Challenges for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 71, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 505-523

  Denoon, David B H ^a   Colbert, Evelyn ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ASEAN; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION; FINANCIAL CRISIS; TRADE BLOC;

(SOUTHEAST); ASIA;

EID: 0032463388     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2761082     Document Type: Article

References (35)

1. ASEAN was organized in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei became a member in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, and Myanmar (Burma) in 1997.
2. For an assessment of ASEAN defense spending patterns in the 1970s and 1980s, see D. Denoon, "Defense Spending in ASEAN: An Overview," in Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 48-71; see also D. Emmerson's discussion of ASEAN as a "regional security regime" in Southeast Asian Security in the New Millenium, R. Ellings and S. Simon, eds. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).
3. For an assessment of ASEAN defense spending patterns in the 1970s and 1980s, see D. Denoon, "Defense Spending in ASEAN: An Overview," in Chin Kin Wah, ed., Defence Spending in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), pp. 48-71; see also D. Emmerson's discussion of ASEAN as a "regional security regime" in Southeast Asian Security in the New Millenium, R. Ellings and S. Simon, eds. (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996).
4. Ball, D., "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisition in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security, vol. 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 78-112.
5. Thailand and the Philippines have longstanding security ties with the United States. Malaysia and Singapore are part of the Five Power Defense Arrangements with Britain, Australia and New Zealand. Most recently in 1996, Indonesia and Australia have signed a bilateral security agreement.
6. Ravenhill, J., "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, vol. 25, no. 9 (September 1995), p. 850.
7. In 1977 the Preferential Trade Arrangement (PTA) was announced. This was followed in 1979 with efforts at ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC). In turn, these plans were succeeded in 1980 by the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIJV) Agreement and in 1983 by the "Brand to Brand Complementation" (BBC) program.
8. The exception to this rule was Singapore which provided trans-shipping facilities and services to the rest of the region.
9. See S. Paribatra, "From ASEAN Six to ASEAN Ten: Issues and Prospects," Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 16, no. 3 (December 1994), pp. 243-58.
10. For ASEAN-Hanoi relations in historical perspective, see E. Colbert, "Southeast Asian Regional Politics: Toward a Regional Order," in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). For the evolution of the relations during and after the Third Indochina War, see F. Brown, Second Chance: The United States and Indochina in the 1990s (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989).
11. For ASEAN-Hanoi relations in historical perspective, see E. Colbert, "Southeast Asian Regional Politics: Toward a Regional Order," in W. H. Wriggins, ed., Dynamics of Regional Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992). For the evolution of the relations during and after the Third Indochina War, see F. Brown, Second Chance: The United States and Indochina in the 1990s (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1989).
12. In November 1997, in what was primarily a change in nomenclature and some personnel, the SLORC became the State Peace and Development Council.
13. The chairman of the Central Military Commission for most of the 1990s, Admiral Liu Huaqing, took a particular interest in this naval build-up. See A. Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy - Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 7-31. On ASEAN concerns, see A. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey. vol. 37, no. 4 (April 1997), pp. 299-322.
14. The chairman of the Central Military Commission for most of the 1990s, Admiral Liu Huaqing, took a particular interest in this naval build-up. See A. Huang, "The Chinese Navy's Offshore Active Defense Strategy - Conceptualization and Implications," Naval War College Review, vol. 47, no. 3 (Summer 1994), pp. 7-31. On ASEAN concerns, see A. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension," Asian Survey. vol. 37, no. 4 (April 1997), pp. 299-322.
15. J. Morgan, Porpoises Among the Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific (Honolulu: East-West Center Special Report No. 2, March 1994), and H. Kenny, An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes (Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, February 1996).
16. J. Morgan, Porpoises Among the Whales: Small Navies in Asia and the Pacific (Honolulu: East-West Center Special Report No. 2, March 1994), and H. Kenny, An Analysis of Possible Threats to Shipping in Key Southeast Asian Sea Lanes (Washington, D.C.: Center for Naval Analyses, February 1996).
17. In 1992, they were Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and the United States.
18. M. Leifer in The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper No. 302 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1996) provides a detailed summary of the steps leading up to ARF's formation and an assessment of the motivation of the principal states involved.
19. At various points in the 1970s (when energy prices were high), intra-ASEAN trade dropped to as little as 15 percent of total ASEAN trade.
20. The term used to define the overall set of procedures is the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT).
21. The number of excluded products specified, in early negotiations, were Malaysia: 0; Brunei: 242; Singapore: 120; Indonesia: 50; the Philippines: 28; Thailand: 26. See J. Ravenhill, "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia," Asian Survey, vol. 35, no. 9 (September 1995), p. 858.
22. For example, B. Ramaswamy has estimated the net effects (trade creation minus trade diversion) as positive for Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines, with negative total effects for Singapore and Malaysia. In none of the cases is trade diversion more than 10 percent of the intra-ASEAN trade. See B. Ramaswamy, "Trade Diversion in the ASEAN Free Trade Area," ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 12, no. 1 (July 1995), pp. 10-17.
23. See T. M. Heng and L. Low, "Is the ASEAN Free Trade Area A Second Best Option?" Asian Economic Journal, vol. 7, no. 3 (1993), pp. 275-98.
24. For a discussion of investment codes in the Pacific, see S. Guisinger, "A Pacific Basin Investment Agreement," ASEAN Economic Bulletin, vol. 10, no. 2 (November 1993), pp. 176-83.
25. See, for example, H.S.B.C. James Capel, Asian Economic Trends, no. 2, (May-April 1997), p. 7; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., May 1997), p. 31.
26. See, for example, H.S.B.C. James Capel, Asian Economic Trends, no. 2, (May-April 1997), p. 7; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook (Washington, D.C.: I.M.F., May 1997), p. 31.
27. In Thailand, the institutions were typically called "finance companies," thus skirting many of the regulations for banks, while in Indonesia, by the time of the crisis, there were 212 private banks, most of which had been established in the 1990s.
28. In the 1990-96 period, Indonesia's current account deficit was 16 percent of GDP, while the Philippines' was 23 percent, Malaysia's 30 percent, and Thailand's 36 percent.
29. For example, by late 1997, short-term debt in Thailand was at least $60 billion and in Indonesia over $50 billion.
30. R. Cheetham, "The Financial Crisis in East Asia - Origins, Consequences, and Prospects" (Seattle, Washington: Asia-Pacific Investment Services Corporation, February 28, 1998), p. 11.
31. Because Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos are not fully linked with the world's trade and capital markets, the initial effects on them of the crisis were small. Their growth could be slowed in the long run, however, if their neighbors are in recession and they maintain protectionist, statist economic policies.
32. Dow Jones Global Indexes estimate that Southeast Asian stock markets lost about 60 percent of their value between July 1997 and April 1998. Source: "Prices and Trends," in the Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2, 1998, p. 58.
33. P. M. Mahathir's September 1st decision to ban currency trading in the Ringgit and to put strict controls on foreign ownership of Malaysian stock, combined with his September 2nd decision to dismiss Deputy P. M. Anwar Ibrahim, raises major questions about Malaysia's future course. See Bloomberg News, "Malaysia Imposes Controls on Trading Its Currency," New York Times September 2, 1998, p. C-2.
34. A fourth Indonesian agreement was signed with the I.M.F. in August 1998, but it is too soon to know how it will fare.
35. Berita Harian (internet version), "ASEAN Finance Ministers, Dialogue Partners to set up Fund," December 3, 1997.