Public sector crowding out of private provision of public goods: The influence of differences in production costs

Public Finance Review

Volumn 26, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 460-479

  Coates, Dennis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND BALTIMORE COUNTY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032371623     PISSN: 10911421     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/109114219802600503     Document Type: Article

References (27)

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