Negotiating locality, Islam, and national culture in a changing borderlands: The revival of the Mäshräp ritual among young Uighur men in the Ili valley

Central Asian Survey

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 673-699

  Roberts, Sean R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BORDER REGION; CULTURAL TRADITION; ETHNIC MINORITY; ISLAMISM; NATIONAL IDENTITY;

CHINA; KAZAKHSTAN;

EID: 0032416511     PISSN: 02634937     EISSN: None     Source Type: Trade Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/02634939808401063     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. Research for this paper was conducted during some 22 months of fieldwork in Almaty, Kazakhstan, from 1994 to 1997. Funding for the research was provided by IREX (The International Research and Exchanges Board) through a ten-month language training grant and a 12-month independent research grant. Local institutional support for the research was provided by the Center of Uighur Studies under the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan. However, only the author is responsible for the content of the article and the opinions expressed.
2. Transliteration is always a problem for Central Asian languages given the different alphabets and orthographies that have been used for these languages over the last century. However, the problem is compounded for the Uighurs of the Ili borderlands who often continue to operate in different orthographies and alphabets given the nature of their status as a deterritorialized stateless people living in two different states. Where possible, I have tried here to use a consistent transliteration system based on that provided by Edward Allworth for the Uighur alphabet developed in the USSR in 1947 [see: Edward Allworth, Nationalities of the Soviet East Publications and Writing Systems (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p 374]. However, there are instances when some of the Uighur words in italics in the text may have different spellings which are used in addition to that which is provided, even within the former Soviet Union. For place names, I have used the versions most often seen in academic texts about the area rather than a transliteration of the Uighur language versions.
3. Polu, pronounced plov in Russian, is a popular Central Asian food consisting of rice that is steamed with mutton, carrots, onions, garlic, and spices. It is the most cost effective way to feed a large number of people at one sitting and, thus, is a staple at many community rituals among Uighurs.
4. The word arzu in Uighur literarily means a 'wish' or 'desire'. However, in this context, its meaning is closer to a 'complaint' or 'issue'.
5. It should be mentioned that the mäshräps about which I am writing are very definitely a part of the Uighur male domain. There is a distinct divide that exists between gendered domains among the Uighurs. While male and female researchers often have access to the world of the opposite sex in such a context, it remains difficult to conduct participant observation across gender lines. Women also often have mäshräp gatherings which differ from the male ritual and are most often referred to as chays, or 'teas'. While I was able occasionally to attend women's chays, I never felt myself a true participant due to the obvious gendered nature of the ritual and, therefore, have not written here about these women's gatherings. Also, as will be explained in this article, the male mäshräp revival movement about which I am writing is distinct in that it attracts Uighurs from both sides of the border since it is primarily Uighur men from the XUAR who have come to Kazakhstan to trade. Furthermore, the resurrection of the male ritual has produced large mäshräps which are far more open to public discourse, albeit gendered.
6. This has been the official name of this region within the administrative structure of the People's Republic of China since 1955 when the area was officially proclaimed an autonomous region. The name Xinjiang, which means "new dominion" in Mandarin Chinese, was attributed to the area as a part of Chinese colonial domains in the 19th century. Most Uighurs disclaim the name Xinjiang, feeling that it suggests Chinese ownership of an area which they see as being historically Uighur. Instead, they prefer the titles Eastern Turkestan or Uighurstan which reflect Turkic and Uighur possession of the region respectively. In this article, I will use the Chinese government's present official name of the region, abbreviated as XUAR, since this is the internationally acceptable toponym for the area and is the least politically sensitive. To avoid justifying a series of different toponyms for different historical periods, I will refer to the area as the XUAR even when discussing events that took place before 1955. However, the use of the Chinese government's name for the area is not meant to discount the viability of other names which Uighurs themselves use nor to suggest that the region has always been known as Xinjiang.
7. This is also the case with the women's ritual of chay. In the case of both these mäshräps and chays, the hosting member is given a set amount of money by each of the other members. As a result, the host then has a significant amount of capital given to them at one time which they can use as they please, being required to return it gradually as he/she attends the ritual when hosted by others. Aside from the male and female segregated rituals, some Uighurs in Kazakhstan and the XUAR also practice this rotating credit system in mäshräps where husbands and wives attend together.
