The peace process and the politics of conflict resolution

Journal of Palestine Studies

Volumn 27, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 5-19

  Sabet, Amr G E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; NEGOTIATION PROCESS; PEACE PROCESS;

MIDDLE EAST;

EID: 0032423720     PISSN: 0377919X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/jps.1998.27.4.00p00027     Document Type: Article

References (49)

1. John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1990), p. 3.
2. "President Hosni Mubarak: The Inevitability of Peace (21 January 1989)." in Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds.. The Israeli-Arab Reader, 5th ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), pp. 546-47.
3. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 241.
4. Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 215.
5. Raimo Väyrynen, ed., New Directions in Conflict Theory (London: Sage Publications, 1991), pp. 4-5.
6. Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (New York: Verso, 1995), p. 237.
7. Michael Field, Inside the Arab World (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 384.
8. Yehoshafat Harkabi, Arab Strategies and Israel's Response (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 103.
9. Interview, Newsweek, 23 June 1997, p. 39.
10. Melvin J. Lerner, "The Justice Motive in Human Relations," in Melvin J. Lerner and Sally C. Lerner, eds., The Justice Motive in Social Behavior: Adapting to Times of Scarcity and Change (New York: Plenum Press, 1981), pp. 12-13.
11. David A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 20.
12. John W. Burton, Global Conflict (London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd., 1984), p. 13.
13. Michael Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1981), p. 93.
14. Ibid.
15. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War, pp. 20-21.
16. Ibid., p. 20.
17. Harkabi, Arab Strategies, p. 88.
18. In Report of a Study Group Convened by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, it was proposed that "regional water plans would be an important component of the bilateral and multilateral accords. The opportunity to increase access to water would serve as one of the inducements for Israel to negotiate security accords with its neighbors. Projects to be given high priority would include the Unity Dam on the Yarmouk River involving Jordan, Syria and Israel, pipelines for water from the Litani River in Lebanon and from Turkey or Egypt, and a joint Jordan-Israel desalinization plant in Eilat/ Aqaba." The report is in Ann M. Lesch, Transition to Palestinian Self-Government (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), p. 158. Note the pattern of concessions required of the Arabs in order for Israel to accept negotiating security accords with them, Israeli security being paramount. Even before the advent of Netanyahu, "security for peace" rather than "land for peace" was essentially what was being demanded.
19. Howard Goller, Washington Post, 12 August 1997.
20. Samar Assad, Los Angeles Times, 12 August 1997.
21. Barry Schweid, Washington Post, 10 September 1997.
22. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 467 and 488.
23. See further Glenn E. Robinson, "The Growing Authoritarianism of the Arafat Regime," Survival 39, no. 2 (Summer 1997), 54.
24. Ibid., 45.
25. Chester L. Karrass, The Negotiating Game (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970), pp. 17-19.
26. Otomar J. Bartos, "Simple Model of Negotiation" in I. William Zartman, ed., The Negotiation Process (London: Sage Publications, 1978), p. 22.
27. Kayhan al-Arabi, 17 March 1998, p. 11.
28. I. William Zartman, "Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process," in Zartman, ed., The Negotiation Process, pp. 76-77.
29. According to Benjamin Netanyahu, Yitzhak Rabin, the assassinated Labor party leader and former prime minister, "was very clear that there were no limitations whatsoever on Israeli construction in Jerusalem. Rabin was the one who authorized the building of Har Homa (Jabal Ghoneim settlement)," Interview, Newsweek, 23 June 1997, p. 39.
30. Commenting on the result, and perhaps justifying Netanyahu's position and his own call for redesigning the Oslo agreements, Kissinger stated that any analogy to the early stages of the peace process was illusory. As he put it "in the earlier negotiation, step-by-step progress relieved tensions and built confidence. On the West Bank, the opposite was the case. Both sides had jumped into the 'peace process' without having clarified workable objectives and expected to wrest that clarity from the process itself. Instead, it has compounded their perplexities. This was no accident. Clearly, Arafat was led to believe by Israeli, American and European interlocutors that the final destination was at least the "67 borders and recognition of a Palestinian statehood. But that ignored the vast difference in the negotiations between Israel and the PLO compared with those between Israel and the neighboring Arab states." Henry Kissinger, "The Oslo Piecemeal Process," Washington Post, 24 August 1997.
31. As quoted by Noam Chomsky, "Eastern Exposure: Misrepresenting the Peace Process," Village Voice, 6 February 1996, p. 6.
32. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1976), p. 49.
33. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Tariq Misr ila al-Quds [Egypt's road to Jerusalem], (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Translation and Publication, 1997), p. 137. Author's translation.
34. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 55-56. On the Egyptian-U.S. relationship, Cohen writes (p. 56) that rarely "can a patron-client relationship have achieved such pronounced expression."
35. Luc Reychler, "The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice," in Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, ed., The Art of Conflict Prevention (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 5-7 . See also Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), as a representative of the Harvard Negotiations Project.
36. Luc Reychler, "The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Practice," in Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, ed., The Art of Conflict Prevention (London: Brassey's, 1994), pp. 5-7 . See also Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to Yes (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), as a representative of the Harvard Negotiations Project.
37. Interview with Husni Mubarak, Al-Hawadeth, 21-27 February 1997, p. 21.
38. Luttwak, Strategy, p. 194.
39. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," Foreign Affairs 5, no. 75 (Sept.-Oct. 1997), p. 1.
40. Burton, Global Conflict, pp. 137-38.
41. Mohammed Abu-Nimer, "Conflict Resolution in an Islamic Context," Peace and Change 21, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 33-34.
42. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention, p. 88.
43. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 79.
44. Field, Inside the Arab World, p. 385. Emphasis added.
45. Commenting on several polls in the Arab world related to this matter, Edward Said observed: "In every instance public opinion has in fact expressed no enthusiasm for normalization with Israel. On mass level this suggests that the sense of defeat is not quite as widespread and prostrate as official policy and the logic of capitulationist intellectuals would have us believe." See his Peace and its Discontents (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), p. 134.
46. Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Prevention, p. 89.
47. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 79.
48. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 78.
49. George Orwell, A Collection of Essays (New York: Harcourt, 1981), p. 40.