The banality of legal reasoning

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 73, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 517-532

  Alexander, Larry ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032380128     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (21)

1. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46-53 (1971).
2. See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing at All? The Intentions of Authorities and the Authority of Intentions, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 357, 381-91 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995).
3. See id. at 385.
4. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321,351-52 (Jan. 1990)(arguing that statutory interpretation is a dynamic process involving the text, history, purpose, and current values).
5. See id.
6. See Larry Alexander, Practical Reason and Statutory Interpretation, 12 LAW & PHIL. 319 (1993).
7. ROBERT E. RODES, JR. & HOWARD POSPESEL, PREMISES AND CONCLUSIONS (1997).
8. RAYMOND N. SMULLYAN, WHAT IS THE NAME OF THIS BOOK? (1978).
9. EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1963).
10. See Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION 279, 299-300 (Andrei Marmor, ed., 1995).
11. See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 28-34 (1989).
12. I introduced the acronym in Larry Alexander, Bad Beginnings, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 57 (1996).
13. See Scott Brewer, Exemplary Reasoning: Semantics, Pragmatics, and the Rational Force of Legal Argument by Analogy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 923, 962-65 (1996).
14. See id. at 939, 1023.
15. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
16. See Alexander & Kress, supra note 10, at 299-300; Alexander, supra note 11, at 15; Larry Alexander, Striking Back At the Empire: A Brief Survey of Problems in Dworkin's Theory of Law, 6 LAW & PHIL. 419, 433 (1987).
17. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-50 (1986) (explaining the process that judges use to discover immanent legal principles); RONALD DWORKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-39 (1977) (arguing that judges use principles, not just rules, to decide cases).
18. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-50 (1986) (explaining the process that judges use to discover immanent legal principles); RONALD DWORKN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 22-39 (1977) (arguing that judges use principles, not just rules, to decide cases).
19. See Alexander & Kress, supra note 10, at 288 n.47 (arguing that such a counterfactual approach describes the dominant methodology for dealing with precedential constraint).
20. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
21. See Alexander & Kress, supra note 10, at 299-300; Alexander, supra note 12, at 15; Alexander, supra note 16.