Intelligence and international relations in the early Cold War

Review of International Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 321-330

  Andrew, Christopher ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032400327     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0260210598003210     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. Christopher Andrew and David Dilks (eds.), The Missing Dimension: Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century (London, 1984), p. 1.
2. Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies (New York, 1981), ch. 1.
3. Eisenhower to Menzies, 12 July 1945, Eisenhower papers 1916 52, box 77, file 'Melo-Men (misc)', Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
4. Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (London and New York, 1995), pp. 199-200, 215-20.
5. I have argued this point in detail in For the President's Eyes Only.
6. Christopher Andrew, Secret Service: The Making of the British Intelligence Community, paperback edn (London, 1986), p. 489.
7. Alex Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Outbreak of the Cold War', MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, 1997; Alex Craig's PhD thesis on the JIC is due for completion in 1999. Other pioneers in the study of the postwar JIC include Richard Aldrich and Peter Hennessy. Apart trom JIC files, some of the most important documents for the early Cold War recently released at the Public Record Office concern scientific intelligence. See J. P. Maddrell, 'British Policy, the Soviet Union and Post-war Germany: The Role and Importance of Scientific Intelligence', MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996; J. P. Maddrell's PhD thesis on scientific intelligence is due for completion in 1998.
8. Alex Craig, 'The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Outbreak of the Cold War', MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, 1997; Alex Craig's PhD thesis on the JIC is due for completion in 1999. Other pioneers in the study of the postwar JIC include Richard Aldrich and Peter Hennessy. Apart trom JIC files, some of the most important documents for the early Cold War recently released at the Public Record Office concern scientific intelligence. See J. P. Maddrell, 'British Policy, the Soviet Union and Post-war Germany: The Role and Importance of Scientific Intelligence', MPhil thesis, University of Cambridge, 1996; J. P. Maddrell's PhD thesis on scientific intelligence is due for completion in 1998.
9. Sir Percy Cradock, In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy under Margaret Thatcher and John Major (London, 1997), esp. ch. 6. At the time of writing, JIC files have been declassified only up to the mid-1950s. The JIC now has its own Website: http://www.open.gov.uk/co/cimrepl.htm
10. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996; In From The Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence (New York, 1996). The author was a member of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force.
11. Preparing for the 21st Century: An Appraisal of U.S. Intelligence, Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, 1 March 1996; In From The Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence (New York, 1996). The author was a member of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force.
12. For examples of recently declassified CIA records, see Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew (eds.), Eternal Vigilance? 50 Years of the CIA (London and Portland, OR, 1997). For details of the latest declassifications by the CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, see its Website: http://www.odci.gov/csi
13. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, KGB: The Inside Story of its Foreign Operations from Lenin to Gorbachev, paperback edn (London, 1991), ch. 9.
14. Because of heavy demand, there is currently a delay of well over a year in granting new applications to work in the Stasi archive, administered by the Gauck Authority.
15. David Childs and Richard Popplewell, The Stasi: The East German Intelligence and Security Service (London, 1996) is the first book in English to draw extensively on Stasi files.
16. Childs and Popplewell, Stasi.
17. Béla Szász, Volunteers for the Gallows (London, 1971).
18. The role of the KGB in each 'normalization', and in the Solidarity crisis in Poland, is analysed in Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB. Since the publication of this volume a series of important, newly declassified documents on these crises, drawn from Soviet and East European archives, have been published in the Cold War International History Project Bulletin.
19. The first Soviet agent to provide warning of Anglo-American plans to build an atomic bomb was John Cairncross, who from 1940 to 1942 was private secretary to Lord Hankey, one of Churchill's ministers. Hankey was chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee and a member of the Tube Alloys Consultative Committee, both of which discussed the bomb. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 272, 321; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT, and London, 1994), pp. 82-3. Cairncross's posthumous, highly unreliable memoirs deny that he provided intelligence on the bomb project. John Cairncross. The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two (London, 1997). Both his former KGB controller, Yuri Modin, and the KGB archives, however, confirm that he did. Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994), pp. 109-10; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels (London, 1998), ch. 10.
