Spanish socialists, privatising the right way?

West European Politics

Volumn 21, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 163-179

  Chari, Raj S ^a  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INDUSTRIAL POLICY; POLITICAL SYSTEM; PRIVATIZATION; STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE;

SPAIN;

EID: 0032423646     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389808425276     Document Type: Article

References (54)

1. V. Pérez Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.219-23; and G. de la Dehesa, 'Spain', in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: IIE 1994) p.130.
2. V. Pérez Díaz, The Return of Civil Society (London: Harvard UP 1993) pp.219-23; and G. de la Dehesa, 'Spain', in J. Williamson (ed.) The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington DC: IIE 1994) p.130.
3. Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), 1977. Programa Electoral 1977 (Madrid).
4. PSOE, Programa Electoral 1979 (Madrid), 9; PSOE, Congreso Extraordinario 1979 (Madrid) 1; PSOE Programa Electoral 1982 (Madrid).
5. PSOE, Programa Electoral 1979 (Madrid), 9; PSOE, Congreso Extraordinario 1979 (Madrid) 1; PSOE Programa Electoral 1982 (Madrid).
6. PSOE, Programa Electoral 1979 (Madrid), 9; PSOE, Congreso Extraordinario 1979 (Madrid) 1; PSOE Programa Electoral 1982 (Madrid).
7. For a list of INI sales see P. Heywood, The Government and Politics of Spain (London: Macmillan 1995) and Cinco Diás (29 Sept. 1995).
8. For a list of INI sales see P. Heywood, The Government and Politics of Spain (London: Macmillan 1995) and Cinco Diás (29 Sept. 1995).
9. G. de la Dehesa, 'Privitización Europea: El Caso de España', ICE 707 (July 1992) pp.55-71.
10. N. Bermeo, 'The Politics of Public Enterprise in Portugal, Spain and Greece' in Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization (Boulder, CO: Westview 1990) pp. 137-63.
11. Garcia Hermosa, 'El INI como grupo de negocios' Papeles de Economia Española 38 (1989) pp.262-76.
12. Martín Seco, La Economía Estúpidos, la Economia (Madrid: Libertarias 1993) pp.52-6.
13. O. Holman, Integrating Southern Europe (London: Routledge 1996) pp.156-62 and 167-98.
14. Heywood, Government (note 4) p.249.
15. J. Muñoz, El Poder de la banca en España (Madrid: ZYX 1970) and J. Muñoz, 'La expansión Bancaria entre 1919 and 1926: La formación de una Banca "Nacional"', ICE 6 (1978) pp.98-162.
16. J. Muñoz, El Poder de la banca en España (Madrid: ZYX 1970) and J. Muñoz, 'La expansión Bancaria entre 1919 and 1926: La formación de una Banca "Nacional"', ICE 6 (1978) pp.98-162.
17. UGT, 'Proceso Reconversión del Sector Fertilizantes' (Madrid: Working Paper 1989).
18. Communications with high officials in the SEPI (the former INI) and analysis of the files surrounding some of the INI's privatisations took place in Sept. and Oct. 1996.
19. In fact, representatives from Economy and Finance on the INI Council constituted 40 per cent of it by 1991.
20. Interviews with 2 PSOE officials formerly in the Ministry of Economy and Finance and two bankers (Sept. 1996 and March 1997).
21. S. Sole, La Historia de Seat (Barcelona: Arazadi 1993) p.26.
22. El Pais, 13 Feb. 1986.
23. It is also important to note that these companies did not constitute part of Seat's share-capital but, instead, were businesses Seat held directly or indirectly as of Dec. 1985 each possessing their own shares with different values.
24. We will assume the 20 billion peseta loan from the state to VW was paid back.
25. This information is from the INI file on Enasa and was also facilitated by two officials (formerly in Economy and Finance) involved in the sale. Interviews Nov. 1996 and May 1997.
26. Direct quote from one former PSOE official in Economy and Finance, Sept. 1996.
27. See Financial Times, 16 Sept. 1987; El Paiś, 4 de octubre, 1984; G. Columbo, Who's Who in Spain (Zurich: Sutter 1994) pp.343, 437, 488, 1091, and 1264; and Holman, Integrating Southern Europe (note 9).
28. See Financial Times, 16 Sept. 1987; El Paiś, 4 de octubre, 1984; G. Columbo, Who's Who in Spain (Zurich: Sutter 1994) pp.343, 437, 488, 1091, and 1264; and Holman, Integrating Southern Europe (note 9).
