The politics of human rights in democratic Brazil: 'A Lei Näo Pega'

Democratization

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 20-51

  Panizza, Francisco ^a,b   De Brito, Alexandra Barahona ^a  

^a School of Economics and Political Science

^b Instituto Estudos Estrategicos Internacionais IEEI   (Portugal)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; HUMAN RIGHTS; POLITICAL PROCESS; STATE ROLE;

BRAZIL;

EID: 0032455834     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349808403583     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. See Amnesty International, Beyond Despair. An Agenda For Human Rights in Brazil (London: Amnesty International, 1994). See also Nücleo de Estudos da Violência, Comissào Teotônio Vilela, Os Direilos Humanos No Brasil (Sào Paulo: Universidade de Sào Paulo, 1995). The most reliable reports by international human rights organizations, are the annual reports by Amnesty International and Americas Watch on Brazil. Among the most authoritative domestic reports are those published by the Nucleo de Estudos da Violencia of the University of Sào Paulo together with the Comissäo Teotônio Vilela. The United States Department of State also publishes annual reports on human rights in Brazil.
2. Ideally, the unity of the state is partially reconstituted by a common political and legal discourse that links competing state agencies and bureaucracies. See Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in Stateless Societies (New York: Ithaca, 1994). However, in the case of Latin America, it is worth remembering Douglas Chalmers' notions about the politicized state where political institutions are often viewed 'instrumentally ... and problems are dealt with purely politically, subject to resolution only through a clash offerees'. See Douglas Chalmers, 'The Politicized State in Latin America', in James Malloy (ed.), Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977), p. 24.
3. On authoritarian enclaves see Manuel Antonio Garreton, 'Human Rights in Democratization Processes', in Elizabeth Jelin and Eric Hirschberg (eds.), Constructing Democracy: Human Rights, Citizenship and Society in Latin America (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), pp.3 9-5 6.
4. For instance, an indication about the extent of crimes against the right to life in rural Brazil is given by reports by the Catholic Church's Pastoral Land Commission (Comissao Pastoral da Terra, or CPT) and by the Landless Peasants' Movement, (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra, or MST) Their figures have not been corroborated and should be treated with some caution. According to figures from the MST, the number of killings of peasants, rural workers and rural union leaders rose steadily towards the end of the military regime. The figures show that in the last five years of military government (1980-84) there was an average of 99.8 land-related killings per year compared to 43 a year between 1974-79. Corresponding figures for the first five years of democratic government showed an increase in land-related killings: According to the CPT, between 1985 and 1989 there were an average of 119.8 land-related assassinations per year. However, the number of killings has since declined: In the last five years for which figures are available (1992-96) the CPT recorded an average of 48.2 killings per year. In all, the CPT recorded 976 land-related killings since Brazil returned to democracy in 1985 until 1996, which gives an average of 81.3 land-related killings per year under democracy. Similar figures for the urban sector are even more scattered as, for instance, there are no national statistics on the number of people killed by the police. However, figures for the Säo Paulo Military Police show that the average annual number of civilian killed by the state's military police rose from 349 in the last four years of military rule (1981-84) to 650 during the first eight years of civilian government (1985-92). The number of police killings in Sào Paulo has since declined as a result of some measures taken by the state government(see below p.30 and note 39). Sources for rural killings are Amnesty International, Brazil. Authorised Violence in Rural Areas, (London: Amnesty International, 1988) and Comissao Pastoral da Terra, Conflilos no Campo Brasil 1996 (Goiânia, 1997).
5. For the military police killings: Policia Militär de Estado de Sào Paulo, quoted in Universidade de S3o Paulo, Nücleo de Estudos da Violencia, Commissào Teotônio Vilela, Os Direitos Humanos No Brasil (Sào Paulo:NEV-CTV, 1993 p. 18).
