Political institutions and Central Bank independence: A cross-country analysis

Public Choice

Volumn 96, Issue 1-2, 1998, Pages 187-204

  Bagheri, Fatholla M ^a   Habibi, Nader ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA   (United States)

^b BILKENT UNIVERSITY   (Turkey)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032372753     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1005055317499     Document Type: Article

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