20. The first Soviet agent to provide warning of Anglo-American plans to build an atomic bomb was John Cairncross, who from 1940 to 1942 was private secretary to Lord Hankey, one of Churchill's ministers. Hankey was chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee and a member of the Tube Alloys Consultative Committee, both of which discussed the bomb. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 272, 321; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT, and London, 1994), pp. 82-3. Cairncross's posthumous, highly unreliable memoirs deny that he provided intelligence on the bomb project. John Cairncross. The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two (London, 1997). Both his former KGB controller, Yuri Modin, and the KGB archives, however, confirm that he did. Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994), pp. 109-10; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels (London, 1998), ch. 10.
21. The first Soviet agent to provide warning of Anglo-American plans to build an atomic bomb was John Cairncross, who from 1940 to 1942 was private secretary to Lord Hankey, one of Churchill's ministers. Hankey was chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee and a member of the Tube Alloys Consultative Committee, both of which discussed the bomb. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 272, 321; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT, and London, 1994), pp. 82-3. Cairncross's posthumous, highly unreliable memoirs deny that he provided intelligence on the bomb project. John Cairncross. The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two (London, 1997). Both his former KGB controller, Yuri Modin, and the KGB archives, however, confirm that he did. Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994), pp. 109-10; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels (London, 1998), ch. 10.
22. The first Soviet agent to provide warning of Anglo-American plans to build an atomic bomb was John Cairncross, who from 1940 to 1942 was private secretary to Lord Hankey, one of Churchill's ministers. Hankey was chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee and a member of the Tube Alloys Consultative Committee, both of which discussed the bomb. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 272, 321; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT, and London, 1994), pp. 82-3. Cairncross's posthumous, highly unreliable memoirs deny that he provided intelligence on the bomb project. John Cairncross. The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two (London, 1997). Both his former KGB controller, Yuri Modin, and the KGB archives, however, confirm that he did. Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994), pp. 109-10; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels (London, 1998), ch. 10.
23. The first Soviet agent to provide warning of Anglo-American plans to build an atomic bomb was John Cairncross, who from 1940 to 1942 was private secretary to Lord Hankey, one of Churchill's ministers. Hankey was chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee and a member of the Tube Alloys Consultative Committee, both of which discussed the bomb. Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 272, 321; David Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (New Haven, CT, and London, 1994), pp. 82-3. Cairncross's posthumous, highly unreliable memoirs deny that he provided intelligence on the bomb project. John Cairncross. The Enigma Spy: The Story of the Man Who Changed the Course of World War Two (London, 1997). Both his former KGB controller, Yuri Modin, and the KGB archives, however, confirm that he did. Yuri Modin, My Five Cambridge Friends (London, 1994), pp. 109-10; Nigel West and Oleg Tsarev, The Crown Jewels (London, 1998), ch. 10.
24. The best account of the building of the Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs is Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. For examples of KGB and other Soviet documents on the nuclear programme declassified during the 1990s, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 4 (1994); and Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster (London, 1994), appendices 2-4.
25. The best account of the building of the Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs is Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. For examples of KGB and other Soviet documents on the nuclear programme declassified during the 1990s, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 4 (1994); and Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster (London, 1994), appendices 2-4.
26. The best account of the building of the Soviet atomic and hydrogen bombs is Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb. For examples of KGB and other Soviet documents on the nuclear programme declassified during the 1990s, see Cold War International History Project Bulletin, 4 (1994); and Pavel and Anatoli Sudoplatov, Special Tasks: The Memoirs of an Unwanted Witness - A Soviet Spymaster (London, 1994), appendices 2-4.
27. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, chs. 7-10; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 383-6.
28. Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, chs. 7-10; Andrew and Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 383-6.
29. Anatoli Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York, 1995), pp. 209, 513.
30. Though no KGB documents on Operation RYAN have been officially declassified, a number were removed by Oleg Gordievsky from the files of the KGB London residency. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (London, 1991), ch. 4. (US edn: Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanford, CA, 1993).)
31. Though no KGB documents on Operation RYAN have been officially declassified, a number were removed by Oleg Gordievsky from the files of the KGB London residency. Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (London, 1991), ch. 4. (US edn: Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985 (Stanford, CA, 1993).)