6. Brazil did not have an official 'truth commission' like the ones set up in Argentina and Chile. It is therefore more difficult to establish comprehensive figures for human rights crimes committed during the years of military rule. The most authoritative report on such crimes is still the one compiled by the Säo Paulo Archdiocese of the Catholic Church, Brasil: Nunca Mais. The report shows that torture was systematic in the first decade of military rule. It lists ten confirmed cases of death under torture and 125 of 'disappeared' people (that is, persons who were detained by the authorities and whose whereabouts is still unkown). This compares with over 10,000 persons officially recorded as 'disappeared' in Argentina. There are no figures, however, for people unlawfully killed by the security forces or for the total number of political prisoners. See Archdiocese of Sào Paulo, Torture in Brazil (New York: Random House, 1986) -a translation of the Brazilian Nunca Mais report.
7. See also Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, Escritos indignados: policia, prisoes e politica no Estado antoritario (Sào Paulo: Brasiliense, 1984)
8. See Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 'O passado nào esta morto, nem ainda épassado', pp.7-8, in Gilberto Dimenstein, Democracia em pedaços: Direitos humanos no Brasil (Sào Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1996). See also US Department of State, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996 (Washington, DC: USDS, 1997).
9. According to a report by the Organization of American States of December 1997 quoted in the Brazilian press, most violations of human rights are committed against the most vulnerable sectors of the population, like peasants, destitute children and indigenous people. See 'Direitos Humanos. Indio, sem-terra e menor sào as maiores vitimas diz OEA', Folha de Sào Paulo (9 Dec. 1997). See also Amnesty International, Beyond Despair, op. cit. See also 'Os Torturados sao negros, pobres e vivem na periferia', Folha de Sào Paulo (1 Jan. 1997).
10. See Paul Chevigny, 'Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, Brazil and Argentina', Série Dossiê do~NücIeo de Estudos da Violencia 2, 1991.
11. In New York, a city of comparable size, the police fatally shot 27 civilians in the same year. See Amnesty International, Beyond Despair, p.3.
12. See Fernando Peregrino, Violência contra o Rio de Janeiro: mito, realidade e exploraçào politico (unpublished manuscript, Rio de Janeiro, n.d.). In recent years, death squad activity has been linked to power struggles among drug gangs and between these and the police. Of the approximately 500 favelas and housing projects in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro, virtually all have drug trading groups although the scope of operations and local impact of such groups may vary' considerably. See Elizabeth Leeds, 'Cocaine and Parallel Politics in the Brazilian Urban Periphery-: Constraints on Local Level Democratization', Latin American Research Review, Vol.31, No.3 (1996), pp.47-83.
13. Lilian Zac has defined the term 'paralegality' as a permissible illegality because, while still illegal, it remains tolerated and unpunished. It indicates the emergence of parallel powers, normally in a context of urban social disintegration, where an alliance between the forces of the state and those of private individuals and organized crime impose their o\vn forms of social regulation parallel to those of the state. See Francisco Panizza, 'Human Rights in the Processes of Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America', Political Studies Vol.43, Special Issue-(1995), pp.168-88.
14. State agents are also responsible for the torture or death of people in police custody or serving prison sentences. There is strong evidence of the generalized use of torture and physical punishment to extract confessions from criminal suspects in many Brazilian states. Furthermore, mass killings of prisoners to repress prison riots and punish attempted escapes have been periodically reported since 1985. See Amnesty International, Brazil Annual Report (London: AI, 1985-97). See also Nucleo de Estudos da Violência/Comissào Teotônio Vilela, Os direitos humanos no Brasil, op. cit.
15. In 1995, for example, 596 minors were murdered in Rio, an increase from the 513 killed the previous year. See Folha de Sào Paulo (31 Dec. 1996). For other states see Amnesty International, Beyond Despair, op cit. A survey carried out by SOS Criança in Sào Paulo indicated that a 16.6 per cent increase in the number of murders committed by street children in Sào Paulo during the first six months of 1996 compared to the same period of 1995. See SEJUP News from Brazil, 238 (1 Aug. 1996); US Department of State, Brazil Country Report for 1996 (Washington, DC: USDS, 1997).
