Reconsidering the "actual contract" theory of political obligation

Ethics

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 236-260

  Gilbert, Margaret ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032623268     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233895     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. Plato, Crito 51b.
2. Compare A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 3-4. See also George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 5.
3. Compare A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 3-4. See also George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992), p. 5.
4. Compare Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 5.
5. Compare ibid., pp. 3-4. The starting point for Simmons's investigations in his book is a widespread sense of political obligation seen as involving a special tie to one's own government. I take this way of initiating the discussion of political obligation from him.
6. The method of discovery for a theory of political obligation in this sense may start with an argument to the effect that people have political obligations, and then derive its interpretive aspect from that argument: people will be said to take themselves to be obligated in the sense that they are (according to the argument) in fact obligated. There is nothing wrong with this procedure. However, a constraint on the adequacy of the theory as a whole will be the plausibility of this particular in erpretation.
7. In his discussion of political obligation, Simmons focuses on the question of accuracy: do people have the political obligations they take themselves to have? He answers "no," and one is likely to infer from what he writes that it is only errors and confusions that allow anyone to think otherwise.
8. I use the term 'contract' in deference to an established use of the phrase 'contract theory' which does not specifically allude to contracts in law as opposed to agreements of an everyday sort. The theory I discuss invokes an actual contract as opposed to a hypothetical one. The most famous contemporary invocation of a hypothetical contract is that of John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971). There will surely be variants of actual contract theory as that is characterized here. I take the following to characterize the most general theory of political obligation for which the label is clearly apposite.
9. I here assume that to have a country is to be the member of (at least one) political society: one's country is the (or a) political society of which one is a member. The terms 'political society' and 'country' are both somewhat vague, and I shall not attempt to make them more precise for present purposes.
10. Insofar as one could be a member of more than one political society, one would presumably be obligated to uphold the political institution of each society of which one was a member. Clearly there would then be at least the potential for conflicting obligations. I shall not consider this possibility further here.
11. This summary follows Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 79-82, on tacit consent.
12. Compare ibid, on the distinction between acts which are signs of consent and acts which imply consent (pp. 88 ff.), which I echo to some extent in the text here. I have some criticisms of the details of Simmons's discussion. In particular, his "joining a game of baseball" example seems to me to involve a member of the family to which agreements belong, albeit not an explicit agreement. The ground of the ensuing obligation is thus of a piece with the ground of the obligations of agreements proper. This is to dispute Simmons's suggestion as to how obligations would best be argued for in relation to that example (Moral Principles, p. 89). The above remark should be less obscure by the end of this article.
13. A similar point was made by Ronald Dworkin in relation to Rawls's appeal to what would be agreed to in Rawls's original position. See Ronald Dworkin, "The Original Position," in Reading Rawls, ed. N. Daniels (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), p. 18. On Rawls's hypothetical contract, see also n. 13.
14. The "hypothetical" contract here appears to be less hypothetical, in a sense, than the Rawlsian contract, where both the situation of the contractors, and the agreement itself, are hypothetical: were people in the original position, and were a certain agreement proposed to them, they would enter that agreement. The idea here is rather that people are actually in a certain situation (they obey the laws, for instance), and were a certain agreement proposed to them, they would enter that agreement. The actual situation of the people in question, in other words, is not different from the situation in which they would agree. They may simply not have contemplated entering the relevant agreement.
15. Such references are found in contexts other than purely philosophical ones. In theories of the family found in the literature of family therapy, e.g., the terms 'agreement' and 'contract' are often brought into play with (or without) one or more of a set of related prefixes ('implicit', 'unstated', 'unconscious'), where it is clear that neither explicit agreements nor tacit agreements of the sort Simmons suggests conditions for are what is at issue.
16. In discussing political obligations Simmons also speaks, as if equivalently, of "political bonds" and "ties."
17. See A. J. Simmons, "Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Governments," Georgia Law Review 18 (1984): 809-17. See also Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 77-78 ("consent must be given voluntarily"). Other references can be found in Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), chap. 12 (a lightly revised version of my "Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation," Ethics 103 [1993]: 679-706).
