Constitutionalising Social Rights

Journal of Political Philosophy

Volumn 6, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 263-284

  Fabre, Cécile ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032371879     PISSN: 09638016     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9760.00055     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. Along the lines of Raz's definition of rights: '"X has a right" if and only if X can have rights and, other things being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) under a duty'; Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 166.
2. Two points. First, I do not mean to imply that civil, political and social rights are the only rights that there are. There is now talk of cultural and environmental rights. The reason why I focus on the first three categories is because they are uncontroversial in the egalitarian liberal literature. Second, by constitutionalisation, I mean that rights are enshrined in the constitution and protected by an institution such as the judiciary, by way of judicial review and/or judicial preview, which is the review of the law after it is enacted but before it is implemented.
3. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 110. For arguments to the effect that there are differences between the two sets of rights, see Thomas Nagel, 'Equality', Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), at pp. 114-15; Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973), ch. 8; Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Human rights and foreign assistance programs', Human Rights and U. S. Foreign Policy, ed. Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 29-44. The difference which is usually made in the literature between negative and positive rights is the duty distinction.
4. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 110. For arguments to the effect that there are differences between the two sets of rights, see Thomas Nagel, 'Equality', Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), at pp. 114-15; Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973), ch. 8; Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Human rights and foreign assistance programs', Human Rights and U. S. Foreign Policy, ed. Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 29-44. The difference which is usually made in the literature between negative and positive rights is the duty distinction.
5. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 110. For arguments to the effect that there are differences between the two sets of rights, see Thomas Nagel, 'Equality', Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), at pp. 114-15; Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973), ch. 8; Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Human rights and foreign assistance programs', Human Rights and U. S. Foreign Policy, ed. Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 29-44. The difference which is usually made in the literature between negative and positive rights is the duty distinction.
6. Charles Fried, Right and Wrong (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 110. For arguments to the effect that there are differences between the two sets of rights, see Thomas Nagel, 'Equality', Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), at pp. 114-15; Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973), ch. 8; Hugo Adam Bedau, 'Human rights and foreign assistance programs', Human Rights and U. S. Foreign Policy, ed. Peter G. Brown and Douglas MacLean (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979), pp. 29-44. The difference which is usually made in the literature between negative and positive rights is the duty distinction.