16. The Northern state of Para has been the main locus of land-related human rights crime in Brazil. Between 1985 and 1997 there have been 225 land-related assassinations in the State. According to the Catholic Church Pastoral Land Comission (Comissao Pastoral da Terra) in the last 13 years in only five cases people have been brought to trial for their responsibility in the murders. Folha de Sào Paulo (13 April 1998). See also Amnesty International, Brazil: Authorized Violence in Rural Areas (London: AI, 1988); Alice Horrigan, 'Terror in Brazil', Tlie New Haven Advocate (24 Nov. 1984).
17. On the growth and development of the MST, see Candido Grzybowski, 'Rural Workers and Democratization in Brazil', The Journal of Development Studies, Vol.26, No.4 (1990) pp. 19-43.
18. See Amnesty International, 'Brazil: Independent Investigation Crucial in Latest Mass Killing of Landless Peasants', News Sen'ice 78 (19 April 1996). The landowners have also set up private militias to fight the land invasions. See article 'As milicias', Folha de Sào Paulo (9 April 1998).
19. According to figures from the Pastoral Land Commission (CPT), in only 19 out of the 1,630 recorded cases of rural killings in 1984-90 were those allegedly responsible brought to justice: there are only three cases in which the person ordering the crime, the mandante, was condemned by a court of law. See Padre Ricardo Rezende, 'Depoimento na Comissâo Parlamentär de Inquêrito (CPI) Sobre a Violência no Campo' (Assambleia Legislativa do Estado do Para), unpublished manuscript (1991), p.10.
20. See Thomas Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964-1985 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 21 and Amnesty International, Brazil Report (London: AI, 1985).
21. See Maria do Carmo Campello de Souza, 'The Brazilian "New Republic" Under the "Sword of Damocles'", in Alfred Stepan (ed.), Democratizing Brazil (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989).
22. For the role of human rights in the struggle against the military regime and in the transition to democracy see Maria Helena Moreira Alves, State and Opposition in Military Brazil (Austin, TX: Texas University Press, 1985), pp.211-12; I. Cheresky, 'La emergencia de los derechos humanos y el retroceso de lo politico', Punlo de Vista (Aug. 1992), pp.42-8; Joan Dassin, 'Time up for Torturers: A Human Rights Dilemma for Brazil", NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol.20, No.2 (1986); Francisco Panizza, 'Human Rights in the Processes of Transition and Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America', op. cit.; Thomas Sanders and Howard Handelman (eds.), Military Government and the Movement Towards Democracy in Latin America (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), pp.145-63; Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), p.68 and pp.181-206; Laurence Weschler, A Miracle a Universe: Settling Accounts with Past Torturers (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990). For contrast with the other countries of the Southern Cone, see Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Human Rights and Demoralization in Latin America: Uruguay and Chile. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp.17-37.
23. Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos (Brasilia: Ministério da Justiça, 1996). See Paulo Sergio Pinheiro and Paulo de Mesquita Neto, 'Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos: avaliaçào do primeiro ano e rJerspectivas', Estudos Avancados, Vol.11, No.30 (1997), p.l 17.
24. For the speech see Amnesty International, Brazil Report (London: AI, 1991 ) p.49 and for the actual report see Amnesty International, Torture and Extrajudicial Executions in Urban Brazil (London: AI, 1990).
25. Other initiatives included: the setting up of working groups the recommendations of which were seldom considered; the promise of investigations which hardly ever reached any substantive conclusion; and, the drafting of legislation with no real chance of being passed by Congress. In January 1991, the Ministry of Justice set up a working group to draw up recommendations to stop the killing of street children. In May of the same year, a meeting of State Governors agreed on a set of targets to reduce violence against children and adolescents. See Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, 'O passado nào esta morto', pp.42-3.
26. See Amnesty International, Beyond Despair, op. cit.
27. See Centra Santo Dias de Direitos Humanos da Arquidiocese de S2o Paulo, Direitos humanos. Caderno 1. Realidade e perpectivas. Agenda Nacional de Direitos Humanos (Sâo Paulo: Nuestra America Editora e Video, 1993).
28. Mao A Obra, Brasil. Proposta de Governo FHC (Brasilia 1994), p. 160.
29. 'Discurso do Senhor Présidente da Repûblica Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Sobre Os Direitos Humanos', Brasilia, Paldcio da Alvorada, 7 de setembro de 1995.