18. See A. J. Simmons, "Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Governments," Georgia Law Review 18 (1984): 809-17. See also Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 77-78 ("consent must be given voluntarily"). Other references can be found in Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), chap. 12 (a lightly revised version of my "Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation," Ethics 103 [1993]: 679-706).
19. See A. J. Simmons, "Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Governments," Georgia Law Review 18 (1984): 809-17. See also Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 77-78 ("consent must be given voluntarily"). Other references can be found in Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), chap. 12 (a lightly revised version of my "Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation," Ethics 103 [1993]: 679-706).
20. See A. J. Simmons, "Consent, Free Choice, and Democratic Governments," Georgia Law Review 18 (1984): 809-17. See also Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 77-78 ("consent must be given voluntarily"). Other references can be found in Margaret Gilbert, Living Together: Rationality, Sociality, and Obligation (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), chap. 12 (a lightly revised version of my "Agreements, Coercion, and Obligation," Ethics 103 [1993]: 679-706).
21. See, e.g., Simmons, Moral Principles: "A promise to aid him in his villainy, of course, would not bind us." Simmons goes on to say: "We can sometimes succeed in obligating ourselves . . . by consent to 'autocratic and arbitrary forms of government'" (p. 77). Perhaps a government can be "autocratic and arbitrary" (a phrase Simmons borrows from Rawls) though conformity to its edicts did not yet constitute aiding it in its villainy.
22. Other objections to actual contract theory have been made. Those noted in the text are the ones most commonly found in discussions critical of actual contract theory, including those found in political philosophy textbooks. I focus on these in this article.
23. Originally in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (1989; reprint, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). The most recent published discussion is in the introduction to Gilbert, Living Together. See also Margaret Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?" in Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 2, The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action, ed. G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). I continue to refine my understanding and exposition of this central notion.
24. Originally in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (1989; reprint, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). The most recent published discussion is in the introduction to Gilbert, Living Together. See also Margaret Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?" in Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 2, The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action, ed. G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). I continue to refine my understanding and exposition of this central notion.
25. Originally in Margaret Gilbert, On Social Facts (1989; reprint, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992). The most recent published discussion is in the introduction to Gilbert, Living Together. See also Margaret Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?" in Contemporary Action Theory, vol. 2, The Philosophy and Logic of Social Action, ed. G. Holmstrom-Hintikka and R. Tuomela (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997). I continue to refine my understanding and exposition of this central notion.
26. See Gilbert, On Social Facts, esp. chaps. 4 and 7.
27. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
28. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
29. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
30. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
31. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
32. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
33. On belief, see, e.g., Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, and Living Together, chaps. 7 and 14; on action, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, and Living Together, chap. 6; on language possession, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 3, and Living Together, chap. 10; on intention, see Gilbert, "What Is It for Us to Intend?"
34. Evidently, if I want to be subject to a commitment that is robust in relation to my own change of mind, I need a joint commitment rather than a personal one. See my "Resisting Temptation: Planning versus Promising" (unpublished comment, 1994, on Michael Bratman, "Planning and Temptation," Conference on Methods, New York, 1994).
35. Evidently, if I want to be subject to a commitment that is robust in relation to my own change of mind, I need a joint commitment rather than a personal one. See my "Resisting Temptation: Planning versus Promising" (unpublished comment, 1994, on Michael Bratman, "Planning and Temptation," Conference on Methods, New York, 1994).
36. See David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophic Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Stephen Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). (Schiffer writes of "mutual knowledge *.")
37. See David Lewis, Convention: A Philosophic Study (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); Stephen Schiffer, Meaning (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972). (Schiffer writes of "mutual knowledge *.")
38. I shall not attempt to fix on a more precise account of common knowledge here. But see Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 186-95; see also 212-13 and elsewhere.
39. 'To dancing together'. This is a natural way to put things. In accordance with my sense of the matter a more perspicuous if more cumbersome characterization would be something like the following: Joe and Lisa are jointly committed to accepting as a body the goal of partnering each other in a dance.
40. See Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 14, p. 367. On social rules, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, esp. pp. 403-7; see also Margaret Gilbert, "Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart's Account, and an Alternative Proposal" (unpublished manuscript, 1997).
41. See Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 14, p. 367. On social rules, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, esp. pp. 403-7; see also Margaret Gilbert, "Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart's Account, and an Alternative Proposal" (unpublished manuscript, 1997).
