Restrictions on innovation: An eu antitrust approach

Antitrust Law Journal

Volumn 66, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 455-484

  Dolmans, Maurits ^a  

^a Brussels ^*  (United States)

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EID: 0032394793     PISSN: 00036056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (110)

1. See generally FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF, ANTICIPATING THE 21ST CENTURY, COMPETITION POLICY IN THE NEW HIGH-TECH, GLOBAL MARKETPLACE (May 1996).
2. Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. II-309.
3. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).
4. Cf. NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 9-11 (1979); see also Speech by Karel Van Miert, now Competition Commissioner, to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Framework and Objectives of EC Competition Policy Speech/93/13 (Feb. 19, 1993).
5. Cf. NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 9-11 (1979); see also Speech by Karel Van Miert, now Competition Commissioner, to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament, Framework and Objectives of EC Competition Policy Speech/93/13 (Feb. 19, 1993).
6. Articles 85 and 86 have "direct effect" and therefore create individual rights that may be invoked before the national courts of the EU Member States. See, e.g., Case 127/73, BRT v. SABAM, 1974 E.C.R. 51, ¶ 16. National courts may to the extent permitted under national law issue orders or injunctions, if damages do not provide the plaintiff with sufficient protection. The remedies granted by the national courts for infringements of arts. 85 and 86 are a matter of national law and must be as effective and no less favorable than those for similar claims under national law. In principle, all national courts recognize a right of damages for harm caused by breach of arts. 85 and 86, but damages have been awarded only in very few cases. This is a result of a number of factors, such as uncertainty about whether a violation has been committed, difficulties in determining the amount of damages, whether or not negligent behavior must be established, as well as uncertainty as to the requirements for standing. The Commission has offered national competition authorities and national courts assistance in EC competition cases. See Commission Notices on cooperation with national courts and competition authorities, 1993 O.J. (C 39) 6; 1997 O.J. (C 313) 3.
7. See, e.g., Commission Regulations 1983/83 and 1984/83 of June 22, 1983, on the application of art. 85(3) to categories of exclusive distribution agreements and exclusive purchasing agreements, 1983 O.J. (L 173) 1 and 1984 O.J. (L 173) 5, both amended by Commission Regulation 1582/97, 1997 O.J. (L 214) 27; Commission Regulation 417/85 of Dec. 19, 1984, on the application of art. 85(3) to categories of specialization agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1, as amended by Commission Regulation 151/93, 1993 O.J. (L 21) 8; and Regulation 2236/97, 1997 O.J. (L 306) 12; Commission Regulation 418/85 of Dec. 19, 1984, on the application of art. 85(3) to categories of research and development agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5, as amended by Commission Regulation 151/93, 1993 O.J. (L 21) 8, and Regulation 2236/97 1997 O.J. (L 306) 12; Commission Regulation 240/96 on the application of art. 85(3) to certain categories of technology transfer agreements, 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2. A restrictive agreement that falls within the terms of one of the block exemptions is enforceable without need for individual notification, unless the Commission withdraws the benefits of the block exemption in that particular case.
8. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission (Vitamins), 1979 E.C.R. 461, 3 C.M.L.R. 211 (1979). For definition of relevant markets under EC law, see Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Markets for the Purposes of Competition Law, 1997 O.J. (C 372) 5.
9. Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon v. Metro, 1971 E.C.R. 487. See also Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995).
10. See Commission Press Release IP/94/509, Shell/Montedison, June 8, 1994 O.J. (L 332) 48, as amended, 1996 O.J. (L 294) 10. One should distinguish between, on the one hand, the concept of "innovation markets" (which has not been referred to in case law as such, although R&D capacity is a factor taken into account to assess present dominance, and cases have considered the impact of restrictive practices and mergers on innovation) and, on the other hand, the definition of "technology markets," which are well established. See, e.g., IBM Undertaking, [1984] 3 C.M.L.R. 147; Digital/Olivetti, 1994 O.J. (L 309) 24; Shell/Montecatini, 1994 O.J. (L 332) 48, as amended, 1996 O.J. (L 294) 10; Upjohn, 1995 O.J. (C 294) 9, Enichem, 1995 O.J. (C 123) 3; Novartis, 1997 O.J. (L 201) 1; Glaxo/ Wellcome, 1995 O.J. (C 65) 3; Carnaud, 1996 O.J. (L 075) 38.
