The response to terrorism as a threat to liberal democracy

Australian Journal of Politics and History

Volumn 44, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 373-388

  Chalk, Peter ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032374497     PISSN: 00049522     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8497.00027     Document Type: Review

References (86)

1. For the purposes of this paper, terrorism is defined as the systematic use of a particular type of illegitimate violence that is employed by sub-state actors as a means of achieving specific political objectives. It is a psychological tactic that seeks to spread fear-inducing effects in a target group wider than the immediate audience through the actual or feared indiscriminate targeting of non-combatant victims. In so doing, it may be regarded as a means of political communication that aims to influence behaviour through the precipitation of a general state of fear and collapse that is exploited to alter political attitudes in such a way that will be beneficial to the group concerned.
2. Paul Wilkinson, "The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism in a Democratic Society", Terrorism and Political Violence 8, 3 (1996), p. 2.
3. See, for instance, D. Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 56-74, 114.
4. Social contract theories of the state attempt to justify political obligation as an undertaking that is based on an implicit promise to obey the government. State and the citizen, it is argued, have entered into an implicit promise to obey the government. State and the citizen, it is argued, have entered into an agrrement whereby the government has a duty to provide law and order and a right to expect obedience; and where the citizen has a duty to obey the government and a right to expect its protection. Although there are many problems with such an approach - namely that the theory, in purporting to account for all bonds in society, ignores the psychological fact that the individual is by nature a social animal with concomitant dispossessions of association towards his/her fellows - it does reveal certain important truths about the reciprocal quality of obligations and responsibilities between government and citizen in democratic states. For further details see Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 12-16; and Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, pp. 182-89.
5. Social contract theories of the state attempt to justify political obligation as an undertaking that is based on an implicit promise to obey the government. State and the citizen, it is argued, have entered into an implicit promise to obey the government. State and the citizen, it is argued, have entered into an agrrement whereby the government has a duty to provide law and order and a right to expect obedience; and where the citizen has a duty to obey the government and a right to expect its protection. Although there are many problems with such an approach - namely that the theory, in purporting to account for all bonds in society, ignores the psychological fact that the individual is by nature a social animal with concomitant dispossessions of association towards his/her fellows - it does reveal certain important truths about the reciprocal quality of obligations and responsibilities between government and citizen in democratic states. For further details see Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 12-16; and Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, pp. 182-89.
6. Peter Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", Terrorism and Political Violence 7, 4 (1995), p. 13.
7. For further details see Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", in Jene Porter, ed., Classics in Political Philosophy (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), pp. 261-82; David Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1977), pp. 80-83; Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, pp. 8-10; and Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, pp. 77-78.
8. For further details see Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", in Jene Porter, ed., Classics in Political Philosophy (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), pp. 261-82; David Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1977), pp. 80-83; Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, pp. 8-10; and Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, pp. 77-78.
9. For further details see Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", in Jene Porter, ed., Classics in Political Philosophy (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), pp. 261-82; David Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1977), pp. 80-83; Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, pp. 8-10; and Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, pp. 77-78.
10. For further details see Thomas Hobbes, "Leviathan", in Jene Porter, ed., Classics in Political Philosophy (Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989), pp. 261-82; David Apter, Introduction to Political Analysis (Cambridge: Winthrop, 1977), pp. 80-83; Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, pp. 8-10; and Raphael, Problems of Political Philosophy, pp. 77-78.
11. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), pp. 115-16.
12. Ronald Crelinsten and Iffet Ozkut, "Reconceptualising Security Threats in a Post-Cold War, Integrated Europe: Implications for Counterterrorism and Human Rights". Paper presented at the "European Democracies Against Terrorism: Governmental Policies, Societal Responses and Supranational Cooperation in the Face of an Evolving Challenge", International Workshop, Oñati, Spain, 2-3 May 1996, p. 8.
13. For further details see Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996), chapter 1; and Martha Crenshaw, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism", Journal of Conflict Resolution 16, 3 (1972), pp. 383-96.