42. See Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 14, p. 367. On social rules, see Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 5, esp. pp. 403-7; see also Margaret Gilbert, "Social Rules: Some Problems for Hart's Account, and an Alternative Proposal" (unpublished manuscript, 1997).
43. Compare Benedict Anderson who, in a much-cited phrase, characterizes nations as "imagined communities" "because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. [London: Verso, 1991], p. 6).
44. That this is going on could be made clear in some such way as this: "You live on this island, don't you. . . . Well, then."
45. See Gilbert, On Social Facts, chap. 4, pp. 212-13. I could know that everyone on a particular island, say, had provided the relevant expression without knowing with respect to a given individual person on the island that he (or she) had provided such an expression. This would happen if I did not know of that individual. I could then have no knowledge about him in particular. I would naturally make use of my knowledge about everyone, were I to meet him.
46. For some additional discussion, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. go into the matter further in my article "Obligation and Joint Commitment," Utilitas (in press).
47. For some additional discussion, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. I go into the matter further in my article "Obligation and Joint Commitment," Utilitas (in press).
48. The rights deriving from a joint commitment may be in some sense waiveable. It is not clear that the waiveability in question must involve the actual disappearance of the right. Consider the following example. Meg says "Shall we meet for lunch on Tuesday?" and Paul replies "Yes" somewhat hesitantly. Meg then offers "Don't worry, you can always call me and say you've changed your mind." The final outcome in a situation like this may be representable in some such way as the following: Meg and Paul have a plan to meet; their having a plan to meet involves their being jointly committed to uphold the relevant plan together and, therefore, having the relevant obligations and rights. In addition, Meg and Paul have a side understanding constituted by a joint commitment to uphold as a body the decision that they are to act as if Paul has the right to back out at will (given that he informs Meg first). Something similar may be said of a case discussed by Michael Bratman ("Shared Intention," Ethics 104 [1993]: 97-113, p. 111), where the parties reserve the right unilaterally to call off a joint enterprise (duet singing) at any time. Any plausible "reservation of right" of this kind is likely to be something explicitly agreed upon by the parties. It could, of course, initiate a convention so that it became unnecessary in particular cases explicitly to bring up the side understanding in question.
49. Some philosophers have argued for a restriction of the term 'obligation' to cases that would not include this one. See, in particular, H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64 (1995): 175-91. Vernacular usage, however, leans in the direction of using 'obligation' here. See R. B. Brandt's article "The Concepts of Obligation and Duty," Mind 73 (1965): 374-93, on the way in which use of the term 'obligation' has developed over time.
50. Some philosophers have argued for a restriction of the term 'obligation' to cases that would not include this one. See, in particular, H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64 (1995): 175-91. Vernacular usage, however, leans in the direction of using 'obligation' here. See R. B. Brandt's article "The Concepts of Obligation and Duty," Mind 73 (1965): 374-93, on the way in which use of the term 'obligation' has developed over time.
51. Compare Brandt, who argues, not without proper caution with respect to some of his examples, that "there are uses of 'obligated' and 'obligation' in connection with which it would be absurd to identify an individual to whom the obligation is owed" (p. 379).
52. For further discussion, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. In the Metaphysics of Morals (in Collected Works, ed. The Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-], vol. 6, p. 274), Kant makes a distinction among rights that appears to correspond quite closely to that I argue for here. I hope to discuss Kant's remarks in another place. I thank Christine Korsgaard for drawing them to my attention after hearing me discuss my own ideas.
53. For further discussion, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. In the Metaphysics of Morals (in Collected Works, ed. The Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences [Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902-], vol. 6, p. 274), Kant makes a distinction among rights that appears to correspond quite closely to that I argue for here. I hope to discuss Kant's remarks in another place. I thank Christine Korsgaard for drawing them to my attention after hearing me discuss my own ideas.
54. For more on the topic of coercion and joint commitment, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. I argue that an agreement crucially requires the formation of a joint commitment (pp. 290-96), and that coercive circumstances do not rule out the formation of an agreement so understood (pp. 301-3).