30. The presidential address acknowledged some of the country's most pressing human rights problems such as child labour and prostitution, discrimination against indigenous and black people, and police violence. The prize has been awarded to members of the nongovernmental community such as Cardinal Arns, one of the great human rights advocates under the military regime, and to non-governmental organizations such as the Casa da Paz. See Direitos Humanos: novo name da liberdade e da democracia (Brasilia: Presidência da Repûblica, Secretaria de Comunicaçâo Social, Ministério da Justiça, Ministério das Relaçôes Exteriores, 1995).
31. See Paulo de Mesquita Neto, 'Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos: continuidade ou mudança no tratamento dos direitos humanos no Brasil?', Revista CEJ, Vol.1, No.l (April 1997) for the process of the elaboration of the programme.
32. For the proposals presented by the First National Human Rights Conference, see Brasil, Càmara de Deputados, Comissäo de Direitos Humanos, Relatorio: Primeira Conferencia National de Direitos Humanos (Brasilia: Comissäo de Direitos Humanos, 1996). The Human Rights Commission of the Chamber of Deputies receives and investigates denunciations of human rights violations; monitors government programmes for the protection of human rights; co-operates with national and international non-governmental human rights organizations; and studies and researches human rights conditions in Brazil and abroad.
33. The most important proposals include: the definition of torture as a criminal offence; the granting of jurisdiction to the federal courts over human rights crimes; the transfer of jurisdiction for military police crimes from military to civilian courts; the establishment of a National Witness Protection Programme; the mandatory suspension from active duty of police officers accused of human rights violations; the strengthening of the CDDPH; the modernization of the judiciary. Other sections propose measures to protect vulnerable social groups, such as children and adolescents, women, blacks, indigenous people, rural workers and homosexuals. The PNDH also includes proposals to promote human rights education in schools and to ratify and implement international instruments for the promotion and protection of human rights. See Minstério da Justica, Programa National de Direitos Humanos, op. cit.
34. Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Paulo de Mesquita Neto, 'Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos', p.120.
35. Passedon 13 Aug.1996.
36. Passed on 20 Feb. 1997.
37. Passed on 7 April 1997.
38. In April 1996, in the first trial in the case, the policeman, Marcos Vmicius Borges Emanuel was sentenced to a total of 309 years imprisonment for his part in the massacre. The sentence was subsequently reduced to a total of 89 years imprisonment at a retrial on 26 June 1996. Other policemen charged with the murder are still awaiting trial. See Amnesty International, The Candelâria Trial: A Small Wedge in the Fortress of Impunity (London: AI, 1996).
39. The sentences are still under appeal. Charges were brought against 28 military policemen, three civil police and two members of the State Public Security Department. The trial often military police charged with participation in the killings was due to start in April 1998. Folha de Sâo Paulo (29 Nov. 1997 and 15 April 1998).
40. US Department of State, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, pp.6-7. See also Ouvidoria da Policia do Estado de Sào Paulo, Relatârio trimestral da Ouvidoria da Policia do Estado de Sào Paulo: Dezembro de 1995 a Janeiro-Fevereiro de 1996 (Säo Paulo: OPESP, 1996).
41. In 1992 the Military Police killed 1,190 civilians in Greater Sao Paulo, in 1996 the number fell to 183, and again to 137 in the first eight months of 1997. However, in the first quarter of 1998 the Sào Paulo Military Police killed at least 120 civilians. See US Department of State, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996, p.7; Human Rights Watch, Report on Brazil 1997, quoted in Folha de Sào Paulo (12 Dec. 1997 and 9 April 1998). The new policy means that police officers who are involved in fatal shootings can lose their jobs and are obliged to take psychological counseling as well as courses on criminal law and community policing. Similarly, after the national and international outcry over the killing of 111 inmates by the Sào Paulo military police in October 1992, and the substitution of the State Secretary for Public Security, there was a sharp decline in the number of people killed by the Sào Paulo military police. There is yet no clear explanation for the alarming increase in police killings in early 1998, although the increase coincided with the appointment of a new General Commander in August 1997.
