Private income transfers and market incentives

Economica

Volumn 65, Issue 260, 1998, Pages 557-580

  Chami, Ralph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INCOME; MARKET SYSTEM;

EID: 0032463025     PISSN: 00130427     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0335.00146     Document Type: Article

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