How electoral systems matter for democratization

Democratization

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 68-91

  Taagepera, Rein ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIZATION; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL SYSTEM;

EID: 0032412037     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349808403573     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) and 'Congruence Theory Explained', in Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffmann and William M. Reisinger (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Rein Taagepera, 'The Tailor of Marrakesh: Western Electoral System Advice to Emerging Democracies', in Jørgen Elklit (ed.), Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies: Experiences and Suggestions (Copenhagen: Danida, 1997), pp.49-62.
2. Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) and 'Congruence Theory Explained', in Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffmann and William M. Reisinger (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Rein Taagepera, 'The Tailor of Marrakesh: Western Electoral System Advice to Emerging Democracies', in Jørgen Elklit (ed.), Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies: Experiences and Suggestions (Copenhagen: Danida, 1997), pp.49-62.
3. Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966) and 'Congruence Theory Explained', in Harry Eckstein, Frederic J. Fleron, Erik P. Hoffmann and William M. Reisinger (eds.), Can Democracy Take Root in Post-Soviet Russia? (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Rein Taagepera, 'The Tailor of Marrakesh: Western Electoral System Advice to Emerging Democracies', in Jørgen Elklit (ed.), Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies: Experiences and Suggestions (Copenhagen: Danida, 1997), pp.49-62.
4. On these aspects, see Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American States (Chicago, IL: Dorsey, 1988).
5. On these aspects, see Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American States (Chicago, IL: Dorsey, 1988).
6. On these aspects, see Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American States (Chicago, IL: Dorsey, 1988).
7. On these aspects, see Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995); George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money, Bicameralism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Malcolm E. Jewell and David M. Olson, Political Parties and Elections in American States (Chicago, IL: Dorsey, 1988).
8. 1 is the largest share, was proposed by Juan Molinar, 'Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index', American Political Science Review, Vol.85 (1991), pp.1383-91.
9. 1 is the largest share, was proposed by Juan Molinar, 'Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index', American Political Science Review, Vol.85 (1991), pp.1383-91.
10. 1 is the largest share, was proposed by Juan Molinar, 'Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index', American Political Science Review, Vol.85 (1991), pp.1383-91.
11. 1 is the largest share, was proposed by Juan Molinar, 'Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index', American Political Science Review, Vol.85 (1991), pp.1383-91.
12. 1 is the largest share, was proposed by Juan Molinar, 'Counting the Number of Parties: An Alternative Index', American Political Science Review, Vol.85 (1991), pp.1383-91.
13. Long used in demography, D was introduced into electoral studies by John Loosemore and Victor J. Hanby, 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.1, No.4 (1971), pp.467-77. Gh was introduced, as 'least-squares index', by Michael Gallagher, 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', Electoral Systems, Vol.10, No.1 (1991), pp.33-51. It was already the preferred index in Lijphart, Electoral Systems. The analogue of D has been used for volatility at least since A. Przeworski, 'Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization a Source of Decay?' American Political Science Review, Vol.69 (1975), pp.49-67. However, Gh may well be preferable for volatility too, for the same reasons as illustrated in examples A and B.
14. Long used in demography, D was introduced into electoral studies by John Loosemore and Victor J. Hanby, 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.1, No.4 (1971), pp.467-77. Gh was introduced, as 'least-squares index', by Michael Gallagher, 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', Electoral Systems, Vol.10, No.1 (1991), pp.33-51. It was already the preferred index in Lijphart, Electoral Systems. The analogue of D has been used for volatility at least since A. Przeworski, 'Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization a Source of Decay?' American Political Science Review, Vol.69 (1975), pp.49-67. However, Gh may well be preferable for volatility too, for the same reasons as illustrated in examples A and B.
15. Long used in demography, D was introduced into electoral studies by John Loosemore and Victor J. Hanby, 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.1, No.4 (1971), pp.467-77. Gh was introduced, as 'least-squares index', by Michael Gallagher, 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', Electoral Systems, Vol.10, No.1 (1991), pp.33-51. It was already the preferred index in Lijphart, Electoral Systems. The analogue of D has been used for volatility at least since A. Przeworski, 'Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization a Source of Decay?' American Political Science Review, Vol.69 (1975), pp.49-67. However, Gh may well be preferable for volatility too, for the same reasons as illustrated in examples A and B.
16. Long used in demography, D was introduced into electoral studies by John Loosemore and Victor J. Hanby, 'The Theoretical Limits of Maximum Distortion', British Journal of Political Science, Vol.1, No.4 (1971), pp.467-77. Gh was introduced, as 'least-squares index', by Michael Gallagher, 'Proportionality, Disproportionality and Electoral Systems', Electoral Systems, Vol.10, No.1 (1991), pp.33-51. It was already the preferred index in Lijphart, Electoral Systems. The analogue of D has been used for volatility at least since A. Przeworski, 'Institutionalization of Voting Patterns, or Is Mobilization a Source of Decay?' American Political Science Review, Vol.69 (1975), pp.49-67. However, Gh may well be preferable for volatility too, for the same reasons as illustrated in examples A and B.
