Hegel on justified disobedience

Political Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 514-535

  Tunick, Mark ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0032368540     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591798026004004     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. This question is distinct from the question, not addressed here, of whether disobedience of a particular unjust law that is part of an otherwise just constitutional system is ever justified.
2. Formulation of principles for right conduct characterizes much contemporary political philosophy, as is apparent by consulting the journals Ethics and Philosophy and Public Affairs and the work of philosophers such as John Rawls, R. M. Hare, Thomas Scanlon, and Joel Feinberg. For a discussion of principled approaches to political theory that emphasizes the ways in which principles are constrained by social practices, norms, and shared understandings, see Mark Tunick, Practices and Principles: Approaches to Ethical and Legal Judgment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
3. Jeremy Bentham, "Fragment on Government," in Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838), chap. 1, sec. 43.
4. George Klosko, "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (summer 1987): 241-59; cf. H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (April 1955): 175-91; and John Rawls, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," in Law and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 9-10.
5. George Klosko, "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (summer 1987): 241-59; cf. H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (April 1955): 175-91; and John Rawls, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," in Law and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 9-10.
6. George Klosko, "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (summer 1987): 241-59; cf. H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (April 1955): 175-91; and John Rawls, "Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play," in Law and Philosophy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1964), 9-10.
7. A.D.M. Walker, "Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17, no. 3 (summer 1988): 192, 205, 207.
8. Harry Beran, "In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority," Ethics 87, no. 3 (April 1977): 261-2 . In some versions, each person must consent, in others the first generation of the political community, in still others the majority. See A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 60. Consent theories also differ about what must be consented to - particular laws? the procedures for passing laws?
9. Harry Beran, "In Defense of the Consent Theory of Political Obligation and Authority," Ethics 87, no. 3 (April 1977): 261-2 . In some versions, each person must consent, in others the first generation of the political community, in still others the majority. See A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 60. Consent theories also differ about what must be consented to - particular laws? the procedures for passing laws?
10. Jeremy Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (winter 1993): 3. See also John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 113-5, 334-7. For criticism of the natural duty theory, see Mark Tunick, "The Scope of Our Natural Duties," forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy.
11. Jeremy Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (winter 1993): 3. See also John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 113-5, 334-7. For criticism of the natural duty theory, see Mark Tunick, "The Scope of Our Natural Duties," forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy.
12. Jeremy Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22, no. 1 (winter 1993): 3. See also John Rawls, Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 113-5, 334-7. For criticism of the natural duty theory, see Mark Tunick, "The Scope of Our Natural Duties," forthcoming in Journal of Social Philosophy.
13. Jeremy Bentham, Book of Fallacies, in Works, ed. Bowring, 392, 398, 459.
14. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). I refer to this work as PR and cite paragraph numbers and, where paragraphs are lengthy, page numbers. "Rem" refers to Remarks, and "Z," to an Addition (Zusatz). I also make reference to lecture notes taken by students of Hegel's course on the philosophy of right. In doing so, I use the following abbreviations: "Rph III": G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); "Rph V": G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831) [Lectures on the Philosophy of Right], 4 vols., ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart-Bad-Canstatt: Friedrich Fromann, 1973), vol. 3; "Rph VI": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4; "Rph VII": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4. When citing from the lecture notes, references are to volume, page, and line when needed.
15. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). I refer to this work as PR and cite paragraph numbers and, where paragraphs are lengthy, page numbers. "Rem" refers to Remarks, and "Z," to an Addition (Zusatz). I also make reference to lecture notes taken by students of Hegel's course on the philosophy of right. In doing so, I use the following abbreviations: "Rph III": G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); "Rph V": G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831) [Lectures on the Philosophy of Right], 4 vols., ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart-Bad-Canstatt: Friedrich Fromann, 1973), vol. 3; "Rph VI": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4; "Rph VII": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4. When citing from the lecture notes, references are to volume, page, and line when needed.
16. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). I refer to this work as PR and cite paragraph numbers and, where paragraphs are lengthy, page numbers. "Rem" refers to Remarks, and "Z," to an Addition (Zusatz). I also make reference to lecture notes taken by students of Hegel's course on the philosophy of right. In doing so, I use the following abbreviations: "Rph III": G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); "Rph V": G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831) [Lectures on the Philosophy of Right], 4 vols., ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart-Bad-Canstatt: Friedrich Fromann, 1973), vol. 3; "Rph VI": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4; "Rph VII": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4. When citing from the lecture notes, references are to volume, page, and line when needed.
17. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). I refer to this work as PR and cite paragraph numbers and, where paragraphs are lengthy, page numbers. "Rem" refers to Remarks, and "Z," to an Addition (Zusatz). I also make reference to lecture notes taken by students of Hegel's course on the philosophy of right. In doing so, I use the following abbreviations: "Rph III": G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); "Rph V": G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831) [Lectures on the Philosophy of Right], 4 vols., ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart-Bad-Canstatt: Friedrich Fromann, 1973), vol. 3; "Rph VI": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4; "Rph VII": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4. When citing from the lecture notes, references are to volume, page, and line when needed.
18. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). I refer to this work as PR and cite paragraph numbers and, where paragraphs are lengthy, page numbers. "Rem" refers to Remarks, and "Z," to an Addition (Zusatz). I also make reference to lecture notes taken by students of Hegel's course on the philosophy of right. In doing so, I use the following abbreviations: "Rph III": G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophie des Rechts: Die Vorlesung von 1819/20, ed. Dieter Henrich (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983); "Rph V": G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie (1818-1831) [Lectures on the Philosophy of Right], 4 vols., ed. Karl-Heinz Ilting (Stuttgart-Bad-Canstatt: Friedrich Fromann, 1973), vol. 3; "Rph VI": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4; "Rph VII": Hegel, Vorlesungen ueber Rechtsphilosophie, vol. 4. When citing from the lecture notes, references are to volume, page, and line when needed.
19. See PR, Preface, pp. 20-1; PR 273 Rem; Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Robert Hartman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 37-8, 58-9.
20. See PR, Preface, pp. 20-1; PR 273 Rem; Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Robert Hartman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 37-8, 58-9.
21. See PR, Preface, pp. 20-1; PR 273 Rem; Hegel, Reason in History, trans. Robert Hartman (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), 37-8, 58-9.
22. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
23. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
24. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
25. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
26. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
27. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
28. See Sean Sayers, "The Actual Is the Rational," in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 147-8; Andrew Arato, "A Reconstruction of Hegel's Theory of Civil Society," Cardozo Law Review 10, no. 5 (1989): 1365; Sidney Hook, "Hegel Rehabilitated?" in Encounter 24 (January 1965): 56; Ossip Flechtheim, Hegels Strafrechtstheorie [Hegel's Theory of Punishment] (Berlin :Duncker und Humblot, 1975), 16, 26, 119; Theodor Adorno, "Kritik," in Die Zeit 26 (27 June 1969); cited in Ernst Topitsch, Die Sozialphilosophie Hegels als Heilslehre und Herrschaflsideologie [Hegel's Social Philosophy as an Ideology of Mastery] (Munich: R. Piper and Co., 1981), 72; Bernard Yack, The Longing for Total Revolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 186-7; and the works cited in section IV.
29. On one view, to say that government or authority is legitimate means simply that one has a prima facie obligation to obey it. "We have not understood what it means to be a member of political society if we suppose that political obligation is something that we might not have had and that therefore needs to be justified" (Thomas Mcpherson, Political Obligation [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967], 64-5; cf. Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent II," American Political Science Review 60 [1966]: 39-52, esp. 39, 48).
30. On one view, to say that government or authority is legitimate means simply that one has a prima facie obligation to obey it. "We have not understood what it means to be a member of political society if we suppose that political obligation is something that we might not have had and that therefore needs to be justified" (Thomas Mcpherson, Political Obligation [London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967], 64-5; cf. Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent II," American Political Science Review 60 [1966]: 39-52, esp. 39, 48).
