Uses and misuses of comparative law in International Human Rights: Some reflections on the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 73, Issue 5, 1998, Pages 1217-1237

  Carozza, Paolo G ^a  

^a NOTRE DAME LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 0032367683     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (70)

1. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 170 (1991).
2. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1981).
3. Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 23-24.
4. Id. at 21.
5. See ELIAS KASTANAS, UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ: NOTIONS AUTONOMES ET MARGE D'APPRÉCIATION DES ÉTATS DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 186-224, 306-22 (1996); HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 193-96 (1996).
6. See ELIAS KASTANAS, UNITÉ ET DIVERSITÉ: NOTIONS AUTONOMES ET MARGE D'APPRÉCIATION DES ÉTATS DANS LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA COUR EUROPÉENNE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 186-224, 306-22 (1996); HOWARD CHARLES YOUROW, THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 193-96 (1996).
7. Valerio Grementieri, Comparative Law and Human Rights in Europe, in EUROPEAN LEGAL TRADITIONS AND ISRAEL 369, 375 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello ed., 1994).
8. Admittedly, as I already noted, Glendon is concerned with evaluating the United States Supreme Court qua constitutional court, not the European Court qua international court. This essay thus does not present a criticism of Glendon's point, but merely takes it as a point of departure for some further reflections.
9. I deliberately avoid calling the Court's exercises either "comparative analysis" or "comparative method." As will be more apparent later on, there appears to be little analysis and even less method involved.
10. For example, Article 6(1) of the Convention provides, in part, that "everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law." Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 228 (1955) [hereinafter Convention].
11. See F. Matscher, Methods of Interpretation of the Convention, in THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 63, 70-73 (R. St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter EUROPEAN SYSTEM].
12. Id. at 68-70. The principles of autonomy and normative evolution may both appear entirely typical in a constitutional jurisprudence; it is as principles of interpreting an international treaty that they are rather bold, since both seem to imply the possibility of the development of normative obligations independent of the consent of any one of the Member States. Cf. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27, art. 31 (providing that treaties shall be interpreted "in accordance with the plain meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context," and defining "context" in static terms).
13. YOUROW, supra note 5, at 13. There is an extensive body of literature on the margin of appreciation doctrine, but this is without doubt the most comprehensive study in English to date.
14. R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, EUROPEAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 83.
15. See generally KASTANAS, supra note 5.
16. Olivier de Schutter, L'interprétation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de L'Homme: Un Essai en Démolition, 70 REVUE DE DROIT INT'L, DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES, POLITIQUES, & SOCIALES 83, 92 (1992).
17. The Article provides: 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. Convention, supra note 9, at art. 8.
18. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1979).
19. Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986).
20. Cossey v. United Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
21. Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15; Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
22. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15; cf. Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 16.
23. Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19; cf. Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17.
24. B. v. France, 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 49 (1992).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 53-54.
27. X, Y and Z. v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143 (1997). This time, Article 8 was implicated in its reference to family, not private life.
28. Id. at 151 (citing Rees, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), and Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)).
29. Among many others, see, e.g., Wingrove v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1996); Stjerna v. Sweden, 299-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994); Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, 264 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993); Open Door & Dublin Well Woman v. Ireland, 246 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988); F. v. Switzerland, 128 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1987); Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); James et al. v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); Abdulaziz v. United Kingdom, 94 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1985); Rasmussen v. Denmark, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1984); Albert & Le Compte v. Belgium, 58 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1983); Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979); Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976); National Union of Belgian Police v. Belgium, 19 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975); De Wilde, et al. v. The Netherlands, 12 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1971); Belgian Linguistics Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1968).
