The role of government in health insurance markets with adverse selection

Health Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 8, 1998, Pages 659-670

  Feldman, Roger ^a,c   Escribano, Carlos ^b   Pellisé, Laura ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSIDAD CARLOS III DE MADRID   (Spain)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

Adverse selection; Compulsory insurance pools; Government policy; Health insurance; Welfare economics

Indexed keywords

GOVERNMENT; HEALTH INSURANCE; MARKET; POLICY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PURCHASING; REVIEW; WELFARE;

CANADA; CHOICE BEHAVIOR; ECONOMIC COMPETITION; EUROPE; FINANCING, GOVERNMENT; HEALTH CARE SECTOR; HUMANS; INSURANCE POOLS; INSURANCE SELECTION BIAS; INSURANCE, HEALTH; MODELS, ECONOMIC; PRIVATE SECTOR; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032425878     PISSN: 10579230     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1050(199812)7:8<659::AID-HEC384>3.0.CO;2-1     Document Type: Review

References (6)

1. Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J. Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1976; 90: 629-650.
2. Pauly, M. Overinsurance and public provision of insurance: the roles of moral hazard and adverse selection. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1974; 88: 44-54.
3. Johnson, W. Overinsurance and the public provision of health insurance: comment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1978; 92: 693-696.
4. Stiglitz, J. Rethinking the economic role of the state: publicly provided private goods. Lecture delivered at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain, November 15, 1992. Published in Spanish as Replanteamiento del papel economico del estado: bienes privados sumnistrados publicamente. In: Lopez-Casasnovas, G. (ed.) Analisis economico de la sanidad. Barcelona: Generalitat de Catalunya, Departament de Sanitat y Seguretat Social, 1994.
5. Dahlby, B. Adverse selection and pareto improvements through compulsory insurance. Public Choice 1981; 37: 547-558.
6. Wilson, C. A model of insurance markets with incomplete information. Journal of Economic Theory 1977; 16: 167-207.