8. These mäshräps, although different from those which have recently been revived, still grow out of the same tradition. While mäshräps had been repressed in the USSR during the 1930s, they were revived in this less educational manner in the 1960s following the large influx of Uighurs from the XUAR to Kazakhstan. From the 1960s, they continued to be practiced to the present day. Despite the relative success of the newly revived mäshräps, this less educationally oriented version of the ritual remains more widespread in Kazakhstan among Uighurs to this day.
9. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, 2nd edition (London: Verso, 1991), p 6.
10. The first of these states, the Ili Sultanate, was established after a Muslim rebellion in the area of Kuldja was successful against the Chinese in 1861. However, fearing that this Islamic Sultanate would spread into Russian territory, the Russian empire moved into the area and deposed the state, occupying it for ten years only to return the region to the Chinese in 1881 [for more on the Ili Sultanate and its aftermath, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), Vol. 2, pp 156-188; N. N. Pantusov, Svedeniia o Kul'dzhinskom Raione za 1871-1877 gody, Sobrannye N. N. Pantusovym (Kazan', 1881)]. The second of these states was established with Soviet help in 1944 when a joint effort by the Turkic-speaking people of the area precipitated a revolt against Chinese rule. The result was the five-year long Eastern Turkestan Republic which, while supported by the Soviets, was dissolved once Communist victory in the rest of China was assured and the leaders of the republic were reported dead in a plane crash en route to conduct negotiations with Mao Zedong. While the dissolution of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is shrouded in mystery, most Uighurs with good reason believe that the peaceful unification of the independent state with the People's Republic of China was orchestrated jointly at high levels in the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties [for more on the Eastern Turkestan Republic, see: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Zunun Taipov, Borba za Svobodu (Moskva, 1974)]
11. The first of these states, the Ili Sultanate, was established after a Muslim rebellion in the area of Kuldja was successful against the Chinese in 1861. However, fearing that this Islamic Sultanate would spread into Russian territory, the Russian empire moved into the area and deposed the state, occupying it for ten years only to return the region to the Chinese in 1881 [for more on the Ili Sultanate and its aftermath, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), Vol. 2, pp 156-188; N. N. Pantusov, Svedeniia o Kul'dzhinskom Raione za 1871-1877 gody, Sobrannye N. N. Pantusovym (Kazan', 1881)]. The second of these states was established with Soviet help in 1944 when a joint effort by the Turkic-speaking people of the area precipitated a revolt against Chinese rule. The result was the five-year long Eastern Turkestan Republic which, while supported by the Soviets, was dissolved once Communist victory in the rest of China was assured and the leaders of the republic were reported dead in a plane crash en route to conduct negotiations with Mao Zedong. While the dissolution of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is shrouded in mystery, most Uighurs with good reason believe that the peaceful unification of the independent state with the People's Republic of China was orchestrated jointly at high levels in the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties [for more on the Eastern Turkestan Republic, see: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Zunun Taipov, Borba za Svobodu (Moskva, 1974)]
12. The first of these states, the Ili Sultanate, was established after a Muslim rebellion in the area of Kuldja was successful against the Chinese in 1861. However, fearing that this Islamic Sultanate would spread into Russian territory, the Russian empire moved into the area and deposed the state, occupying it for ten years only to return the region to the Chinese in 1881 [for more on the Ili Sultanate and its aftermath, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), Vol. 2, pp 156-188; N. N. Pantusov, Svedeniia o Kul'dzhinskom Raione za 1871-1877 gody, Sobrannye N. N. Pantusovym (Kazan', 1881)]. The second of these states was established with Soviet help in 1944 when a joint effort by the Turkic-speaking people of the area precipitated a revolt against Chinese rule. The result was the five-year long Eastern Turkestan Republic which, while supported by the Soviets, was dissolved once Communist victory in the rest of China was assured and the leaders of the republic were reported dead in a plane crash en route to conduct negotiations with Mao Zedong. While the dissolution of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is shrouded in mystery, most Uighurs with good reason believe that the peaceful unification of the independent state with the People's Republic of China was orchestrated jointly at high levels in the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties [for more on the Eastern Turkestan Republic, see: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Zunun Taipov, Borba za Svobodu (Moskva, 1974)]