11. B&I Line v. Sealink Harbour, Commission Decision, [1992] 5 C.M.L.R. 255; cf. the very similar test in Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536, 544 (9th Cir. 1991) (a facility controlled by a single firm will be considered "essential" only if control of the facility carries with it the power to eliminate competition in the downstream market).
12. See Case 85/76, Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 461, 541, 3 C.M.L.R. 211 (1979).
13. See Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359, ¶ 81, 5 C.M.L.R. 215 (1993).
14. Case 322/81, Michelin v. Commission, 1983 E.C.R. 3461, 3511, ¶ 57, 1 C.M.L.R. 282 (1985). For a more detailed review, see Romano Subiotto, The Confines of the Special Responsibility of Dominant Undertakings Not to Impair Genuine Undistorted Competition, 18 WORLD COMP., L. & ECON. REV. 3, 5 (Mar. 1995).
15. Until 1989, Commission decisions could be appealed directly to the ECJ. Since 1989, the CFI acts as a court of first review of issues of facts and law, with the ECJ acting as a "Supreme Court," reviewing issues of law only.
16. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
17. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
18. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
19. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
20. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
21. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
22. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
23. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
24. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
25. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
26. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
27. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
28. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
29. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
30. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). On the Magill case and its history and implications, see Rosa Greaves Magill Est Arrivé . . . RTE and ITP v. Commission of the European Communities, 16 EUR COMP. L. REV. 244-47 (1995); Monica Esteve Sanz, The Magill Judgment - Its Consequences for the Software Industry, 11 COMP. L. & PRAC. 67-70 (1995); Tom Skinner, Magill: Consumer Interests Prevail, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Apr. 1995, at 90-99; Christoph v. Einem, National IP-Rights v. EU Competition Law After Ideal-Standard and Magill, Paper Presented for Meeting of the Union Internationale des Avocats (Sept. 6, 1995); Thomas C. Vinje, The Final Word on Magill: The Judgment of the ECJ, 17 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 297-303 (1995); W. Deselaers, Die "Essential Facilities" - Doktrin im Lichte des Magill - Urteils des EugH, EUROPÄISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT, No. 16, 563-68 (1995); H.H. Paul Lugard, ECJ Upholds Magill: It Sounds Nice in Theory, But How Does It Work in Practice?, EUR. BUS. L. REV., Oct. 1995, at 231-34; Ian S. Forrester, Magill "A Famous Victory?", Third Party Access to Intellectual Property Rights, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 35-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1997); Marleen Van Kerckhove, The Advocate General Delivers His Opinion on Magill, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 276-79 (1994); Tom Skinner, The Oral Hearing in the Magill Case, 15 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 103-07 (1994); Clifford G. Miller, Magill: Time to Abandon the "Specific Subject-Matter" Concept, 10 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 415-21 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Intellectual Property Rights After Magill, Speech at the Irish Center for Commercial Studies, University College, Dublin (Apr. 16, 1992); Andreas Reindl, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright Law?, 24 IIC No 1, 60-82 (1993); Romano Subiotto, The Right to Deal with Whom One Pleases Under EEC Competition Law, 6 E.C.L.R. 234 (1992); R.E. Myrick, Will Intellectual Property on Technology Still Be Viable in a Unitary Market?, 14 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 298-304 (1992).
31. Commission Decision (88/501/EEC), July 26, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 272) 27; Case T-51/ 89, Tetra Pak v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. II-309, ¶ 25. The case also establishes that art. 86 does not provide for the possibility of an exemption once an abuse has been found, and that block exemptions do not provide immunity from application of art. 86.