14. For further details see Peter Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: The Evolving Dynamic (London: Macmillan, 1996), chapter 1; and Martha Crenshaw, "The Concept of Revolutionary Terrorism", Journal of Conflict Resolution 16, 3 (1972), pp. 383-96.
15. Grant Wardlaw, Political Terrorism.: Theory, Tactics and Counter-Measures (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), p. 69.
16. Ronald Crelinsten and Alex Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism: A Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet", Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 4 (1992), pp. 332-33.
17. Chalk, "The Liberal Response to Terrorism", p. 16.
18. See Ronald Creliniten "Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship between the Controller and the Controlled", in Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart, eds, Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989), p. 9.
19. See generally Otto Kirchheimer, Political Justice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).
20. F. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Age (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1976); Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 6).
21. F. Hacker, Crusaders, Criminals, Crazies: Terror and Terrorism in Our Age (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1976); Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 6).
22. Alison Jamieson, "The Italian Experience", in H. Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists: Democratic Responses to Political Violence (New York: Facts on File, 1988), p. 122.
23. Herbert Kampf, "Appeals of Extremism to Youth", Terrorism: An International Journal 4, 1-4 (1980), p. 173. For a detailed account of the factors tha contributed to the rise of the New Left throughout Western Europe during the late 1960s see Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, pp. 31-35; and Benjamin Harrison, "Roots of the Anti-Vietnam War Movement", Studies in Confilct and Terrorism 16, 2 (1993), pp. 99-11.
24. Herbert Kampf, "Appeals of Extremism to Youth", Terrorism: An International Journal 4, 1-4 (1980), p. 173. For a detailed account of the factors tha contributed to the rise of the New Left throughout Western Europe during the late 1960s see Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, pp. 31-35; and Benjamin Harrison, "Roots of the Anti-Vietnam War Movement", Studies in Confilct and Terrorism 16, 2 (1993), pp. 99-11.
25. Herbert Kampf, "Appeals of Extremism to Youth", Terrorism: An International Journal 4, 1-4 (1980), p. 173. For a detailed account of the factors tha contributed to the rise of the New Left throughout Western Europe during the late 1960s see Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, pp. 31-35; and Benjamin Harrison, "Roots of the Anti-Vietnam War Movement", Studies in Confilct and Terrorism 16, 2 (1993), pp. 99-11.
26. Jamieson, "The Italian Experience", p. 123.
27. See Franco Ferraresi, "La destra eversiva", in Franco Ferraresi, ed., La destra radicale (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1984), pp. 58-59.
28. Leonard Weinberg, "Italian Neo-Fascist Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective", Terrorism and Political Violence 7, 1 (1995), p. 232. See also Jamieson, "The Italian Experience", pp. 118-20.
29. Leonard Weinberg, "Italian Neo-Fascist Terrorism: A Comparative Perspective", Terrorism and Political Violence 7, 1 (1995), p. 232. See also Jamieson, "The Italian Experience", pp. 118-20.
30. See, for instance, Donna della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism: The Italian Case", Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 4 (1992), p. 155.
31. S. Rodata, "La risposta dello stato al terrorismo: gli apparati", in G. Pasquino, ed., La prova delle armi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984), p. 83. In total, the attacks at Piazza Fontana, Piazza della Loggia, on the train Italicus and a, the Bologna railway station left 122 people dead with a further 394 injured. See Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 180.
32. S. Rodata, "La risposta dello stato al terrorismo: gli apparati", in G. Pasquino, ed., La prova delle armi (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1984), p. 83. In total, the attacks at Piazza Fontana, Piazza della Loggia, on the train Italicus and a, the Bologna railway station left 122 people dead with a further 394 injured. See Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 180.
33. Weinberg, "Italian Neo-Fascist Terrorism", pp. 233-34. The Salo Republic was a fascist Italian Social state established in the north of Italy under German protection in 1943, with Mussolini as its puppet leader.