13. The first of these states, the Ili Sultanate, was established after a Muslim rebellion in the area of Kuldja was successful against the Chinese in 1861. However, fearing that this Islamic Sultanate would spread into Russian territory, the Russian empire moved into the area and deposed the state, occupying it for ten years only to return the region to the Chinese in 1881 [for more on the Ili Sultanate and its aftermath, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), Vol. 2, pp 156-188; N. N. Pantusov, Svedeniia o Kul'dzhinskom Raione za 1871-1877 gody, Sobrannye N. N. Pantusovym (Kazan', 1881)]. The second of these states was established with Soviet help in 1944 when a joint effort by the Turkic-speaking people of the area precipitated a revolt against Chinese rule. The result was the five-year long Eastern Turkestan Republic which, while supported by the Soviets, was dissolved once Communist victory in the rest of China was assured and the leaders of the republic were reported dead in a plane crash en route to conduct negotiations with Mao Zedong. While the dissolution of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is shrouded in mystery, most Uighurs with good reason believe that the peaceful unification of the independent state with the People's Republic of China was orchestrated jointly at high levels in the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties [for more on the Eastern Turkestan Republic, see: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Zunun Taipov, Borba za Svobodu (Moskva, 1974)]
14. The first of these states, the Ili Sultanate, was established after a Muslim rebellion in the area of Kuldja was successful against the Chinese in 1861. However, fearing that this Islamic Sultanate would spread into Russian territory, the Russian empire moved into the area and deposed the state, occupying it for ten years only to return the region to the Chinese in 1881 [for more on the Ili Sultanate and its aftermath, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), Vol. 2, pp 156-188; N. N. Pantusov, Svedeniia o Kul'dzhinskom Raione za 1871-1877 gody, Sobrannye N. N. Pantusovym (Kazan', 1881)]. The second of these states was established with Soviet help in 1944 when a joint effort by the Turkic-speaking people of the area precipitated a revolt against Chinese rule. The result was the five-year long Eastern Turkestan Republic which, while supported by the Soviets, was dissolved once Communist victory in the rest of China was assured and the leaders of the republic were reported dead in a plane crash en route to conduct negotiations with Mao Zedong. While the dissolution of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is shrouded in mystery, most Uighurs with good reason believe that the peaceful unification of the independent state with the People's Republic of China was orchestrated jointly at high levels in the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties [for more on the Eastern Turkestan Republic, see: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Zunun Taipov, Borba za Svobodu (Moskva, 1974)]
15. The first of these states, the Ili Sultanate, was established after a Muslim rebellion in the area of Kuldja was successful against the Chinese in 1861. However, fearing that this Islamic Sultanate would spread into Russian territory, the Russian empire moved into the area and deposed the state, occupying it for ten years only to return the region to the Chinese in 1881 [for more on the Ili Sultanate and its aftermath, see: Immanuel Hsu, The Ili Crisis: A Study of Sino-Russian Diplomacy (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); Eugene Schuyler, Turkistan: Notes of a Journey in Russian Turkistan, Khokand, Bukhara, and Kuldja (New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co., 1876), Vol. 2, pp 156-188; N. N. Pantusov, Svedeniia o Kul'dzhinskom Raione za 1871-1877 gody, Sobrannye N. N. Pantusovym (Kazan', 1881)]. The second of these states was established with Soviet help in 1944 when a joint effort by the Turkic-speaking people of the area precipitated a revolt against Chinese rule. The result was the five-year long Eastern Turkestan Republic which, while supported by the Soviets, was dissolved once Communist victory in the rest of China was assured and the leaders of the republic were reported dead in a plane crash en route to conduct negotiations with Mao Zedong. While the dissolution of the Eastern Turkestan Republic is shrouded in mystery, most Uighurs with good reason believe that the peaceful unification of the independent state with the People's Republic of China was orchestrated jointly at high levels in the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties [for more on the Eastern Turkestan Republic, see: Linda Benson, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944-1949 (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1990); Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911-1949 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Zunun Taipov, Borba za Svobodu (Moskva, 1974)]
16. By looking exclusively at the Uighurs of the Ili valley, I do not intend to suggest that this community reflects a population which is historically bound to this region. In fact, among virtually all age groups, there are many Uighurs in the Ili valley who grew up in other oases within the XUAR. Thus, it is the actual borderlands region which makes the negotiation of national culture there distinct rather than the content of the valley's population. In a recent book, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Justin Jon Rudelson has suggested that the Ili Uighurs and other regional groups within the XUAR form distinct cultural groups that have developed in isolation. Rudelson argues that these regional cultural groups are becoming increasingly differentiated by the opening up of border areas in the XUAR to the outside world. However, I have found the opposite tendency to be taking place as the trade opportunities in the borderlands of the XUAR attract more and more Uighurs from throughout the region, making the borderlands a lightning rod for the negotiation and reconciliation of various cultural differences. However, embedded in Rudelson's argument is the important point, also made by the St Petersburg ethnographer Ludmilla Chvyr', that various regions within the XUAR have long had more cultural relations with regions outside of China rather than with China proper, an assertion which supports the concept of the Ili valley as a borderlands [see L. A. Chyvr', Uigury Vostochnogo Turkestana Sosednie Narody v Kontse XIX- Nachale XX v., Moskva: 'Nauka', 1990).