31. PR 258 Rem, p. 277; Hegel adds that contract and consent are too "abstract."
32. Plamenatz says that consent is the "granting to another the right to act in a certain way." John Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation. 2d ed. (1938; reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 8-9.
33. See Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 192.
34. Hegel, Philosophy of History, in G.W.F. Hegel Werke in zwanzig Baenden [Works in Twenty Volumes], ed. Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Michel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), vol. 12, p. 417.
35. Jeremy Bentham, Book of Fallacies, in Works, ed. Bowring, 392-3.
36. Hegel, Werke, vol. 7, p. 238, corresponding to PR 126.
37. Hegel, Werke, vol. 7, p. 238, corresponding to PR 126.
38. Rph VI: 4:338, 16-22. Cf. PR 280, p. 218: "Love, the ethical moment in marriage, is, as love, a feeling for actual individuals in the present, not for an abstraction."
39. See PR 151; Rph III, 124, 21-8; Mark Tunick, "Are There Natural Rights? - Hegel's Break with Kant," in Hegel on the Modern World, ed. Ardis Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); and Tunick, Practices and Principles, chap. 2.
40. See PR 151; Rph III, 124, 21-8; Mark Tunick, "Are There Natural Rights? - Hegel's Break with Kant," in Hegel on the Modern World, ed. Ardis Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); and Tunick, Practices and Principles, chap. 2.
41. See PR 151; Rph III, 124, 21-8; Mark Tunick, "Are There Natural Rights? - Hegel's Break with Kant," in Hegel on the Modern World, ed. Ardis Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); and Tunick, Practices and Principles, chap. 2.
42. See PR 151; Rph III, 124, 21-8; Mark Tunick, "Are There Natural Rights? - Hegel's Break with Kant," in Hegel on the Modern World, ed. Ardis Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); and Tunick, Practices and Principles, chap. 2.
43. But not always. Hegel adheres to a principle of equality - all human beings are equally deserving of being free (as Hegel understands "free"). However, as we shall see, he opposes using the principle of equality as a basis of wealth distribution, and he does not regard all humans as having equal capacities.
44. PR 145, p. 190. Cf. PR 3 Rem; PR 261 Rem, p. 283: "the part should be considered only with reference to the whole"; and PR 211Z, p. 243: "right . . . must be a system in itself." Cf. Michael Hardimon, "The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social Philosophy," Philosophy and Public Affairs (spring 1992): 168: Hegel seeks to show that "the family, civil society, and the state formed a single coherent, intelligible system that promoted both individuality and community."
45. PR 145, p. 190. Cf. PR 3 Rem; PR 261 Rem, p. 283: "the part should be considered only with reference to the whole"; and PR 211Z, p. 243: "right . . . must be a system in itself." Cf. Michael Hardimon, "The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social Philosophy," Philosophy and Public Affairs (spring 1992): 168: Hegel seeks to show that "the family, civil society, and the state formed a single coherent, intelligible system that promoted both individuality and community."
46. PR 145, p. 190. Cf. PR 3 Rem; PR 261 Rem, p. 283: "the part should be considered only with reference to the whole"; and PR 211Z, p. 243: "right . . . must be a system in itself." Cf. Michael Hardimon, "The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social Philosophy," Philosophy and Public Affairs (spring 1992): 168: Hegel seeks to show that "the family, civil society, and the state formed a single coherent, intelligible system that promoted both individuality and community."
47. PR 145, p. 190. Cf. PR 3 Rem; PR 261 Rem, p. 283: "the part should be considered only with reference to the whole"; and PR 211Z, p. 243: "right . . . must be a system in itself." Cf. Michael Hardimon, "The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social Philosophy," Philosophy and Public Affairs (spring 1992): 168: Hegel seeks to show that "the family, civil society, and the state formed a single coherent, intelligible system that promoted both individuality and community."