55. Simmons makes a similar point about obligations as he understands these (Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 10). He says that obligations do not provide "conclusive reasons" for acting, meaning that to say that one has a certain obligation does not of itself close the discussion. There could be other considerations that make it the case that one should not fulfill one's obligation. Given no other relevant considerations, an obligation is presumably a sufficient reason for acting, hence "conclusive" in that sense.
56. See, in particular, Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 13. This is a lightly revised version of Margaret Gilbert, "Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?" Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 627-49. See also Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. I argue that given certain features of typical everyday agreements (more precisely, bilateral executory agreements), such agreements cannot be constituted by a pair of exchanged promises, as is often thought. A joint commitment to uphold a certain decision as a body has the features in question. Typical promises, too, can be argued to involve an underlying joint commitment.
57. See, in particular, Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 13. This is a lightly revised version of Margaret Gilbert, "Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?" Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 627-49. See also Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. I argue that given certain features of typical everyday agreements (more precisely, bilateral executory agreements), such agreements cannot be constituted by a pair of exchanged promises, as is often thought. A joint commitment to uphold a certain decision as a body has the features in question. Typical promises, too, can be argued to involve an underlying joint commitment.
58. See, in particular, Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 13. This is a lightly revised version of Margaret Gilbert, "Is an Agreement an Exchange of Promises?" Journal of Philosophy 90 (1993): 627-49. See also Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12. I argue that given certain features of typical everyday agreements (more precisely, bilateral executory agreements), such agreements cannot be constituted by a pair of exchanged promises, as is often thought. A joint commitment to uphold a certain decision as a body has the features in question. Typical promises, too, can be argued to involve an underlying joint commitment.
59. This way of looking at agreements and promises provides a new perspective on many discussions relating to obligations in ethics. See Gilbert, "Obligation and Joint Commitment."
60. On the prima facie implausibility of arguing that an agreement cannot be coerced, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12, pp. 286-88. The same seems to go for immoral agreements (can't thieves agree as to where to hide their booty?). I argue that an ambiguity in talk of voluntariness may be responsible at least in part for a contrary judgment on the matter of coerced agreements. With respect to immoral agreements, philosophers have tended to see them as nonbinding and therefore perhaps impossible (insofar as all genuine agreements are binding). Compare the quotation from Simmons in n. 17 above. Something similar has been said of coerced agreements also. But once one construes the "binding" nature of agreements as the binding nature of joint commitments, this tendency appears to be misplaced. Which is of course not to say that immoral agreements (or coerced agreements) are binding in another sense. Such agreements may be neither morally binding (in some relevant sense) nor - in estimable legal systems - legally binding.
61. In some places I have suggested that plural subject theory is a form of actual contract theory. This could be misleading. Clearly plural subject theory is the more general theory; actual contract theory being a special case of plural subject theory - assuming my understanding of the nature of agreements.
62. See Gilbert, On Social Facts, pp. 175 ff. (the restaurant case).
63. "Of the relevant sort": given that the parties are talking together, must they not already constitute a plural subject? Perhaps so, but the appropriateness of proposing that we go for a walk together may seem to require more than this as a basis. Going for a walk together may appear to be a thing of a saliently different kind from having a casual conversation. Someone who has established his or her readiness for the latter may reasonably feel they have not established it for the former. See ibid., pp. 177-78.
64. Ibid., see, in particular, chap. 4, sec. 3, pp. 167-99; see also sec. 4.2, pp. 214-19 (on the formation of social groups).
65. Ibid., see, in particular, chap. 4, sec. 3, pp. 167-99; see also sec. 4.2, pp. 214-19 (on the formation of social groups).
66. See ibid., p. 217.
67. I shall shortly consider what happens if we waive the first assumption. I will not for present purposes question the second.
68. As noted earlier, I am assuming that those with common knowledge of some fact will know of that common knowledge. In On Social Facts (p. 195) I note the plausibility of that assumption given the particular account of common knowledge proposed there.
69. See my "Social Rules,which argues for a plural subject interpretation of the notion of a social rule by reference to the specific type of criticisms liable to arise in the context of a social rule.