17. By looking exclusively at the Uighurs of the Ili valley, I do not intend to suggest that this community reflects a population which is historically bound to this region. In fact, among virtually all age groups, there are many Uighurs in the Ili valley who grew up in other oases within the XUAR. Thus, it is the actual borderlands region which makes the negotiation of national culture there distinct rather than the content of the valley's population. In a recent book, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), Justin Jon Rudelson has suggested that the Ili Uighurs and other regional groups within the XUAR form distinct cultural groups that have developed in isolation. Rudelson argues that these regional cultural groups are becoming increasingly differentiated by the opening up of border areas in the XUAR to the outside world. However, I have found the opposite tendency to be taking place as the trade opportunities in the borderlands of the XUAR attract more and more Uighurs from throughout the region, making the borderlands a lightning rod for the negotiation and reconciliation of various cultural differences. However, embedded in Rudelson's argument is the important point, also made by the St Petersburg ethnographer Ludmilla Chvyr', that various regions within the XUAR have long had more cultural relations with regions outside of China rather than with China proper, an assertion which supports the concept of the Ili valley as a borderlands [see L. A. Chyvr', Uigury Vostochnogo Turkestana Sosednie Narody v Kontse XIX- Nachale XX v., Moskva: 'Nauka', 1990).
18. Aside from the transnational cultural influences which have entered the Ili valley along with its opening up to a world capitalist market, the Uighurs remain a marked minority within this borderlands. According to the last official available data on the population of both the XUAR (1993 Chinese census) and Kazakhstan (1989 Soviet census), the Uighurs represented about 15 per cent of the 4,713,886 people living in the Ili valley (689,042). Of these Uighurs, 175,053 lived on the territory of what is today the Almaty oblast' of Kazakhstan (total population of the oblast' 2,814,847), and 513,989 lived in the Ili Viliyat of the XUAR (total population of the viliyat 1,899,039). These figures were compiled from 1994 Shinjang Yilnamisi, (Shinjang Khälq Näshriyati, 1995), p 98 and Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia-1989 g., Tom II, Goskomstat Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1992, pp 34, 114, 144.
19. Aside from the transnational cultural influences which have entered the Ili valley along with its opening up to a world capitalist market, the Uighurs remain a marked minority within this borderlands. According to the last official available data on the population of both the XUAR (1993 Chinese census) and Kazakhstan (1989 Soviet census), the Uighurs represented about 15 per cent of the 4,713,886 people living in the Ili valley (689,042). Of these Uighurs, 175,053 lived on the territory of what is today the Almaty oblast' of Kazakhstan (total population of the oblast' 2,814,847), and 513,989 lived in the Ili Viliyat of the XUAR (total population of the viliyat 1,899,039). These figures were compiled from 1994 Shinjang Yilnamisi, (Shinjang Khälq Näshriyati, 1995), p 98 and Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Perepisi Naseleniia-1989 g., Tom II, Goskomstat Respubliki Kazakhstan, 1992, pp 34, 114, 144.