42. Folha de Sào Paulo (2 Feb. 1997).
43. In February 1997 the Minister of Justice called for an expedient trial for the military police officers charged with the murder of 19 peasants in Para in April 1996. Folha de Sào Paulo (15 Feb. 1997).
44. Commissäo Pastoral da Terra Conflitos no Campo. Brasil 96.
45. See Amnesty International, 'Briefing on Human Rights in Brazil. President Fernando
46. Henrique Cardoso's State Visit to UK, 1-5 December 1997' and Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World Report 1998, op. cit. 44 See 'PM e Segurança em SP', Folha de Sào Paulo (24 March 1998). 45 Folha de Sào Paulo (28 March 1998).
47. The following are the main political parties in Brazil: The Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro, or PMDB), which was created in the early years of the military regime as a legal outlet of opposition to the government. Situated at the centre of the political spectrum, the party is highly heterogeneous and has very little internal discipline or ideological coherence. The PMDB had the largest number of seats in Congress in the 1995-99 legislature. The Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal, or PFL) is a centre-right party. Its political stronghold is the underdeveloped North East of the country and it has been accused of appealing to traditional practices of clientelism and patronage to gather electoral support. The PFL had the second largest number of seats in Congress in 1995-99. The party supported the presidential candidacy of Fernando Henrique Cardoso and is a key member of his coalition government. The Brazilian Social Democratic Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, or PSDB)was set up in 1988 by a group of dissidents from the PMDB. It is broadly modelled on the European social democratic tradition, although it has no organized working class support. The victory of its presidential candidate, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in the 1994 election gave the party a considerable political boost. The Progressive Brazilian Party (Partido Progressista Brasileiro, or PPB) is made up of the remnants of the party set up by the military as the political base of support for the military government. In spite of its name the PPB is on the political right. The PPB supported the government of President Cardoso (1995-99). The Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT)was created in 1980 by trade union leaders, activists from the progressive branch of the Catholic Church and members of small left-wing groups. The PT is the most important left-wing party in Brazil and was the main opposition to the Cardoso administration. PT legislators have been particularly active in legislative human rights commissions at Federal and State levels and the party has consistently supported human rights legislation.
48. The fate of crucial social security, administrative and tax reforms, stalled in Congress for almost three years, illustrates the difficulty the government faces to gather congressional support for even priority legislation. Judicial reform, for example, has been stalled in Congress for a long time and would probably exacerbate the already fraught relations between the government and the judiciary, produced by disputes over salaries and judges' pensions.
49. Military courts are still charged with the decision of whether to forward cases to a civilian court and continue to have jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the armed forces and military police when the crime is committed while the accused is in uniform or carrying a weapon belonging to the force. As it stands, the law will have very little bearing over most killings by the military police as it would be very difficult to characterize them as intentional. US Department of State, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1995 (Washington, DC: USDS, 1995), p.2. In corporations permeated by non-democratic values and imbued in a culture of violence, leniency toward those accused of human rights crimes is common. A human rights group in the Northeast of Brazil studying police crimes against civilians tried in military courts from 1970 to 1991, found that only eight per cent of cases resulted in convictions. US Department of State, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practises for 1996, p.21. A new law on civil court jurisdiction for military crimes was approved by the Chamber of Deputies on 30 April 1997 and is awaiting approval by the Senate.
50. Amnesty International, 'Amnesty International Memorandum of Preliminary Comments on Brazil's National Action Plan For Human Rights', Amnesty International Index (AMR 19 April 1996). Although Amnesty's document is generally positive about the Action Plan, it makes a number of detailed criticisms and calls for the establishment of clear targets and a time-frame.
51. See Amnesty International, 'Briefing on Human Rights in Brazil', December 1997. The approval of the law defining torture as a serious crime, was a direct response to the outcry of the national and international TV showing of the video of the killing in Diadema, Sào Paulo, signaling the continued importance of the 'politics of shame'.
52. See Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Paulo Mesquita Neto, 'O Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos", pp.129 and 131.