34. Ibid., p. 233.
35. della Porta, "Institutional Responses to Terrorism: The Italian Case", pp. 167-68.
36. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 55. See also Edward MoxonBrowne, "Terrorism and the Spanish Stat: The Violent Bid for Basque Autonomy", in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, p. 157; Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-99; and Fernando Jimenez, "Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government Response", Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 4 (1992), p. 112.
37. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 55. See also Edward MoxonBrowne, "Terrorism and the Spanish Stat: The Violent Bid for Basque Autonomy", in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, p. 157; Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-99; and Fernando Jimenez, "Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government Response", Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 4 (1992), p. 112.
38. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 55. See also Edward MoxonBrowne, "Terrorism and the Spanish Stat: The Violent Bid for Basque Autonomy", in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, p. 157; Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-99; and Fernando Jimenez, "Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government Response", Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 4 (1992), p. 112.
39. Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 55. See also Edward MoxonBrowne, "Terrorism and the Spanish Stat: The Violent Bid for Basque Autonomy", in Tucker, ed., Combating the Terrorists, p. 157; Richard Clutterbuck, Terrorism, Drugs and Crime in Europe After 1992 (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 95-99; and Fernando Jimenez, "Spain: The Terrorist Challenge and the Government Response", Terrorism and Political Violence 4, 4 (1992), p. 112.
40. Moxon-Browne, "Terrorism and the Spanish State", pp. 164-65.
41. Fernando Reinares, "The Political Conditioning of Collective Violence: Democratisation and Insurgent Terrorism in Spain". Paper presented before the "European Democracies Against Terrorism: Government Policies, Societal Responses and Supranational Cooperation in the Face of an Evolving Challenge", International Workshop, Oñati, Spain, 2-3 May 1996, p. 32.
42. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
43. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
44. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
45. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
46. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
47. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
48. See "Spain: Government Accused of Organising GAL", Statwatch 5, 1 (1995); "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5, 4 (1995); "SPAIN: Gal Investigation Goes to Court", Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); "SPAIN: The GAL Affair: General Held", Statewatch 6, 3 (1996); "Paris Linked to Spanish Hit Squads", Australian, 4 October 1995; "Spanish PM Faces Death Squad Probe", Australian, 20 October 1995; and "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish", Australian, 26 January 1996.
49. "Spain: The GAL Case", Statewatch 5,4 (1995); "Death Squad Mire Alienates Spanish".
50. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 24. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 43; Frank Gregory, "Policing the Democratic State. How Much Force?" Conflict Studies 194 (1986), p. 1; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 90; and Crelinsten and Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism", pp. 334-35.
51. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 24. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 43; Frank Gregory, "Policing the Democratic State. How Much Force?" Conflict Studies 194 (1986), p. 1; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 90; and Crelinsten and Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism", pp. 334-35.
52. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 24. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 43; Frank Gregory, "Policing the Democratic State. How Much Force?" Conflict Studies 194 (1986), p. 1; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 90; and Crelinsten and Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism", pp. 334-35.
53. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 24. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 43; Frank Gregory, "Policing the Democratic State. How Much Force?" Conflict Studies 194 (1986), p. 1; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 90; and Crelinsten and Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism", pp. 334-35.
54. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 24. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 43; Frank Gregory, "Policing the Democratic State. How Much Force?" Conflict Studies 194 (1986), p. 1; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 90; and Crelinsten and Schmid, "Western Responses to Terrorism", pp. 334-35.
55. Santiago González, "Have We Learned from Our Spanish Experience?" Paper presented befor the "European democracies Against Terrorism: Government Policies, Societal Responses and Supranational Cooperation in the face of an Evolving Challenge", International Workshop, Oñati, Spain, 2-3 May 1996, p. 11.
56. Catherine Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democray: The Case of Peru" [http://www.is.rhodes.edu/modus_vivendi/cizart.html], 1 July 1997, pp. 2-3.]
57. Pinkerton's Risk Assessment Services (hereafter referred to as PRAS), Annual Risk Assessment, 1990-1992 (Virginia: Pinkerton's, 1991-1993).