30. See Rudolf Bernhardt, The Convention and Domestic Law, in EUROPEAN SYSTEM, supra note 10, at 35.
31. See Cossey, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 27-29, 35-37 (Martens, J., dissenting).
32. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 603 (2d ed. 1995); KASTANAS, supra note 5, at 192, 196; YOUROW, supra note 5, at 195; Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 35; Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKRECHT 240, 284 (1996); Grementieri, supra note 6, at 375; Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 135 (1993); François Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
33. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 603 (2d ed. 1995); KASTANAS, supra note 5, at 192, 196; YOUROW, supra note 5, at 195; Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 35; Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKRECHT 240, 284 (1996); Grementieri, supra note 6, at 375; Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 135 (1993); François Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
34. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 603 (2d ed. 1995); KASTANAS, supra note 5, at 192, 196; YOUROW, supra note 5, at 195; Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 35; Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKRECHT 240, 284 (1996); Grementieri, supra note 6, at 375; Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 135 (1993); François Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
35. See P. VAN DIJK & G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 603 (2d ed. 1995); KASTANAS, supra note 5, at 192, 196; YOUROW, supra note 5, at 195; Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 35; Eva Brems, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in 56 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKRECHT 240, 284 (1996); Grementieri, supra note 6, at 375; Laurence R. Helfer, Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 133, 135 (1993); François Ost, The Original Canons of Interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 283, 305 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
36. See Bernhardt, supra note 29, at 35-36; Brems, supra note 31, at 284-85; Heifer, supra note 30, passim.
37. Cf. Macdonald, supra note 13, at 123 (nothing that margin of appreciation is a principle of justification rather than interpretation).
38. Convention, supra note 9, Preamble at 222-24.
39. Brems, supra note 31, at 276-77. See also W.J. Ganschof van der Meersch, Reliance, in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights, on the Domestic Law of the States, 1 HUM. RTS. L.J. 13, 15-16 (1980).
40. See, e.g., Grementieri, supra note 6, at 374.
41. See Ost, supra note 31, at 305-09.
42. Many of the provisions of the Convention are structured so that first a right is articulated in broad form, then permissible limitations on that right are set forth, one requirement of which is always that the limitations be "necessary in a democratic society." See, e.g., Convention, supra note 9, at 230 (covering Article 8).
43. Mireille Delmas-Marty, The Richness of Underlying Legal Reasoning, in THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION VERSUS NATIONAL RESTRICTIONS 319, 322 (Mireille Delmas-Marty ed., 1992).
44. Macdonald, supra note 13, at 123.
45. See Richard S. Kay, The European Human Rights System as a System of Law (1997) (unpublished paper on file with the author) (arguing that the operation of the European human rights system has now achieved acceptance among the Member States as a system of law requiring compliance).
46. Cf. Ost, supra note 31, at 305.
47. Even in this case, the assumption may be unwarranted. As Dinah Shelton has pointed out to me, even in seeking the "original intent" of human rights treaties it is more reasonable to conclude that the parties agreed to a higher international standard precisely out of a conviction that the internal laws of the contracting states had been insufficient to protect human rights adequately.
48. See Jeroen Schokkenbroek, Judicial Review by the European Court of Human Rights: Constitutionalism at European Level, in JUDICIAL CONTROL: COMPARATIVE ESSAYS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 153, 163 (Rob Bakker et al. eds., 1995) (describing the margin of appreciation doctrine as "an expression of a 'vertical' separation of powers between the European and the national levels").
49. The 40 Member States of the Council of Europe now include all European states except Belarus, Bosnia, Monaco, the Vatican, and Yugoslavia. See The 40 Member States of the Council of Europe (visited Mar. 27, 1998) 〈http://www.coe.fr/eng/std/ states.htm〉.
50. That the comparative approach to the margin of appreciation could result in a lowering or restriction of established standards is a commonly mentioned concern. See, e.g., Macdonald, supra note 13, at 123-24; de Schutter, supra note 15, at 88, but so far the case law of the Court has not resulted in any such cases.
51. Cf. Macdonald, supra note 13, at 124 (noting "the dangers of selective justification which pragmatism condones").
52. See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989).
53. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 57 (1996).
54. Macdonald, supra note 13, at 124.
55. See de Schutter, supra note 15, at 94.
56. See KASTANAS, supra note 5.
57. See id. at 186-224, 306-22.
58. Cf. de Schutter, supra note 15, at 88 (noting that the result of the Court's comparative interpretation "is always the product of a choice, and it is indeterminate in its consequences").
