The political economy of fiscal consolidations

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 367-394

  Perotti, Roberto ^a  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032397274     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00107     Document Type: Article

References (74)

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