Mobilizing principles: the role of transnational activists in promoting human rights principles

Human Rights Quarterly

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 905-923

  Burgerman, Susan D ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HUMAN RIGHTS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION;

CENTRAL AMERICA;

EID: 0032428815     PISSN: 02750392     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/hrq.1998.0035     Document Type: Article

References (40)

1. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR (1991); SUSANNE JONAS, THE BATTLE FOR GUATEMALA: REBELS, DEATH SQUADS, AND U.S. POWER (1991) (providing background on military violations in the conduct of these civil wars).
2. See generally AMERICAS WATCH, EL SALVADOR'S DECADE OF TERROR (1991); SUSANNE JONAS, THE BATTLE FOR GUATEMALA: REBELS, DEATH SQUADS, AND U.S. POWER (1991) (providing background on military violations in the conduct of these civil wars).
3. These are the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), July 1991 to April 1995, and the United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA), November 1994 to present.
4. Ethan A. Nadelman, Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of norms in International Society, 44 INT'L ORG. 479, 482 (1990).
5. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Issue Networks in International Politics 2 (16 Sept. 1994) (paper presented at the Conference of the American Political Science Associaton). The conceptualization of transnational networks presented here owes much to that developed by Keck and Sikkink. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). For an earlier approach, see Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993).
6. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Issue Networks in International Politics 2 (16 Sept. 1994) (paper presented at the Conference of the American Political Science Associaton). The conceptualization of transnational networks presented here owes much to that developed by Keck and Sikkink. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). For an earlier approach, see Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993).
7. Margaret Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Transnational Issue Networks in International Politics 2 (16 Sept. 1994) (paper presented at the Conference of the American Political Science Associaton). The conceptualization of transnational networks presented here owes much to that developed by Keck and Sikkink. See, e.g., MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998). For an earlier approach, see Kathryn Sikkink, Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America, 47 INT'L ORG. 411 (1993).
8. See e.g., Douglas Chalmers, Scott Martin & Kerianne Piester, Associative Networks: New Structures of Representation for the Popular Sectors?, in THE NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY IN LATIN AMERICA: RETHINKING PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION 543 (1997) (the moral or ideological motivation for principle-based network mobilization distinguishes them from other network models currently being developed. For example, the associative networks that link societal actors with decision makers within a local political system).
9. See LIAM MAHONY & LUIS ENRIQUE EGUREN, INTERNATIONAL ACCOMPANIMENT FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: SCENARIOS, OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGIES (1996).
10. See Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty, Regimes, and Human Rights, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 139 (Volker Rittberger ed., 1993); Nadelman, supra note 3, at 479. 8. See Keck & Sikkink, supra note 4, at 4-8.
11. See Andrew P. Cortell & James W. Davis, How Do International Institutions Matter? The Domestic Impact of International Rules and Norms, 40 INT'L STUD. Q. 451 (1996) (examining from a different perspective how domestic actors use the government's accountability to international norms and institutions to legitimize their claims).
12. See Gerald Davis, Social Characteristics of Organizations and the Embedded Evolution of Governance Regimes (5 Dec. 1995) (paper presented at Columbia University Center for the Social Sciences).
13. See, e.g., Kathryn Sikkink, The Emergence, Evolution, and Effectiveness of the Latin American Human Rights Network, in CONSTRUCTING DEMOCRACY: HUMAN RIGHTS, CITIZENSHIP, AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA 59, 64-65 (1996). From a prescriptive standpoint, this is where the strategy of framing norms to seek a broad consensus becomes troubling. It displaces, perhaps for all time, other equally valid values and concerns in order to build a consensus. The contemporary debate within the human rights field over whether, or how, to approach socioeconomic or ecological rights stems indirectly from Amnesty International's earlier decision. Limiting the human rights parameter to rights of the person enabled mobilization across cultural boundaries. Nonetheless, it also channeled human rights activism to the detriment of those rights most commonly claimed by citizens of lesser developed nations. A side effect of this norm-framing decision has been that those seeking to discredit the human rights agenda can claim that it is Eurocentric and inappropriate to non-Western contexts.
14. See Douglas Chalmers, Internationalized Domestic Politics in Latin America: The Institutional Role of Internationally Based Actors, OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES (Institute of Latin American and Iberian Studies, Columbia University, 1993).
