Party, state and political competition in Canada: The cartel model reconsidered

Canadian Journal of Political Science

Volumn 31, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 339-358

  Young, Lisa ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032371578     PISSN: 00084239     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s000842390001982x     Document Type: Article

References (53)

1. Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair, "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 1 (1995), 5.
2. Examples of this include Jane Jenson, "Innovation and Equity: The Impact of Public Funding," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed., Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 113; and Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 209-30.
3. Examples of this include Jane Jenson, "Innovation and Equity: The Impact of Public Funding," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed., Comparative Issues in Party and Election Finance, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 113; and Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1991), 209-30.
4. See, for example, Peter P. Constantinou, "Public Funding of Political Parties, Candidates and Elections in Canada," in F. Leslie Seidle, ed., Issues in Party and Election Finance in Canada, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 236.
5. In fact, some observers argue the reverse - that public funding enhances the capacity of parties to act as agents of political intermediation. See, for example, Jenson, "Innovation and Equity."
6. See, for example, Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 114-16.
7. For a critique of the cartel theory, see Ruud Koole, "Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party," Party Politics 2 (1996), 507-23.
8. Katz and Mair, "Changing Models," 19.
9. Heather MacIvor, "Do Canadian Parties Form a Cartel?" this JOURNAL 29 (1996), 317-34.
10. Ibid., 333.
11. Katz and Mair, "Changing Models," 23-24.
12. It would, however, be incorrect to attribute the stable three-party system over this period solely to electoral laws. As Alan Cairns and others have demonstrated, Canada's single-member plurality electoral system acts as a significant barrier to the entry of new parties. In historical context, we find that the period 1970-1993 was by no means the only era of stability within the Canadian party system. See Alan C. Cairns, "The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965," this JOURNAL 1 (1968), 55-80.
13. See Jenson, "Innovation and Equity."
14. Katz and Mair, "Changing Models," 15.
15. Ibid., 16.
16. While it must be acknowledged that the Barbeau Committee and, 25 years later, the Royal Commission of Electoral Reform and Party Financing comprised partisan appointees, it can nonetheless be argued that both achieved a degree of independence. Certainly, the parties in parliament were not quick to embrace the regulatory regimes recommended by either body.
17. Robin Sears, cited in W. T. Stanbury, Money in Politics: Financing Federal Parties and Candidates in Canada, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 30-31.
18. F. Leslie Seidle, "Canadian Political Finance Regulation and the Democratic Process: Established Rules in a Dynamic System," revised version, paper prepared for the round table on Discontent and Reform in the Mature Democracies, Tokyo, August 1996, 2.
19. Khayyam Z. Paltiel, "Campaign Financing in Canada and Its Reform," in Howard Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls: The General Election of 1974 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), 195.
20. See Stanbury, Money in Politics, 35; and Jenson, "Innovation and Equity," 120-24. During the period between 1960 and 1974, six federal elections were held, four of which resulted in minority governments.
21. See Stanbury, Money in Politics, 35; and Jenson, "Innovation and Equity," 120-24. During the period between 1960 and 1974, six federal elections were held, four of which resulted in minority governments.
22. Jenson, "Innovation and Equity," 124.
23. Ibid., 123.
24. See Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, 305-07.
25. Jenson, "Innovation and Equity," 130.
26. Cited in Stanbury, Money in Politics, 43.
27. See ibid., 41-52.
28. F. Leslie Seidle, "The Election Expenses Act: The House of Commons and the Parties," in John Courtney, ed., The Canadian House of Commons: Essays in Honour of Norman Ward (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1985), 131.
29. Calculated from Report of the Chief Electoral Officer Respecting Election Expenses (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1988).
30. Stanbury, Money in Politics, 452. The Liberals have spent between 85 per cent and 99 per cent of their limit, and the Conservatives have spent between 89 per cent and 100 per cent of their limit.
31. Ibid., 385-86.
32. Ibid., 50-51.
33. Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, 296-302.
34. Ibid., 368-72. In the 1990s parties used a variety of formulas to tax back portions of candidate reimbursements.
35. Increasingly, however, the parties have adopted internal receipting procedures that allow them to benefit from the tax credit for these contests.
36. Seidle, "Canadian Political Finance Regulation," 19-20.
37. Stanbury, Money in Politics, 361-62.
38. Michaud and Laferrière, "Economic Analysis," 372.
39. Stanbury, Money in Politics, 225. There is some dispute over this because of findings that only 45 per cent to 65 per cent of all those eligible to claim the tax credit actually do so.
40. Ibid., 276-80, 546-47.
41. Because Revenue Canada does not disaggregate the value of the political contribution tax credit by party, it was necessary to use the value of the tax credit to all registered parties for this calculation. Therefore, the figures in Table 2 slightly overestimate the three parties' reliance on public funding.
42. Michaud and Laferrière, "Economic Analysis," 376.
43. Katz and Mair, "Changing Models," 19.
44. Ibid., 16-17.
45. Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems, 107-08.
46. Calculated from data in Frank Feigert, Canada Votes 1935-1988 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), 22. Figures from 1993 were not included in the calculation because the 1993 election involved the break-up of the cartel. Had 1993 figures been included, however, the difference between the contemporary period and the pre-cartel era would have been even smaller.
47. Katz and Mair, "Changing Models," 19-20.
48. Reginald Whitaker, The Government Party: Organizing and Financing the Liberal Party of Canada, 1930-1958 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977).
49. David J. Elkins, "Parties as National Institutions: A Comparative Study," in Herman Bakvis, ed., Representation, Integration and Political Parties in Canada, Research Study for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 29.
50. See Elkins, "Parties as National Institutions"; and Whitaker, The Governing Party.
51. See Elkins, "Parties as National Institutions"; and Whitaker, The Governing Party.
52. Both the American and German courts have been active in this regard.
53. Karl-Heinz Nassmacher, "Structure and Impact of Public Subsidies to Political Parties in Europe," in Herbert E. Alexander, ed., Comparative Political Finance in the 1980s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 237.