20. For various articulations of today's emergently transnational world, cf. Ulf Hannerz, 'Notes on the global ecumene,' Public Culture, Vol. 1, No. 2, 66-75 (spring 1989); Arjun Appadurai, 'Global ethnoscapes: Notes and queries for a transnational anthropology', pp 191-210 in Richard Fox, ed, Recapturing Anthropology (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 1991); Robert Foster, 'Making national cultures in the global ecumene', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 20, pp 235-260 (1991); and Linda Basch, Nina Click Shiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 1994).
21. For various articulations of today's emergently transnational world, cf. Ulf Hannerz, 'Notes on the global ecumene,' Public Culture, Vol. 1, No. 2, 66-75 (spring 1989); Arjun Appadurai, 'Global ethnoscapes: Notes and queries for a transnational anthropology', pp 191-210 in Richard Fox, ed, Recapturing Anthropology (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 1991); Robert Foster, 'Making national cultures in the global ecumene', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 20, pp 235-260 (1991); and Linda Basch, Nina Click Shiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 1994).
22. For various articulations of today's emergently transnational world, cf. Ulf Hannerz, 'Notes on the global ecumene,' Public Culture, Vol. 1, No. 2, 66-75 (spring 1989); Arjun Appadurai, 'Global ethnoscapes: Notes and queries for a transnational anthropology', pp 191-210 in Richard Fox, ed, Recapturing Anthropology (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 1991); Robert Foster, 'Making national cultures in the global ecumene', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 20, pp 235-260 (1991); and Linda Basch, Nina Click Shiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 1994).
23. For various articulations of today's emergently transnational world, cf. Ulf Hannerz, 'Notes on the global ecumene,' Public Culture, Vol. 1, No. 2, 66-75 (spring 1989); Arjun Appadurai, 'Global ethnoscapes: Notes and queries for a transnational anthropology', pp 191-210 in Richard Fox, ed, Recapturing Anthropology (Santa Fe, NM: SAR Press, 1991); Robert Foster, 'Making national cultures in the global ecumene', Annual Review of Anthropology, Vol. 20, pp 235-260 (1991); and Linda Basch, Nina Click Shiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach, 1994).
24. Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p 189.
25. I have discussed this issue and its history at length elsewhere. See Scan R. Roberts, Waiting for Uighurstan: A Companion Study Guide for the Video Documentary, 1996 and 'The Uighurs of the Kazakstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation'. Nationalities Papers. In press.
26. I have discussed this issue and its history at length elsewhere. See Scan R. Roberts, Waiting for Uighurstan: A Companion Study Guide for the Video Documentary, 1996 and 'The Uighurs of the Kazakstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation'. Nationalities Papers. In press.
27. The degree to which Uighurs believe in the ancient origins of their people is evident in the incredible popularity of the pop-historical book Uighurlar by Uighur writer Turghun Almas (Üriimchi: Shinjang Yashlar Näshriyati, 1990; Almuta: 'Kazakhstan', 1992). This book, which claims that the Uighurs' history dates back 6,000 years, was banned by the Chinese state shortly after it appeared in bookstores in the XUAR. As a result, the book has gained almost mythical status in the XUAR. In 1992, a Uighur trader in Kazakhstan sponsored the transliteration of it into Cyrillic and later its translation into Russian. Since 1992, the version circulating in Kazakhstan has become an important book in the general education of Uighur children and college students. Furthermore, the sponsor of its publication in Kazakhstan, who himself is very religious and has been on the pilgrimage to Mecca, has told me that this is the second most important book to the Uighurs after the Koran. As he states, 'one must read the Koran to be a Muslim, and one must read Uighurlar to be a Uighur'.
28. The degree to which Uighurs believe in the ancient origins of their people is evident in the incredible popularity of the pop-historical book Uighurlar by Uighur writer Turghun Almas (Üriimchi: Shinjang Yashlar Näshriyati, 1990; Almuta: 'Kazakhstan', 1992). This book, which claims that the Uighurs' history dates back 6,000 years, was banned by the Chinese state shortly after it appeared in bookstores in the XUAR. As a result, the book has gained almost mythical status in the XUAR. In 1992, a Uighur trader in Kazakhstan sponsored the transliteration of it into Cyrillic and later its translation into Russian. Since 1992, the version circulating in Kazakhstan has become an important book in the general education of Uighur children and college students. Furthermore, the sponsor of its publication in Kazakhstan, who himself is very religious and has been on the pilgrimage to Mecca, has told me that this is the second most important book to the Uighurs after the Koran. As he states, 'one must read the Koran to be a Muslim, and one must read Uighurlar to be a Uighur'.