17. .5.
18. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), pp.60-66. A very different strategy-oriented approach is used by Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
19. Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), pp.60-66. A very different strategy-oriented approach is used by Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
20. L correspondency, without abolishing it.
21. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
22. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
23. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
24. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
25. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
26. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
27. Effective magnitude was proposed as the unifying measure by Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989). Lijphart, Electoral Systems , preferred effective threshold. The two are approximately convertible into each other, but one must exert caution not to confuse the district-level and nationwide indicators; see Rein Taagepera, 'Effective Magnitude and Effective Threshold', Electoral Studies , forthcoming. These overarching indicators need further refinement, in view of the enormous variety of detail in electoral rules. Relatively recent overviews and discussions of specific aspects include Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (eds.), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Arend Lijphart and Bernard Grofman (eds.), Choosing an Electoral System: Issues and Alternatives (New York: Praeger, 1984); Dieter Nohlen, Elections and Electoral Systems (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 1996); Richard S. Katz, A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).
28. An illustrative graph of N vs. M, using various allocation rules, is given by Rein Taagepera and Edgar Kaskla, 'Effect of District Magnitude on the Number of Parties: A Quasi-Experiment', unpublished ; reproduced in Taagepera and Shugart, op. cit., p.265.
29. An illustrative graph of N vs. M, using various allocation rules, is given by Rein Taagepera and Edgar Kaskla, 'Effect of District Magnitude on the Number of Parties: A Quasi-Experiment', unpublished ; reproduced in Taagepera and Shugart, op. cit., p.265.
30. Cox, op. cit., pp.203-21; Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox, 'Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties', American Journal of Political Studies, Vol.41, No.1 (1997), pp.149-74; Lijphart, Democracies, pp.127-49.
31. Cox, op. cit., pp.203-21; Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox, 'Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties', American Journal of Political Studies, Vol.41, No.1 (1997), pp.149-74; Lijphart, Democracies, pp.127-49.
32. Cox, op. cit., pp.203-21; Octavio Amorim Neto and Gary W. Cox, 'Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties', American Journal of Political Studies, Vol.41, No.1 (1997), pp.149-74; Lijphart, Democracies, pp.127-49.
33. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
34. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
35. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
36. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
37. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
38. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
39. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
40. 1/3. See Rein Taagepera, 'The Size of National Assemblies', Social Science Research, Vol.1 (1972), pp.385-401, and Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, pp.173-83. The difficulty of defining parties in the Chilean context has been addressed by Shugart and Carey, p.220; Peter Siavelis, 'Continuity and Change in the Chilean Party System', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.6 (1997), pp.651-74; and Peter Siavelis, 'Executive-Legislative Relations in Post-Pinochet Chile: A Preliminary Assessment', in Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart (eds.), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.321-62. Siavelis maintains that Chile's traditional multi-party constellation has re-emerged despite the two-seat districts, but he also recognizes that at most two blocs can hope to receive significant seat shares, so that the system's operational characteristics 'more closely approximate a single-member system precisely because the magnitude is so low' (p.358).
41. Cox, op. cit., especially pp.13-33; Lijphart, Electoral Systems, pp.78-94. For previous discussion of Duverger's rule, see in particular three articles in Grofman and Lijphart: William H. Riker, 'Duverger's Law Revisited', pp.19-42; Giovanni Sartori, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Methods?' pp.43-68; and Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', pp.69-84.
42. Cox, op. cit., especially pp.13-33; Lijphart, Electoral Systems, pp.78-94. For previous discussion of Duverger's rule, see in particular three articles in Grofman and Lijphart: William H. Riker, 'Duverger's Law Revisited', pp.19-42; Giovanni Sartori, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Methods?' pp.43-68; and Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', pp.69-84.
43. Cox, op. cit., especially pp.13-33; Lijphart, Electoral Systems, pp.78-94. For previous discussion of Duverger's rule, see in particular three articles in Grofman and Lijphart: William H. Riker, 'Duverger's Law Revisited', pp.19-42; Giovanni Sartori, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Methods?' pp.43-68; and Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', pp.69-84.
44. Cox, op. cit., especially pp.13-33; Lijphart, Electoral Systems, pp.78-94. For previous discussion of Duverger's rule, see in particular three articles in Grofman and Lijphart: William H. Riker, 'Duverger's Law Revisited', pp.19-42; Giovanni Sartori, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Methods?' pp.43-68; and Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', pp.69-84.