58. Control Risks Group (hereafter referred to as CRG), Business Security Outlook: The World in 1993 (London: Control Risks Information Services, 1993), p. 102; Europa Yearbook, Volume II (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 2541; and Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", pp. 4-5.
59. Control Risks Group (hereafter referred to as CRG), Business Security Outlook: The World in 1993 (London: Control Risks Information Services, 1993), p. 102; Europa Yearbook, Volume II (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 2541; and Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", pp. 4-5.
60. Control Risks Group (hereafter referred to as CRG), Business Security Outlook: The World in 1993 (London: Control Risks Information Services, 1993), p. 102; Europa Yearbook, Volume II (London: Europa Publications, 1996), p. 2541; and Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", pp. 4-5.
61. Bill Wedemeyer, "Peru's Emergency Decrees of 1992" [http://www.mcs.cornell.edu/~weeds/LawPages/decrees.html], 15 January 1996.
62. Ibid.
63. For further details see, United Nations Human Rights Committee, "Comments on Peru", [http://www.msc.cornell.edu/~weeds/LawPages/un_hrc_96.html], 1 July 1997.
64. CRG, Business Security Outlook 1996 (London: Control Risks Information Services, 1996), p. 115.
65. Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", pp. 1-6.
66. By the end of 1996, a staggering 500,000 people were believed to have been detained by the Peruvian police on suspicion of being involved with the "aims and objectives of terrorism". See "Confident They Had Defeated Guerrillas, Security Forces Let Guard Down", Vancouver Sun, 21 December 1996.
67. 43 For further details see United Nations Human Rights Committee, "Comments on Peru."
68. Personal correspondence, Mayer Nudell [mnudell@juno.com], Director, Specialized Consulting Services, "Terrorism Reasserts Itself in Peru", 17 March 1997, 70. 13; Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", p. 6 and Philip Mauceri, "State Reform, Coalitions and the Neoliberal Autogolpe in Peru", Latin American Research Review 30, 2 (1995), p. 20.
69. Personal correspondence, Mayer Nudell [mnudell@juno.com], Director, Specialized Consulting Services, "Terrorism Reasserts Itself in Peru", 17 March 1997, 70. 13; Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", p. 6 and Philip Mauceri, "State Reform, Coalitions and the Neoliberal Autogolpe in Peru", Latin American Research Review 30, 2 (1995), p. 20.
70. Personal correspondence, Mayer Nudell [mnudell@juno.com], Director, Specialized Consulting Services, "Terrorism Reasserts Itself in Peru", 17 March 1997, 70. 13; Cozart, "A Persistent but Unconsolidated Democracy: The Case of Peru", p. 6 and Philip Mauceri, "State Reform, Coalitions and the Neoliberal Autogolpe in Peru", Latin American Research Review 30, 2 (1995), p. 20.
71. Quoted in "Fujimori Salvages Flagging Fortunes", Australian, 24 April 1997.
72. See Chalk, West European Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism, p. 162.
73. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 36. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 124.
74. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 36. See also Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 124.
75. Chalk, "The Liberal Democratic Response to Terrorism", p. 36.
76. Ibid. See also G. Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 47; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 70; and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 124.
77. Ibid. See also G. Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 47; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 70; and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 124.
78. Ibid. See also G. Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 47; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 70; and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 124.
79. Ibid. See also G. Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 47; Wardlaw, Political Terrorism, p. 70; and Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State, p. 124.