32. Cf. United States v. Johnson and Bayer, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20797 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
33. Tetra Pak, 1990 E.C.R. II, at 337, 357, ¶ 23.
34. Id. at 357-58, ¶¶ 23, 24.
35. Joined Cases C-241/91 & C-242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995). For additional articles discussing the case, see supra note 15.
36. Since Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom, the conduct affected two EU Member States, the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom, thereby facilitating a finding of the requisite effect on trade between Member States.
37. See Commission Decision (89/205/EEC), Dec. 21, 1988, 1989 O.J. (L 78) 43.
38. Case 238/87, Volvo v. Veng, 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 4 C.M.L.R. 122 (1989).
39. The importance of this aspect was confirmed in Ladbroke v. Commission, where the CFI refused the request by Ladbroke (a horse-betting chain) for a compulsory license of video recordings of horse-racing, on the grounds that the racing organizers that withheld the license did not compete with Ladbroke in the betting market and did not discriminate against Ladbroke; and that Ladbroke did not plan to develop a "new service," but already was present as a strong player in the betting market. Case T-504/93, Ladbroke v. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 309 (1997).
40. Cf. id. (CFI concluded that since there was no downstream foreclosure in the betting market, the Commission correctly refused a betting chain's request for compulsory license of video recordings of horse races). The issue of downstream foreclosure allegedly also played a role in the 1994 Microsoft case, but was not addressed in the 1994 Undertaking (discussed below).
41. Undertaking of July 15, 1994; see Commission Press Release IP/94/653, July 17, 1994.
42. It was suggested that Microsoft has privileged access to development and interoperability information on MS-DOS and, in addition, reserved the use of certain undocumented functions within MS-DOS for its own applications software. This practice allegedly gave Microsoft an advantage in the development and marketing of applications and other software running on Covered Products. Independent software developers argued that advance access to this information was essential for them to adapt their products on a timely basis to new developments in MS-DOS and to be placed on an equal footing with Microsoft's application software group. They took the view that, pursuant to the "essential facility" doctrine under EU and U.S. antitrust law, Microsoft should provide independent software vendors with the same information at the same time as it provides to its own applications development group.
43. See Page, Microsoft: A Case Study in International Competitiveness, High Technology, and the Future of Antitrust Law, in 47 FED. COMMUNICATIONS L.J. 99 (1994).
44. See, e.g., Spartan Grain & Mill v. Ayers, 581 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1978); Betaseed v. U & I Inc., 681 F.2d 1203 (9th Cir. 1982) (coercive reciprocal dealing should be analyzed on the same basis as tie-ins).
45. Other difficult questions are standing, remedies, the burden of proof, and (in Europe for a private plaintiff) discovery. A licensor would probably be able to annul exclusivity of a license or terminate the license altogether if the licensed technology is not exploited, both under arts. 85 and 86, as well as (probably more important in practice) contract or tort law, allowing the licensor the freedom to grant licenses to third parties. A defendant in an IPR infringement action might raise the defense that the IPR is not exploited, and that enforcement leading to foreclosure in those circumstances would be an abuse. In patent cases, compulsory license provisions in patent law may apply. In mergers and joint ventures, conditions may be imposed to ensure that technology that the parties plan to abandon in their rationalization efforts would be either licensed or sold off. See, e.g., Shell/ Montecatini, 1994 O.J. (L 332) 48, as amended, 1996 O.J. (L 294) 10 (Montedison's PP technology to be kept outside JV, with sufficient resources for R&D and marketing - although this condition was later abandoned when Shell agreed with the FTC to sell off its interests in the PP technology); Glaxo/Wellcome, 25TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 142 (1995) (third party granted a license to overlapping product that the newly formed firm might otherwise abandon); Ciba/Geigy/Sandoz - Novartis, Commission Decision (97/469/EEC), July 17, 1996, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1 (newly formed firm requested to grant non-exclusive licenses); Crown Cork-Carnaud-Metal Box, 1996 O.J. (L 75) 38 (one of the merging parties undertook to sell state-of-the art factories through a trustee to reduce technology barriers for third parties).