53. See, for example: Rogério Bastos Arantes, O contrôle da comlitucionalidade das leis no Brasil: a constmçào de um modela hibrido, Säo Paulo: University of Sào Paulo, Masters thesis, 1993 and Maria Teresa Sadek, 'A crise do judiciärio e a visao dos juiizes', Revista da Universidade de Sào Paulo (Spring 1994), pp. 12-22.
54. Although, in general, state governors from conservative parties, such as the PFL and the PPB, have promoted a tougher police action in detriment of the observance of human rights, state governors' attitude towards human rights is often determined more by their personal sensitivity towards the issue than by their political affiliation. So, in the 1995-99 period both the governors of Rio de Janeiro, Marcello Alencar, and of Säo Paulo, Mario Covas, belonged to the PSDB. However, the latter had a much more active pro-human rights policy, including the setting up of the first state programme for human rights. In contrast, in Rio de Janeiro, killings by the police were indirectly incited by a system of special awards (see page 38 and end note 63 below). Also some state governors are known to be particularly close to the powerful military and civil police lobbies. This was the case of the former governor of Säo Paulo, Antonio Fleury, under whose government the number of civilians killed by the state's military police reached very high levels.
55. A human rights group in the northeast, studying police crimes against civilians tried in police courts from 1970 to 1991, found that only eight per cent of the cases resulted in convictions. In Säo Paulo another study found that only five per cent of cases resulted in convictions. The military courts are composed of four military officers and one civilian judge. With too few judges for the caseload there are backlogs, and human rights groups note a lack of zeal among police charged with investigating fellow officers. See US State Department, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 (Washington, DC: USDS), p.21.
56. See Amnesty International, Brazil. Authorized Violence in Rural Areas (London: AI, 1988), pp. 13-34; US State Department, Brazil Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1996 (Washington, DC: USDS), p.22 and Amnesty International, Torture and Extrajudicial Execution in Urban Brazil (London: AI, 1990).
57. See Frances Hagopian, Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
58. See, for example, 'Apoio de PMDB-SC a FHC custa R$ 150 milhôes', Folha de Sào Paulo (4 March 1998).
59. See 'As milicias', Folha de Sào Paulo (13 April 1998).
60. According to the Federaçao dos Vigilantes de Säo Paulo and the Sindicato das Empresas de Segurança Privada e Cursos de Segurança de Sào Paulo, the number of private security men employed in the state has increased from 80,000 in 1993 to 135,000 in 1996, a 68.7 per cent increase in four years. In addition, an estimated 100,000 clandestine vigilantes which are not registered with the Federal Police operate illegally in security related activities. See André Lozano, 'Uso da Segurança privada explode em Sào Paulo', Folha de Sào Paulo (20 April 1997), cited in Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Paulo Mesquita Neto, 'O Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos', pp.121-2.
61. The best account of the institutional culture and police practices that underlie the human rights crimes of the ROTA is Caco Barcellos, Rota 66. A histôria dapolicia que mata (Sào Paulo: Globo, 1992). The report names officers who had committed between 34 and 45 lethal shootings each. The incidents are never properly investigated, as members of the same group of officers often investigate each others' fatal shootings. The report indicates that the police deliberately and systematically destroy any evidence of unlawful! killings. Police units involved in a fatal shooting often alter the scene of the crime by taking the bodies of their victims to hospital and creating the pretense that death occurred after arrival at the hospital, or by planting handguns in victims' hand to bolster 'legitimate defence' arguments. A survey of 147 fatal shootings by police in Rio de Janeiro between January 1995 and April 1996, revealed that, in 102 cases, corpses were taken to hospitals and not to a Forensic Medicine Institute (Instituto de Medicina Legal, or IML) for autopsy. In some instances medical staff have refused to accept these corpses or to certify that they died after arrival at hospital. Forensic doctors are subordinated to the State Secretary for Public Security and their independence is compromised by this link. See Amnesty Internationa!, Brazil. Human Rights Violations and the Health Professions (London: AI, 1996), pp.11 and 17.