80. The 1989 Security Service Act was enacted to stem growing public concern over the accountability of the SIS - especially in relation to its activities in Northern Ireland following the "shoot-to-kill" scandal. The 1993 Act aimed to enhance further control over the Service following the 1991 - prompted in part by the release of the Birmingham Six and revelations that the police and intelligence community had deliberately circumvented the rule of law in investigating the bombing of two Birmingham pubs in November 1974. While civil libertarians remain somewhat sceptical of the actual degree of oversight that the 1989 and 1993 acts impose over the SIS, it is generally accepted that the current system of external checks - many of which were initiated by the current head of SIS, Stella Rimmington - has done much to improve the overall legislative and judicial control of the Service. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have argued that there is still need for a more comprehensive system of oversight, particularly in relation to the control of SIS activities such as the use of paid informants/infiltrated agents, undercover operations, mail opening, communication interceptions and the exercise of "bug and burgle" powers of entry under warrant. Concern has also been expressed over the continuing practice of allowing SIS operatives to testify behind screens in court so as to protect their anonymity. For further details see "Military Intelligence and Northern Ireland", Statewatch 2, 5 (1992); "MI5 and Police Carve Out New Roles , Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); and "MI5 and Organised Crime", Statewatch 6, 1 (1996).
81. The 1989 Security Service Act was enacted to stem growing public concern over the accountability of the SIS - especially in relation to its activities in Northern Ireland following the "shoot-to-kill" scandal. The 1993 Act aimed to enhance further control over the Service following the 1991 - prompted in part by the release of the Birmingham Six and revelations that the police and intelligence community had deliberately circumvented the rule of law in investigating the bombing of two Birmingham pubs in November 1974. While civil libertarians remain somewhat sceptical of the actual degree of oversight that the 1989 and 1993 acts impose over the SIS, it is generally accepted that the current system of external checks - many of which were initiated by the current head of SIS, Stella Rimmington - has done much to improve the overall legislative and judicial control of the Service. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have argued that there is still need for a more comprehensive system of oversight, particularly in relation to the control of SIS activities such as the use of paid informants/infiltrated agents, undercover operations, mail opening, communication interceptions and the exercise of "bug and burgle" powers of entry under warrant. Concern has also been expressed over the continuing practice of allowing SIS operatives to testify behind screens in court so as to protect their anonymity. For further details see "Military Intelligence and Northern Ireland", Statewatch 2, 5 (1992); "MI5 and Police Carve Out New Roles , Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); and "MI5 and Organised Crime", Statewatch 6, 1 (1996).
82. The 1989 Security Service Act was enacted to stem growing public concern over the accountability of the SIS - especially in relation to its activities in Northern Ireland following the "shoot-to-kill" scandal. The 1993 Act aimed to enhance further control over the Service following the 1991 - prompted in part by the release of the Birmingham Six and revelations that the police and intelligence community had deliberately circumvented the rule of law in investigating the bombing of two Birmingham pubs in November 1974. While civil libertarians remain somewhat sceptical of the actual degree of oversight that the 1989 and 1993 acts impose over the SIS, it is generally accepted that the current system of external checks - many of which were initiated by the current head of SIS, Stella Rimmington - has done much to improve the overall legislative and judicial control of the Service. Nevertheless, a number of commentators have argued that there is still need for a more comprehensive system of oversight, particularly in relation to the control of SIS activities such as the use of paid informants/infiltrated agents, undercover operations, mail opening, communication interceptions and the exercise of "bug and burgle" powers of entry under warrant. Concern has also been expressed over the continuing practice of allowing SIS operatives to testify behind screens in court so as to protect their anonymity. For further details see "Military Intelligence and Northern Ireland", Statewatch 2, 5 (1992); "MI5 and Police Carve Out New Roles , Statewatch 5, 5 (1995); and "MI5 and Organised Crime", Statewatch 6, 1 (1996).
83. Stella Rimmington, Security and Democracy - Is There a Conflict? (London: BBC Education, 1994), pp. 12-13; "Secret Services Unite Against Crime", Financial Times, 20 November 1993,
84. Stella Rimmington, Security and Democracy - Is There a Conflict? (London: BBC Education, 1994), pp. 12-13; "Secret Services Unite Against Crime", Financial Times, 20 November 1993,
85. and No Taping of Subversives", Statewatch 2, 5 (September-October, 1992).
86. See, for example, Davidson-Smith, Combating Terrorism, p. 231.