46. Although note that, as a matter of fact, in Magill the program owners had dealt with publishers before (both in Britain and abroad).
47. In the United States, this could fall under § 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (acquisition of assets which may cause substantial lessening of competition), as well as § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (monopolization attempt).
48. Cf. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432-33, clarified, 324 U.S. 570 (1945).
49. Software houses may announce new versions of their products before they are ready, to discourage customers from buying a competitor's product, and keep postponing the announced introduction date until their own product is ready. Such pre-announced software is called "vaporware."
50. See, e.g., David B. Yoffie, Competing in the Age of Digital Convergence, 38 CAL. MGMT. REV., June 22, 1996, at 31.
51. Sealink, Commission Decision (94/19/EEC), Dec. 21, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8 ("A dominant company may improve its service, but if that improvement will necessarily harm its competitor, then its own commercial interests are not enough...").
52. Aer Lingus, Commission Decision, 1992 O.J. (L 96) 34 (a refusal to interline that hinders the maintenance or development of competition cannot be justified by the "wish to avoid helping a competitor" even if it results in a loss of revenue).
53. See Michael Kende (INSEAD), Profitability Under an Open Venus a Closed System (Jan. 1996). Nevertheless, the Commission recently investigated the licensing practices of Sega, see Commission Press Release IP/97/757, Aug. 14, 1997; and Nintendo, see Commission Press Release IP/97/676, July 22, 1997 (accepting undertakings liberalizing the license agreements while maintaining certain quality control safeguards).
54. See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong, 980 F.2d 171, 205-06 (3d Cir. 1992) (plaintiff must show threatened or actual monopoly in the leveraged market); Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
55. See, e.g., Berkey Photo v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979) (a firm violates § 2 by using monopoly power in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another market); Viacom v. Time, 785 F. Supp. 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Kerasotes Michigan Theaters v. National Amusement, 854 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1988).
56. See Case T-504/93, Ladbroke v. Commission, 5 C.M.L.R. 309 (1997); Joined Cases C-241 & 242/91, RTE and ITP v. Commission (Magill), 1995 E.C.R. I-743, 4 C.M.L.R. 718 (1995); Case 238/87, Volvo v. Veng, 1988 E.C.R. 6211, 4 C.M.L.R. 122 (1989).
57. This is the view of the Commission. For aftermarkets, see IBM Undertaking (EC Bull. 10-1984, point 3.4.1.); Digital Undertaking, 19 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 108-15 (1998).
58. London-European/Sabena, Commission Decision (88/589 EEC), Nov. 24, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 317) 47 (airline cannot refuse access to computerized reservation system to competitor with a view to forcing the competitor to abandon competition on a route, if other competitors are given access to the system). Cf. Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
59. Aer Lingus, Commission Decision, 1992 O.J. (L 96) 34 (a refusal to interline that hinders the maintenance or development of competition cannot be justified by the "wish to avoid helping a competitor" even if it results in a loss of revenue).
60. Sealink, Commission Decision (94/19/EEC), Dec. 21, 1993, 1994 O.J. (L 15) 8: A dominant undertaking which both owns and controls and itself uses an essential facility, i.e., a facility or infrastructure without access to which competitors cannot provide services to their customers, and which refuses its competitors access to that facility or grants access to competitors only on terms less favorable than those which it gives its own services, thereby placing the competitors at a competitive disadvantage, infringes Article 86.
61. Joined Cases 6/73 & 7/73, Commercial Solvents v. Commission, 1974 E.C.R. I-223, 258: [A] n undertaking which has a dominant position in the market in raw materials and which, with the object of reserving such raw materials for manufacturing its own derivatives, refuses to supply a customer, which is itself a manufacturer of these derivatives, and therefore risks eliminating all competition on the part of this customer, is abusing its dominant position....