29. In ethnographic notes from his stay in Kashgar from 1858-59, Chokan Valikhanov merely notes the 'mäshräp' as a 'Kashgar party' where all guests danced [see Chokan Valikhanov: Izbrannye proizvedeniia, (Alma-Ata: Akademiia Nauk KazSSR,1958; p 503)], P. Skrine, refers to the 'ottuz oghul' (thirty men-the members of a 'mäshräp') as the patriarchs of the Kashgar neighbourhoods who make the decisions regarding the price of the brideswealth and the terms of the nika at marriages he observed in Kashgar in the 1920s [see C. P. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, Boston (1926, p 96)]. I would like to thank Dil'nara Qasymova for bringing Valikhanov's citation to my attention and Bill Clark for alerting me to the reference in Skrine's work.
30. In ethnographic notes from his stay in Kashgar from 1858-59, Chokan Valikhanov merely notes the 'mäshräp' as a 'Kashgar party' where all guests danced [see Chokan Valikhanov: Izbrannye proizvedeniia, (Alma-Ata: Akademiia Nauk KazSSR,1958; p 503)], P. Skrine, refers to the 'ottuz oghul' (thirty men-the members of a 'mäshräp') as the patriarchs of the Kashgar neighbourhoods who make the decisions regarding the price of the brideswealth and the terms of the nika at marriages he observed in Kashgar in the 1920s [see C. P. Skrine, Chinese Central Asia, Boston (1926, p 96)]. I would like to thank Dil'nara Qasymova for bringing Valikhanov's citation to my attention and Bill Clark for alerting me to the reference in Skrine's work.
31. According to older Uighur men 1 have interviewed, the mäshräp has been extensively practised in the XUAR as long as they can remember. Furthermore, Uighur newspapers from the 1920s describe the ritual as at that time, 'having long been practised by Uighurs' (see, for example, G. Rozykulof, 'mäshräplar Bashlanmaqda', Kämbäghällär Avazi, December 4, 1923 (No. 14) and Sheripay Ughli, 'mäshräp Yashliri', Kämbäghällär Avazi, 1 January 1925). While this information does not substantiate the ancient origins of the mäshräp often evoked by Uighurs, it does suggest that the ritual has been an integral part of local Uighur cultural practices for most of this century.
32. According to older Uighur men 1 have interviewed, the mäshräp has been extensively practised in the XUAR as long as they can remember. Furthermore, Uighur newspapers from the 1920s describe the ritual as at that time, 'having long been practised by Uighurs' (see, for example, G. Rozykulof, 'mäshräplar Bashlanmaqda', Kämbäghällär Avazi, December 4, 1923 (No. 14) and Sheripay Ughli, 'mäshräp Yashliri', Kämbäghällär Avazi, 1 January 1925). While this information does not substantiate the ancient origins of the mäshräp often evoked by Uighurs, it does suggest that the ritual has been an integral part of local Uighur cultural practices for most of this century.
33. For more on the general efforts of Uighurs to recover their past in terms of the reinterpretation of Uighur history in the XUAR, see Rudelson, Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along China's Silk Road, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp 143-165.
34. Most of this literature also discusses other regional mäshräp forms which were practised outside of the Ili valley, but usually the Ili mäshripi is given central attention. Other types of mäshräps described in the literature include the keyit mäshripi and the kok mäshripi [see Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, (Ürümchi: Shinjang Yashlar-Ösmürlar Näshriyati, 1996) pp 144-147] as well as the dolan mäshripi [see Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Elnografiyisi, (Ürümchi: Shinjang Khälq Näshriyati, 1993) pp 448-449]
35. Most of this literature also discusses other regional mäshräp forms which were practised outside of the Ili valley, but usually the Ili mäshripi is given central attention. Other types of mäshräps described in the literature include the keyit mäshripi and the kok mäshripi [see Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, (Ürümchi: Shinjang Yashlar-Ösmürlar Näshriyati, 1996) pp 144-147] as well as the dolan mäshripi [see Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Elnografiyisi, (Ürümchi: Shinjang Khälq Näshriyati, 1993) pp 448-449]
36. . 21. Interestingly, after the Soviet revolution, a group of Uighur communists began a campaign to advocate the mäshräp as a means for propagating Marxist ideology among the Uighurs of Kazakhstan (see, for example, G. Rozykulof, 'mäshräplar Bashlanmaqda', Kämbäghällär Avazi, 4 December 1923 (No. 14) and Sheripay Ughli, 'mäshräp Yashliri', Kämbäghällär Avazi, 1 January 1925). While this campaign enjoyed some success, it was later criticized by the Communist Party, and a campaign against the mäshräp was waged along with the general repression of the early Uighur communist leaders.