15. Interview, Frank LaRue, labor rights activist, Guatemala City (6 June 1995).
16. The author obtained information concerning CALDH's operations through observing the activities of the Guatemala office and conducting interviews with staff members.
17. Interview with Will Harrell, US civil rights attorney, offices of CALDH, in Guatemala City (30 Mar. 1995).
18. JOHN P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 12-13 (1984).
19. Alison Brysk, From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 259, 285 (1993).
20. See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. and Chinese Seem Near a Deal on Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES, 24 Feb. 1997, at A1.
21. See generally, AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORTS; THE WATCH COMMITTEES AND LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (published annually); Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, Barriers to Reform: A Profile of El Salvador's Military Leaders (21 May 1990); Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. Pedro Nikken, On Developments in the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, 1993/284, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/11 (1994).
22. See generally, AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORTS; THE WATCH COMMITTEES AND LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (published annually); Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, Barriers to Reform: A Profile of El Salvador's Military Leaders (21 May 1990); Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. Pedro Nikken, On Developments in the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, 1993/284, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/11 (1994).
23. See generally, AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORTS; THE WATCH COMMITTEES AND LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (published annually); Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, Barriers to Reform: A Profile of El Salvador's Military Leaders (21 May 1990); Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. Pedro Nikken, On Developments in the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, 1993/284, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/11 (1994).
24. See generally, AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORTS; THE WATCH COMMITTEES AND LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (published annually); Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, Barriers to Reform: A Profile of El Salvador's Military Leaders (21 May 1990); Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. Pedro Nikken, On Developments in the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, 1993/284, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/11 (1994).
25. See generally, AMERICAS WATCH AND THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (1982); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORTS; THE WATCH COMMITTEES AND LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE: A REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (published annually); Congressional Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report, Barriers to Reform: A Profile of El Salvador's Military Leaders (21 May 1990); Report of the Independent Expert, Mr. Pedro Nikken, On Developments in the Human Rights Situation in El Salvador, 1993/284, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1994/11 (1994).
26. See Susan D. Burgerman, The Evolution of Compliance; The Human Rights Regime, Transnational Networks, and United Nations Peacebuilding (1997) (Doctoral Dissertation, Columbia University).
27. See CYNTHIA J. ARNSON, CROSSROADS: CONGRESS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, AND CENTRAL AMERICA (1989).
28. See William M. LeoGrande, After the Battle of San Salvador, 7 WORLD POL'Y J. 331 (1990); Sam Dillon, Dateline El Salvador: Crisis Renewed, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 153 (1988).
29. See William M. LeoGrande, After the Battle of San Salvador, 7 WORLD POL'Y J. 331 (1990); Sam Dillon, Dateline El Salvador: Crisis Renewed, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 153 (1988).
30. See Terry Lynn Karl, El Salvador's Negotiated Revolution, 71 FOREIGN AFF. 147 (1992).
31. See JONAS, supra note 1, at 205, tbl. 13.1.
32. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1990, at 641 (1991).
33. See Gary Bland, Assessing the Transition to Democracy, in IS THERE A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN EL SALVADOR? (Joseph S. Tulchin & Gary Bland eds., 1992).
34. See Salvador Samayoa (interviewed by Terry Karl), El Salvador: Negotiations or Total War, 6 WORLD POL'Y J. 321 (1989).
35. See GABRIEL AGUILERA PERALTA & KAREN PONCIANO, EL ESPEJO SIN REFLEJO: LA NEGOCIACION DE PAZ EN 1993, at 16-19 (1994).
36. See Julia Preston, Guatemala's New President Shakes Up Army and Police, N.Y. TIMES, 7 Feb. 1996, at A11 ; Preston, Guatemala Kidnappings Follow Purge, N.Y. TIMES, 12 Mar. 1996, at A4;
37. See Julia Preston, Guatemala's New President Shakes Up Army and Police, N.Y. TIMES, 7 Feb. 1996, at A11 ; Preston, Guatemala Kidnappings Follow Purge, N.Y. TIMES, 12 Mar. 1996, at A4;
38. Destituyen a militares, jefes policiacos y aduanales por estar involucrados con el capo del contrabando, PRENSA LIBRE, 18 Sept. 1996.
39. See Burgerman, supra note 20, at 181-97, 304-26, 462-65 (for purposes of comparison, the importance of maintaining local contacts is more clearly seen in the case of Cambodia, where the lack information reaching international monitors in the 1970s and 1980s severely hampered mobilization efforts).
40. Chalmers, supra note 12, at 1.