62. See I'eja (19 April 1995)
63. In November 1995, the Rio de Janeiro state government introduced decree 21.753 whereby police involved in exceptional acts of bravery are decorated with medals and given an average pay increase of between 50 per cent and 150 per cent. Since then, in monthly public ceremonies the Secretary of Public Security, the Commander of the Military Police and the Chief of the Civil Police read out citations, award medals and pay rises to police involved in armed confrontations. These citations invariably end with the total of civilians killed by the individuals receiving the award. Between November 1995 and April 1996,257 such awards were given. See Amnesty International Brazil. The Candelaria trial, p.9. See also: Human Rights Watch, 7997 Brazil Report (New York: HRW, 1997). It also alleges forensic examinations revealed that a number of killings were summary executions and not of 'acts of courage' as claimed by the police. Inter-Press Service (25 May 1996) and Folha de Sào Paulo (12 Dec. 1997). The number of fatal shootings by police continued to rise until the end of the year due to the state's policy of rewarding acts of 'bravery and fearlessness'. The average monthly number of deaths resulting from police action has reportedly doubled. 64 per cent of the victims were shot in the back of the head or in the back, which suggests that they were not resisting arrest or engaged in a confrontation with the police. See Amnesty International, 'Briefing on Human Rights in Brazil', op. cit., and Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Hatch World Report 199S, op. cit.
64. As noted by Hagopian, 'the practice of state clientelism that pervades the executive branch in large measure prevents the democratization of the state by inhibiting its responsiveness to citizens'. See Frances Hagopian, 'Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political Pacts and Regime Transition in Brazil', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.23, No.2 July (1990), p. 159.
65. Roberto Schwarz, Ao vencetlor as batatas (Säo Paulo, 1977), pp. 15-16. This books examines the contradictions generated by the juxtaposition of a slave-based monarchy informed by liberal ideology.
66. These 'persons' operate according to an authority 'which however illegal or illegitimate, is visibly effective. Such illegal authority consists of the capacity to command and to receive obedience due to personal connections'. See Claudia de Andrade Melim, 'Parallel Power. A Study of the exercise of power of the Brazilian state and the alternative power structure of the Rio de Janeiro slums' (Copenhagen: unpublished manuscript, 1997), p.37. On the other hand, 'only individuals must go to police stations, are tried in court, stand in queues, use the public health and education facilities. It is also only individuals who are drafted into the military'. See Roberto Da Malta, Carnavals, malandros e lierais (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Guanabara, 1990), p.193, whose work is analyzed by Claudia de Andrade Melim, 'Parallel Power', pp.35-40.
67. Roberto Da Malta, Carnavals, p.195. According to surveys undertaken in January-August 1996 in the Rio Metropolitan area, approximately 91 per cent of those interviewed felt that the application of the law applied to some more rigorously than to others. See Mario Grynszpan, 'Democratizaçao e accesso diferencial àjustiça no Brasil', paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Congresss, 17-19 April 1997, Guadalajara, Mexico, p.5, which cites the 1996 survey undertaken by the Centro de Documentaçào de Histôria Contemporänea do Brasil (CPDOC), thé Fundaçào Getülio Vargas and the Instituto de Estudos da Religiäo (ISER) entitled Lei, justiça e cidadania.
68. Sources: Amaury de Souza, 'The Social Agenda at Century's End', in Susan Kaufman Purcell and Riordan Roett (eds.), Brazil Under Cardoso (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1997) and Pedro Malan and Régis Bonelli, 'The Success of Growth Policies in Brazil', in Simon Teitel (ed.), Towards a New Development Strategy for Latin America (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 1992). For the worsening of socio-economic conditions in the 1980s, see World Bank, Poverty and Income Distribution: The Story of the 1980s (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1993).
69. Regionally, The Northeast consistently has had the worst performance for each social indicator, followed by the North and the Centre West, while the South and the Southeast compete for the highest position in social development. Maria J.F. Willumsen, 'Regional Disparities in Brazil', in M.J.F. Willumsen and E. Gianetti da Fonseca (eds.), Tlie Brazilian Economy: Structure and Performance in Recent Decades (Miami, FL: North-South Center Press, 1997).