62. Case 311/84, Telemarketing v. Cie Luxembourgeoise de Telediffusion, 1985 E.C.R. 3261: [A] n abuse within the meaning of Article 86 is committed where, without objective necessity, an undertaking holding a dominant position on particular market reserves to itself ... an ancillary activity which might be carried out by another undertaking as part of its activities on a neighboring but separate market, with the possibility of eliminating all competition from such undertaking.
63. Hugin, Commission Decision, 1978 O.J. (L 22/23) 31; see also Case 22/78, Hugin v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 1869, 1912, 3 C.M.L.R. 345 (1979).
64. See Commission Regulation 418/85, on the application of art. 85(3) of the Treaty to categories of research and development agreements, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 5, as amended by Commission Regulation 151/93, 1993 O.J. (L 21) 8. The Regulation expires by the end of the year 2000. See Commission Regulation 2236/97, 1997 O.J. (L 306) 12.
65. See, e.g., BBC Brown Boveri, Commission Decision (88/541/EEC), Oct. 11, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 301) 68, 4 C.M.L.R. 610 (1989); KSB/Goulds/Lowara/ITT, Commission Decision (91/38/EEC), Dec. 12, 1990, 1991 O.J. (L 19) 25; IBM-Philips Semiconductors, 1995 O.J. (C 117) 7.
66. See Commission Notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint ventures pursuant to art. 85 of the Treaty, Feb. 16, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2-14.
67. Commission Decision (87/100/EEC), Dec. 17, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 41) 31, 4 C.M.L.R. 111 (1988).
68. Commission Decision (90/410/EEC), July 13, 1990, 1990 O.J. (L 209) 15, 4 C.M.L.R. 832 (1991).
69. Commission Notice concerning the assessment of cooperative joint ventures pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty, Feb. 16, 1993 O.J. (C 43) 2. As of March 1, 1998, full-function cooperative joint ventures (i.e., entities under joint control engaged not only in R&D but also in production and marketing on their own behalf) are subject to the merger control rules if they have a Community dimension, July 9, 1997 O.J. (L 180) 1; see also Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures, March 2, 1998 O.J. (C 66) 1.
70. Id. ¶ 59 at 11.
71. Shell/Montecatini, Commission Decision, 1994 O.J. (L 332), as amended, 1996 O.J. (L 294) 10 (Shell agreed with the FTC to spin off its interests in the PP technology, making the EC remedy redundant).
72. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
73. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
74. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
75. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND
76. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
77. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
78. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
79. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
80. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
81. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
82. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
83. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
84. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
85. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
86. EU law relating to vertical agreements is thus fairly well developed and is, therefore, not discussed in further detail. See generally VALENTINE KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COMPETITION RULES (1996); Jean-François Pons, Innovation and Competition: A View from the European Commission, Speech at the Tokyo Symposium (Dec. 1997) ; Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe - Do We Need a Block Exemption?, in THIRD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (1996) at 409-22 (Hugh Hansen ed., 1997); Dolmans & Snelders, supra note *; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, COMP. POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 1-13; Aidan Robertson, Technology Transfer Agreements: An Overview of How Regulation 240/96 Changes the Law, EUR. COMP. L. REV. 157-62 (1996); Ilana Saltzman, The New Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 506-08 (1996); Howard W. Fogt & Ilene Knable Gotts, A Tale of Two Continents: European Technology Transfer Block Exemption Takes Different Approach from US Counterpart Guidelines, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 327-30 (1996); Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Under Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regulation - Procedural Issues, 17 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 331-38 (1996); Valentine Korah, Technology Transfer Regulation Still-Born: Reflections on the Future, 6 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 259-61 (1995); Robin Whaite, The Draft Technology Transfer Block Exemption, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 259-62 (1994); Romano Subiotto, Technology Licensing: The EC and U.S. Rules Compared, Conference Paper on EC technology transfer regulation, IBC Conference (Oct. 13, 1995); Valentine Korah, Distribution and Licensing Agreements in Europe: The Effect of the EEC Rules for Free Movement and Competition on Distribution of Goods and Services in Europe, in SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY, Fordham University School of Law (Hugh Hansen ed., 1996); Jennifer Darbyshire, Computer Programs and Competition Policy: A Block Exemption for Software Licensing?, 16 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 374-85 (1994); T.C. Vinje, Licensing Software in Europe: EC Competition Law Considerations, COMPUTER & TELECOMMS L. REV., 46-58 (1993); James Leavy, Application of Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 17 LICENSING L. & BUS. REP., July/Aug. 1995, at 85-89.