37. . 21. Interestingly, after the Soviet revolution, a group of Uighur communists began a campaign to advocate the mäshräp as a means for propagating Marxist ideology among the Uighurs of Kazakhstan (see, for example, G. Rozykulof, 'mäshräplar Bashlanmaqda', Kämbäghällär Avazi, 4 December 1923 (No. 14) and Sheripay Ughli, 'mäshräp Yashliri', Kämbäghällär Avazi, 1 January 1925). While this campaign enjoyed some success, it was later criticized by the Communist Party, and a campaign against the mäshräp was waged along with the general repression of the early Uighur communist leaders.
38. For a more detailed examination of the migration of Uighurs from the XUAR to Kazakhstan in the 1950s and 1960s, see Scan R. Roberts, Waiting for Uighurstan: A Companion Study Guide for the Video Documentary, 1996 and The Uighurs of the Kazakstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation'. Nationalities Papers. In press.
39. For a more detailed examination of the migration of Uighurs from the XUAR to Kazakhstan in the 1950s and 1960s, see Scan R. Roberts, Waiting for Uighurstan: A Companion Study Guide for the Video Documentary, 1996 and The Uighurs of the Kazakstan Borderlands: Migration and the Nation'. Nationalities Papers. In press.
40. This name does not suggest that a mäshräp should always consist of 30 men. Rather, whatever the number of participants, the group is known as ottuz oghul [see Mäsimzhan Zulfikar, Khälq Pedagogikisi vä Milliy Dästurlirimiz, (Almaty, 1993) p 47],
41. and the group is usually limited to no more than 30 men [see Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996 (p 141)].
42. For two similar accounts of a young Uighur man's acceptance into a mäshräp, compare Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, [1994, Vol. 3, pp 15-35] pp 21-22, and Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, pp 141-142.
43. For two similar accounts of a young Uighur man's acceptance into a mäshräp, compare Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, [1994, Vol. 3, pp 15-35] pp 21-22, and Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, pp 141-142.
44. Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 141.
45. Compare Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 141, Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 20-21, and Mäsimzhan Zulfikar, Khälq Pedagogikisi vä Milliy Dästurlirimiz, 1993, p 47 for different descriptions of the various roles of the members of the Ili mäshripi.
46. Compare Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 141, Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 20-21, and Mäsimzhan Zulfikar, Khälq Pedagogikisi vä Milliy Dästurlirimiz, 1993, p 47 for different descriptions of the various roles of the members of the Ili mäshripi.
47. Compare Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 141, Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 20-21, and Mäsimzhan Zulfikar, Khälq Pedagogikisi vä Milliy Dästurlirimiz, 1993, p 47 for different descriptions of the various roles of the members of the Ili mäshripi.
48. See Iliyar Omär, 'Ili Yashlar Mäshripining Gullinishi vä Uning Pajiälik Täghdiri Häqqidä', Yengi Hayat, 9 May 1997, p 6 (originally published in Birlik, No. 1, 1996).
49. See especially Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 31-33.
50. See Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 31-33; Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Etnografiyisi, 1993, pp 450-459; and Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 143-144.
51. See Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 31-33; Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Etnografiyisi, 1993, pp 450-459; and Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 143-144.
52. See Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, pp 31-33; Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Etnografiyisi, 1993, pp 450-459; and Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 143-144.