29. See Financial Times, 16 Sept. 1987; El Paiś, 4 de octubre, 1984; G. Columbo, Who's Who in Spain (Zurich: Sutter 1994) pp.343, 437, 488, 1091, and 1264; and Holman, Integrating Southern Europe (note 9).
30. See Financial Times, 16 Sept. 1987; El Paiś, 4 de octubre, 1984; G. Columbo, Who's Who in Spain (Zurich: Sutter 1994) pp.343, 437, 488, 1091, and 1264; and Holman, Integrating Southern Europe (note 9).
31. Interview with a PSOE official in Economy and Finance, Nov. 1996.
32. Interviews with a Spanish banking executive, Oct.-Nov. 1996.
33. Interview with official who still works in the SEPI, Nov. 1996.
34. Direct quote from a PSOE official in interview held in Nov. 1996. Similar comments made by officials previously mentioned.
35. Interviews with former high member of Executive Committee of PCE/IU. Feb. 1997, and June 1997.
36. Along with high officials from IU interviewed above, discussions held with researchers in the Area Economía of IU, between February and June 1997.
37. Interviews with 3 officials from the UGT-FIA (Federación Indsutrial Afines) and interviews with 2 CC.OO. officials between Feb. and May 1997.
38. While PSOE and bank officials above stated that banks previously financing the enterprises would later do business with the multinational owners, it is all but impossible to quantify this because of the secrecy surrounding any present loans.
39. The average hourly labor cost in total industry in Spain is one of the lowest in the EC and below Germany and Italy. For comparative data see Eurostat, Labor Costs Updating, 1992-1995 (Luxembourg 1997).
40. The closer the debt/equity ratio is to 0, the more likely bankers would help finance the company in the future. After the cash injection, the denominator of the ratio would be larger than before, thus ensuring that the ratio would be smaller even if the numerator (i.e. debts) increased in future years. See O. Amat, Análisis económico-financiero (Madrid: Ediciones Gestion 2000 1990) pp.41-9.
41. Interviews with party officials formerly in the Ministry of the Presidency and the Socialist Federation of Madrid (Oct. and Nov. 1996).
42. Gimbert El Sector del Automovil en España, Working paper ESADE, (Barcelona, Sept. 1995) p.25.
43. Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union? An Introduction to the European Community (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner 1994).
44. INI, Informe Anual (1984 and 1991)
45. The three Grupo Patrimonio companies investigated by the Commission were Hytasa, Imepiel, and Intelhorce. For example, the injections and contributions to Intelhorce before its sale in 1989 equalled 4.405 billion pesetas. The Commission deemed these illegal based on articles 92(2), 92(3) and 93(3) of the Treaty and the sums had to be returned to the state by the new owners. See, Bautista et al. Ayudas Públican a Empresas - Decisiones de la Comisión European Sentencias del Tribunal de Justicia 1990-1994 (Madrid: CAM 1995) pp. 127-42.
46. Cinco Días, 1 Dec. 1993, p.1.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. A written communication of 19 March 1997 from a key member of the DG IV to this author stated that '...the Commission never investigated possible aid flows through the INI to the undertakings you mentioned (in a previous fax dated 12 March 1997 by the author outlining the key INI companies sold after 1986, including Fovisa, Purolator Ibérica, Endesa, Asticain, MTM, Ateinsa, Enfersa, Pesa, Acesa, Seat and Enasa), because of a difference in interpretation (between the Spanish government and Brussels) of the Transparency Directive 1980/1993 and article 92 of the Treaty with respect of information of the Commission by member states.'
50. Telephone interviews with two other high officials in DG IV between March and May 1997.
51. El País, 11 June 1997, p.23.
52. Ibid.
53. El País, 28 Dec. 1996, pp.1, 8, 11.
54. Although the Audit Commission announced overall figures of outside financing of the PSOE, because Ley 7/1981 does not clearly stipulate that third party financing is illegal, their conclusion was that the debts must still be considered 'alegal' and not illegal until discussed in the courts.