Warming, International Fairness, and Alternative Energy', pp. 245-6.
38. 28 See R.A. Warrick et al., 'Changes in Sea-level', in J. Houghton et al., Climate Change 1995: the Science of Climate Change, p. 385.
39. 29 See L. Bijlsma et al., 'Coastal Zones and Small Islands', in R.T. Watson et al., Climate Change 1995: Impacts, Adaptations, and Mitigation of Climate Change, pp. 289-324. The authors project that sea-level rise will have 'negative effects on a number of sectors, including tourism, freshwater supply and quality, fisheries and aquaculture, agriculture, human settlements, financial services, and human health' (p. 292).
40. 30 See Bijlsma et al., 'Coastal Zones and Small Islands', pp. 296-8. See also E. Charles et al., A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), pp. 67ff.
41. 30 See Bijlsma et al., 'Coastal Zones and Small Islands', pp. 296-8. See also E. Charles et al., A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability (London, Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997), pp. 67ff.
42. 31 The IPCC certainly think so, for they expect that 'adaptation to sea-level-rise and climate change will involve important trade-offs, which could include environmental, social, cultural values' (Bijlsma et al., 'Coastal Zones and Small Islands', p. 292).
43. 32 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989), p. 208; and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 80ff.
44. 32 W. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford, Clarendon, 1989), p. 208; and Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford, Clarendon, 1995), pp. 80ff.
45. 33 See Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, pp. 34ff.
46. 34 The idea of group-centred requirements of intergenerational justice might also be contrasted with the more obviously 'communitarian' idea that present persons should protect the conditions of communal flourishing because the communities which they belong to are in fact essential components of their identity as persons. Consider, for example, the communitarian theory of intergenerational justice defended in A. de Shalit's Why Posterity Matters (London, Routledge, 1996), especially ch. 1. The idea is also to be contrasted with recent contributions to the 'deep ecology' mode of environmental thought, according to which duties of environmental conservation flow from the fact that human identity is not merely moulded by membership in human communities, but in addition by its connection to natural processes and the biosphere itself. See, for example, W. Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston, Shambala, 1990). By contrast, the key to the group-centred view is the idea is the idea that adopting social policies which undermine the integrity of viability of certain human, or non-human animal, communities is morally regrettable because this fails to afford these communities with the respect that they deserve as moral entities, not that they are regrettable in virtue of undermining the motivations of self-transcendence entertained by existing human beings.
47. 34 The idea of group-centred requirements of intergenerational justice might also be contrasted with the more obviously 'communitarian' idea that present persons should protect the conditions of communal flourishing because the communities which they belong to are in fact essential components of their identity as persons. Consider, for example, the communitarian theory of intergenerational justice defended in A. de Shalit's Why Posterity Matters (London, Routledge, 1996), especially ch. 1. The idea is also to be contrasted with recent contributions to the 'deep ecology' mode of environmental thought, according to which duties of environmental conservation flow from the fact that human identity is not merely moulded by membership in human communities, but in addition by its connection to natural processes and the biosphere itself. See, for example, W. Fox, Toward a Transpersonal Ecology (Boston, Shambala, 1990). By contrast, the key to the group-centred view is the idea is the idea that adopting social policies which undermine the integrity of viability of certain human, or non-human animal, communities is morally regrettable because this fails to afford these communities with the respect that they deserve as moral entities, not that they are regrettable in virtue of undermining the motivations of self-transcendence entertained by existing human beings.
48. 35 C. Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', in A. Guttman (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 40-1.
49. 36 Taylor, 'The Politics of Recognition', p. 41.
50. 37 Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', p. 110.
51. 38 Scanlon, 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', pp. 113-4.