53. Mehray Abdilim, 'Ili Mäshräpliri Häqqidä', Miras, 1994, p 26.
54. Uyghur Örp-Adätliri, 1996, p 143-144.
55. This important aspect of how mäshräps contribute to local social structure is evident in Uighur mähälläs in Kazakhstan where the neighbourhood organizer, like the organizer of a mäshräp, is called the zhigit beshi. While the zhigit beshis of Uighur communities in Kazakhstan are not necessarily the leaders of an actual mäshräp, this would be the ideal way of selecting them if every male in a community actually belonged to a group of ottuz oghul representing their respective age group. However, it should be mentioned that the institution of the community zhigit beshi was revived by most Uighurs in Kazakhstan in the 1980s, not in connection with the recent revival of the ritual, but as part of the partial renewal of mäshräps in the 1960s by new Uighur immigrants from the XUAR.
56. In his articulation of the 'production of locality', Arjun Appadurai has made the point that all rites of passage can be viewed as taking part in the 'creation of local subjects' who, in turn, inherit the role of maintaining the communities of which they are a part. See Appadurai, Modernity at Large, 1996, p 178.
57. Sec Dru C. Gladney, 'Transnational Islam and Uighur national identity: Salman Rushdie, Sino-Muslim missile deals, and the Trans-Eurasian Railway', Central Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 3, 1-21 (1992).
58. Orville Schell, To Get Rich is Glorious: China in the 1980s (New York: Mentor Books, 1984).
59. Iliyar Ornär, 'Ili Yashlar Mäshripining Gullinishi vä Uning Pajiälik Täghdiri Häqqidä', Yengi Hayat, 1997, p 6.
60. This outline of these mäshräps' structure is from: Iliyar Ornar, 'Ili Yashlar Mäshripining Gullinishi vä Uning Pajiälik Täghdiri Häqqidä', Yengi Havat, 1997, p 6. See Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Etnografiylsi, 1993, p 453-454 for more on the game of gülchay.
61. This outline of these mäshräps' structure is from: Iliyar Ornar, 'Ili Yashlar Mäshripining Gullinishi vä Uning Pajiälik Täghdiri Häqqidä', Yengi Havat, 1997, p 6. See Abdurähim Häbibulla, Uyghur Etnografiylsi, 1993, p 453-454 for more on the game of gülchay.
62. Iliyar Ornar, 'Ili Yashlar Mäshripining Gullinishi vä Uning Pajiälik Täghdiri Häqqidä' Yengi Hayat, 1997, p 6.
63. See ibid for a more detailed description of these events.
64. For arguments positing that Sufism played the role of a 'parallel Islam' in the Soviet Union, see: Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Official Islam and the Sufi Brotherhoods in the Soviet Union Today', pp 95-106 in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds, Islam and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979).
65. For arguments positing that Sufism played the role of a 'parallel Islam' in the Soviet Union, see: Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Official Islam and the Sufi Brotherhoods in the Soviet Union Today', pp 95-106 in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds, Islam and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979).
66. For arguments positing that Sufism played the role of a 'parallel Islam' in the Soviet Union, see: Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Official Islam and the Sufi Brotherhoods in the Soviet Union Today', pp 95-106 in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds, Islam and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979).
67. For arguments positing that Sufism played the role of a 'parallel Islam' in the Soviet Union, see: Alexandre Bennigsen and S. Enders Wimbush, Mystics and Commissars: Sufism in the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Alexandre Bennigsen, 'Official Islam and the Sufi Brotherhoods in the Soviet Union Today', pp 95-106 in Alexander S. Cudsi and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, eds, Islam and Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Michael Rywkin, Moscow's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1979).
68. This is an important debate in Kazakhstan and Xinjiang where Uighurs see the category of Muslim as not only demarcating religion, but as a sign of identity which is akin to race as well. While national differences remain important among the Muslim peoples of Central Asia, they themselves often prefer to identify, regardless of their personal religiosity, as Muslim vis-à-vis Slavs and Chinese respectively. In this respect, many of the Uighurs who have converted to Christianity in Central Asia prefer to call themselves Aisa Musulmanliri, or 'Jesus Muslims', than to identify as Christian which may be seen as similar to the Russians.
69. O. Dyadyuchenko and A. Otorbayeva, 'Jihad: Victims and Hostages' (Vecherniy Bishkek, 1 May 1998) (translated by Abdulrahim Aitbayev in World Uighur Network News, 11 May 1998).
70. O. Dyadyuchenko and A. Otorbayeva, 'Jihad: Victims and Hostages' (Vecherniy Bishkek, 1 May 1998) (translated by Abdulrahim Aitbayev in World Uighur Network News, 11 May 1998).