45. Cox, op. cit., especially pp.13-33; Lijphart, Electoral Systems, pp.78-94. For previous discussion of Duverger's rule, see in particular three articles in Grofman and Lijphart: William H. Riker, 'Duverger's Law Revisited', pp.19-42; Giovanni Sartori, 'The Influence of Electoral Systems: Faulty Laws or Faulty Methods?' pp.43-68; and Maurice Duverger, 'Duverger's Law: Forty Years Later', pp.69-84.
46. Lijphart, Democracies, p. 148; Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems - Parties Minus Issues Equals One', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.13 (1985), pp.341-52; Rein Taagepera, 'The Number of Parties as Function of Heterogeneity and Electoral System', Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming; Amorim Neto and Cox, op. cit.
47. Lijphart, Democracies, p. 148; Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems -Parties Minus Issues Equals One', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.13 (1985), pp.341-52; Rein Taagepera, 'The Number of Parties as Function of Heterogeneity and Electoral System', Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming; Amorim Neto and Cox, op. cit.
48. Lijphart, Democracies, p. 148; Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems - Parties Minus Issues Equals One', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.13 (1985), pp.341-52; Rein Taagepera, 'The Number of Parties as Function of Heterogeneity and Electoral System', Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming; Amorim Neto and Cox, op. cit.
49. Lijphart, Democracies, p. 148; Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, 'Rethinking Duverger's Law: Predicting the Effective Number of Parties in Plurality and PR Systems - Parties Minus Issues Equals One', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.13 (1985), pp.341-52; Rein Taagepera, 'The Number of Parties as Function of Heterogeneity and Electoral System', Comparative Political Studies, forthcoming; Amorim Neto and Cox, op. cit.
50. Lijphart, Electoral Systems, p. 108; Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, p.141.
51. Lijphart, Electoral Systems, p. 108; Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, p.141.
52. Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman (eds.), Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994); Richard E. Matland and Michelle M. Taylor, 'Electoral Systems Effects on Women's Representation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.2 (1997), pp. 186-210.
53. Wilma Rule and Joseph F. Zimmerman (eds.), Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1994); Richard E. Matland and Michelle M. Taylor, 'Electoral Systems Effects on Women's Representation: Theoretical Arguments and Evidence from Costa Rica', Comparative Political Studies, Vol.30, No.2 (1997), pp. 186-210.
54. Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes, p. 100.
55. The actual testing is difficult. On the one hand, the election results immediately preceding and following the change in rules are affected by the learning process. On the other, if one takes into consideration elections much before and after the change, many other factors also may have shifted. Still, effects in the expected direction can be observed. See Matthew S. Shugart, 'Electoral Reform in Systems of Proportional Representation', European Journal of Political Research, Vol.21 (1992), pp.207-24.
56. Nigel S. Roberts, '"A Period of Enhanced Surprise, Disappointment, and Frustration"? The Introduction of a New Electoral System in New Zealand', in Jørgen Elklit (ed.), Electoral Systems for Emerging Democracies: Experiences and Suggestions (Copenhagen: Danida, 1997), pp.63-74.
57. Andrew Reynolds and Ben Reilly, The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design (Stockholm: International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance, 1997).
58. Reynolds and Reilly, op. cit., p. 119.
59. 3/16 is 1.26. The actual value is 1.30.
60. See Krzystof Jasiewicz and Andrzej Tymowski, 'Poland's New Political Landscape', ACE Analysis of Current Events, Vol.10, No.1 (1998), pp.6-10. For a typical view sceptical of Duverger, barely one month prior to the Polish September 1997 elections, see Katarzyna Stanclik, 'Electoral Law and the Formation of Political Party Systems in the New Eastern European Democracies', Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28-31 Aug. 1997.
61. See Krzystof Jasiewicz and Andrzej Tymowski, 'Poland's New Political Landscape', ACE Analysis of Current Events, Vol.10, No.1 (1998), pp.6-10. For a typical view sceptical of Duverger, barely one month prior to the Polish September 1997 elections, see Katarzyna Stanclik, 'Electoral Law and the Formation of Political Party Systems in the New Eastern European Democracies', Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, 28-31 Aug. 1997.
62. Reynolds and Reilly, p.125.
63. W.J.M. Mackenzie, 'The Export of Electoral Systems', Political Studies. Vol.5, No.3 (1957), pp.240-57; Harry Eckstein, 'The Impact of Electoral Systems on Representative Government', in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp.247-54.
64. W.J.M. Mackenzie, 'The Export of Electoral Systems', Political Studies. Vol.5, No.3 (1957), pp.240-57; Harry Eckstein, 'The Impact of Electoral Systems on Representative Government', in Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter (eds.), Comparative Politics: A Reader (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp.247-54.