70. See A. John Simmons, "Associative Political Obligations, "Ethics 106 (1996): 247-73, p. 264. "Of course we identify ourselves with 'our' countries, 'our' governments, and 'our' fellow citizens. We have typically been taught from birth to do so . . . but none of . . . these ways of speaking . . . seems, considered by itself, in any way inconsistent with denying that we are morally bound by political obligations to our countries of residence." In writing of our being "morally bound," Simmons may mean to appeal to a type of obligation that is not at issue in the discussion in the text here. Nonetheless, a parallel worry may arise regarding joint commitment.
71. Suppose one knows that if one does not say "our country" and so on, one will be thrown into jail or worse? The secret police are all around. If in such a context one speaks of "our country" in the plural subject sense, can this betoken a genuine readiness to commit, and be the basis for ascribing participation in a joint commitment? Note that one is asking not what is betokened by a mere utterance of the words 'our country' but of their utterance, given a certain understanding. One might compare the case of saying 'I promise' in similar circumstances. One may while promising know full well that one plans not to fulfill one's promise. One may despise the person who compels the promise. Yet under what circumstances can one properly deny that one promised at all? To echo Wittgenstein: "Can I say 'I promise' and mean 'I don't promise'?" That seems hard. Perhaps one could understand there to be inverted commas around one's uttered 'our'. One would then not be using 'our' in the plural subject sense, but rather quoting it as used in that sense. Using terms in such an "inverted commas" sense may be possible. However, this use is properly marked by a change in intonation or delivery of the terms - an overt difference the secret police might notice, and hence probably to be eschewed. None of this implies, of course, that anyone who becomes subject to a joint commitment in such extreme circumstances is morally bound, all things considered, to uphold the commitment. Nor does it imply that people in this position are going to lack strong motivations to act against it.
72. It may be argued that, standardly, people are born into a particular political society and by virtue of this fact alone they have the appropriate political obligations. See John Horton, Political Obligation (New York: Macmillan, 1992), chap. 6; see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), on "associational obligations."
73. It may be argued that, standardly, people are born into a particular political society and by virtue of this fact alone they have the appropriate political obligations. See John Horton, Political Obligation (New York: Macmillan, 1992), chap. 6; see also Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986), on "associational obligations."
74. This way of seeing them is mooted in Gilbert, On Social Facts, and discussed further in Gilbert, Living Together, chaps. 12 and 13. See n. 37 for details.
75. This way of seeing them is mooted in Gilbert, On Social Facts, and discussed further in Gilbert, Living Together, chaps. 12 and 13. See n. 37 for details.
76. Compare T. Pink, The Psychology of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
77. This point appears to stand even for coerced agreements, insofar as it is the agreement that is coerced, not the act which is done in order to conform to the agreement. See the discussion of the agreement to marry in Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12, pp. 301-3. It seems to follow that one can be "forced to be free" in the following sense: one can be forced to enter an agreement; that agreement being in place, one is free in the sense that one is in a position to act freely in the sense of the text. If one can be forced to act in the light of an agreement one has made, then one can be forced to act freely. There is no need to pursue this issue further here, nor to consider the relationship of the points made so far with the famous passage in Rousseau's Social Contract (chap. 7, last paragraph) in which he writes of forcing people to be free.
78. This point appears to stand even for coerced agreements, insofar as it is the agreement that is coerced, not the act which is done in order to conform to the agreement. See the discussion of the agreement to marry in Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12, pp. 301-3. It seems to follow that one can be "forced to be free" in the following sense: one can be forced to enter an agreement; that agreement being in place, one is free in the sense that one is in a position to act freely in the sense of the text. If one can be forced to act in the light of an agreement one has made, then one can be forced to act freely. There is no need to pursue this issue further here, nor to consider the relationship of the points made so far with the famous passage in Rousseau's Social Contract (chap. 7, last paragraph) in which he writes of forcing people to be free.
79. See Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 70. "The feature that promises, contracts, and the giving of consent share is that they are all deliberate undertakings." I don't say that Simmons has in mind precisely the feature of premeditation noted here.
80. See Gilbert, On Social Facts, p. 432.
81. See Simmons's discussion of "positional obligations" which do not have such implications, in his view (Moral Principles, pp. 16-23).
82. On commitments as providing reasons for action, see Gilbert, Living Together, chap. 12, p. 288 and p. 306, n. 13.