70. Very high inflation and the governments' failure to take appropriate action was a major contributing factor in the increase in poverty in the 1980s. According to a study by Ferreira & Litchfield between 1980 and 1991 the shares in total income of all but the richest 20 per cent fell and these gained chiefly at the expense of the poorest groups: The poorest decile lost 20 per cent of its original share, the fifth decile lost nine per cent and the rich gained by almost six per cent. There are some indications that the dramatic fall in inflation since 1994 has led to a significant fall in the number of people living under the poverty line. According to a study by S. Rocha, the percentage of people living under the poverty line declined from 42 per cent to 28 per cent on average between 1994 and 1996. See Günther Schönleinter, 'Poverty and Inequality in Brazil: Obstacles to Economic Development and Democratic Consolidation?' (unpublished manuscript, London School of Economics, 1997).
71. Studies carried out by Maravall in Spain, Moisés in Brazil and Bruszt and Simon in Hungary, cited in Adam Przeworski (ed.), Siistainable Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1995), p.37,
72. indicate this. See José Maria Maravall, La politico de transiciôn, 1975-1980 (Madrid: Taurus, 1981);
73. José Alvaro Moisés, 'Eleiçoes, participaçao e cultura politica: mudanças e continuidades', Lua Nova 22 (1990), pp.271;
74. Lâszlo Bruszt and Janos Simon, 'Political Culture, Political and Economical Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe during the Transition to Democracy' (Budapest, Erasmus Foundation for Democracy, unpublished manuscript). On the other hand, Mitchell and McCormick found only a modest correlation between economic well-being and better human rights records. See N.J. Mitchell and J.M. McCormick, 'Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations', World Politics, Vol.40, No.4 ( 1988), p.497.
75. See Juan J. Linz, Democratic Crisis, Breakdown and Re-equilibration (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
76. Adam Przeworski, Sustainable Democracy, pp.34 and 39.
77. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p.48.
78. For workers movements see Margaret Keck, The Workers Party and Demoralization in Brazil (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992);
79. Scott Maimvaring, 'Grassroots Popular Movements, Identity and Democratization in Brazil', University of Notre Dame, Working Paper of the Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies 48; Maria Helena Moreira Alves, 'Grassroots Organizations, Trade Unions, and the Church: A Challenge to the Controlled Abertura in Brazil', Latin American Perspectives, Vol.11, No.l (1984), pp.73-102.
80. For religious and other NGOs see Leilah Landim, Sem fins lucratives: as organizaçdes nàogovernamentais no Brasil (Rio de Janiero: Institute de Estudos da Religiäo, 1988).
81. For neighbourhood associations or groups see Julie Fisher, 'Development from Below: Neighbourhood Improvement Associations in the Latin American Squatter Settlements', Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol.19, No.l (1984), pp.61-85.
82. For land rights and MST see Cândido Grzybowski, 'Rural Workers and Democratization in Brazil', pp.19-43.
83. For indigenous rights, see Laura Graham, 'Constitutional Lobbying in Brazil: Indians Seek Expanded Role', Cultural Survival Quarterly, Vol.11, No.2 (1987), pp.61-2;
84. David Mayberry-Lewis, 'Indians in Brazil: The Struggle Intensifies', Cultural Survival Quarterly. Vol.13, No.l (1989), pp.2-5.
85. See, for example, Hector Béjar and Peter Oakley, 'From Accountability to Shared Responsibility: NGO Evaluation in Latin America', in Micheal Edwards and David Hulme (eds.), Beyond the Magic Bullet: NGO Performance and Accountability in the Post-Cold War World (Connecticut, CT: Kumarian Press, 1996), pp.93-4 and 98-9.
86. The Second National Human Rights Conference held in Brasilia on 12-13 May 1997 to evaluate the Plan brought together 400 participants and the final report showed a high level of understanding of the human rights situation among the human rights community in attendance. See Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro and Paulo de Mesquita Neto, 'O Programa Nacional de Direitos Humanos', p. 120.