32. Dobrynin, however, was informed about RYAN by the KGB resident in Washington. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 522. The East German foreign intelligence chief, Markus Wolf, concluded that the Kremlin 'had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack', and regarded RYAN as 'a burdensome waste of time'. Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Memoirs of a Spymaster (London, 1997), p. 222.
33. Dobrynin, however, was informed about RYAN by the KGB resident in Washington. Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 522. The East German foreign intelligence chief, Markus Wolf, concluded that the Kremlin 'had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack', and regarded RYAN as 'a burdensome waste of time'. Markus Wolf, Man without a Face: The Memoirs of a Spymaster (London, 1997), p. 222.
34. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, chs. 6, 7.
35. Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1991), pp. 281-2. For other examples of the contribution made by HUMINT to photographic interpretation, see Dino A. Brugioni, 'The Unidentifieds', in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.), Inside CIA's Private World (NeW Haven, CT, and London, 1995).
36. Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York, 1991), pp. 281-2. For other examples of the contribution made by HUMINT to photographic interpretation, see Dino A. Brugioni, 'The Unidentifieds', in H. Bradford Westerfield (ed.), Inside CIA's Private World (NeW Haven, CT, and London, 1995).
37. Mary S. McAuliffe (ed.), CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (Washington, DC, 1992).
38. Christopher Andrew, 'The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance, 1940-1948', in James E. Dillard and Walter T. Hitchcock (eds.), The Intelligence Revolution and Modern Warfare (Chicago, 1996).
39. The VENONA decrypts, together with some explanatory material, are accessible on the NSA Website: http://www.nsa.gov:8080/. Robert Louis Benson and Michael Benson (eds.), VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, DC, 1996), provide a valuable introduction to the VENONA operation and a selection of some of the most significant decrypts.
40. Because the VENONA decrypts represent only a fraction of the total intelligence traffic between Moscow and its wartime residencies in the United States, they are necessarily incapable of corroborating the whole of Chambers' and Bentley's testimony. But there is much in their version of events which VENONA does corroborate and nothing of importance which it contradicts.
41. See, e.g., VENONA, 3rd release, part II, pp. 17-18.
42. VENONA, 3rd release, part III, p. 207. Cf. Eric Breindel, 'Hiss's Guilt', The New Republic, 15 Apr. 1996.
43. VENONA, 3rd release, part III, p. 207. Cf. Eric Breindel, 'Hiss's Guilt', The New Republic, 15 Apr. 1996.
44. See, e.g., VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 157-8; 3rd release, part I, pp. 26-8. At the time of writing, the best study of the American aspects of VENONA is the 1997 Cambridge MPhil in International Relations thesis by Tim Shipman. Several further studies are scheduled for publication during 1998 and 1999.
45. See, e.g., VENONA, 2nd release, pp. 157-8; 3rd release, part I, pp. 26-8. At the time of writing, the best study of the American aspects of VENONA is the 1997 Cambridge MPhil in International Relations thesis by Tim Shipman. Several further studies are scheduled for publication during 1998 and 1999.
46. Robert F. Futrell argues that 'excessive secrecy, particularly concerning signal intelligence (SIGINT) [in Korea] prevented a needful understanding in the military of the role of air intelligence in air warfare'. Robert F. Futrell, 'USAF Intelligence in the Korean War', in James E. Dillard and Walter T. Hitchcock (eds.), The Intelligence Revolution and Modern Warfare (Chicago, 1996), p. 167.
47. Among the most important neglected sources on the role of SIGINT before and during the Korean War is the report of the Brownell Commission, which led in 1952 to the establishment of NSA. George A. Brownell, The Origin and Development of the National Security Agency (Laguna Hills, CA, 1981).
48. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only, pp. 106-21, 185-7.
49. Ibid., pp. 187-94.
50. Selwyn Jones to E. M. Jones, 20 Sept. 1956, PRO, AIR 20/10621. On the role of intelligence in the Suez Crisis, see W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the United States and the Suez Crisis (London, 1991).