59. See Paolo G. Carozza, Continuity and Rupture in "New Approaches to Comparative Law," 1997 UTAH L. REV. 657.
60. Marie-Thérèse Meulders-Klein, Internationalisation des Droits de L'Homme et Évolution du Droit de la Famille: Un Voyage Sans Déstination?, in INTERNATIONALISATION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET L'ÉVOLUTION DU DROIT DE LA FAMILLE: ACTES DES JOURNÉES D'ÉTUDES DES 15 ET 16 DÉCEMBRE 1994, 179, 211 (1996).
61. See, e.g., David M. Smollin, Will International Human Rights Be Used as a Tool of Cultural Genocide? The Interaction of Human Rights Norms, Religion, Culture and Gender, 12 J.L. & RELIGION 143 (1995-96).
62. See MERRILLS, supra note 11, at 149 (noting that the European Court's differing applications of the margin of appreciation reflects "not so much an inconsistency in the Court's jurisprudence, as . . . that decisions about human rights are not a technical expertise in interpreting texts, but judgments about political morality"). Cf. Joseph H.H. Weiler, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the Protection of Human Rights, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 51 (Nanette A. Neuwahl & Allan Rosas eds., 1995). In discussing the European Union, Weiler notes that the particular balance of fundamental values and social goods that human rights represent in any given society is "an important aspect of the political culture and identity of societies . . . [and] a source of, and index for, cross-national differentiation." Id. at 54. He then advances an understanding of the European Union "as a polity with its own separate identity and constitutional sensibilities which has to define its own fundamental balances - its own core values." Id. at 66. At the same time, he would subject certain Member State measures to fundamental rights review only for conformity with that State's national standards, not the EU standards, on the grounds of respecting the variations in national identity represented by differing human rights standards. Weiler's analysis provides both support for and also a useful contrast to the problem that I discuss more generally. Neither the European Convention nor other international human rights regimes creates a constitutional polity comparable to the EU; accordingly, the aspects of national identity that a given balance of fundamental values represents are correspondingly wider and less justifiably constrained by supranational order.
63. Cf. Delmas-Marty, supra note 39, at 330-34 (describing the margin of appreciation doctrine in European human rights jurisprudence norms as creating a "heterogeneous space" where "the principle of identity . . . is replaced by the principle of proximity").
64. Cf. David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 545, 636-37. Kennedy describes the historical project of comparative law and its relationship to international law as participation in "the academy's broad ideological project to defend the integrity, autonomy, and pragmatic capacity of the international legal order to remain above the specifics of political dispute." He instead proposes that "[w]e might begin to unravel their work by reading global governance as a local culture." While I note above that a comparative approach to human rights would, in part, do exactly what he advocates, the difference is that my argument here also suggests that a simultaneous and complementary pursuit of more genuinely universal values is both inevitable and desirable.
65. For example, Philip Alston's collection of essays exploring the concept of "the best interests of the child" simultaneously suggests the desirability of universal aspirations and relativist conclusions about the transferability of uniform concepts between international and domestic law. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 1994). Similar tensions arise in Abdullahi An-Na'im's explorations of cross-cultural, and especially African and Islamic, approaches to universal human rights. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 1992); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29 (1997).
66. For example, Philip Alston's collection of essays exploring the concept of "the best interests of the child" simultaneously suggests the desirability of universal aspirations and relativist conclusions about the transferability of uniform concepts between international and domestic law. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 1994). Similar tensions arise in Abdullahi An-Na'im's explorations of cross-cultural, and especially African and Islamic, approaches to universal human rights. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 1992); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29 (1997).
67. For example, Philip Alston's collection of essays exploring the concept of "the best interests of the child" simultaneously suggests the desirability of universal aspirations and relativist conclusions about the transferability of uniform concepts between international and domestic law. THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Philip Alston ed., 1994). Similar tensions arise in Abdullahi An-Na'im's explorations of cross-cultural, and especially African and Islamic, approaches to universal human rights. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR CONSENSUS (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im ed., 1992); Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The Case of Freedom of Expression in African and Islamic Contexts, 11 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 29 (1997).
68. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 237-39 (1994) (describing the characteristics of legal reasoning as a form of dialectical reasoning).
69. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 5-7 (1987);
70. THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE LAWS OF PLATO (1980).