48. PR 145, p. 190. Cf. PR 3 Rem; PR 261 Rem, p. 283: "the part should be considered only with reference to the whole"; and PR 211Z, p. 243: "right . . . must be a system in itself." Cf. Michael Hardimon, "The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social Philosophy," Philosophy and Public Affairs (spring 1992): 168: Hegel seeks to show that "the family, civil society, and the state formed a single coherent, intelligible system that promoted both individuality and community."
49. PR 270Z, p. 302, my emphasis; cf. PR 272, p. 305. Also, PR, Preface, p. 11 on "enduring."
50. PR 270Z, p. 302, my emphasis; cf. PR 272, p. 305. Also, PR, Preface, p. 11 on "enduring."
51. PR 270Z, p. 302, my emphasis; cf. PR 272, p. 305. Also, PR, Preface, p. 11 on "enduring."
52. Cf. Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 225.
53. Hegel, Werke, vol. 12 (Philosophy of History), 57.
54. Hegel, Reason in History, 24.
55. Ibid., 25, 27.
56. See Rph V, 3:227, 6-11: "slavery is wrong, but necessary for certain epochs, though it is an untrue appearance"; and PR 57 Rem on slavery being "absolutely unjust."
57. Ibid., 88.
58. I cannot take up here the highly charged controversy of whether Hegel thinks the modern state as depicted in Philosophy of Right is also the last system of ethical life we shall see, whether on his view there is an "end to history."
59. For a detailed account of Hegel's conception of freedom that fills out what can only briefly be sketched here, see Mark Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), chap. 3.
60. For a treatment of how Hegel develops an account of the purpose of the practice of legal punishment in order to explain certain features of the practice and criticize others, see ibid. For a discussion of his account of the institution of hereditary monarchy, see Mark Tunick, "Hegel's Justification of Hereditary Monarchy," History of Political Thought 12 (1991): 481-96.
61. Hegel, Reason in History, 36-7.
62. Examples of works that have challenged the nonliberal view of Hegel are Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Joaquim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and more recently, Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Alan Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy. Allen Wood does take up the question of justified disobedience briefly, and I discuss what he says below. 7
63. Examples of works that have challenged the nonliberal view of Hegel are Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Joaquim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and more recently, Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Alan Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy. Allen Wood does take up the question of justified disobedience briefly, and I discuss what he says below. 7
64. Examples of works that have challenged the nonliberal view of Hegel are Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Joaquim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and more recently, Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Alan Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy. Allen Wood does take up the question of justified disobedience briefly, and I discuss what he says below. 7
65. Examples of works that have challenged the nonliberal view of Hegel are Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Joaquim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and more recently, Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Alan Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy. Allen Wood does take up the question of justified disobedience briefly, and I discuss what he says below. 7
66. Examples of works that have challenged the nonliberal view of Hegel are Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Joaquim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and more recently, Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Alan Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy. Allen Wood does take up the question of justified disobedience briefly, and I discuss what he says below. 7
67. Examples of works that have challenged the nonliberal view of Hegel are Shlomo Avineri, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975); Joaquim Ritter, Hegel and the French Revolution, trans. Richard Dien Winfield (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982); and more recently, Steven B. Smith, Hegel's Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Alan Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy. Allen Wood does take up the question of justified disobedience briefly, and I discuss what he says below. 7
68. Carol Pateman, The Problem of Political Obligation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 104-5, 113.
69. Patrick Riley, Will and Political Legitimacy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 187.
70. See also Howard Williams, "Politics and Philosophy in Kant and Hegel," in Hegel's Critique of Kant, ed. Stephen Priest (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987): "to know how the citizens of a society ought to act the philosopher need do no more, in Hegel's view, than look closely at that society and the rules that govern it" (p. 200). See also the sources referred to in note 11, above.
71. PR 140 Rem, p. 175. Cf. PR 270 Rem, p. 301: "when [opinions] based on bad principles give themselves a universal existence which undermines actuality, the state must protect objective truth and the principles of ethical life."
72. PR 140 Rem, p. 175. Cf. PR 270 Rem, p. 301: "when [opinions] based on bad principles give themselves a universal existence which undermines actuality, the state must protect objective truth and the principles of ethical life."