87. See Commission of the European Communities, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints, COM/96/0721, Jan. 22, 1997. The Commission is contemplating adopting a broad block exemption for all distribution agreements (except a few black-listed clauses), subject to a market share ceiling, combined with a notice on agreements above the ceiling, and the possibility to obtain retroactive individual exemptions for cases above the ceiling. This new system would not apply to technology licenses.
88. The Commission recently issued a new notice on de minimis agreements, explaining that it will not apply art. 85(1) to purely vertical agreements between parties with a joint market share of less than 10%, and to horizontal agreements between parties with a joint market share below 5%. It will, however, continue to apply art. 85(1) to certain per se violations (such as price fixing or market sharing). National competition laws are not affected by these EU thresholds. See Commission of the European Communities, Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Fall Within the Meaning of Article 85(1) of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1997 O.J. (C 372), Dec. 9, 1997, at 13.
89. See Commission Regulation 240/96, on the application of art. 85(3) of the Treaty to technology transfer agreements, 1996 O.J. (L 31) 2-13. The Regulation applies to patent and know-how license agreements and also to so-called "mixed" agreements combining patent and know-how licensing. It does not apply to software licenses.
90. Examples are: access to standards (exclusion or collective boycott); spillover collusion (market allocation, horse trading - firm A supporting B's technology for standard B, in consideration of B's support for A's technology for standard A in disregard of quality considerations - and information exchanges concerning strategic planning); and access to the standardization process. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Maurits Dolmans, Standards for Standards, IBC paper 1995, integrated in INTERNATIONAL COMPUTER LAW, supra note *, ch. 4.02. Standards arise from many sources, such as single-firm de facto standards (see IBM, EC Bull. 10-1984, point 3.4.1.; Microsoft, Commission Press Release IP/94/653, July 17, 1994); multi-firm commercial standards (see X-Open, Commission Decision (87/69/EEC), Dec. 16, 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 35) 36; Philips VCR, Commission Decision, Feb. 18, 1978, 1978 O.J. (L 47) 42); formal commercial standards bodies with mixed membership (ETSI IPR Undertaking, 1995 O.J. (C 76) 5, Mar. 28, 1995); government standards prepared by CEN, ISO, Cenelec, IEC, CCITT, and national standards bodies. These activities are subject to art. 90 (to the extent their activities could be undertaken by private enterprise) and could be subject to arts. 5 juncto 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty. Compare, in that connection, Case C-185/91, Reiff, 1993 E.C.R. I-5801, 5 C.M.L.R. 145 (1994); Case C-2/91, Meng, 1993 E.C.R. I-5791; and Case C-245/91, OHRA, 1993 E.C.R. I-5851.
91. See ETSI IPR Undertaking: "an undertaking pursuant to which IPR holders are deprived of their freedom to decide whether or not to grant licenses on their existing and future technology is restrictive of competition: it amounts to a mutual renunciation of gaining competitive advantages thanks to technical efforts and thereby deprives the participants of the incentive to develop new technologies...." (Open letter from the Commission to ETSI, Feb. 1994); see also Commission Communication on Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization, COM 92/445, Oct. 27, 1992, § 5.1.15, and O.J. (C 76), Mar. 28, 1995, at 5.