73. PR 215Z, p. 247; cf. Rph V, 3:414-15; PR 107, 118, 132, 260Z.
74. PR 215Z, p. 247; cf. Rph V, 3:414-15; PR 107, 118, 132, 260Z.
75. PR 215Z, p. 247; cf. Rph V, 3:414-15; PR 107, 118, 132, 260Z.
76. Rph VI, 4:154, 12-21. Cf. PR 270 Rem., p. 295: "A state which is strong because its organization is fully developed . . . may . . . even tolerate communities whose religion does not recognize even their direct duties towards the state (although this naturally depends on the numbers concerned)." For an extensive discussion on the reliability of the lecture notes and on Hegel's reasons for not publishing all the views he espoused in his lectures, see Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy, chap. 1; see also Jacques D'Hondt, Hegel in His Time, trans. John Burbridge, Nelson Roland, and Judith Levasseur (Peterboroush, Ontario: Broadview, 1988); and Karl-Heinz Ilting, "Der exoterische und der esoterische Hegel ( 1824-1831)" [The Exoteric and Esoteric Hegel], Introduction to Rph IV, pp. 45-66.
77. Rph VI, 4:154, 12-21. Cf. PR 270 Rem., p. 295: "A state which is strong because its organization is fully developed . . . may . . . even tolerate communities whose religion does not recognize even their direct duties towards the state (although this naturally depends on the numbers concerned)." For an extensive discussion on the reliability of the lecture notes and on Hegel's reasons for not publishing all the views he espoused in his lectures, see Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy, chap. 1; see also Jacques D'Hondt, Hegel in His Time, trans. John Burbridge, Nelson Roland, and Judith Levasseur (Peterboroush, Ontario: Broadview, 1988); and Karl-Heinz Ilting, "Der exoterische und der esoterische Hegel ( 1824-1831)" [The Exoteric and Esoteric Hegel], Introduction to Rph IV, pp. 45-66.
78. Rph VI, 4:154, 12-21. Cf. PR 270 Rem., p. 295: "A state which is strong because its organization is fully developed . . . may . . . even tolerate communities whose religion does not recognize even their direct duties towards the state (although this naturally depends on the numbers concerned)." For an extensive discussion on the reliability of the lecture notes and on Hegel's reasons for not publishing all the views he espoused in his lectures, see Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy, chap. 1; see also Jacques D'Hondt, Hegel in His Time, trans. John Burbridge, Nelson Roland, and Judith Levasseur (Peterboroush, Ontario: Broadview, 1988); and Karl-Heinz Ilting, "Der exoterische und der esoterische Hegel ( 1824-1831)" [The Exoteric and Esoteric Hegel], Introduction to Rph IV, pp. 45-66.
79. Dieter Henrich, "Vernunft in Verwirklichung" [The Realisation of Reason], in Rph III, p. 20. "Recht zum Aufstand" is Henrich's term; it does not appear in the lecture notes.
80. See Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy, 117-8.
81. PR 265Z, p. 287.1 am reading "this satisfaction" narrowly, here, to refer to the satisfaction of welfare needs, but conceivably it can be construed more broadly.
82. Cf. PR 138Z, pp. 166-7: "only in ages when the actual world is a hollow, spiritless, and unsettled existence may the individual be permitted to flee from actuality and retreat into his inner life." See also Rph V, 3:573, 27-33: where there is misery (Elend), society is in the process of breaking apart.
83. Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, 105. Wood notes, however, that it is "positively inconsistent with Hegel's explicit account of legal obligation to maintain that we are obligated by right to obey unjust laws." His is one of the few statements acknowledging that Hegel in principle would be open to justified disobedience.
84. See Ludwig Siep, "Review of Hegels Heidelberger Rechtsphilosophie," Hegel-Studien 20 (1985): 291.
85. Hardimon, "The Project of Reconciliation," 183, 185.
86. See Tunick, Hegel's Political Philosophy, 116-8.
87. Philosophical anarchists argue that "we are not specially bound to obey our laws or to support our government simply because they are ours" - Simmons, Moral Principles, 194.