92. Case 120/78, Cassis de Dijon, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 3 C.M.L.R. 494 (1979).
93. See, e.g., Council Directive (91/263/EEC), 1991 O.J. (L 184), Apr. 29, 1991, Recital 14, on the approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning telecommunications terminal equipment, including the mutual recognition of their conformity. 1991 O.J. (L 128) 1. See also Commission Communication on Intellectual Property Rights and Standardization, COM/92/445 final, Oct. 27, 1992, ¶ 2.2.1 (the Communication). Of these three bodies, ETSI seems to have given rise to most antitrust questions. This is due to its importance as the only EEA-wide organization to develop technical standards for telecommunications equipment and services, and to the fact that its members are not only administrative bodies, but also public network operators, manufacturers, users, and others.
94. Common technical regulations (CTRs) are harmonized standards implementing essential requirements concerning, for instance, electromagnetic compatibility, protection of and interworking with the telecommunications network, or effective use of the radio frequency spectrum. See Council Directive (91/263), supra note 64, art. 6(2). Examples of mandatory standards include the X.21, X.25, and ISDN access requirements.
95. See Council Directive (91/263), arts. 3, 5, & 6 (on the mutual recognition of terminal equipment).
96. See Council Directive (90/387), 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1, amended by Council Directive (97/51), 1997 O.J. (L 295) 23 (on the establishment of the internal market for the telecommunications services through the implementation of open network provision). See also the ONP Reference List of Standards published regularly in connection with ONP.
97. Council Directive (90/531), 1990 O.J. (L 297) 1 (on the procurement procedures of endues operating in the water, energy, transport, and telecommunications sector). See also Council Directive (77/67), as amended by Council Directive (88/295), 1988 O.J. (L 92) 50; Council Directive (71/305), as amended by Council Directive (89/440), 1989 O.J. (L 210) 1.
98. See Guidelines on the Application of EEC Competition Rules in the Telecommunications Sector, 1991 O.J. (C 233) 2, ¶ 49. See also Philips Matsushita D2B, 1991 O.J. (C 220) 2-4 (The Commission indicated that it would exempt a joint venture to develop the D2B standard to ensure interoperability between various audio and video products. It reasoned that while standardization of specifications reduced competition, the interoperability achieved was desirable for competition, Philips was prepared to license third parties, and there was effective competition from competing system); Philips/Matsushita DCC, Dec. 17, 1992 O.J. (C 333) 8-9 (DCC patent owners had set up a patent pool for digital compact cassettes, with Philips having the exclusive right to license third parties under all patents. They agreed to make the license subject to a requirement to incorporate the "serial copying management system" in all DCC equipment. This system, designed to curb home taping, prevents reproduction of copies of copyright-protected digital recordings. The Commission considered that the standardization of specification was caught by art. 85 but exemptible); VVVF, 1969 O.J. (L 168) 22; 1995 O.J. (C 76) 5.
99. By analogy, one can refer to the block exemption regulations for R&D and specialization agreements (Commission Regulation (418/85), 1985 O.J. (L 53), Feb. 22, 1985, at 5; Commission Regulation (417/85), Feb. 22, 1985, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1, as amended by Commission Regulation (93/151), Jan. 29, 1993, 1993 O.J. (L 21) 8-11). These block exemptions are available only for agreements between parties that have 20% or less of the market of the products competing with or to be replaced by the contract products. The objective is to ensure that independent sources of initiative continue to exist.
100. Philips VCR, Commission Decision (78/156/EEC), Dec. 20, 1977, 1978 O.J. (L 47) 42.
101. Id. ¶ 9.
102. Id. ¶ 11.
103. Id. ¶ 23.
104. Id. ¶ 29.
105. Id. ¶ 31.
106. See ETSI Documents ETSI/TA20(94)71 and ETSI/TA20(94)44. No Commission decision was published.
107. ETSI/TA20(94)71, at 2-3.
108. See ETSI Director's Report on the ETSI dispute resolution proceedings, ETSI/ TA20(94)44, at 11, ¶ 4.8.
109. John Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law - Innovation Markets and High Technology Industries, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 717 (1997).
110. Letter from Dr. Alexander Schaub, Director-General DG-IV (Competition) of the European Commission (Dec. 1, 1997) (unpublished)